Solomon v. Anna Independent School District

4:25-cv-01303TxedApr 7, 2026

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
SHAWANDA SOLOMON,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANNA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-1303-
SDJ-AGD
MEMORANDUM ADOPTING THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Came on for consideration the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) of the
United States Magistrate Judge in this action, this matter having been heretofore
referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. On February 19, 2026,
the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	entered 	the 	Report, 	(Dkt. 	#27), 	recommending 	Plaintiff
Shawanda Solomon’s “Emergency Motion to Enforce Mandatory IDEA Stay-Put
Provision,” (Dkt. #21), “Rule 72(a) Objection to Magistrate’s Order [Dkt. #22] and
Motion for Expedited Ruling to Enforce Mandatory IDEA Stay Put Provision,” (Dkt.
#24), and “Emergency Motion to Enjoin Defendant from Holding Unauthorized
Administrative Proceedings Pending Resolution of [Dkt. #21] [#24],” (Dkt. #25), be
held in abeyance until Defendant had an opportunity to answer or otherwise appear
in the lawsuit. On March 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed an objection to the Report in
“Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Vacate Abeyance and Immediately Enforce 20
U.S.C. 	§ 	1415(j) 	and 	Objections 	Under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b) 	to 	Report 	and
Recommendation (DKT. #27)” (“Objection”) (Dkt. #29).
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In the Report, the Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiff had objected to a
previous report and made a motion in Plaintiff’s “Rule 72(a) Objection to Magistrate’s
Order [Dkt. #22] and Motion for Expedited Ruling to Enforce Mandatory IDEA Stay
Put Provision” (Dkt. #24) (Dkt. #27, at p. 8). The Magistrate Judge informed Plaintiff
in the Report that this violated Local Rule CV-7, which states that “[e]ach pleading,
motion, or response to a motion must be filed as a separate document, except for
motions for alternative relief…” (Dkt. #27, at p. 8). Moreover, Plaintiff recognized her
breach in her most recent Objection (Dkt. #29, at p. 9) (“While the Magistrate [Judge]
cites Local Rule CV-7(a) regarding combined filings, a local formatting preference
cannot override a Federal Rule. Under Haines v. Kerner, pro se pleadings must be
held to less stringent standards. The Court should have severed the Rule 72(a)
Objection and transmitted it to the District Judge immediately.”).
However, Plaintiff once again disregarded Local Rule CV-7 in her Objection
(See Dkt. #29). In her Objection, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and also asks this court to “[vacate] the order holding Plaintiff’s motions in abeyance;
[set aside] the February 11 Order as contrary to law under Rule 72(a); [declare] the
February 19, 2026, ARD meeting procedurally invalid and [void] any resulting IEP
revisions or timeline extensions; [enforce] the Stay-Put mandate by ordering the
district 	to 	maintain 	the 	January 	21, 	2025, 	IEP 	as 	the 	operative 	placement
immediately…” (Dkt. #29, at p. 26). Despite Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff must
comply with the court’s Local Rules. McCalley v. Olson, No. 4:21-CV00511-ALM-
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CAN, 2022 WL 18141391, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 4:21-CV-511, (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2023). This includes Local Rule CV-7.
Additionally, Plaintiff argues in her Objection that “[t]he Magistrate Judge’s]
Finding Regarding Prior Stay-Put Orders is Clearly Erroneous” (Dkt. #29, at p. 11).
Plaintiff bases this argument on the Magistrate Judge’s statement in the Report that
“[t]he court was first made aware of [prior stay-put orders] in Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion to Enforce Mandatory IDEA Stay-Put Provision (Dkt. #21)” (Dkt. #29, at p.
11). Plaintiff asserts that this was clearly erroneous because the prior Stay-Put orders
were included in Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” (Dkt. #9) and “Notice of Filing
Exhibits in Support of Emergency TRO” (Dkt. #12) (Dkt. #29, at p. 11).
Plaintiff claims that in her “Memorandum in Support of Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” (Dkt. #9), she “explicitly
discuss[ed] both the administrative proceedings and the stay-put orders” (Dkt. #29,
at p. 11). Based on her filings, those orders were signed by the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) on August 25, 2025, and October 2, 2025 (Dkt. #21, at p. 5). Nowhere
in Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction” (Dkt. #9), were those dates mentioned. Moreover,
on page five of the document, where Plaintiff points the court, there is no “explicit”
mention of those orders (Dkt. #9, at p. 5).
However, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff included these orders in her
“Notice of Filing Exhibits in Support of Emergency TRO,” like she claims in her
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Objection (Dkt. #12-2, at pp. 145-53). However, Plaintiff’s “Notice of Filing Exhibits
in Support of Emergency TRO” was 637 pages (Dkt. #12). Moreover, the Magistrate
Judge was not directed to these exhibits prior to Plaintiff filing her Emergency Motion
to Enforce Mandatory IDEA Stay-Put Provision (Dkt. #21), as the Magistrate Judge
stated in her Report (Dkt. #27, at p. 2). Importantly, Plaintiff did not direct the court’s
attention to the orders, and the court need not scour the record in search of such
evidence. Cf. Wease v. Ocwen Loan Serv., L.L.C., 915 F.3d 987, 996-97 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“It is not [the court’s] function to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a
motion for summary judgment; we rely on the nonmoving party to identify with
reasonable particularity the evidence upon which [it] relies.”) (citation omitted);
Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Judges are not like pigs,
hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”) (citation omitted); Prescott v. Denton Cnty. Jail,
No. 4:16-CV-879, 2025 WL 891871, at *10 n. 16 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 4:16-CV-879, 2025 WL 885850 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21,
2025) (“Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint is handwritten and over 40 pages long.
