Flowers Title Companies, LLC v. Bessent et al

6:25-cv-00127TxedMar 19, 2026

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
FLOWERS TITLE COMPANIES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT BESSENT, in his official
capacity as U.S. Secretary of Treasury,
et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 6:25-cv-127-JDK
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case challenges a 2024 Final Rule promulgated by the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”). The Rule implements reporting requirements for
any non-financed residential real estate transaction where ownership is transferred
to an entity or trust, subject to a few exceptions. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations
for Residential Real Estate Transfers, 89 Fed. Reg. 12,424 (February 16, 2024)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. § 1031.320).
Plaintiff challenges the Rule as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure
Act (“the APA”). 	Plaintiff first claims that the Rule exceeds FinCEN’s statutory
authority provided by the Bank Secrecy Act. If the Act authorizes the Rule, Plaintiff
argues, 	then 	the 	Act 	violates 	the 	nondelegation 	doctrine, 	exceeds 	Congress’s
enumerated powers, and violates the Fourth Amendment.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. 	For the reasons set forth
below, 	the 	Court 	grants 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	and 	denies 	FinCEN’s 	cross-motion.
Neither provision of the Act cited by FinCEN authorizes the Final Rule. 	The first
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provision, 	31 	U.S.C. 	§ 5319(g)(1), 	permits 	FinCEN 	to require 	reports 	of 	“any
suspicious transaction.” 	But the agency fails to explain or show how non-financed
residential real estate transactions are categorically “suspicious.” 	The second
provision, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2), gives FinCEN the authority to require financial
institutions to maintain “procedures” to comply with the Act, not the authority to
require the reports covered by the Final Rule. 	The Court need not reach Plaintiff’s
alternative arguments.
Accordingly, the Court vacates and sets aside the Rule.
I.
Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 to combat money laundering
primarily in international transactions. 	Since then, Congress has expanded the
statute’s reach to include certain “suspicious” domestic transactions. 	Based on this
authority, FinCEN recently finalized a Rule that requires the reporting of any non-
financed residential real estate transaction where ownership is transferred to an
entity or trust.
A. 	The Statute. The Bank Secrecy Act was enacted on October 26, 1970,
to require banks to maintain records that “have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.” Pub. L. No. 91-508 § 101,
84 Stat. 1114–15 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–60;
31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 5311–14, 5316–36). 	The statute also authorized the Secretary of
the Treasury to prescribe regulations to carry out the Act’s purposes. 	12 U.S.C.
§§ 1829b(b)(1), 1952–53, 1958(b).
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Congress has amended the Bank Secrecy Act on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550 § 1517(b),
106 Stat. 3672, 4059–60 (1992) (amending the Act to authorize the Secretary to
require financial institutions to report “any suspicious transaction relevant to a
possible 	violation 	of 	law”); 	William 	M. 	(Mac) 	Thornberry 	National 	Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6002(2), 134 Stat. 3388,
4604 (2021) (amending the Act to “modernize” existing anti-money laundering laws
“to adapt the government and private sector response to new and emerging threats”).
The current version of the Bank Secrecy Act includes two provisions relevant
here. 	First, § 5318(g)(1) authorizes the Secretary of Treasury to “require any
financial institution, and any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial
institution, to report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law
or regulation.” 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1). And § 5318(a)(2) authorizes the Secretary to
require a class of domestic financial institutions or nonfinancial trades
or 	businesses 	to 	maintain 	appropriate 	procedures, 	including 	the
collection and reporting of certain information as the Secretary of the
Treasury may prescribe by regulation, to ensure compliance with this
subchapter and regulations prescribed under this subchapter or to
guard against money laundering, the financing of terrorism, or other
forms of illicit finance;
31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2).
The 	Secretary 	has 	delegated 	the 	authority 	“to 	take 	all 	necessary 	and
appropriate actions to implement and administer the provisions of the Bank Secrecy
Act” to the Director of FinCEN, a bureau within Treasury. 	Treasury Order 180-01,
¶ 3(a) (Jan. 14, 2020).
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B. 	Geographic Targeting Orders. In 2001, in response to the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center, Congress enacted the Patriot Act, which amended
key portions of the Bank Secrecy Act. 	Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA
PATRIOT ACT”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 84 Stat. 1116 (2001). One provision
broadly authorized the Secretary of Treasury to require any financial institution “in
a geographic area” to report information about “any transaction” when there are
“reasonable grounds” for “concluding that additional recordkeeping and reporting
requirements are necessary to carry out the purposes of [the Bank Secrecy Act].”
31 U.S.C. § 5326(a). By statute, these “geographic targeting orders” (“GTOs”) expire
after 180 days, unless renewed. Id. § 5326(d).
Since 2016, FinCEN has acted under this authority to issue GTOs that “require
certain title insurance companies to file reports and maintain records concerning non-
financed purchases of residential real estate above a specific price threshold by
certain legal entities in select metropolitan areas of the United States.” 89 Fed. Reg.
at 70,259–60. 	FinCEN found these GTOs to be “effective within the covered
geographic areas.” 	Id. at 70,260. 	But the GTOs were geographically limited, and
thus “[did] not address the illicit finance risks posed by certain real estate transfers
on a nationwide basis—a significant shortcoming,” according to FinCEN. Id.
C. 	The Rule. 	On February 16, 2024, FinCEN proposed establishing a
nationwide reporting requirement for the vast majority of non-financed real estate
transactions. 	Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Residential Real Estate
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Transfers, 89 Fed. Reg. 12,424, 12,425 (February 16, 2024). 	FinCEN received more
than 620 comments, including comments questioning the statutory authority for the
Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 70,261, and at least one comment predicting significant
reporting costs and requesting FinCEN to narrow the Rule. 	Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Re:
Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Residential Real Estate Transfers, (May 27,
2024), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FINCEN-2024-0005-0623. 	On August
29, 2024, FinCEN adopted the Rule with minimal changes. 89 Fed. Reg. at 70,258.
