National Religious Broadcasters et al v. Bessent et al

6:24-cv-00311TxedMar 31, 2026

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No. 6:24-cv-00311
National Religious Broadcasters et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Scott Bessent et al.,
Defendants.
O P I N I O N A N D O R D E R
This case involves eligibility for federal tax benefits. Congress
grants an income-tax exemption to defined religious, educational,
and public-interest organizations, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), and
makes donations to covered organizations deductible from one’s
taxable income, id. § 170(c)(2). Qualifying as such an organization
requires a covered purpose, non-profit status, and that:
no substantial part of the activities of [the organization] is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influ-
ence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsec-
tion (h)), and [the organization] does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office.
Id. § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added). The italicized requirement was
added in 1954 and is known as the Johnson Amendment. See 100
Cong. Rec. 9604 (1954). Organizations that engage in the political
activity defined there can potentially lose their tax-exempt status.
Plaintiffs are two churches and two other nonprofit groups fo-
cused on religious practice. Doc. 20 at 6–7 ¶¶ 28–31. They allege
self-censorship from activities that would threaten their tax-ex-
empt status under the Johnson Amendment. Id. at 7–13 ¶¶ 34–41.
Plaintiffs contend that the Johnson Amendment, facially and as
applied to them, violates the First Amendment rights to freedom
of speech and free exercise of religion, the void-for-vagueness and
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equal-protection strands of Fifth Amendment due-process doc-
trine, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id. at
46–55 ¶¶ 110–57.
Defendants are the IRS and its Commissioner. Id. at 7 ¶¶ 32–
33. They moved to dismiss the original complaint for lack of
standing, lack of statutory jurisdiction, and on the merits. Doc.
13. That motion was mooted by plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
Doc. 20. Under a new administration, defendants answered and
then joined plaintiffs in moving for entry of a consent judgment
as a final resolution of plaintiffs’ claims. Docs. 30, 35. That trig-
gered a motion by Americans United for Separation of Church
and State to answer the complaint as an intervenor-defendant or,
in the alternative, file an amicus curiae brief. Doc. 37. The court
held oral argument on both motions and received post-argument
briefing. Docs. 96, 99, 100, 101. The court denied Americans
United’s motion to intervene but granted it leave to file an amicus
curiae brief. Doc. 102.
The court now considers its jurisdiction to enter the proposed
relief and finds that it is barred by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act
(AIA) and the related tax-suit bar in the Declaratory Judgment
Act (DJA). Plaintiffs are not challenging a burden that arises “sep-
arate and apart from” a tax. Cf. CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 593 U.S.
209, 220–22 (2021). The Johnson Amendment exempts organiza-
tions from taxes if they do not participate or intervene in political
campaigns. If credited, then, plaintiffs’ claims would restrain the
assessment or collection of a tax based on certain activity. See Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 738–39 (1974) (holding that a
suit to prevent the loss of § 501(c)(3) status is a suit to enjoin tax-
ation). The AIA and DJA thus withhold jurisdiction over plain-
tiffs’ claims.
1. 	Defendants’ lead argument is that the AIA does not limit
a federal court’s jurisdiction if the government agrees to an in-
junction as part of a settlement. Doc. 84 at 7–8. That argument
fails. The AIA’s and DJA’s tax-suit provisions are jurisdictional,
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and a court’s jurisdiction is determined from the operative com-
plaint. It cannot be waived or created by litigation conduct.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They pos-
sess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,
which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations
omitted). That rule applies to the AIA’s and DJA’s tax-suit provi-
sions because they are jurisdictional. Rivero v. Fid. Invs., Inc., 1
F.4th 340, 346 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The DJA prohibits courts from
providing declaratory relief with respect to federal taxes; that pro-
hibition is jurisdictional.”); Matter of Westmoreland Coal Co., 968
F.3d 526, 533 (5th Cir. 2020) (“When the AIA applies, it divests
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the
claims and parties in the operative complaint, not by consent dur-
ing litigation. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“[N]o action of the parties can confer
subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the con-
sent of the parties is irrelevant . . . .”); People’s Bank v. Calhoun,
102 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1880) (“[M]ere consent of parties cannot
confer upon a court of the United States the jurisdiction to hear
and decide a case.”). Entry of a judgment declaring rights or en-
joining conduct is an exercise of the judicial power even if the par-
ties consent to it. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944) (“It
is a judicial function and an exercise of the judicial power to ren-
der judgment on consent.”).
Indeed, enlisting the judicial power is why some litigants pre-
fer to settle cases not with dismissals but with consent judg-
ments—they bind defendants regardless of policy changes. See
Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1136 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (“An agency can abandon a rule so
long as the change in policy is not arbitrary and capricious; an
agency cannot escape a consent decree without the active partici-
pation and approval of the court. . . . [G]overnment by consent
decree 	inhibits 	Congressional 	influence 	on 	agency 	policy.”
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(footnote omitted)). But “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514
(1868).
The government cites no authority for its position that its own
consent to an injunction regarding a condition for tax benefits cre-
ates jurisdiction that the AIA or DJA otherwise denies. It first
cites United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258
(1947), but that decision involved the government as a plaintiff.
