Riggins et al v. Grayson County, Texas et al

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
PAMELA RIGGINS, Individually, and
on Behalf of the Estate of HAYWOOD
RIGGINS, MELYNDA RIGGINS,
BRANDON RIGGINS, and KIRSTIE
RIGGINS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GRAYSON COUNTY, TEXAS, TYLER
LELIO, ERINN GRISOLIA,
CORPORAL GARCIA, MICHAEL
LEHMAN, REECE MILLER, and MAX
MOORE,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-592
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Sealed Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”)
(Dkt. #16). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the
Motion should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the death of a pretrial detainee (“Mr. Riggins”). Plaintiffs Pamela
Riggins (“Mrs. Riggins”), Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Mr. Riggins, Melynda
Riggins, Brandon Riggins, and Kirstie Riggins (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against
Defendants1 for the death of Mr. Riggins while in custody at Grayson County Jail (Dkt. #2).
1 As alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendants are Grayson County, Texas (“Grayson County”), Tyler Lelio
(“Lelio”), Erinn Grisolia (“Grisolia”), Corporal Garcia (“Garcia”), Michael Lehman (“Lehman”), Reece Miller
(“Miller”), and Max Moore (“Moore”) (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 5–11).
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The factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint relating to Mr. Riggins’s death proceed as
follows (Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 14–117). On June 2, 2023, Mr. Riggins was arrested for Driving While
Intoxicated and subsequently booked in the Grayson County Jail (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 24–35, 40–41).
Mr. Riggins was a severe alcoholic and upon being incarcerated, he began experiencing major
alcohol withdrawals, which quickly progressed into Delirium Tremens2 (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 50–60). The
Grayson County jails staff knew Mr. Riggins was withdrawing from alcohol and placed him in an
observation cell to be monitored (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 47). Defendants Garcia, Lehman, Miller, and Moore
failed to provide Mr. Riggins with medical care or attention despite knowing Mr. Riggins was
detoxing, experiencing Delirium Tremens by way of seizures, and suffering from incontinence
(Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 68, 80). Mr. Riggins suffered for three days inside the observation cell—not eating,
experiencing incontinence, developing bedsores from not moving, and seizing (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 77,
79–80, 114). On June 5, 2023, at 6:03 a.m., Mr. Riggins was pronounced dead after being found
unresponsive in his cell (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 90–96).
Plaintiffs contend Grayson County Jail’s policies, practices, and training for its personnel
required that inmates detoxing from alcohol and experiencing Delirium Tremens be placed in an
observation cell without medical attention until the withdrawals ended (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 111). Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants were responsible for the care and safety of Mr. Riggins as a pretrial detainee
and their conduct in refusing to provide medical care or attention to Mr. Riggins was
2 “‘Delirium tremens, or the “DTs,” affects roughly 5 percent of alcoholics in the withdrawal stage and about 30
percent of sufferers of rum fits. It generally makes its appearance within three to five days after drinking has ceased.
The standard signs of delirium tremens include agitation, fever, sweating, tachycardia and tremor. Patients become
so disoriented that they do not know what time it is or where they are. They suffer such confusion that memory
lapses block out both recent events and those long past. Vivid visual hallucinations are also common.’” Thompson v.
Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 453 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting 9 Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine P 59A.22(2) (Gray &
Gordy, eds., 3rd ed. 2000)).
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unconstitutional (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 113). Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Riggins’s death was
preventable (Dkt. #2 at p. 2).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, filed on June 3, 2025, specifically alleges the following causes of
action: (1) deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
against Defendants Lelio, Grisolia, Garcia, Lehman, Miller, and Moore pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) practice and custom of deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment against Defendant Grayson County, Texas pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) wrongful
death; and (4) survival action (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 118–255). On August 19, 2025, Defendants Grayson
County, Garcia, Lehman, Miller, and Moore filed their Motion3 urging the Court to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #16). On October 22, 2025, Plaintiffs responded
(Dkt. #23). On November 11, 2025, Defendants4 replied (Dkt. #28). The Motion is now ripe for
adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a “short
and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Each
claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
3 Defendants Lelio and Grisolia did not join the Motion or file a separate motion to dismiss in this matter.
4 Unless stated otherwise, the use of the term Defendants hereinafter refers to Grayson County, Garcia, Lehman,
Miller, and Moore.