The Final Rule requires those involved in real estate transactions to report to
FinCEN the details of any “non-financed transfer to a transferee entity or transferee
trust of an ownership interest in residential real property.” Id. at 70,290. The Rule
exempts certain types of transactions like transfers “resulting from the death of an
individual” or transfers “incident to divorce.” 31 C.F.R. § 1031.320(b)(2). Unlike the
GTOs, which were limited by geography and price, the Rule requires the reporting of
any eligible transaction occurring within the United States or its territories with no
minimum dollar threshold value. 89 Fed Reg. at 70,269. A full version of the Final
Rule is appended to this Memorandum Opinion.
The Rule became effective on December 1, 2025. Id. at 70,258.
D. 	This Lawsuit. 	On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff Flowers Title Companies,
LLC 	filed 	this 	lawsuit, 	challenging 	the 	Final 	Rule 	under 	the 	Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702.1 First, Plaintiff claims that the Rule exceeds
1 Others have also challenged the Final Rule. See Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Bessent, No. 3:25-CV-554-
WWB-SJH, (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2026). In Fidelity, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting FinCEN’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. Fidelity Nat’l, 2025 WL 4477503 (Dec. 9, 2025). The magistrate judge found that FinCEN
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FinCEN’s statutory authority under the Bank Secrecy Act. Docket No. 11 ¶¶ 86–92.
Alternatively, if the Act is interpreted as authorizing the Rule, Plaintiff alleges that
the statute would grant such extensive powers that it would violate the
“nondelegation doctrine,” the Commerce Clause, and the Fourth Amendment. Id.
¶¶ 93–122.
Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. Docket Nos. 12; 14.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323–25 (1986); Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.
1998).
At oral argument, the parties agreed that if the Bank Secrecy Act does not
permit the Final Rule, then the Court need not decide Plaintiff’s other claims.
II.
The Court begins (and ends) with Plaintiff’s statutory argument—that the
Final Rule exceeds FinCEN’s statutory authority under the Bank Secrecy Act.
Docket No. 12 at 9–12.
The APA requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . .
found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C.
acted within its statutory authority and rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to the Final
Rule. Id. The district judge later adopted the recommendation. Fidelity Nat’l, 2026 WL 472350 (Feb.
19, 2026).
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§ 706(2)(C). 	“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate
legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.” 	Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 	“Agencies, as mere creatures of
statute, must point to explicit Congressional authority justifying their decisions.”
Inhance Techs., LLC v. EPA, 96 F.4th 888, 893 (5th Cir. 2024); see also Earl v. Boeing
Co., 515 F. Supp. 3d 590, 615 (E.D. Tex. 2021) (“[B]efore promulgating rules or
regulations pursuant to a statute, agencies must demonstrate a clear ‘textual
commitment of authority’ in the language Congress enacted.” (quoting Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001))). And in reviewing whether an agency
acted 	within 	its 	statutory 	authority, 	a 	court 	does 	not 	defer 	to 	the 	agency’s
interpretation but should decide for itself “whether the law means what the agency
says.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024).
FinCEN cites 	two statutory provisions as 	authority for the Final Rule:
(A) Section 5318(g)(1), which authorizes the agency to require financial institutions
to report “any suspicion transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or
regulation,” 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1), and (B) Section 5318(a)(2), which permits FinCEN
to require financial institutions to “maintain appropriate procedures, including the
collection and reporting of certain information,” 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2).
The Court considers each provision in turn.
A.
Section 	5318(g)(1) 	states: 	“The 	Secretary 	may 	require 	any 	financial
institution, and any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial institution,
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to report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or
regulation.” 	31 U.S.C. § 3518(g)(1). 	Plaintiff argues that this provision does not
authorize the Final Rule because there is nothing “suspicious” about non-financed
residential real estate transactions involving entities or trusts. Docket No. 12 at 10.
FinCEN disagrees, arguing that “the Rule identifies, and explains why, non-financed
transfers of residential real property to certain legal entities and trusts are a class of
suspicious transactions.” Docket No. 14 at 17.
All statutory interpretation “begins with the text.” 	E.g., Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016); United States v. Lauderdale Cnty., 914 F.3d 960, 961 (5th
Cir. 2019); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[A]
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.”). 	Here, the key term is “suspicious,” which is not defined in the statute.
Applying the “fundamental canon of statutory construction,” the Court interprets the
term “as taking [its] ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.”
E.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113 (2019) (citation modified); see also
ANTONIN SCALIA & B RYAN A. G ARNER , R EADING LAW : THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 69–77 (2012) (“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic
rule of interpretation.”); Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400 (“[E]very statute’s meaning is
fixed at the time of enactment.” (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S.
274, 284 (2018))). “[D]ictionaries are a principal source for ascertaining the ordinary
meaning of statutory language.” Buffalo Marine Servs. Inc. v. United States, 663 F.3d
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750, 755 n.22 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Orellana, 405 F.3d 360, 365
(5th Cir. 2005)).
Citing Merriam-Webster, both sides agree that “suspicious” means “tending to
arouse suspicion” and that “suspicion” means “the act or an instance of suspecting
something wrong without proof or on slight evidence.” 	Docket No. 12 at 15, Docket
No. 	14 	at 	19 	(quoting 	Suspicious, 	M ERRIAM -WEBSTER . COM 	D ICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/suspicious; 	Suspicion, 	M ERRIAM -
WEBSTER . COM D ICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/suspicion).
See also OXFORD ENGLISH D ICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989) (defining “suspicious” as “open
to, deserving of, or exciting suspicion”); RANDOM H OUSE D ICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1917 (1987) (defining “suspicious” as “tending to cause or excite suspicion;
questionable”); BLACK ’ S LAW D ICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (“Suspicion implies a belief or
opinion based upon facts or circumstances that do not amount to proof.”).
Thus, to be “suspicious,” a transaction must “tend to arouse” the belief that
“something [is] wrong” based on facts or circumstances that do not amount to proof
but may be based on “slight evidence.” 	The term as used in § 5318(g)(1), moreover,
limits FinCEN’s rule-making authority. See Mexican Gulf Fishing Co. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Com., 60 F.4th 956, 965 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that “the adjectives necessary and
appropriate” in a statute granting rule-making authority “limit the authorization
contained in this provision”); see also Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015)
(explaining that the term “appropriate and necessary” limited the agency’s exercise
of rule-making power). 	This means that § 5318(g)(1) does not give FinCEN the
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authority to regulate all transactions—but only those transactions that tend to
arouse the belief that something is wrong.
