Mosquera v. Layland et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION
NICHOLAS DAVID MOSQUERA,
Institutional ID No. 02377827
Plaintiff,
v.
AMANDA LAYLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 1:24-CV-00061-BU
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff NICHOLAS DAVID MOSQUERA, an inmate at the TDCJ Allred Unit,
brings this action against Defendants Amanda Layland and Jaime McGowan (collectively,
“the Defendants”), alleging that they violated his constitutional rights.1 Mosquera’s claims
are subject to judicial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A because Mosquera has
been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 22, and he sues government
officials, see Dkt. No. 20.
For the reasons below, the Court should order Layland to file an answer, motion, or
other responsive pleading to Mosquera’s Fourteenth Amendment right-of-access-to-courts
claim in connection with his criminal appeal. The Court should dismiss all remaining
1 Although Mosquera initially named as defendants FNU Lovelady and FNU McGowen, the Court was able
to presumptively identify these defendants through Mosquera’s filings and the authenticated records Law
Librarian Amanda Layland and Sergeant Jaime McGowan. The Clerk is directed to conform the docket
accordingly.
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claims.
I. JURISDICTION
Mosquera brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing the Court with sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. No. 20. Venue is proper in the North-
ern District of Texas, Abilene Division, because Mosquera’s claims arise from his incar-
ceration at the TDCJ Robertson Unit located in Jones County, Texas. Dkt. No. 29; 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The undersigned has the authority to enter these Findings, Conclu-
sions, and Recommendations after Senior United States District Court Judge Sam R. Cum-
mings transferred Mosquera’s case to the undersigned for preliminary screening.2 Dkt. No.
24; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Mosquera has not consented to the undersigned exercising the
full jurisdiction of this Court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of screening a plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
or 1915A, a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them
in a way that most favor the plaintiff. Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d
415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017). A court may look to the plaintiff’s allegations in their complaint,
responses to a questionnaire, authenticated prison or jail records, and testimony provided
at a Spears hearing. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Banue-
los v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts may consider au-
thenticated medical and prison records).
2 Mosquera’s cases was later reassigned to United States District Judge James Wesley Hendrix. See Special
Order No. 3–355.
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Mosquera alleges two constitutional violations he suffered while at Robertson Unit.
First, he alleges that Layland denied him his right to access the courts by withholding legal
materials and indigent supplies. Second, he alleges that McGowan used excessive force
against him when moving him to a different cell.
A. Access to Courts Allegations
Mosquera first alleges that Layland continually delayed and interfered with his right
to access the courts by refusing to provide materials he needed to overturn his wrongful
conviction. Dkt. No. 20 at 4. From September 2023 to May 2024, Mosquera filed multiple
material request forms that Layland denied. Id. at 4; Dkt. No. 29 at 3. The authenticated
prison records indicate that the materials commonly requested through these forms include
paper, pens, business envelopes, and writ envelopes. These requests were denied despite
indicating that he needed the materials to deal with his conviction, his appeals, and his
habeas petitions. Id.
Mosquera needed legal materials to manage multiple court cases. First, Mosquera
appealed a January 2022 criminal conviction he received in Montgomery County. Id. Sec-
ond, Mosquera filed a habeas petition seeking post-conviction relief for the same case. Id.
Third, Mosquera sought to contest a child support lien filed against him in Harris County.
Id. Lastly, Mosquera sought to file an additional, unspecified “potential claim” which he
desired to investigate or appeal. Id.
As a result of Layland denying him legal materials, Mosquera alleges that he was
prevented from filing a motion for rehearing and petition for discretionary review in his
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criminal appeal.3 Id. Mosquera also alleges that because he was unable to study family law,
the child support lien against him was foreclosed on. Id.