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plaintiff’s complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City
of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the
complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency
of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and
disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine
if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or
elements.’” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This
evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
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complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
ANALYSIS
Defendants urge the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs
assert claims under § 1983, which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs raise two Fourteenth Amendment violation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(1) deliberate indifference to medical needs against Garcia, Lehman, Miller, and Moore
(the “Individual Defendants”); and (2) practice and custom of deliberate indifference against
Grayson County (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 118–236). The Individual Defendants and Grayson County argue
Plaintiffs cannot establish a valid claim under § 1983 and that the Individual Defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity (Dkt. #16 at pp. 7–27).
First, the Court will analyze whether Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the Individual
Defendants should be dismissed. Second, the Court will consider whether the Individual
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Third, the Court will determine whether Plaintiffs’
§ 1983 claims against Grayson County should be dismissed.
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I. Individual Defendants
The Court begins by determining whether Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges facts that show the
Individual Defendants violated Mr. Riggins’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. “The constitutional
rights of a pretrial detainee . . . flow from both the procedural and substantive due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Martinez v. City of North Richland Hills, 846 F. App’x
238, 241 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633,
639 (5th Cir. 1996)). “The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right ‘not to
have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining
officials.’” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457).
“To succeed on a deliberate-indifference claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) the official was ‘aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ and
(2) the official actually drew that inference.” Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380 (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Plaintiffs allege just that. First, Plaintiffs allege the Individual Defendants were
independently aware of facts from which they could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm
existed as it relates to Mr. Riggins’s medical condition while in the observation cell (Dkt. #2 at
¶¶ 151-57, 161–66). Specifically, Garcia, Lehman, and Miller knew Mr. Riggins was detoxing from
alcohol, experiencing Delirium Tremens, and having seizures (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 154–55), and Moore,
based on a conversation with Mrs. Riggins, knew Mr. Riggins was a severe alcoholic and
experiencing Delirium Tremens and incontinence (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 162–63).
Second, Plaintiffs allege the Individual Defendants actually drew that inference because
Mr. Riggins’s worsening medical condition while detoxing was so obvious and the need for medical
attention was so apparent that even a layman would recognize that Mr. Riggins required immediate
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medical care before his eventual death (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 158-60, 167–69). Plaintiffs point to another
inmate, Wesley Cox, who Plaintiffs allege is a layperson and observed Mr. Riggins after his booking
(Dkt. #23 at p. 16). Ms. Cox stated Mr. Riggins was confused, his condition became concerning to
other inmates, and they began begging jail staff to help him (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 45, 104; Dkt. #23 at
p. 16). Plaintiffs further allege the Individual Defendants knew Mr. Riggins was placed in an
observation cell because he was detoxing and needed to be monitored (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 159). Plaintiffs
also allege that because none of the Individual Defendants provided medical care or summoned
medical care for Mr. Riggins:
[H]e suffered numerous seizures, the physical pain and suffering associated with
those seizures and Delirium Tremens, the mental torment and anguish associated
with his agonizing, painful, and slow death over a three day period locked in an
observation cell as he withdrew from alcohol in front of these [Individual]
Defendants, and ultimately his death.
(Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 169–70).
Thus, Plaintiffs have alleged the Individual Defendants were aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that Mr. Riggins was in substantial risk of serious harm and, despite
knowing this, they did not summon medical care until he was found unresponsive in his observation
cell. In accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and viewing those facts in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible deliberate-indifference
claim for relief against the Individual Defendants. Bowlby, 681 F.3d at 219.
II. Qualified Immunity
The Court next addresses whether Plaintiffs’ deliberate-indifference claims against the
Individual Defendants are barred by qualified immunity. Public officials whose positions entail the
exercise of discretion may be protected from personal liability by the defense
of qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When a defendant asserts the
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defense of qualified immunity and has established that the alleged actions were conducted
pursuant to the exercise of his discretionary authority, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to rebut
this defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002).