FinCEN does not dispute any of this. 	Instead, it claims that non-financed
residential real estate transactions involving entities or trusts are categorically
“suspicious.” 	89 Fed. Reg. at 70,258. 	“[N]on-financed transfers do not involve []
financial institutions [subject to anti-money laundering laws],” FinCEN explains, and
thus “such transfers can be and have been exploited by illicit actors of all varieties.”
Id. at 70,259. 	As evidence, FinCEN cites “[n]umerous public law enforcement
actions” where defendants were prosecuted for money laundering, presumably by
conducting non-financed residential real estate transactions. 	See id. at n.12 (citing
cases). FinCEN also states that, “from 2017 to early 2024, approximately 42 percent
of non-financed real estate transfers captured by the Residential Real Estate GTOs
were conducted by individuals or legal entities on which a SAR [Suspicious Activity
Report] has been filed.” 	Id. 	“In other words, individuals engaging in a type of
transaction known to be used to further illicit financial activity—the non-financed
purchase of residential real estate through a legal entity—are also engaging in other
identified forms of suspicious activities.” Id.
FinCEN’s explanations are vague, conclusory, and unpersuasive. The fact that
some bad actors have conducted non-financed real estate transactions does not make
such transactions categorically “suspicious.” 	If it did, then nearly every type of
transaction imaginable would be “suspicious,” and § 5318(g)(1) would grant FinCEN
far-reaching powers no one has contemplated. Nor does the 42% statistic justify the
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Final Rule. This number focused on a limited subset of non-financed real estate
transactions—those covered by the GTOs, which were limited by price and to
geographic areas selected by FinCEN for monitoring. See 31 U.S.C. § 5326(a).
Further, the fact that 42% of the parties involved in these transactions were flagged
elsewhere as conducting other allegedly suspicious transactions does not prove much
without more information. It could be that financial institutions were overinclusive
in their reporting out of an abundance of caution or that the rules governing those
reports required institutions to be overinclusive. Whatever the reason, the 42%-GTO
statistic does not show that non-financed real estate transactions across the country
are categorically suspicious.
FinCEN argues that it is not required to make an individualized assessment
for every non-financed residential real estate transaction involving an entity or trust,
that “suspicious” does not mean “unlawful,” and that the Rule may properly “sweep[]
in legitimate transactions.” Docket No. 14 at 17–20. The Court agrees. But FinCEN
is required to limit its reporting rule to “any suspicious transaction,” 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(g)(1), and it has not done so. Instead, FinCEN has declared an entire category
of residential real estate transactions to be “suspicious” with no proof or sufficient
explanation why. As Plaintiff demonstrates, in contrast, individuals with sufficient
assets choose to purchase property without financing for myriad legitimate reasons,
such as “sav[ing] thousands of dollars in lending costs and interest payments.”
Docket No. 12, Ex. 1. And those engaged in non-financed real estate transfers “almost
always pay[] for the property with money from a savings account at a bank or credit
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union that is required to maintain an anti-money-laundering program.” Id. Further,
“there is nothing unusual about an investor creating a limited liability corporation,
or another incorporated entity, to acquire and hold real estate” because it “minimizes
legal risks and serves legitimate tax planning purposes.” 	Id. 	FinCEN does not
dispute these points.
By FinCEN’s own calculation, the “number of reportable transfers [covered by
the Final Rule] would be between approximately 800,000 and 850,000 annually,”
costing “between approximately $428.4 and $690.4 million (midpoint $559.4 million)
in the first compliance year.” 	89 Fed. Reg. at 70,283–84. 	On this record, the Court
concludes that § 5318(g)(1) does not authorize FinCEN to treat every one of these
transactions as “suspicious.”
B.
Although FinCEN relied on § 5318(g)(1) as authority for the Rule below, see 89
Fed. Reg. at 12,428 and n.45; 89 Fed. Reg. at 70,259 and n.9, FinCEN alternatively
justifies the Rule here under 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2).2 	It is a “bedrock principle of
administrative law that a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that
the agency invoked when it took the action.” Michigan, 576 U.S. at 758. The Court,
however, need not decide whether FinCEN is barred from relying on § 5318(a)(2) now
2 Both the Proposed Rule and Final Rule discussed FinCEN’s claimed authority under § 5318(g)(1),
including the agency’s efforts to satisfy the “suspicious transaction” requirement of that
provision. See generally 89 Fed. Reg. at 12,428–31; see also 89 Fed. Reg. at 70,262. Although the
agency also cited § 5318(a)(2) in a footnote, see 89 Fed. Reg. at 12,429 n.47; 89 Fed. Reg. at 70,259
n.11, FinCEN provided no analysis or explanation of that provision justifying the Rule.
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because, as explained below, the Court concludes that (a)(2) does not authorize the
Final Rule.
Section 5318(a)(2) states:
The 	Secretary 	of 	the 	Treasury 	may 	. 	. 	. 	(2) 	require 	a 	class 	of
domestic financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses to
maintain appropriate procedures, including the collection and reporting
of certain information as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe by
regulation, to ensure compliance with this subchapter and regulations
prescribed under this subchapter or to guard against money laundering,
the financing of terrorism, or other forms of illicit finance.
Plaintiff argues that this provision authorizes FinCEN to issue only “rules specifying
procedures that financial institutions must abide by when reporting information as
mandated by rules separately authorized under the subchapter.” 	Docket No. 12
at 10–11. 	FinCEN disagrees, arguing that § 5318(a)(2) independently “empowers
FinCEN to require reporting to ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.”
Docket No. 14 at 15–16, 20–21.
In determining the ordinary meaning of a statute, “(1) we begin with the
statute’s language; (2) we give undefined words their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning; (3) we read the statute’s words in proper context and consider them
based on the statute as a whole; and (4) we consider a statute’s terms in the light of
the statute’s purposes.” Contender Farms, LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 F.3d 258,
269 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotations removed). 	“In determining the ordinary meaning of
terms, dictionaries are often a principal source.” 	NPR Invs., LLC ex rel. Roach v.