B. Excessive Force Allegations
Mosquera also alleges that Defendant McGowan used excessive force against him
on or around November 19, 2023.4 Id. at 1. Mosquera alleges that McGowan sprayed him
with chemical agent despite Mosquera complying with his instructions.5 Dkt. No. 20 at 3–
4. Mosquera was sprayed during a strip search being supervised by McGowan; despite
Mosquera complying with the instructions given, McGowan sprayed him two or three
times. Dkt. No. 29 at 1–2. He claims that there was no reason for the strip-out procedure,
and it was instead used as a pretext to claim he wasn’t following orders and use force
against him.6 Id. at 2.
As a result of the use of force, Mosquera suffered skin irritation, along with emo-
tional distress and mental anguish. Id. Mosquera alleges that he requested medical treat-
ment after being sprayed, but was not provided a medical assessment or treatment.7 Id.
3 The authenticated prison records contain grievance reports in which Mosquera complains that, because he
was denied writing materials, he missed the 15-day deadline to file a motion for rehearing in his appeals
case.
4 The prison records show the incident occurred on November 13, 2023.
5 In his questionnaire responses, Mosquera suggests that he never said McGowan was the one who sprayed
him, and instead claims that McGowan stood by and watched others use bear spray on him. Dkt. No. 29 at
1. Nonetheless, the video footage found in the prison records shows that it was McGowan who sprayed
Mosquera.
6 According to the video recording and prison records, the strip-out occurred because Mosquera refused a
cell reassignment, and threatened to kill himself if he was forced to move. Mosquera is not visible for most
of the video recording; he is first sprayed when he allegedly refused to spread his buttocks during the strip
search. The second and third sprays occurred after Mosquera barricaded the door with his mattress, an act
which was visible on camera.
7 The video recording indicates that, after he was moved to a new holding cell, a medical officer asked
Mosquera if he had any injuries. Mosquera initially refused to answer the questions, but eventually replied
that he couldn’t see and that his chest hurt; it was then explained that those were the result of the chemical
agent. Mosquera was also given decontamination instructions.
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III. THE PARTIES
Mosquera brings claims against two defendants: (1) Amanda Layland, the law li-
brary supervisor at the Robertson Unit; and (2) Sergeant Jaime McGowen, a correctional
officer. Dkt. No. 20 at 3. Liberally construing Mosquera’s pleadings, he has alleged the
following claims against the defendants: (1) an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim
based on McGowan’s unprovoked use of chemical agent, and (2) a Fourteenth Amendment
access to courts claim based on Layland’s failure to provide materials he needed to make
court filings.
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis or filed by a prisoner
against a government entity or employee if the court determines the complaint is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B);
1915A(b) (applying section to any suit by a prisoner against certain governmental entities,
regardless of whether the prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis).
A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable basis, either in fact or in law, for the wrong
alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis
in fact if it rests upon clearly baseless factual contentions, and similarly, it lacks an arguable
basis in law if it contains indisputably meritless legal theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v.
Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim—whether under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Sec-
tion 1915A(b)(1), or Rule 12(b)(6)—“turns on the sufficiency of the ‘factual allegations’
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in the complaint.” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App’x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam)). Thus, if
a plaintiff “plead[s] facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle
them to relief, the claims should not be dismissed merely because the plaintiff fails to ar-
ticulate the proper legal theory that otherwise makes those facts actionable in court. John-
son, 574 U.S. at 11–12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3), (d)(1), (e)).
Courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). This means the factual allegations, while not
required to be detailed, must amount to more than mere labels, conclusions, or a statement
of the legal elements of a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469.
For claims to be substantively plausible, a plaintiff need not establish that the
pleaded facts probably occurred as alleged, but the facts must allow the court “to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc.,
634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–679). Even pro se plain-
tiffs must plead facts that raise the right to relief above a speculative level. Chhim, 836 F.3d
at 469 (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)). And
when plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
When evaluating a complaint under these standards, courts liberally construe the
pleadings of pro se plaintiffs, holding their complaints to “less stringent standards than
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formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). But
“liberal construction does not require that the Court . . . create causes of action where there
are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8
(N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013). “To demand otherwise would require the ‘courts to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff’” and would “‘transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.’” Jones v. Mangrum,
No. 3:16-cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Ultimately, “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experi-
ence and common sense.’” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d
890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
V. ANALYSIS
To state a claim under § 1983, Mosquera must plausibly “allege facts showing that
a person, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity
secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Bryant v. Mil.