Id. at 265 (“The United States on November 18 filed a complaint
[to enjoin defendants from encouraging a strike].”). The issue was
whether a statute’s broad reference to employer-initiated suits to
enjoin certain labor practices kept the government from suing for
a remedy otherwise available to it. Id. at 270. Here, in contrast,
the government is the object of the claims filed by plaintiffs. The
jurisdictional bar here does not interfere with the IRS’s ability to
sue anyone.
Defendants then cite Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 220 (1957), but that case concerned the remedial limitation
concerning state courts in 28 U.S.C. § 2283, id. at 224, which “is
not a jurisdictional statute, but goes only to the granting of a par-
ticular form of equitable relief.” Matter of Mooney Aircraft, Inc.,
730 F.2d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 1984); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d
283, 287 (5th Cir. 1969) (“§ 2283 is non-jurisdictional in that it is
no more than a statutory enactment of the principle of comity for
application in the relationship between federal and state courts”).
That flexible principle of comity gives no license to rewrite Con-
gress’s statutory limits on a court’s jurisdiction.
Defendants’ final citation is also far afield. United States v.
Hercules, Inc., 961 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992), concerned statutory
limits on an executive officer’s authority. It did not discuss a fed-
eral court’s jurisdiction or purport to overrule the black-letter rule
that party consent does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on
federal courts. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702.
2. 	The DJA and AIA apply here because plaintiffs’ claims are
“in respect to” taxes and seek to restrain the threat of tax
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collection or assessment based on certain activity. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421; 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 748–49
(holding that the AIA precluded jurisdiction over a suit seeking
relief from the threatened loss of the plaintiff’s tax-exempt status
under § 501(c)(3)).
As relief on their claims, plaintiffs seek a declaration “that the
Johnson Amendment is unconstitutional” and an injunction
against defendants “prohibiting them from enforcing the Johnson
Amendment.” Doc. 20 at 56. As noted, the Johnson Amendment
is a condition of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and the tax-
deductibility of donations under § 170(c)(2). Relief enjoining the
Johnson Amendment’s enforcement or declaring that it does not
apply to specific conduct would thus directly bear on the amount
of tax that could be collected. It would prevent revoking an organ-
ization’s tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) based on the speci-
fied conduct, imposing an excise tax for that conduct as a prohib-
ited political expenditure under 26 U.S.C. § 4955, or seeking to
enjoin an organization under 26 U.S.C. § 7409 to abandon either
that conduct or tax-exempt status.
Put differently, if the plaintiffs here gave up their § 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status, none of the harms they allege could occur.
That is the same dynamic as in Bob Jones University, which held
the AIA’s jurisdictional bar applicable. See also Crenshaw Cnty.
Priv. Sch. Found. v. Connally, 474 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding that the AIA applied because, without tax-exempt status,
the plaintiff “will be liable for taxes on any net income realized by
it and contributors to it will not be permitted to deduct from their
gross income the amount of their contributions. Either event will
result in an increase in taxes.”).
Plaintiffs rely on a false dichotomy in arguing that “[i]t is their
speech, not their money, that is at stake here.” Doc. 83 at 4. Both
are implicated. The rights underlying plaintiffs’ claims for relief
arise under the First Amendment as well as the Fifth Amendment
and RFRA. Cf. Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 736 (addressing claims
under the rights to free exercise of religion, to free association,
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and to due process and equal protection of the laws). But the relief
sought is from the allegedly threatened enforcement of a condi-
tion for tax benefits: an organization’s tax-exempt status and a do-
nation’s tax deductibility. It is the potential enforcement of tax
conditions (the Johnson Amendment) that allegedly infringes the
legal rights invoked.
That distinguishes this case from others challenging tax-inde-
pendent burdens. For example, the plaintiffs in CIC Services chal-
lenged an information-reporting regime that imposed costs “sep-
arate and apart from” any potential tax liability that might accrue
based on the information—a matter “several steps removed”—
and which was enforced by a freestanding criminal penalty for fail-
ure to report. 593 U.S. at 220–22. This case does not involve any
penalty independent of tax status. It does not involve reporting
costs with no proximate relation to tax collection. The claims al-
lege that the Johnson Amendment cannot lawfully be applied to
condition tax consequences on certain expressive conduct.
Similarly, Linn v. Chivatero challenged the seizure of records
by federal agents and sought the return of that property. 714 F.2d
1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1983). The court had jurisdiction there be-
cause the litigant did not “challenge the propriety of any tax that
may be assessed against him” but instead only the government’s
seizure and use of records. Id. at 1283. As such, the status of the
government agents “as tax officials is incidental to the underlying
complaint.” Id. at 1282. The opposite is true here. The complaint
seeks relief from potential enforcement of the Johnson Amend-
ment—a condition for tax advantages.
Linn in fact recognized several principles applicable here. The
Fifth Circuit noted that a plaintiff’s “decision to cast his lawsuit
in constitutional terms does not mean that the Anti-Injunction
Act is inapplicable.” Id. That overcomes plaintiffs’ appeal to the
constitutional nature of their legal rights.
