Clark v. Whitehouse Independent School District

6:25-cv-00161TxedMar 20, 2026

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
ROBBIN CLARK, individually and as
next friend of G.W., a minor,
Plaintiff,
v.
WHITEHOUSE INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
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Case No. 6:25-cv-161-JDK-KNM
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Whitehouse Independent School District’s
motion to dismiss. Docket No. 5.
Plaintiff Robbin Clark, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit against Defendant,
asserting violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and Texas state law.
Docket No. 1. The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge K. Nicole
Mitchell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
On January 16, 2026, Judge Mitchell issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that the Court grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 5) in
part. Docket No. 10. Judge Mitchell recommended that the Court dismiss all of
Plaintiff’s claims, except the ADA and Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate
claims for compensatory damages. Id. Defendant filed written objections to the
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Magistrate Judge’s Report. Docket No. 11. Plaintiff timely responded to Defendant’s
written objections. Docket No. 12.
When a party timely objects to the Report and Recommendation, the Court
reviews the objected-to findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge de novo. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In conducting a de novo review, the Court examines the entire
record and makes an independent assessment under the law. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded on other
grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from
ten to fourteen days).
I.
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation regarding
Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claims for three reasons: (1) Plaintiff did not state
a claim for intentional discrimination; (2) Plaintiff did not plead facts sufficient to
show that Defendant knew of the disability and its consequential limitations; and
(3) Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to show that Defendant failed to make
reasonable accommodations. Docket No. 11.
When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must construe all well-pleaded
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Moreover, “a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “To
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survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
To state a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act, a plaintiff must plead that “(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity;
and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792
F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015).
A.
Defendant first objects that, because the Magistrate Judge recommended
dismissal of Plaintiff’s intentional discrimination claims, the Magistrate Judge
should have also recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claims
for compensatory damages. Docket No. 11 at 2–3.
However, a failure-to-accommodate claim requires a plaintiff to plead only that
the defendant had “actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary.” J.W. v.
Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 450 (5th Cir. 2023). And, here, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
had such knowledge, as set forth below.
Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendant’s first objection.
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B.
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claims should
be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to plead the second element—that “the disability
and its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity.” Ball, 792 F.3d
at 596 n.9. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not plead facts
demonstrating the nature of her grandchild’s disability,1 the specific limitations
resulting from that disability, or that Plaintiff communicated the disability or
limitations to Defendant. Docket No. 11 at 3–5. Defendant further argues that
Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead that the disability and limitations were “open,
obvious, and apparent” to Defendant, such that Plaintiff would not have needed to
communicate the disability and limitations to Defendant. Id.
Construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, however, the Court finds that
Plaintiff adequately alleged the second element by alleging that she or her grandchild
made his disability and its resulting limitations known to Defendant. See Docket No.
1 at ¶¶ 2, 7–8, 11–12; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. For example, Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant participated in Admission, Review, and Dismissal (“ARD”) meetings and
knew of and established educational accommodations for Plaintiff’s grandchild
through an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). Docket No. 10 at 22–23;
Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 7–8, 11–12. Participating in ARD meetings is an inherently
1 To the extent Defendant now argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish the “qualified
individual” element of her failure-to-accommodate claims, such an argument is untimely, as it was not
raised in Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1994) (“By
waiting until after the magistrate court had issued its findings and recommendations” to raise
arguments, “[the objecting party] has waived [its] objections.”); see also Herod v. DMS Sols., Inc., No.
4:23-CV-04465, 2024 WL 4140613, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2024) (collecting cases).
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collaborative process involving discussions about the nature of a student’s disability,
the resulting limitations, and the reasonable accommodations needed. Docket No. 10
at 22–23. During one of these meetings, a representative of Defendant allegedly
asserted that Plaintiff’s grandchild’s “emotional reactions justified denial of requested
educational services.” Docket No. 1 at ¶ 12 (emphasis added). This suggests that
Plaintiff or her grandchild did in fact request accommodations from Defendant.
The Court overrules Defendant’s second objection.
C.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to state
the third element of her failure-to-accommodate claims: that Defendant failed to
make reasonable accommodations. See Ball, 792 F.3d at 596 n.9. This objection,
however, is dependent on the second objection—that Plaintiff did not allege she
requested an accommodation. Docket No. 11 at 5. Because the Court overruled that
objection, this objection likewise fails.
III.
Having conducted a de novo review of the record in this case and the
Magistrate Judge’s Report, the Court has determined that the Report of the
Magistrate Judge is correct, and Defendant’s objections are without merit.
Accordingly, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge (Docket
No. 10) as the opinion of this Court. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 5) is
therefore GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
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Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act
failure-to-accommodate claims for compensatory damages. Defendant’s motion is
DENIED as moot as to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for punitive damages,
neither of which is included in Plaintiff’s complaint.
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the IDEA, Texas state law, and any ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims for equitable relief are DISMISSED without prejudice
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation
Act intentional discrimination claims, for which Plaintiff seeks compensatory
damages, are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
So ORDERED and SIGNED this day of
___________________________________
JEREMY D. KERNODLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20th	March, 2026.
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