Dept. of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 2010). A convicted prisoner’s rights “spring
from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment” and, in ex-
treme situations, the substantive due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hare
v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
Here, Mosquera brings both a Fourteenth Amendment access to courts claim and an
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Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Below, the undersigned examines each in turn
to determine if Mosquera has plausibly alleged a constitutional violation.
A. Access to Courts Claim
Mosquera first alleges that Layland deprived him of his right to access the courts by
denying him law library resources. Prisoners have a constitutionally recognized right to
access the courts. 	Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, failure to provide legal materials through a prison library may violate a pris-
oner’s right to access the courts. Id. at 828. However, access to a law library or legal ma-
terials is not a freestanding right, but instead a component of the right to due process; thus,
this right “encompasses only ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal
claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement.’” Johnson v. Rodriguez,
110 F.3d 299, 310–11 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996)).
To bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on access to the courts, a prisoner
must show that they suffered actual injury. In this context, actual injury requires a showing
of “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability
to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. In addition, the
“injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim[;]” it must
arise specifically from (1) a direct appeal of his criminal conviction, (2) a habeas petition,
or (3) a civil rights action under § 1983. Id. at 354‒55.
Here, Mosquera alleges that Layland’s refusal to provide legal materials affected
three ongoing cases he was litigating: a criminal appeal arising from an allegedly wrongful
conviction, a habeas claim contesting his imprisonment for the same conviction, and his
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efforts to challenge foreclosure on a child support lien. Dkt. No. 29 at 3. Mosquera also
alleges that he sought to investigate a potential additional claim or appeal. Id. Under Lewis,
his efforts to pursue a criminal appeal or habeas relief in his criminal conviction could
potentially support a finding of actual injury; the same is potentially true of his anticipated
claim, although he does not specify its subject matter. Conversely, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to access the courts does not encompass unrelated family law claims; thus, his
child support lien cannot support a showing of actual injury.8
Of the potentially valid claims, Mosquera has alleged two instances in which it is
plausible that he suffered actual prejudice; he alleges that he was prevented from filing a
motion for rehearing and a petition for discretionary review in his criminal appeal. Id. Mos-
quera’s pleadings do not specify the prejudice he suffered in either instance, one of the
grievances in the authenticated records does; there, he states that he missed the 15-day
deadline to file for rehearing because the law library withheld requested writing materials.9
This is sufficient to plausibly allege actual prejudice in a valid criminal appeal. Neither
Mosquera’s filings nor the authenticated prison record include any allegations that he was
unable to request habeas relief or missed any deadlines for the additional claim he sought
to pursue; thus, the undersigned concludes there has been no plausible allegation of actual
prejudice as to those claims.
8 Notably, Mosquera also alleges that he was unable to contest foreclosure of the lien due to being denied
study materials on family law. Dkt. No. 29 at 3. Because the child support lien is not alleged to be related
to his criminal conviction or a § 1983 claim, whatever harm he suffered as a result of the foreclosure is
irrelevant to his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
9 In a grievance, Mosquera complains that he missed the fifteen-day deadline to file for rehearing because
he was not given the writing materials he requested.
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For the reasons above, the undersigned concludes that Mosquera has plausibly al-
leged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to access the courts because he plau-
sibly suffered actual prejudice in his criminal appeal; however, Mosquera has not plausibly
alleged a violation arising from his habeas claims, child support lien, or efforts to pursue
an additional claim.
B. Excessive Force Claim
Mosquera also alleges that McGowan used excessive force against him when spray-
ing him with chemical agent. When evaluating the constitutionality of a prison official’s
use of force, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Byrd
v. Harrell, 48 F.4th 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7
(1992). The subjective intent of such an official is assessed “by reference to the well-known
Hudson factors.” Byrd, 48 F.4th at 347 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d
444, 452–53 (5th Cir. 2016)).
