Howard v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
RONALD LEE HOWARD, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § 2:25-cv-34-Z-BR
§
DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF §
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is Petitioner Ronald Lee Howard’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF 1). For the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the Petition be DENIED.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 22, 2022, after a jury trial in the 222nd Judicial District Court of Deaf Smith
County, Texas, Howard was sentenced to 99 years of imprisonment on each of two counts of
aggravated sexual assault. (ECF 1 at 29).1 Howard filed a direct appeal, and the appellate court
affirmed his convictions on October 24, 2023. (Id. at 31-43; see also Howard v. State, No. 07-22-
323-CR, 2023 WL 7006282 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 24, 2023, pet. ref’d)). He then filed a
petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the petition was
refused on February 14, 2024. (ECF 1 at 45). He filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the writ was denied on October 7, 2024. (Id. at 46). He did not pursue state
1Page citations to the record refer to the electronic page number assigned by the Court’s electronic filing
system.
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habeas corpus relief. (Id. at 10). Howard timely filed his federal petition on February 14, 2025.
(ECF 1).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 authorizes a federal court to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment if the prisoner is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
However, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §
2254, a federal court may not grant relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the
state court proceeding unless the petitioner shows that the prior adjudication:
1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is considered contrary to clearly established federal law if the
state reaches a conclusion opposite to a decision of the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if
the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). An application of
clearly established federal law is considered unreasonable if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts. Id.
The role of federal courts in reviewing habeas corpus petitions by prisoners in state
custody is exceedingly narrow. When reviewing state proceedings, “federal courts do not sit as
courts of appeal and error for state court convictions.” Dillard v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 509, 513
(5th Cir. 1986). Instead, a person seeking federal habeas corpus review must assert a violation of
a federal constitutional right. Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993). Federal
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habeas corpus relief will not issue to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory, or procedural
law unless a federal issue also is present. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); West v.
Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1404 (5th Cir. 1996). This standard is “difficult to meet,” because it
requires the state prisoner to show that the state court’s ruling was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded
disagreement. Harrison v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011). The petitioner must show that
there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Id. at 98. The AEDPA standard is
met only in cases in which there is no possibility that a fair-minded jurist could disagree that the
state court’s decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 86.
Deference to the state court’s ruling applies even when the state court decides an issue
without fully explaining its reasoning. See Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir.
2003); accord Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[D]eference
due under § 2254(d)(1) is not diminished by the fact that the [state court] did not explain the
reasons for its determination[.]”). This is because “a federal habeas court only reviews the
reasonableness of the state court’s ultimate decision,” “not the written opinion explaining that
decision.” Schaetzle, 343 F.3d at 443 (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (per curiam)). Thus, in reviewing a state court opinion, this Court focuses on “the
ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not on whether the state court considered
and discussed every angle of the evidence.” Neal, 286 F.3d at 246.
When applicable, the state court’s findings of fact “are ‘presumed to be correct’ unless the
habeas petitioner rebuts the presumption through ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Nelson v.
Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). This
presumption extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings as well. See
Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). In determining
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whether the state court decision was unreasonable, this Court must be careful not to substitute its
judgment for that of the state court. In other words, a determination that the state court reached
the wrong result or that the state court decision was incorrect, is insufficient. Denial of relief by
the state court based on a factual determination will not be overturned by a federal habeas court
unless the state court’s decision is objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in
the state court proceeding. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Howard argues that his federal due process rights were violated when the Seventh Court
of Appeals for the State of Texas affirmed his conviction and sentence “without addressing and
ruling on the merits of each non-frivolous issue raised.” (ECF 1 at 10). He seeks relief under
Section 2254(d)(1), alleging that the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that …
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.” (Id.). Specifically, he
claims that the state appellate court unreasonably refused to extend federal precedent “to a new
context where it should apply.” See Fratta v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 485, 502 (5th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407).
A. Factual Background.
The state appellate court summarized the facts of his case as follows:
Appellant [Howard], a local farmer and former truck driver, and the complainant,
an intellectually disabled nineteen-year-old, have known each other since the
complainant was a toddler. They became familiar with each other through
Appellant’s stepdaughter, who was in special education classes with the
complainant. After not seeing each other for many years, they met in a chance
encounter at a Walmart. Appellant extended an invitation to the complainant and
her nine-year-old sister to visit his farm and spend the night which they accepted.
In the middle of the night, Appellant engaged in sex with the complainant. During
interviews with investigators, Appellant claimed the encounter was consensual.
The complainant maintained it was nonconsensual. Appellant was charged with
two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a disabled person based upon the
complainant’s statements he performed both vaginal and oral sex with her.
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At trial, the jury heard testimony from several people who knew the complainant
and her diminished mental capacity establishing she was a “disabled individual.”
The jury also heard from the complainant and her sister regarding the events of the
evening in Appellant’s home. Complainant maintained at trial she did not consent
to the sexual contact. Appellant testified in his defense and stated the encounter
was consensual. At the end of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of two counts
of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced him to 99 years in prison for each
count. This appeal followed.