United States, 740 F.3d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Taniguchi v. Kan Pac.
Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–68 (2012) (consulting multiple dictionaries and
finding similar traits to deduce the ordinary meaning). Further, “[i]nterpretation of
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a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the
purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that
inform the analysis.” Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P., 970 F.3d 576, 584–85
(5th Cir. 2020).
The key language in § 5318(a)(2) is the phrase “to maintain appropriate
procedures, including the collection and reporting of certain information.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(a)(2). “Procedure” is generally the form or method of doing something.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2025) (defining “procedure” as “the established
or prescribed way of doing something”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024)
(defining “procedure” as “a specific method or course of action”). “Reporting,” in
contrast, is ordinarily not a “procedure,” but is the substantive act of giving an
account or making a record. MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/report (“report” means “to make a
written record or summary of”); Report, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2025)
(“To give an account of”); Report, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2022) (“To make or present an official or formal account of”).
Interpreting another provision of the Bank Secrecy Act, the Fifth Circuit noted this
distinction between “the substantive obligation to file reports” and “the procedural
obligation to file the appropriate reporting form.” United States v. Bittner, 19 F.4th
734, 745 (5th Cir. 2021), rev’d on other grounds by Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S.
85 (2023).
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Thus, the natural way to read § 5318(a)(2) is that FinCEN may require
institutions to maintain procedures, including maintaining collection and reporting
procedures. 	This interpretation carries forward “procedures” to modify “reporting,”
which is how people commonly speak and write. Consider, for example, the sentence,
“The shop serves ice cream, including chocolate and strawberry.” Most people would
interpret that to mean that the shop serves “ice cream, including chocolate [ice cream]
and strawberry [ice cream].” “[C]ommon parlance matters in assessing the ordinary
meaning of a statute.” 	Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 590 U.S. 644, 790 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582
U.S. 79, 84 (2017) (using a conversation between friends to demonstrate ordinary
meaning); Wis. Cent. Ltd., 585 U.S. at 278 (2018) (similar)). This interpretation also
makes the most sense in light of the language of (a)(2) and the other provisions in
§ 5318.
FinCEN interprets the phrase “including the . . . reporting” to grant it
independent, standalone authority to require reports from financial institutions. But
this interpretation has several problems. First, it changes the meaning of the phrase
“maintain appropriate procedures” from a requirement to maintain certain methods
or forms to a substantive obligation to report information. 	Cf. Bittner, 19 F.4th
at 745. 	It also ignores other language in (a)(2). 	How does a financial institution
“maintain” the substantive reporting of information? 	FinCEN’s interpretation,
moreover, smuggles expansive reporting authority into a provision that is focused on
procedures. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 517 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring)
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(noting that in interpreting a statute, courts should be “skeptical of mismatches
between broad invocations of power by agencies and relatively narrow statutes that
purport to delegate that power” (citation modified)); see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at
468 (“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in
vague terms of ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes.”).
FinCEN’s read of § 5318(a)(2) would also render the reporting requirement in
§ 5318(g)(1) 	surplusage. 	If 	§ 5318(a)(2) 	broadly authorizes 	FinCEN 	to impose
reporting requirements on financial institutions, then the more limited reporting
authority in § 5318(g)(1) would be unnecessary. Courts, however, are “bound by the
canon that we ought not interpret any statutory provision in a manner that would
render another provision superfluous.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States, 775 F.3d 743,
754 (5th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)
(The canon disfavoring surplusage is “one of the most basic interpretative canons”
and mandates that a “statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”
(citation modified)). 	Finally, relatedly, FinCEN’s interpretation would allow the
agency to circumvent the express congressional limit on its authority in § 5318(g)(1)—
which restricts FinCEN to requiring reports only where there is a “suspicious
transaction.”
The Court thus concludes that § 5318(a)(2) does not authorize the Final Rule.
See Weaver v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 939 F.3d 618, 626 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[J]udges must
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be attentive not to words standing alone but to surrounding structure and other
contextual clues that illuminate meaning.”); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined
by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used,
and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).
III.
Having determined that the Rule violates the APA, the Court considers the
proper remedy. Plaintiff asks for vacatur of the Rule under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Docket
No. 12 at 21.
“Vacatur is the only statutorily prescribed remedy for a successful APA
challenge to a regulation.” Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 47 F.4th 368, 374–75 (5th
Cir. 2022). 	And vacatur under the APA is “not party-restricted.” 	Career Colls. and
Schs. of Tex. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 98 F.4th 220, 255 (5th Cir. 2024). 	“When a
reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result
is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners
is proscribed.” Id. (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 978 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir.
1989)). As such, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected agency efforts to limit relief
to the parties and has upheld universal vacatur as the appropriate remedy in APA
cases. See, e.g., id.; Career Colls. and Schs. of Tex., 98 F.4th at 255; Tex. Med. Ass’n
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 110 F.4th 762, 779–80 (5th Cir. 2024).
Though vacatur is the “default rule,” Cargill v. Garland, 57 F.4th 447, 472 (5th
Cir. 2023) (en banc), courts may deviate based on two equitable interest factors:
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“(1) the seriousness of the deficiencies of the action, that is, how likely it is the agency
will be able to justify its decision on remand; and (2) the disruptive consequences of
vacatur.” Texas v. Biden, 20 F.4th 928, 1000 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting United Steel v.
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 925 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2019), rev’d on other
grounds, 597 U.S. 785 (2022)). 	Considering these factors here, the Court concludes
that the appropriate remedy is vacatur.
First, the seriousness of the Rule’s deficiencies means it is unlikely that
FinCEN can justify its decision on remand because the Rule exceeds its authority
under the Bank Secrecy Act. 	See supra Section II. 	Without an “explanation as to
how [FinCEN] could correct the Final Rule’s conflicts with the statute on remand,”
this factor weighs against FinCEN. 	Tex. Med. Ass’n, 110 F.4th at 779 (citation
modified).