Linn also noted that the Fifth Circuit has “interpreted the Act
broadly: it is applicable not only to the assessment and collection
of taxes, but to ʻactivities which are intended to or may culminate
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in the assessment or collection of taxes’ as well.” Id. (quoting
Kemlon Prods. & Dev. Co. v. United States, 638 F.2d 1315, 1320 (5th
Cir.), modified on other grounds, 646 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1981)). En-
forcement of the Johnson Amendment—what is disputed here—
would directly affect the assessment or collection of taxes on in-
come that would otherwise be exempt or deductible.
As such, the AIA removes this court’s jurisdiction to issue in-
junctive relief in this “suit for the purpose of restraining the as-
sessment or collection of any tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). Declara-
tory relief is also outside this court’s jurisdiction. The DJA with-
holds jurisdiction to declare party rights “with respect to Federal
Taxes.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). And the DJA’s bar is “at least as
broad” as the AIA’s bar. McCabe v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 963, 965
(5th Cir. 1976).
Other fora, however, may be available. A refund suit could be
brought if a tax were ultimately collected. 26 U.S.C. § 7422; 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491. And an exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)
now allows a 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a) declaratory suit—available in
one of three courts headquartered in the District of Columbia—
if the IRS were to make any determination with respect to an or-
ganization’s § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. A dispute in that pos-
ture would also have the benefit of a specific set of facts upon
which the IRS made a determination.
3. 	The parties appeal to “a narrow, judicially created excep-
tion” to the AIA recognized by the Supreme Court in Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). That excep-
tion applies only if (1) “it is clear that under no circumstances
could the Government ultimately prevail” and (2) “equity juris-
diction otherwise exists.” Id. at 7. The first prong requires that
the plaintiff have a “certainty of success on the merits.” Bob Jones
Univ., 416 U.S. at 737. The second prong requires the plaintiff to
show that irreparable harm will occur absent an injunction—
“harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.” Daniels
Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579,
585 (5th Cir. 2013). These prongs define a “stringent” test, Bob
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Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 737, that is “most onerous . . . indeed,”
Connally, 474 F.2d at 1187.
As to the second prong, it is not obvious that the government
will ever assess an income tax against plaintiffs or impose any
other tax consequence under the Johnson Amendment. In any
event, after Bob Jones University, Congress provided the remedy
under 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a) of a pre-tax declaratory suit if the IRS
makes a determination about an organization’s § 501(c)(3) status.
The prospect of a taxpayer paying a tax that results in financial
ruin not fixable by a later tax refund—the reason for this narrow,
equitable exception—is thus not present.
The exception’s first prong is also not met. It requires that a
court adopt the “most liberal view of the law and the facts” that
favors the taxing authority. Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7. The
prong then requires a “certainty” that the government would col-
lect a tax doomed to be refunded. Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 737.
Given the open-textured nature of the legal provisions at issue
here and the wide array of potential facts discussed in the com-
plaint, the court is not prepared to find plaintiffs’ contentions so
undebatable as to foreclose any possibility of government success.
Cf. id. at 748 (holding that the “petitioner’s First Amendment,
due process, and equal protection contentions are sufficiently de-
batable to foreclose any notion that under no circumstances could
the Government ultimately prevail”) (quotation marks omitted).
The court of course reaches that decision “[w]ithout deciding the
merits.” Id. at 748–49.
4. 	Citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984), plain-
tiffs argue that 26 U.S.C. § 7428 “provides no remedy for the
chilling effect” on plaintiffs’ speech because they have not been
subject to an adverse § 501(c)(3) determination. Doc. 83 at 3–4.
That echoes the argument in Bob Jones University about the “pres-
sures operating on organizations facing revocation of § 501(c)(3)
status” before it occurs. 416 U.S. at 731. But the Supreme Court
there focused on taxes—the nature of the jurisdictional bar—not-
ing that a tax-refund suit was available and offered “a full, albeit
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delayed, opportunity to litigate” the applicability of § 501(c)(3)
conditions in light of a party’s constitutional rights. Id. at 746.
So, even as the law stood in Bob Jones University, it was “not
a case in which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial
review.” Id. Access to judicial review was then expanded by Con-
gress’s addition of § 7428(a)’s procedure for pre-tax declaratory
relief. Plaintiffs present arguments about the consequences of re-
quiring them to use that procedure. But Congress “is the appro-
priate body to weigh the relevant, policy-laden considerations,
such as the harshness of the present law, the consequences of an
unjustified revocation of § 501(c)(3) status, [and] the number of
organizations in any year threatened with such revocation.” Id. at
750. This court also need not decide whether such consequences
give plaintiffs standing under Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
573 U.S. 149 (2014), for Congress can withhold an inferior court’s
statutory jurisdiction to decide even Article III cases and contro-
versies. Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 746 (rejecting due-process
challenge to the AIA).
* * *
For the reasons explained above, this case is dismissed with-
out prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
So ordered by the court on March 31, 2026.
J. C A M P BE L L B A R K E R
United States District Judge
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