Anthony v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
JOHN DENNIS CLAYTON ANTHONY, §
TDCJ-CID No. 01846242, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § 2:25-CV-194-Z-BR
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS and MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OUT OF TIME APPEAL
Petitioner John Dennis Clayton Anthony filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a Motion for Leave to File Out of Time Appeal. (ECF 4). Having
considered the petition, the motion, the record and applicable authorities, the Court concludes that
Anthony’s motion and his habeas petition should be DENIED for the reasons set forth below.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2009, Anthony pleaded guilty to a charge of aggravated sexual assault of a child younger
than fourteen years old in exchange for the state’s recommendation of deferred adjudication. See
Anthony v. State, 494 S.W.3d 106, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Accepting the plea agreement, the
trial court placed Anthony on an eight-year term of deferred-adjudication community supervision.
(Id.) In 2013, the state moved to adjudicate, alleging that Anthony violated the terms of his
community supervision. (Id.). The trial court found the violations true, found Anthony guilty, and
sentenced him to life imprisonment. (Id.).
On February 12, 2015, the Seventh Court of Appeals of Texas reversed the trial court’s
judgment based on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. See Anthony v. State, 457 S.W.3d
548, 553 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015). The court of appeals concluded that Anthony’s counsel
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was deficient for providing incorrect legal advice to Anthony on the range of punishment
applicable to the offense charged. Id. On June 15, 2016, however, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed the court of appeals, reformed the judgment as to the victim’s age, and reinstated
the trial court’s judgment as reformed. Anthony, 494 S.W.3d at 109. Anthony did not file a state
habeas application. (ECF 3 at 6).
Anthony filed this federal petition on August 15, 2025. (ECF 3 at 15); see Spotville v. Cain,
149 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1998) (a federal petition is deemed filed on the date it is placed in the
prison mail system). He also filed his Motion for Leave, asking the Court to allow him to file his
petition outside the one-year statute of limitations mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Title 28 U.S.C § 2244(d) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal petitions for
writs of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners:
(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitations period shall run from the latest of –
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State
action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
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other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitations under this
subsection. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2).
Anthony’s conviction became final on September 13, 2016, when the period for timely filing a
petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court expired. See Butler v. Cain, 533 F.3d
314, 317 (5th Cir. 2008) (“the conviction becomes final when the time for seeking further direct
review in the state court expires”); SUP. CT. R. 13.1 (a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a
judgment entered by a state court of last resort is timely when filed within 90 days after entry of
judgment). Consequently, the one-year period for Anthony to timely file a federal habeas petition
expired on September 13, 2017, absent tolling.1
Anthony appears to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period
because he was unaware of his right to seek federal habeas relief until he was informed by a fellow
prisoner. (ECF 4). A party seeking an extension of the statute of limitations on equitable grounds
has the burden of showing entitlement to such tolling. Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629
(5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner must show “(1) that
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
his way and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quotations
omitted). A petitioner must pursue the habeas process with “diligence and alacrity.” Phillips v.
Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000). Unexplained delays do not evince due diligence or
rare and extraordinary circumstances. Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1164 (2001). Equitable tolling applies principally when the petitioner is actively
misled by the government or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.
1Anthony does not allege that a state-created impediment prevented timely filing of his claims, nor does he
base his claims on any new constitutional right. Further, the facts supporting his claims became or could
have become known prior to the date the deferred adjudication order became final. Therefore, the provisions
of §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) do not change the accrual date for his claims.
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Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927,
930 (5th Cir. 2000).
First, the petitioner must demonstrate “reasonable diligence [in pursuing his rights], not
maximum feasible diligence.” Jackson v. Davis, 933 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010)). There is no temporal cut-off for diligence, but
“‘delays of the petitioner’s own making do not qualify’ for equitable tolling.” Clarke v. Rader, 721
F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2013). The failure to satisfy the statute of limitations must result from
factors beyond the petitioner’s control. In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 2006).
Anthony simply states that he was unaware of his right to pursue federal habeas relief until
another prisoner informed him. (ECF 4 at 1). While he seeks to raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims applicable to both his guilty plea and revocation of his deferred adjudication, such
claims are untimely as to both proceedings. Anthony has provided no evidence that he diligently
pursued his rights, and “ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally
does not excuse prompt filing.” Alexander, 294 F.3d at 629 (quoting Fisher, 174 F.3d at 714); see
also Sutton v. Cain, 722 F.3d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 2013) (“neither excusable neglect nor ignorance
of the law is sufficient to justify equitable tolling”). Similarly, neither proceeding pro se, nor a
deficient prison law library, nor lack of knowledge of filing deadlines constitutes a “rare and
exceptional circumstance” to justify equitable tolling. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170 (5th
Cir. 2000). For the reasons stated above, Anthony’s request for equitable tolling should be denied.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
An appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals from a final order in a proceeding
under Section 2254 “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of appealability may issue only if a petitioner has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In cases where a district
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court rejected constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Henry v. Cockrell, 327 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir.
2003). When a district court denies a motion on procedural grounds without reaching the
underlying constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue when the petitioner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id.
In this case, it is recommended that reasonable jurists could not debate the denial of
Anthony’s Section 2254 motion on procedural grounds, nor find that the issues presented are
adequate to proceed. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-37 (2003) (citing Slack, 529
U.S. at 484). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court find that Anthony is not entitled to a
certificate of appealability.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the United States Magistrate Judge recommends that
Anthony’s Motion for Leave be DENIED, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DENIED and
that a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.
V. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of these Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
ENTERED December 16, 2025.
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* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the
event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is
fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the
signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by
electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the
fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections
with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A
party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds
of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district
court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS
Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857
F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).
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