Second, the Court finds that vacatur would not be unduly disruptive. The Rule
has only been in place since December 1, 2025. 	By granting vacatur, “it would ‘do
nothing but re-establish the status quo absent the unlawful agency action.’” Texas v.
EPA, 132 F.4th 808, 863 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Texas v. United States, 40 F.4th 205,
220 (5th Cir. 2022)).
With no reason to depart from the default rule, the Court finds that vacatur of
the Final Rule and remand is the proper remedy.
IV.
In sum, the Court holds that (1) the Final Rule conflicts with the unambiguous
terms of the Bank Secrecy Act and (2) vacatur and remand is the proper remedy.
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
(Docket No. 12), DENIES FinCEN’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Docket
No. 14), and ORDERS that the Rule be vacated.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this day of
___________________________________
JEREMY D. KERNODLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19th	March, 2026.
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APPENDIX
31 C.F.R. § 1031.320 Reports of residential real property transfers.
(a) General. A reportable transfer as defined in paragraph (b) of this section
shall be reported to FinCEN by the reporting person identified in paragraph
(c) of this section. The report shall include the information described in
paragraphs (d) through (i) of this section. The reporting person may
reasonably rely on information collected from others under the conditions
described in paragraph (j). The report required by this section shall be filed
in the form and manner, and at the time, specified in paragraph (k) of this
section. Records shall be retained as specified in paragraph (l) of this
section. Reports required under this section and any other information that
would 	reveal 	that 	a 	reportable 	transfer 	has 	been 	reported 	are 	not
confidential as specified in paragraph (m) of this section. Terms not defined
in this section are defined in 31 CFR 1010.100.
(b) Reportable Transfer.
(1) Except as set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a reportable
transfer 	is 	a 	non-financed 	transfer 	to 	a 	transferee 	entity 	or
transferee trust of an ownership interest in residential real property.
For the purposes of this section, residential real property means:
(i) 	Real 	property 	located 	in 	the 	United 	States 	containing 	a
structure designed principally for occupancy by one to four
families;
(ii) 	Land located in the United States on which the transferee
intends to build a structure designed principally for occupancy
by one to four families;
(iii) 	A unit designed principally for occupancy by one to four
families within a structure on land located in the United
States; or
(iv) 	Shares in a cooperative housing corporation for which the
underlying property is located in the United States.
(2) A reportable transfer does not include a:
(i) 	Grant, transfer, or revocation of an easement;
(ii) 	Transfer resulting from the death of an individual, whether
pursuant to the terms of a decedent's will or the terms of a
trust, the operation of law, or by contractual provision;
(iii) 	Transfer incident to divorce or dissolution of a marriage or
civil union;
(iv) 	Transfer to a bankruptcy estate;
(v) 	Transfer supervised by a court in the United States;
(vi) 	Transfer for no consideration made by an individual, either
alone or with the individual's spouse, to a trust of which that
individual, that individual's spouse, or both of them, are the
settlor(s) or grantor(s);
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(vii) 	Transfer to a qualified intermediary for purposes of 26 CFR
1.1031(k)-1; or
(viii) 	Transfer for which there is no reporting person.
(c) Determination of reporting person.
(1) Except as set forth in paragraphs (c)(2), (3) and (4) of this section, the
reporting person for a reportable transfer is the person engaged
within the United States as a business in the provision of real estate
closing and settlement services that is:
(i) 	The person listed as the closing or settlement agent on the
closing or settlement statement for the transfer;
(ii) 	If no person described in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section is
involved in the transfer, then the person that prepares the
closing or settlement statement for the transfer;
(iii) 	If no person described in paragraph (c)(1)(i) or (ii) of this
section is involved in the transfer, then the person that files
with the recordation office the deed or other instrument that
transfers ownership of the residential real property;
(iv) 	If no person described in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (iii) of
this section is involved in the transfer, then the person that
underwrites 	an 	owner's 	title 	insurance 	policy 	for 	the
transferee with respect to the transferred residential real
property, such as a title insurance company;
(v) 	If no person described in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (iv) of
this section is involved in the transfer, then the person that
disburses in any form, including from an escrow account, trust
account, or lawyers' trust account, the greatest amount of
funds 	in 	connection 	with 	the 	residential 	real 	property
transfer;
(vi) 	If no person described in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (v) of
this section is involved in the transfer, then the person that
provides an evaluation of the status of the title; or
(vii) 	If no person described in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (vi) of
this section is involved in the transfer, then the person that
prepares the deed or, if no deed is involved, any other legal
instrument that transfers ownership of the residential real
property, including, with respect to shares in a cooperative
housing 	corporation, 	the 	person 	who 	prepares 	the 	stock
certificate.
(2) Employees, agents, and partners. 	If an employee, agent, or
partner acting within the scope of such individual's employment,
agency, or partnership would be the reporting person as determined
in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, then the individual's employer,
principal, or partnership is deemed to be the reporting person.
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(3) Financial 	institutions. 	A 	financial 	institution 	that 	has 	an
obligation to maintain an anti-money laundering program under this
chapter is not a reporting person for purposes of this section.
(4) Designation agreement.
(i) 	The reporting person described in paragraph (c)(1) of this
section may enter into an agreement with any other person
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section to designate such
other person as the reporting person with respect to the
reportable transfer. The person designated by such agreement
shall be treated as the reporting person with respect to the
transfer. 	If 	reporting 	persons 	decide 	to 	use 	designation
agreements, 	a 	separate 	agreement 	is 	required 	for 	each
reportable transfer.
(ii) 	A designation agreement shall be in writing, and shall include:
(A) The date of the agreement;
(B) The name and address of the transferor;
(C) The 	name 	and 	address 	of 	the 	transferee 	entity or
transferee trust;
(D) Information described in in paragraph (g) identifying
transferred residential real property;
(E) The name and address of the person designated through
the agreement as the reporting person with respect to
the transfer; and
(F) The 	name 	and 	address 	of 	all 	other 	parties 	to the
agreement.