The five non-exhaustive Hudson factors include: “(1) the extent of the injury suf-
fered, (2) the need for the application of force, (3) the relationship between that need and
the amount of force used, (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,
and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Bourne v. Gunnels,
921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). While it is theoretically possible for one
factor to “overshadow the others” such that it is dispositive, this is rarely the case. Martin
v. Seal, 510 F. App’x 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In particular, there is no re-
quirement that a prisoner suffer significant injury; the assessment turns on the nature of the
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force, rather than the extent of the injury. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010).
However, the Eighth Amendment does not apply to “de minimis uses of physical
force,” unless it is “of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9–10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1991)). Various Fifth Circuit cases
have determined that chemical sprays and analogous uses of force are de minimis, absent
exacerbating factors. See Thomas v. Comstock, 222 F. App'x 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2007) (stat-
ing that chemical spray is a de minimis use of force where officer ensured both the level of
force and any injury to the inmate were minimal); Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699,
700 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that use of fire extinguisher on prison inmate after fire was
extinguished was de minimis force).
Based on Mosquera’s allegations, the undersigned concludes that he has failed to
plausibly allege that the force used against him was more than de minimis. As noted above,
the Fifth Circuit generally considers the use of chemical spray de minimis; neither Mos-
quera’s factual allegations nor the use-of-force video indicate any exacerbating factors—
such as spraying directly in Mosquera’s face, extended spraying, lack of warning before
spraying so Mosquera could cover his face, or knowledge that Mosquera suffered from a
relevant medical condition—that would justify a departure from this general rule.
The only allegation that potentially suggests McGowan had a malicious or sadistic
intent is Mosquera’s assertion that he requested medical treatment after being sprayed, but
was not provided a medical assessment or treatment. Dkt. No. 29 at 2. But the video shows
that after Mosquera was moved to a new holding cell, a medical officer examined him and
asked if he had any injuries. Mosquera initially refused to answer the medical officer’s
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questions, but eventually said he could not see, and his chest hurt. Mosquera was given
decontamination instructions, and he has not alleged that these instructions were ineffective
or that the conditions persisted. The only other injuries Mosquera claims from the chemical
agent are skin irritation, emotional distress, and mental anguish. Id.
For these reasons, the undersigned finds that Mosquera has failed to plausibly allege
that the force used against him anything other than de minimis.
Because McGowan’s use of force was de minimis, there is no constitutional viola-
tion unless the use of force was also repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Prior prece-
dent sets a high bar for repugnancy. In the Fifth Circuit, the use of chemical spray is not
repugnant when used on noncompliant prisoners and the prisoners are given medical treat-
ment afterwards. Thomas, 222 F. App'x at 442; see also Clemmons v. Greggs, 509 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1975) (gas canister permissible to subdue unruly prisoners).
Mosquera alleges that he was sprayed despite being compliant with the officers’
directions. He does not dispute the accuracy of the video. Per the video, the first dispersal
of chemical agent occurs only after officers verbally attempt, for at least four minutes, to
gain Mosquera’s compliance with strip search procedures. This first dispersal lasts two or
three seconds. The second dispersal does not occur until another six minutes passes while
officers continue trying to obtain Mosquera’s compliance, only to be met with him blocking
the cell door with his mattress. This second dispersal also lasts only two or three seconds.
The third and last dispersal, lasting approximately five seconds, occurs after officers try for
another eight minutes without success to gain Mosquera’s compliance. Throughout this 18-
minute span of time, officers repeatedly warn Mosquera that chemical agents will be
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dispersed if he does not comply and, ultimately, that a five-man team will be assembled to
remove him from his cell if necessary. The five-man team eventually had to remove Mos-
quera from his cell.
Mosquera asks this Court to find it plausible that he was fully compliant this entire
time and that the officers, including McGown, made statements on the video that Mosquera
was not complying “[a]s a pretext to use to say I refused to comply with orders[.]” Dkt.