It is not this court's obligation to scour the complaint looking for factual support to
defeat the motion to dismiss.) Accordingly, the court’s finding was not clearly
erroneous.
Separately, Plaintiff’s Objection asserts that the Report “incorrectly applies
the four-factor Preliminary Injunction (PI) test to a Stay-Put motion. This is a clear
legal error. Under the IDEA, stay-put is a statutory command, not an equitable
remedy” (Dkt. #29, at p. 12). The current Report at issue did not apply the “four-
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factor” test, as Plaintiff asserts (Dkt. #27). Instead, Plaintiff seems to be complaining
about the Magistrate Judge’s prior Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #15). However,
it appears that Plaintiff fails to recognize that this Court already adopted that Report
and Recommendation (Dkt. #18). Plaintiff has already indicated her disagreement
with this Court’s decision, as evidenced by “Plaintiff’s Notice of Interlocutory Appeal”
(Dkt. #19). Accordingly, that issue is before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. This also applies to Plaintiff’s argument that the “Stay-Put is an
Exception to the Exhaustion Requirement” (Dkt. #29, at p. 14). As with Plaintiff’s
prior argument, this was addressed in the Magistrate Judge’s prior Report and
Recommendation (Dkt. #15), adopted by this Court (Dkt. #18), and appealed to the
Fifth Circuit (Dkt. #19).
The Court notes that in making the argument that the Magistrate Judge
“incorrectly applie[d] the four-factor Preliminary Injunction (PI) test to a Stay-Put
motion,” Plaintiff represented to the Court that the Fifth Circuit stated “[t]he stay-
put provision of the [IDEA] is a statutory injunction…which is to be applied without
the necessity of the parent proving the usual precursors to injunctive relief. Stacey G.
v. Pasadena ISD, 695 F.2d 949, 954 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added)” (Dkt. #29, at
p. 13). Upon review of that case, no such quote exists. Again, the Court reminds
Plaintiff that she has an obligation to adhere to the Local Rules. McCalley, 2022 WL
18141391, at *1. Namely, “[l]itigants remain responsible for the accuracy and quality
of 	legal 	documents 	produced 	with 	the 	assistance 	of 	technology…Litigants 	are
cautioned that certain technologies may produce factually or legally inaccurate
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content. If a litigant chooses to employ technology, the litigant continues to be bound
by the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and must review and verify any computer-
generated content to ensure that it complies with all such standards. See also Local
Rule AT-3(m).” Local Rule CV-11(g).
Finally, in her Objection, Plaintiff references M.S.’s “rights” at various points
(Dkt. #29, at pp. 5, 8, 19, 22, 26). For instance, Plaintiff states that the Magistrate
Judge’s “[p]rocedural preference for separate filings cannot supersede the Court's
mandatory duty to resolve a Stay-Put dispute, nor does it waive the Student’s right to
a timely Article III review of an automatic injunction” (Dkt. #29, at p. 8) (emphasis
added).1 At the beginning of this lawsuit, the Magistrate Judge ordered Plaintiff to
brief the court on whether the case was her own or M.S.’s (Dkt. #8, at p. 4). As a pro
se litigant, Plaintiff may not represent M.S. unless the case falls within the teachings
of Raskin on Behalf of J.D. v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 69 F.4th 280, 282 (5th Cir.
2023). 	Plaintiff 	filed 	“Plaintiff 	S.S.’s 	Response 	to 	Order 	Regarding 	Pro 	Se
Representation and Raskin Briefing” (Dkt. #11). Therein, Plaintiff asserted that
“Plaintiff [was] not seeking to prosecute M.S.’s substantive educational claims pro se”
(Dkt. #11, at p. 1). Plaintiff’s current Objection does not conform with that statement.
In fact, it suggests that Plaintiff is again attempting to represent M.S.’s rights pro se
(Dkt. #29, at pp. 5, 8, 19, 22, 26). If Plaintiff intends to assert claims on behalf of M.S.,
she must explain to the Court why she is able to do so under the Raskin test or retain
counsel to represent M.S.’s interests.
1 Local Rule CV-7 is not the Magistrate Judge’s “procedural preference.” It is a requirement that
litigants must follow in this jurisdiction, even pro se litigants. McCalley, 2022 WL 18141391, at *1.
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Having received the Report of the Magistrate Judge, considered Plaintiff’s
objection, (Dkt. #29), and having conducted a de novo review, the Court is of the
opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and
adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report as the findings and conclusions of the Court.
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Emergency Motion to Enforce
Mandatory 	IDEA 	Stay-Put 	Provision,” 	(Dkt. 	#21), 	“Rule 	72(a) 	Objection 	to
Magistrate’s Order [Dkt. #22] and Motion for Expedited Ruling to Enforce Mandatory
IDEA Stay Put Provision,” (Dkt. #24), and “Emergency Motion to Enjoin Defendant
from Holding Unauthorized Administrative Proceedings Pending Resolution of [Dkt.
#21] [#24],” (Dkt. #25), were properly HELD IN ABEYANCE until Defendant could
answer or otherwise appear in this lawsuit. On March 9, 2026, Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss and appeared in this action. (Dkt. #30). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
“Emergency Motion to Enforce Mandatory IDEA Stay-Put Provision,” (Dkt. #21),
“Rule 72(a) Objection to Magistrate’s Order [Dkt. #22] and Motion for Expedited
Ruling to Enforce Mandatory IDEA Stay Put Provision,” (Dkt. #24), and “Emergency
Motion to Enjoin Defendant from Holding Unauthorized Administrative Proceedings
Pending Resolution of [Dkt. #21] [#24],” (Dkt. #25), are no longer held in abeyance,
and may be resolved.
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