(d) Information concerning the reporting person. 	The reporting person
shall report:
(1) The full legal name of the reporting person;
(2) The category of reporting person, as determined in paragraph (c) of
this section; and
(3) The street address that is the reporting person's principal place of
business in the United States.
(e) Information concerning the transferee —
(1) Transferee entities. 	For each transferee entity involved in a
reportable transfer, the reporting person shall report:
(i) 	The following information for the transferee entity:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Trade name or “doing business as” name, if any;
(C) Complete current address consisting of:
(1) The street address that is the transferee entity's
principal place of business; and
(2) If such principal place of business is not in the
United States, the street address of the primary
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location 	in 	the 	United 	States 	where 	the
transferee entity conducts business, if any; and
(D) Unique identifying number, if any, consisting of:
(1) The 	Internal 	Revenue 	Service 	Taxpayer
Identification 	Number 	(IRS 	TIN) 	of 	the
transferee entity;
(2) If the transferee entity has not been issued an
IRS TIN, a tax identification number for the
transferee entity that was issued by a foreign
jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction; or
(3) If the transferee entity has not been issued an
IRS TIN or a foreign tax identification number,
an entity registration number issued by a foreign
jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction;
(ii) 	The following information for each beneficial owner of the
transferee entity:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Date of birth;
(C) Complete current residential street address;
(D) Citizenship; and
(E) Unique identifying number consisting of:
(1) An IRS TIN; or
(2) Where an IRS TIN has not been issued:
(i) 	A tax identification number issued by a
foreign jurisdiction and the name of such
jurisdiction; or
(ii) 	The unique identifying number and the
issuing 	jurisdiction 	from 	a 	non-expired
passport issued by a foreign government;
and
(iii) 	The following information for each signing individual, if any:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Date of birth;
(C) Complete current residential street address;
(D) Unique identifying number consisting of:
(1) An IRS TIN; or
(2) Where an IRS TIN has not been issued:
(i) 	A tax identification number issued by a
foreign jurisdiction and the name of such
jurisdiction; or
(ii) 	The unique identifying number and the
issuing 	jurisdiction 	from 	a 	non-expired
passport issued by a foreign government to
the individual;
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(E) Description of the capacity in which the individual is
authorized to act as the signing individual; and
(F) If the signing individual is acting in that capacity as an
employee, 	agent, 	or 	partner, 	the 	name 	of 	the
individual's employer, principal, or partnership.
(2) Transferee trusts. 	For each transferee trust in a reportable
transfer, the reporting person shall report:
(i) 	The following information for the transferee trust:
(A) Full legal name, such as the full title of the agreement
establishing the transferee trust;
(B) Date the trust instrument was executed;
(C) Unique identifying number, if any, consisting of:
(1) IRS TIN; or
(2) Where an IRS TIN has not been issued, a tax
identification 	number 	issued 	by 	a 	foreign
jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction;
and
(D) Whether the transferee trust is revocable;
(ii) 	The following information for each trustee that is a legal
entity:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Trade name or “doing business as” name, if any;
(C) Complete current address consisting of:
(1) The street address that is the trustee's principal
place of business; and
(2) If such principal place of business is not in the
United States, the street address of the primary
location in the United States where the trustee
conducts business, if any; and
(D) Unique identifying number, if any, consisting of:
(1) The IRS TIN of the trustee;
(2) In the case that a trustee has not been issued an
IRS TIN, a tax identification number issued by a
foreign 	jurisdiction 	and 	the 	name 	of 	such
jurisdiction; or
(3) In the case that a trustee has not been issued an
IRS TIN or a foreign tax identification number,
an entity registration number issued by a foreign
jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction;
(E) For purposes of this section, an individual trustee of the
transferee trust is considered to be a beneficial owner of
the trust. As such, information on individual trustees
must be reported in accordance with the requirements
set forth in paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this section;
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(iii) 	The following information for each beneficial owner of the
transferee trust:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Date of birth;
(C) Complete current residential street address;
(D) Citizenship;
(E) Unique identifying number consisting of:
(1) An IRS TIN; or
(2) Where an IRS TIN has not been issued:
(i) 	A tax identification number issued by a
foreign jurisdiction and the name of such
jurisdiction; or
(ii) 	The unique identifying number and the
issuing 	jurisdiction 	from 	a 	non-expired
passport issued by a foreign government;
and
(F) The category of beneficial owner, as determined in
paragraph (j)(1)(ii) of this section; and
(iv) 	The following information for each signing individual, if any:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Date of birth;
(C) Complete current residential street address;
(D) Unique identifying number consisting of:
(1) An IRS TIN; or
(2) Where an IRS TIN has not been issued:
(i) 	A tax identification number issued by a
foreign jurisdiction and the name of such
jurisdiction; or
(ii) 	The unique identifying number and the
issuing 	jurisdiction 	from 	a 	non-expired
passport issued by a foreign government to
the individual;
(E) Description of the capacity in which the individual is
authorized to act as the signing individual; and
(F) If the signing individual is acting in that capacity as an
employee, 	agent, 	or 	partner, 	the 	name 	of 	the
individual's employer, principal, or partnership.