Courts have historically conducted a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, courts
must determine whether a “constitutional right would have been violated on the facts
alleged.” Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2004). Second, if a constitutional right
was violated, courts then determines whether “the defendant’s actions violated clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. The
Supreme Court instructs district courts “to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Here, Defendants argue “it is clear that Mr. Riggins’s constitutional rights were not
violated by any Defendant” (Dkt. #16 at p. 24), and “Plaintiff[s] improperly attempt[] to attribute
a complete collection of knowledge of every symptom Mr. Riggins could have been experiencing to
each individual officer” (Dkt. #16 at p. 26). Specifically, Defendants note that Plaintiffs allege
Moore only knew about two instances of incontinence, Garcia was merely stationed in the same
area in which Mr. Riggins was held, and Lehman and Miller were on duty in the same area in which
Mr. Riggins was housed on the date that he was found unresponsive (Dkt. #16 at pp. 26–27).
Finally, Defendants argue that there are no facts in the Complaint “demonstrating that these
officers knew or should have known how Mr. Riggins was feeling that day” and “Plaintiffs’ well
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pleaded facts demonstrate minimal involvement on the part of each named Defendant with no
demonstration of individual liability” (Dkt. #16 at p. 27).
Based on the analysis in the previous section, the Court finds that these arguments present
an inaccurate summary of Plaintiffs’ allegations found in the Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege
that Mr. Riggins’s constitutional rights were violated when each of the Individual Defendants
refused to treat him and ignored his medical needs, or at a minimum engaged in conduct that clearly
evinces a wanton disregard for Mr. Riggins’s serious medical needs—namely, Mr. Riggins was
seizing caused by Delirium Tremens, not eating, experiencing incontinence, and developing
bedsores from not moving (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 121-171). Taken as true, these allegations support
Plaintiffs’ claim that Mr. Riggins’s Fourteenth Amendment rights—namely, not to have his serious
medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining official—were violated.
Thus, the first prong of the analysis has been sufficiently alleged. Flores, 381 F.3d at 395; Easter v.
Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006).
Next, the Court addresses whether the Individual Defendants’ actions violated clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The
law is established if a reasonable official would understand that their conduct violates the asserted
right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A government official’s conduct violates
clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, “[t]he contours of the right
[are] sufficiently clear” such that every “reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right.” Id. The clearly established inquiry does not require a case directly on
point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate. See id.
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The Fifth Circuit has admitted that its “deliberate-indifference cases are not a paradigm of
consistency.” Dyer, 964 F.3d at 383. As the Fifth Circuit did in Dyer, the Court will consider
Thompson v. Upshur County, which involves a deliberate-indifference claim arising out of a
detainee’s death in jail from a seizure brought on by Delirium Tremens. 245 F.3d 447, 452–54
(5th Cir. 2001). In Thompson, the detainee was shaking, sweating profusely, and hallucinating. Id.
The detainee was observed by medical staff that confirmed his alcohol detoxing. Id. at 453. The
detainee refused to go to the hospital and signed a refusal of medical treatment form. Id.
The detainee was placed in a special “detox” cell to be observed. Id. The detainee’s
condition worsened, and he began to collide with objects in his cell, sometimes falling and striking
his head against the window, floor or concrete bench of his cell. Id. at 454. Eventually, the detainee
appeared to calm down. Id. The sergeant jailer at this time discussed the detainee’s condition with
the incoming jail staff that would relieve her from observing the detainee. Id. For various reasons,
the sergeant jailer instructed the staff not to provide the detainee with medical attention. Id. The
detainee then had a seizure, stopped breathing, and died. Id. An autopsy revealed the cause of
death to be the result of Delirium Tremens. Id.
In affirming the district court’s decision to deny the sergeant jailer’s qualified immunity
argument, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “all reasonable jailers would have recognized the
constitutional obligation to summon medical assistance well before [the detainee] died.” Id. at 464.
The Fifth Circuit also refused to accept the argument that “[the detainee’s] refusal of medical care
in Marion County could be reasonably understood to absolve [the sergeant jailer] of her
constitutional duty to summon professional medical assistance.” Id.