No. 29 at 2. First of all, Mosquera’s theories or subjective beliefs about why the officers
made the statements they indisputably made are not well-pleaded facts which this Court is
required to accept as true. Second, any inference that the officers here staged this lengthy
standoff with Mosquera for nefarious purposes—a standoff consisting of at least four of-
ficers trying for at least 18 minutes to persuade Mosquera to comply, followed by the as-
sembly and deployment of a five-man removal team—is not only an unreasonable infer-
ence, but one that would require this Court to abandon its common sense.10
To be clear, this is not a question of the Court accepting the officers’ version of
events over Mosquera’s version. That is neither done here nor necessary. This is simply a
matter of Mosquera’s version of events resting on nothing more than his subjective beliefs
that he was complying with the officers and that the officers’ statements that he was not
were nothing but a pretext to escalate the force being used against him.
Subjective beliefs aside, Mosquera’s alleged facts are thin and of little help to him.
10 Ultimately, “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc. , 920 F.3d at 899 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
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Mosquera’s sprayed-while-compliant allegations are largely conclusory, supported by few,
if any, facts. The totality of his allegations are that (1) McGowan “spray[ed] me with bear
spray despite me complying” and (2) McGowan “falsely claimed that I failed to obey his
order to strip to justify his use of force” Dkt. No. 20 at 3–4. The Court’s questionnaire
attempted to flesh out specific facts underlying this claim by asking Mosquera, “What were
you doing immediately before McGowen sprayed you?” But in response, Mosquera simply
reiterates that he was “complying with the orders given by officers.” Dkt. No. 29 at 1–2.
Otherwise, Mosquera fails to explain factually what he or the officers were doing and say-
ing.
Moreover, the question of compliance is often a matter more of opinion than of fact.
Only well-pleaded facts are accepted by the Court as true, not conclusions couched as fact.
And when the paucity of facts to support Mosquera’s compliance is considered in light of
the video, it is difficult for the Court to reasonably draw the inference that Mosquera was
plausibly complying.
Finally, even if the Court reaches the Hudson factors, that analysis does not plausi-
bly support that McGowan sprayed Mosquera maliciously or sadistically. First, Mosquera’s
alleged injuries were de minimis.11 Second, the video directly rebuts any allegation that
there was no need for the application of force. Third, the allegations fail to plausibly sup-
port 	that 	the 	relationship 	between 	that 	need 	and 	the 	amount 	of 	force 	used 	was
11 The Fifth Circuit has held that the expected effects of being pepper sprayed constitute a de minimis injury.
See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Unknown Lieutenant, No. 02-10072, 2002 WL 31017404 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that an inmate's “burning eyes and skin for approximately 24 hours, twitching of his eyes, blurred vision,
irritation of his nose and throat, blistering of his skin, rapid heartbeat, mental anguish, shock and fear as a
result of the use of mace” after the use of pepper spray was nothing more than a “de minimis injury”).
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disproportional. Fourth, while the officers likely did not perceive a significant threat, their
response was also not significant. Lastly, the video directly rebuts any suggestion that the
officers did not attempt to temper their response.
For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that Mosquera has failed to plausibly
allege that McGowan’s use of chemical spray violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Layland be ordered
to file an answer, motion, or other response to Mosquera’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
based on her alleged failure to provide legal materials, resulting in Mosquera’s inability to
file a motion for rehearing in his criminal appeal. The undersigned further RECOM-
MENDS that Mosquera’s remaining claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
VII. RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these Find-
ings, Conclusions, and Recommendations must file specific written objections within four-
teen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
the objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magis-
trate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations where the disputed determina-
tion is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will
bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
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magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of
plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
VIII. TRANSFER OF CASE
Having completed the preliminary screening of Mosquera’s claims, the undersigned
ORDERS that this case be TRANSFERRED to the docket of the United States District
Judge and designated as Civil Action No. 1:24-CV-00061-H.
ORDERED this 31st day of December 2025.
JOHN R. PARKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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