(f) Information concerning the transferor. 	For each transferor involved
in a reportable transfer, the reporting person shall report:
(1) The following information for a transferor who is an individual:
(i) 	Full legal name;
(ii) 	Date of birth;
(iii) 	Complete current residential street address; and
(iv) 	Unique identifying number consisting of:
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(A) An IRS TIN; or
(B) Where an IRS TIN has not been issued:
(1) tax identification number issued by a foreign
jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction; or
(2) The unique identifying number and the issuing
jurisdiction from a non-expired passport issued
by a foreign government to the individual;
(2) The following information for a transferor that is a legal entity:
(i) 	Full legal name;
(ii) 	Trade name or “doing business as” name, if any;
(iii) 	Complete current address consisting of:
(A) The street address that is the legal entity's principal
place of business; and
(B) If the principal place of business is not in the United
States, the street address of the primary location in the
United States where the legal entity conducts business,
if any; and
(iv) 	Unique identifying number, if any, consisting of:
(A) An IRS TIN;
(B) In the case that the legal entity has not been issued an
IRS TIN, a tax identification number issued by a foreign
jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction; or
(C) In the case that the legal entity has not been issued an
IRS TIN or a foreign tax identification number, an
entity 	registration 	number 	issued 	by 	a 	foreign
jurisdiction and the name of such jurisdiction; and
(3) The following information for a transferor that is a trust:
(i) 	Full legal name, such as the full title of the agreement
establishing the trust;
(ii) 	Date the trust instrument was executed;
(iii) 	Unique identifying number, if any, consisting of:
(A) IRS TIN; or
(B) Where 	an 	IRS 	TIN 	has 	not 	been 	issued, 	a 	tax
identification number issued by a foreign jurisdiction
and the name of such jurisdiction;
(iv) 	For each individual who is a trustee of the trust:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Current residential street address; and
(C) Unique identifying number consisting of:
(1) An IRS TIN; or
(2) Where an IRS TIN has not been issued:
(i) 	A tax identification number issued by a
foreign jurisdiction and the name of such
jurisdiction; or
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(ii) 	The unique identifying number and the
issuing 	jurisdiction 	from 	a 	non-expired
passport issued by a foreign government;
and
(v) 	For each legal entity that is a trustee of the trust:
(A) Full legal name;
(B) Trade name or “doing business as” name, if any;
(C) Complete current address consisting of:
(1) The 	street 	address 	that 	is 	the 	legal 	entity's
principal place of business; and
(2) If the principal place of business is not in the
United States, the street address of the primary
location in the United States where the legal
entity conducts business, if any; and
(D) Unique identifying number, if any, consisting of:
(1) An IRS TIN;
(2) In the case that the legal entity has not been
issued an IRS TIN, a tax identification number
issued by a foreign jurisdiction and the name of
such jurisdiction; or
(3) In the case that the legal entity has not been
issued an IRS TIN or a foreign tax identification
number, an entity registration number issued by
a 	foreign 	jurisdiction 	and 	the 	name 	of 	such
jurisdiction.
(g) Information concerning the residential real property. 	For each
residential real property that is the subject of the reportable transfer, the
reporting person shall report:
(1) The street address, if any;
(2) The legal description, such as the section, lot, and block; and
(3) The date of closing.
(h) Information concerning payments.
(1) The 	reporting 	person 	shall 	report 	the 	following 	information
concerning each payment, other than a payment disbursed from an
escrow or trust account held by a transferee entity or transferee
trust, that is made by or on behalf of the transferee entity or
transferee trust regarding a reportable transfer:
(i) 	The amount of the payment;
(ii) 	The method by which the payment was made;
(iii) 	If the payment was paid from an account held at a financial
institution, the name of the financial institution and the
account number; and
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(iv) 	The name of the payor on any wire, check, or other type of
payment if the payor is not the transferee entity or transferee
trust.
(2) The reporting person shall report the total consideration paid or to
be paid by the transferee entity or transferee trust regarding the
reportable transfer, as well as the total consideration paid by or to be
paid by all transferees regarding the reportable transfer.
(i) Information concerning hard money, private, and other similar
loans. 	The reporting person shall report whether the reportable transfer
involved credit extended by a person that is not a financial institution with
an obligation to maintain an anti-money laundering program and an
obligation to report suspicious transactions under this chapter.
(j) Reasonable reliance —
(1) General. Except as described in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the
reporting person may rely upon information provided by other
persons, absent knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into
question the reliability of the information provided to the reporting
person.
(2) Certification 	when 	reporting 	beneficial 	ownership
information. 	For purposes of reporting information described in
paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) and (e)(2)(iii) of this section, the reporting
person may rely upon information provided by the transferee or a
person representing the transferee in the reportable transfer, absent
knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into question the
reliability of the information provided to the reporting person, if the
person 	providing 	the 	information 	certifies 	the 	accuracy 	of 	the
information in writing to the best of the person's knowledge.
(k) Filing procedures —
(1) What to file. A reportable transfer shall be reported by completing
a Real Estate Report.
(2) Where to file. 	The Real Estate Report shall be filed electronically
with FinCEN, as indicated in the instructions to the report.
(3) When to file. 	A reporting person is required to file a Real Estate
Report by the later of either:
(i) 	the final day of the month following the month in which the
date of closing occurred; or
(ii) 	30 calendar days after the date of closing.
(l) Retention of records. 	A reporting person shall maintain a copy of any
certification described in paragraph (j)(2) of this section. In addition, all
parties to a designation agreement described in paragraph (c)(4) of this
section shall maintain a copy of such designation agreement.
(m) 	Exemptions —
(1) Confidentiality. 	Reporting persons, and any director, officer,
employee, or agent of such persons, and Federal, State, local, or
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Tribal government authorities, are exempt from the confidentiality
provision in 31 U.S.C. 5318(g)(2) that prohibits the disclosure to any
person involved in a suspicious transaction that the transaction has
been reported or any information that otherwise would reveal that
the transaction has been reported.
(2) Anti-money laundering program. A reporting person under this
section is exempt from the requirement to establish an anti-money
laundering program, in accordance with 31 CFR 1010.205(b)(1)(v).
(n) Definitions. 	For purposes of this section, the following terms have the
following meanings.
(1) Beneficial owner —
(i) 	Beneficial owners of transferee entities.
(A) The beneficial owners of a transferee entity are the
individuals who would be the beneficial owners of the
transferee entity on the date of closing if the transferee
entity 	were 	a 	reporting 	company 	under 	31 	CFR
1010.380(d) on the date of closing.
(B) The beneficial owners of a transferee entity that is
established as a non-profit corporation or similar entity,
regardless of jurisdiction of formation, are limited to
individuals who exercise substantial control over the
entity, as defined in 31 CFR 1010.380(d)(1) on the date
of closing.
(ii) 	Beneficial owners of transferee trusts. 	The beneficial
owners of a transferee trust are the individuals who fall into
one or more of the following categories on the date of closing:
(A) A trustee of the transferee trust.
(B) An individual other than a trustee with the authority to
dispose of transferee trust assets.