Howard v. State, 2023 WL 7006282, at *1.
B. Howard’s Grounds for Requested Habeas Relief.
Howard’s state appeals turned on the scienter requirement in the statutes under which he
was convicted. Texas courts distinguish offenses into three different categories, based on the
offense-defining statute’s focus: “result of conduct,” “nature of conduct,” or “circumstances of
conduct” offenses. “Result-of-conduct offenses concern the product of certain conduct. Nature-
of-conduct offenses are defined by the act or conduct that is punished, regardless of any result
that might occur. Lastly, circumstances-of-conduct offenses prohibit otherwise innocent behavior
that becomes criminal only under specific circumstances.” Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166,
170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
Howard contends that his offense of conviction, aggravated sexual assault, is a “nature of
conduct” offense and, as such, he believes that the state must prove a defendant’s knowledge of
both the underlying criminal action and the aggravating factor. He claims that the state should be
required to show not only that he “intentionally or knowingly” performed the sexual act, but also
that he had knowledge of the aggravating factor, i.e., that the victim was disabled. (ECF 1 at 13).
Texas Penal Code § 6.03(b) (“Definitions of Culpable Mental States”) explains that
[a] person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the
nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly,
or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
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(emphasis added). Texas courts, including Seventh Court of Appeals in Howard’s direct appeal,
agree that aggravated sexual assault is a “nature of conduct” crime. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d
847, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see also Nuttall v. State, No. 07-22-256-CR, 2023 WL 5424301
*2 (Tex. App.–Amarillo, August 23, 2023, no pet.) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals has
explicitly stated aggravated sexual assault is a ‘nature-of-conduct’ statute” (citing Gonzales v.
State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)); Howard, 2023 WL at *4. Howard alleges
that knowledge of the victim’s disability is a “nature of conduct” factor that must be proven. He
calls this position “common sense,” stating that “a person can scarcely be convicted of a nature-
of-conduct offense – requiring awareness ‘of the nature of his conduct’ under § 6.03(b) – without
knowing its full nature.” (ECF 1 at 23) (emphasis in original).
Howard raised four issues on appeal, but contends that the appellate court failed to address
the following issue, thereby violating his federal right of due process:
The statute regarding aggravated sexual assault of a disabled person has no explicit
scienter requirement regarding the disability. Yet case law concludes that this is a
nature-of-conduct offense – one in which the culpable mental state applies to each
of the offense’s essential elements, of which the complainant’s disability is one.
Does a guilty verdict require proof that the defendant knew of the complainant’s
disability?
(Id. at 16). Howard claims that the state appellate court, by ignoring this appellate point, “failed
to resolve the conflict” of whether the state had to prove that Howard knew the victim was
disabled. (ECF 7 at 3). This failure, Howard alleges, deprives him of federal due process. He asks
the Court to grant him a new state appeal so that the appellate court may specifically address the
issue it purportedly ignored. (Id.).
The federal law to which he refers is Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985), which
holds that, when a state permits an appeal of right, “the procedures used in deciding appeals must
comport with the demands of the Due Process” Clause. 469 U.S. at 393 (citing Griffin v. Illinois,
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351 U.S.12, 18-19 (1955). Howard claims he was denied a true appeal of right because the state
court of appeals “refused even to contemplate the first and most critically dispositive and non-
frivolous issue he raised. When such issues are raised but their merits are not addressed, the right
to appeal is meaningless.” (ECF 1 at 25). He argues that, under Griffin and Evitts, the federal due
process guarantee should be extended under Section 2254(d)(1) “to require the reviewing court
to analyze and render a decision on the merits of each non-frivolous issue the appellant raises.”
(Id. at 26).
C. Howard Was Not Deprived of Federal Due Process.
Assuming the truth of Howard’s assertion that a state appellate court must, under federal
due process standards, review and render a decision on the merits of each non-frivolous issue the
appellant raises, Howard cannot show that such right was violated here. His appellate point—
which he contends was completely ignored by the Seventh Court of Appeals—asks “Does a guilty
verdict require proof that the defendant knew of the complainant’s disability?” (ECF 1 at 16). The
appellate court expressly addressed this issue.
Issue One—Scienter of the Aggravating Element
Appellant argues in his first issue there is insufficient evidence supporting his
conviction for aggravated sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Particularly,
he argues, under the statute, the aggravating element of the offense in this case—
“victim is [a] disabled individual”—requires proof of scienter, i.e., the knowledge
the complainant was a disabled person at the time of the offense. See §
22.021(a)(2)(C). Because the State failed to introduce such evidence, he urges,
aggravated sexual assault was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
judgment should be reformed to the lesser included offense of sexual assault.
* * *
[T]he only issue before us is one of statutory interpretation: whether the Legislature
intended scienter as a requirement for the aggravating elements of the offense of
aggravated sexual assault.
When interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute’s literal text, and “we read
words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar
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and usage.” Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citations
omitted, quotations original). We must “presume that every word in a statute has
been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be
given effect if reasonably possible.” Id. (quotations original). Only if the statutory
language is ambiguous or leads to absurd results that the Texas Legislature could
not have possibly intended may we consult extra-textual sources. Id. Using these
principles, we are tasked with analyzing the following language from the statute
applicable to this matter:
[ ] A person commits an offense (1) if the person[ ] intentionally or
knowingly: (i) causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of
another person by any means, without that person’s consent; [or]
causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by the sexual
organ of the actor, without that person’s consent;[ ] and (2) if[ ] the
victim is an elderly individual or a disabled individual.
§ 22.021(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
Our plain reading of the statute finds two separate clauses: (1) the act of
nonconsensual penetration, which must be done intentionally or knowingly; and (2)
the aggravating factors based on the harm caused to the victim or the status of the
victim as a child, elderly person, or, relevant here, a disabled person. It is clear the
“intentionally or knowingly” requirement applies only to section 22.021(a)(1) of
the statute concerning the act of “penetration,” and is separated from the second
part, section 22.021(a)(2), concerning the aggravating factor of the status of the
victim. The use of the word “and” after section 22.021(a)(1) also signals the
beginning of a new clause under section 22.021(a)(2), in which there is no mens
rea requirement. “[T]his prescription of a mental state as to one element and not as
to others sufficiently demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to dispense with a mental
state as to those other elements.” Rodriguez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018) (quoting White v. State, 509 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017)). Because they specifically placed the “intentionally and knowingly”
language within section 22.021(a)(1) and neglected to do so in 22.021(a)(2), we
conclude the Legislature did not intend for the aggravating factors of the offense to
require proof of scienter.
Appellant would have us read into the statute a scienter requirement based on the
legislative history of the statute and our own decisions which, up to now, have not
expressly excluded a scienter requirement for the aggravating factors of the offense.
We decline to do so. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
Howard, 2023 WL 7006282, at *2-4. The state appellate court directly addressed Howard’s
argument. The court conducted a statutory analysis and concluded that “the Legislature did not
intend for the aggravating factors of the offense to require proof of scienter.” Id. at *3. The fact
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that the appellate court did not specifically refer to aggravated sexual assault as a “nature of
conduct” crime in its discussion does not change the fact that the court conducted the very analysis
Howard was seeking.
Howard apparently takes issue with the fact that the appellate court conducted its analysis
under Section 22.021(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(C) rather than Section 6.03(b). He claims the state court
undertook its analysis “without the implications of the designation of the offense as nature-of-
conduct requiring scienter of all elements and aggravating factors, which is another question
entirely.” (ECF 1 at 17). His appellate point did not ask the state court to analyze Section 6.03, so
the appellate court did not err in conducting the analysis under Section 22.021(a), the more
specific statute applicable to Howard’s convictions. See generally RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC
v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“A well[-]established canon of statutory
interpretation succinctly captures the problem: ‘[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction
that the specific governs the general.’”)(quoting Morales v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
374 (1992)); In re Prescription Home Health Care, Inc., 316 F.3d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 2002) (“First,
it is well established that a more specific statute controls over a more general one.”);
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d. 887 (Tex. 2000) (“This conclusion is
consistent with the traditional statutory construction principle that the more specific statute
controls over the more general.”).2
Howard has failed to show a violation of federal due process, or that “the state court’s
ruling was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood in existing law
2In addition, other Texas courts addressing whether scienter is required for an aggravating element agree
with the appellate court here. See, e.g., Mejia v. State, No. 14-96-1470-CR, 1999 WL 976533 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 28, 1999) (“A culpable mental state to the aggravating circumstance of injury is
not necessary to elevate the offense.”); Woods v. State, 488 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet.
ref’d) (“It is simply an aggravating element for which scienter is not required.”); Taylor v. State, 632
S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref’d) (A culpable mental state “is required in the allegation
of the primary offense, but is not necessary with reference to the aggravating circumstance.”).
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beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Harrison, 562 U.S. at 102-03.
Accordingly, his petition should be DENIED.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
An appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals from a final order in a proceeding
under § 2254 “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of appealability may issue only if a petitioner has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In cases where a district
court rejected constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Henry v. Cockrell, 327 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir.
2003). When a district court denies a motion on procedural grounds without reaching the
underlying constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue when the petitioner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id.
In this case, it is recommended that reasonable jurists could not debate the denial of
Howard’s Section 2254 motion on procedural grounds, nor find that the issues presented are
adequate to proceed. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336-37 (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 484).
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court find that Howard is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the United States Magistrate Judge recommends that
Howard’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DENIED and that a Certificate of Appealability
be DENIED with prejudice.
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V. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of these Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
ENTERED March 31, 2026.
* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In
the event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections
is fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the
signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by
electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the
fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections
with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A
party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds
of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district
court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS
Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857
F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).
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