UWorld LLC v. USMLE Galaxy LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
UWORLD LLC f/k/a
USMLEWORLD LLC,
§
§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
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v. 	§ 	Civ. Action No. 3:23-CV-0447-K-BN
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USMLE GALAXY LLC d/b/a
ARCHER REVIEW and TART
LABS,
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§
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Defendants. 	§
ORDER ACCEPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On September 11, 2025, the United States Magistrate Judge entered his
Findings, 	Conclusions, 	and 	Recommendation 	(the 	“FCR”) 	(Doc. 	No. 	541) 	on
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 305) and Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 311). 	The FCR recommends this
Court grant in part and deny in part both Plaintiff’s Motion and Defendants’ Motion.
Defendants USMLE Galaxy LLC d/b/a Archer Review (“Archer Review”) and
Tart Labs (together, “Defendants”) filed Objections to the Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. No. 559). Plaintiff
UWorld LLC f/k/a USMLEWorld LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response (Doc. No. 578),
and Defendants thereafter filed a Reply in Support (Doc. No. 593).
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Plaintiff filed Objections to the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of
the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. No. 561), to which Defendants filed a
Response in Opposition (Doc. No. 576), and Plaintiff thereafter filed a Reply in
Support (Doc. No. 592).
The Court has reviewed the parties’ respective briefing, the FCR, the relevant
portions of the record, and the applicable law. 	The Court made a de novo review of
those 	portions 	of 	the 	FCR 	to 	which 	objections 	were 	made. 	See 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); FED . R. CIV. P. 72(b); United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1222
(5th Cir. 1989). 	The Court reviewed the other portions of the FCR for plain error.
Serrano v. Customs and Border Patrol, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 975 F.3d 488, 502
(5th Cir. 2020); see Wilson, 864 F.2d at 1221 (the district court appropriately “appl[ies]
the ‘clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion and contrary to law’ standard of review” only
to those portions of magistrate’s ruling for which there are no objections).
The Court found no error in those portions of the FCR to which no objection
was filed. On its de novo review of those portions of the FCR to which objections were
filed, the Court finds no basis to reject the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation as to
the following of Plaintiff’s claims—trade dress infringement, trade dress dilution, and
unfair competition under federal law, and trade dress dilution under Texas law;
violation of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”); violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (the “CFAA”); violation of the Texas Harmful Access
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by Computer Act (the “THACA”); and breach of contract. 	The Court likewise finds
no basis to reject the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations as to Defendant Archer
Review’s counterclaims for business disparagement and false advertising, and its
request for a permanent injunction. 	Finally, the Court finds no basis to reject the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	copyright 	infringement 	claims. 	Accordingly, 	the 	parties’
objections to the aforementioned portions of the FCR are OVERRULED and the
Court ACCEPTS those specific portions of the FCR.
However, the Court’s de novo review does not support accepting the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation to grant summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability on its
claims for direct and vicarious copyright infringement (Counts V and VI). 	For the
following reasons, Defendants’ Objection to this specific portion of the FCR is
SUSTAINED and the Court REJECTS said part of the FCR. “[A] plaintiff generally
must prove two elements to establish infringement: ‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright,
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.’” 	BWP Media
USA, Inc. v. T&S Software Assocs., Inc., 852 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). 	In direct-copyright-
infringement 	cases, 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	recently 	adopted 	“the 	volitional 	conduct
requirement.” 	BWP Media, 852 F.3d at 444; see id. at 439–442 (discussing the
“developing line of authority” that has approved the volitional conduct requirement
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since it “first came to the fore in 1995” and disagreeing with the suggestion that the
Supreme Court expressly rejected this requirement in American Broadcasting Companies
v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014)). In its attempt to define “volitional” in the context
of copyright infringement, the Fifth Circuit explained that, “[a]t the very least, the
[Copyright] Act ‘requires conduct by a person who causes in some meaningful way an
infringement.’” Id. at 440 n.1 (quoting CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544,
549 (4th Cir. 2004)); see CoStar, 373 F.3d at 440 (“There must be actual infringing
conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could
conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the
copyright owner.”).
In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff does not discuss, let
alone 	establish, the required 	volitional 	conduct 	element 	for 	its 	direct 	copyright
infringement claim against Defendants. 	See Doc. No. 305-1 at 26–30 (discussing
ownership of valid copyrights and factual copying and substantial similarity). 	If the
movant will have the burden of proof at trial, that party’s summary judgment “burden
is even higher; [it] ‘must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of
the claim.’” 	Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 160 (5th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986)). 	On this
summary judgment record, Plaintiff fails to establish beyond peradventure that Archer
Review and/or Tart Labs engaged in volitional conduct with respect to Plaintiff’s direct
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copyright infringement. For that reason, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment
as to liability on its direct copyright infringement claim. See F ED . R. CIV. P. 56(a) (court
may grant summary judgment only when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law”).
Plaintiff argues in the Objection briefing that Defendants waived this volitional
conduct argument by not raising it in their response to Plaintiff’s summary judgment
motion. Doc. No. 578 at 20-23. The case law is well-established on this point; Plaintiff
did not satisfy its initial summary judgment burden on its direct copyright infringement
claim so the burden never shifted to Defendants. See John v. State of La. (Bd. of Trs. for
State Colls. & Univs., 757 F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). 	“If the moving party fails to
meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s
response.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Lapolla Indus., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D. Tex.
2015), aff’d, 634 F. App’x 439 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Meecorp Cap. Mkts. LLC v. Tex-
Wave Indus. L.P., 265 F. App’x 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2008)). 	Plaintiff’s argument,
therefore, is unavailing.
The FCR also recommends the Court grant summary judgment to Plaintiff as to
Archer Review’s liability for Plaintiff’s vicarious copyright infringement claim. This
recommendation is premised on the recommendation as to liability for direct copyright
infringement. 	Because Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on Defendants’
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liability for direct copyright infringement, summary judgment as to Archer Review’s
liability for vicarious copyright infringement necessarily fails.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ objection to the
FCR’s recommendation that the Court grant summary judgment to Plaintiff as to
liability on its claims for direct and vicarious copyright infringement (Counts V and
VI). The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and the remaining objections from
Defendants.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED in its
entirety. 	Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. Specifically, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion as to
Plaintiff’s claims for (1) Injury to Business Reputation and Trade Dress Dilution (state
law), (2) Trade Dress Infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, (3) Trade Dress
Dilution 	under 	§ 43(a) 	of 	the 	Lanham 	Act, 	(4) 	Unfair 	Competition 	and 	False
Designation of Origin under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, (5) Direct and Vicarious
Copyright Infringement, (6) violations of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, (7)
violation of the Texas Harmful Access by Computer Act, (8) breach of contract, and
(9) tortious interference with prospective business relations. 	The Court grants
summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for (1) false advertising under
the Lanham Act (Count VIII against Archer Review), (2) business disparagement
(Count IX against Archer Review), and (3) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
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Act (Count X against both Defendants).
SO ORDERED.
Signed April 7 th, 2026.
_____________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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