(C) A beneficiary who is the sole permissible recipient of
income and principal from the transferee trust or who
has the right to demand a distribution of, or withdraw,
substantially all of the assets from the transferee trust.
(D) A grantor or settlor who has the right to revoke the
transferee trust or otherwise withdraw the assets of the
transferee trust.
(E) A beneficial owner of any legal entity that holds at least
one of the positions in the transferee trust described in
paragraphs (n)(1)(ii)(A) through (D) of this section,
except when the legal entity meets the criteria set forth
in paragraphs (n)(10)(ii)(A) through (P) of this section.
Beneficial 	ownership 	of 	any 	such 	legal 	entity 	is
determined under 31 CFR 1010.380(d), utilizing the
criteria for beneficial owners of a reporting company.
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(F) A beneficial owner of any trust that holds at least one
of the positions in the transferee trust described in
paragraphs (n)(1)(ii)(A) through (D) of this section,
except when the trust meets the criteria set forth in
paragraphs 	(n)(11)(ii)(A) 	through 	(D). 	Beneficial
ownership of any such trust is determined under this
paragraph (n)(1)(ii), utilizing the criteria for beneficial
owners of a transferee trust.
(2) Closing or settlement agent. 	The term “closing or settlement
agent” means any person, whether or not acting as an agent for a
title agent or company, a licensed attorney, real estate broker, or real
estate 	salesperson, 	who 	for 	another 	and 	with 	or 	without 	a
commission, fee, or other valuable consideration and with or without
the intention or expectation of receiving a commission, fee, or other
valuable consideration, directly or indirectly, provides closing or
settlement 	services 	incident 	to 	the 	transfer 	of 	residential 	real
property.
(3) Closing or settlement statement. The term “closing or settlement
statement” means the statement of receipts and disbursements
prepared for the transferee for a transfer of residential real property.
(4) Date of closing. The term “date of closing” means the date on which
the transferee entity or transferee trust receives an ownership
interest in residential real property.
(5) Non-financed transfer. 	The term “non-financed transfer” means
a 	transfer 	that 	does 	not 	involve 	an 	extension 	of 	credit 	to 	all
transferees that is:
(i) 	Secured by the transferred residential real property; and
(ii) 	Extended by a financial institution that has both an obligation
to 	maintain 	an 	anti-money 	laundering 	program 	and 	an
obligation 	to 	report 	suspicious 	transactions 	under 	this
chapter.
(6) Ownership interest. 	The term “ownership interest” means the
rights held in residential real property that are demonstrated:
(i) 	Through 	a 	deed, 	for 	a 	reportable 	transfer 	described 	in
paragraph (b)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section; or
(ii) 	Through 	stock, 	shares, 	membership, 	certificate, 	or 	other
contractual agreement evidencing ownership, for a reportable
transfer described in paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of this section.
(7) Recordation office. The term “recordation office” means any State,
local, Territory and Insular Possession, or Tribal office for the
recording of reportable transfers as a matter of public record.
(8) Signing individual. 	The term “signing individual” means each
individual who signed documents on behalf of the transferee as part
of 	the 	reportable 	transfer. 	However, 	it 	does 	not 	include 	any
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individual who signed documents as part of their employment with
a financial institution that has both an obligation to maintain an
anti-money 	laundering 	program 	and 	an 	obligation 	to 	report
suspicious transactions under this chapter.
(9) Statutory trust. 	The term “statutory trust” means any trust
created or authorized under the Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act
or as enacted by a State. For the purposes of this subpart, statutory
trusts are transferee entities.
(10) 	Transferee entity.
(i) 	Except as set forth in paragraph (n)(10)(ii) of this section, the
term “transferee entity” means any person other than a
transferee trust or an individual.
(ii) 	A transferee entity does not include:
(A) A 	securities 	reporting 	issuer 	defined 	in 	31 	CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(i);
(B) A 	governmental 	authority 	defined 	in 	31 	CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(ii);
(C) A bank defined in 31 CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(iii);
(D) A credit union defined in 31 CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(iv);
(E) A depository institution holding company defined in 31
CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(v);
(F) A 	money 	service 	business 	defined 	in 	31 	CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(vi);
(G) A broker or dealer in securities defined in 31 CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(vii);
(H) A securities exchange or clearing agency defined in 31
CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(viii);
(I) Any other Exchange Act registered entity defined in 31
CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(ix);
(J) An 	insurance 	company 	defined 	in 	31 	CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(xii);
(K) A State-licensed insurance producer defined in 31 CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(xiii);
(L) A Commodity Exchange Act registered entity defined in
31 CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(xiv);
(M) 	A 	public 	utility 	defined 	in 	31 	CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(xvi);
(N) A 	financial 	market 	utility 	defined 	in 	31 	CFR
1010.380(c)(2)(xvii);
(O) An investment company as defined in section 3(a) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(a))
that is registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission 	under 	section 	8 	of 	the 	Investment
Company Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-8); and
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(P) Any legal entity controlled or wholly owned, directly or
indirectly, 	by 	an 	entity 	described 	in 	paragraphs
(n)(10)(ii)(A) through (O) of this section.
(11) 	Transferee trust.
(i) 	Except as set forth in paragraph (n)(11)(ii) of this section, the
term “transferee trust” means any legal arrangement created
when a person (generally known as a grantor or settlor) places
assets under the control of a trustee for the benefit of one or
more persons (each generally known as a beneficiary) or for a
specified purpose, as well as any legal arrangement similar in
structure or function to the above, whether formed under the
laws of the United States or a foreign jurisdiction. A trust is
deemed 	to 	be 	a 	transferee 	trust 	regardless 	of 	whether
residential real property is titled in the name of the trust itself
or in the name of the trustee in the trustee's capacity as the
trustee of the trust.
(ii) 	A transferee trust does not include:
(A) A trust that is a securities reporting issuer defined in
31 CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(i);
(B) A trust in which the trustee is a securities reporting
issuer defined in 31 CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(i);
(C) A statutory trust; or
(D) An 	entity 	wholly 	owned 	by 	a 	trust 	described 	in
paragraphs (n)(11)(ii)(A) through (C) of this section.
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