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The Court notes the similarities between Thompson and the present case. With respect to
the deliberate-indifference claim raised against the Individual Defendants, Plaintiffs allege a non-
party individual, Corporal Gentry, asked about Mr. Riggins’s status, to which the booking officers
responded that he was detoxing and having seizures (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 151–53). Plaintiffs contend that
the booking officers that were aware Mr. Riggins was detoxing from alcohol and experiencing
Delirium Tremens by way of seizure and incontinence were Garcia, Lehman, and Miller (Dkt. #2
at ¶ 155). Garcia, Lehman, and Miller were stationed at Mr. Riggins’s observation cell three, and
Plaintiffs allege that Garcia, Lehman, and Miller failed to provide Mr. Riggins with proper medical
care or attention despite knowing he was at risk of serious harm medical condition (Dkt. #2
at ¶¶ 156–57).
With respect to Moore, Plaintiffs allege that the day after Mr. Riggins was detained, Moore
spoke with Mrs. Riggins to inform her that Mr. Riggins was experiencing incontinence (Dkt. #2
at ¶ 161). Mrs. Riggins told Moore that Mr. Riggins did not have a history of incontinence (Dkt. #2
at ¶ 162). Plaintiffs contend that by this day, Mr. Riggins was already placed in observation cell
three and jail staff, including Moore, knew Mr. Riggins was a severe alcoholic and experiencing
Delirium Tremens (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 163–64). Thus, Plaintiffs allege that despite knowing Mr. Riggins
needed medical attention, Moore failed to provide it (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 164–65).
Like the detainee in Thompson, Plaintiffs further allege that Mr. Riggins remained inside of
the observation cell for three days —not eating, experiencing incontinence, developing bedsores
from not moving, and having seizures (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 77, 79–80, 114). On June 5, 2023, at 6:03 a.m.,
Mr. Riggins was pronounced deceased after being found unresponsive in his cell (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 90–
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96). Mr. Riggins’s autopsy report lists the cause of death as “Complications of chronic alcoholism”
(Dkt. #2 at ¶ 98).
Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to establish the second prong of the
qualified immunity analysis. Specifically, the Individual Defendants admit they knew Mr. Riggins
was detoxing and someone may have known he was experiencing seizures but Mr. Riggins was being
consistently monitored (Dkt. #16 at p. 25). Defendants further contend that there was no moment
where Mr. Riggins was in “critical need of help” to which the Individual Defendants did not
respond (Dkt. #24 at p. 25). Defendants finally assert that Mr. Riggins never asked for help, and
since he was unaware of his own medical condition, it would be unreasonable to impute knowledge
of a serious risk of harm on non-medically trained jail personnel, such as the Individual Defendants
(Dkt. #24 at p. 25). Defendants maintain that, at most, Plaintiffs’ allegations amount to the
Individual Defendants’ negligence (Dkt. #16 at p. 26).
The Court is not convinced by Defendants’ arguments and Thompson does not support the
assertion that it was Mr. Riggins’s duty to actively ask for help to ensure his constitutional rights
were protected and that their monitoring was sufficient to absolve the Individual Defendants of
liability (Dkt. #24 at p. 25). 245 F.3d at 447. Indeed, the facts, as alleged, suggest Mr. Riggins was
in critical need of help while being monitored by the Individual Defendants in the observation cell,
he was unable to ask for help, his medical condition worsened, and he did not receive the medical
care he needed before dying (Dkt. #2 at ¶¶ 77, 79–80, 114). Moreover, in Thompson, the detainee in
that case refused medical treatment in writing, and still, the Fifth Circuit found the detainee’s
refusal of medical care did not absolve the jailer of her constitutional duty to summon professional
medical assistance. 245 F.3d 447, 452–54 (emphasis added). Thus, like the Fifth Circuit held in
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Dyer, “Thompson defines clearly established law in sufficient detail to have notified the [jailer] that
their actions were unconstitutional.” 964 F.3d at 384. Based on the facts as alleged, the Individual
Defendants’ actions violated the clearly established constitutional rights of pretrial detainees,
which a reasonable officer or jailer would have known.
Accordingly, because the Court cannot find that Individual Defendants’ conduct was
objectively reasonable, the Individual Defendants are not entitled to their qualified immunity
defense to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for the violation of Mr. Riggins’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.
III. Municipal Liability
Finally, the Court addresses whether Grayson County can be held liable for upholding a
practice and custom of deliberate indifference in violation of Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants
contend that Plaintiffs failed to allege Grayson County—a municipality—can be held liable for the
alleged violations of Mr. Riggins’s constitutional rights.
“To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the deprivation of a
federally protected right caused by action taken ‘pursuant to an official municipal policy.’” Valle v.
City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978)). To do so, “[a] plaintiff must identify: (1) an official policy (or custom), of which
(2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional
violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Id. at 541–42 (quoting Pineda v. City of
Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). These three elements “are necessary to distinguish
individual violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly
identified as actions of the government itself.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th
Cir. 2001). A plaintiff asserting § 1983 claims is required to plead specific facts, not merely
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conclusory allegations, with sufficient particularity to meet all elements of recovery. See Fraire v.
City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992).
Defendants argue that “the pleadings clearly show that Mr. Riggins’s constitutional rights
were not violated;” thus, “Plaintiffs’ claims against [Grayson] County must fail regardless of the
legal theory under which they arise” (Dkt. #16 at p. 31). Defendants continue that “[e]ven if
Plaintiffs had alleged that Mr. Riggins’s constitutional rights were violated, however, they have not
sufficiently pleaded a cause of action against Grayson County” (Dkt. #16 at p. 31).
The Court disagrees, and to begin, Defendants identify the following purported policies,
customs, or practices in the Grayson County Jail at issue in Plaintiffs’ Complaint:
(1) failure to provide medical treatment to inmates suffering withdrawals from
alcohol; (2) failure to provide medical treatment to inmates experiencing seizures
from alcohol withdrawal; (3) failure to provide medical treatment to inmates
experiencing Delirium Tremens; (4) failure to provide medical treatment to inmates
experiencing incontinence from alcohol withdrawal and Delerium Tremens; and (5)
failure to adequately monitor inmates being held in the observation cells due to
detoxing from alcohol; (6) failing to train jailers on how to respond when an inmate
is experiencing Delerium Tremens; (7) failing to train jailers on how to respond
when an inmate is suffering seizures; (8) failing to train jailers on how to respond
when an inmate is experiencing withdrawals from alcohol that involve incontinence,
not eating, not moving, and seizures; (9) maintaining a policy and practice that
inmates experiencing withdrawals from drugs and alcohol would just be left in an
observation cell without medical treatment until they became better on their own;
(10) not having a medical doctor available in the jail to examine or treat inmates
detoxing from alcohol and experiencing withdrawals and Delirium Tremens; (11)
not having a detox program or implementing withdrawal management protocols for
inmates detoxing from alcohol and experiencing withdrawals; and (12) not
providing medication or vitamin supplements for inmates detoxing from alcohol and
experiencing withdrawals.
(Dkt. #16 at p. 31; Dkt. #2 at ¶ 228).
Plaintiffs also identify the policymaker as Sheriff Tom Watts (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 216), and
Plaintiffs allege Grayson County’s “policies and/or customs were the moving force leading to the
constitutional violation of failing to provide adequate medical care for Mr. Riggins causing his
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injuries and ultimately his death” (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 226). Specifically, Plaintiffs contend Grayson
County’s “policies, practices, customs, and de facto policies caused Defendants Lelio, Grisolia,
Garcia, Lehman, Miller, and Moore to show their subjective deliberate indifference toward Mr.
Riggins’ health and safety” despite being “aware of Mr. Riggins’ suffering” (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 234).
Plaintiffs further contend that because of these policies and customs, “Mr. Riggins was denied
adequate medical care in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and he suffered physical injury, physical pain and suffering, mental
anguish and emotional distress, and died” (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 235). Plaintiffs go on to allege that there
are other instances of inmates suffering from withdrawals in the Grayson County Jail and further
allege this demonstrates the implementation of an unconstitutional policy and practice of Grayson
County under Sheriff Tom Watts (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 115). Plaintiffs specifically identify Lorelei Palmore,
another detainee in the Grayson County Jail, who was detoxing while in custody, not provided
medical care or treatment, and died on April 22, 2022 (Dkt. #2 at ¶ 116).
Taking these allegations as true, Plaintiffs have pleaded specific facts to meet all elements
of their § 1983 claim against Grayson County for a practice and custom of deliberate indifference
in violation of Fourteenth Amendment.
* * *
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ Sealed Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #16) is hereby
DENIED.
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16
It is further ORDERED that the Parties file a proposed joint scheduling order within
fourteen (14) days of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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