Rezene v. HARIBO Of America, Inc. et al

4:24-cv-00759TxedDec 16, 2025

Full text

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
NATRAN REZENE,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARIBO OF AMERICA, INC. and
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-759
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are two Motions: (1) Defendant Haribo of America, Inc.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. #51); and (2) Defendant Michael
Best & Friedrich LLP’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. #54)
(collectively, the “Motions”). Having considered the Motions, the relevant pleadings, and the
applicable law, the Court finds as follows:
Defendant Haribo of America, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in
Support (Dkt. #51) should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Defendant Michael Best & Friedrich LLP’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Brief in Support (Dkt. #54) should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case has been thoroughly examined in this Court’s prior
ruling and will be repeated only as is necessary here (Dkt. #61). Pertinent to the pending Motion is
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
2
Plaintiff’s recruitment by Defendant Haribo of America, Inc. (“Haribo”) as the company’s “Head
of Sales Development,” a role created specifically for her (Dkt. #32 at ¶ 32; Dkt. #51 at p. 9).1
Plaintiff began working for Haribo on July 19, 2021, and remained with the company for
over one year. While there, she took on multiple roles and experienced a wide variety of events,
including those which would later form the foundation of the present lawsuit. Following personnel
changes, restructuring, and questionable interactions with fellow employees, Plaintiff became
determined to pursue a policy of severance with Haribo (Dkt. #64 at p. 9). Accordingly, on March
11, 2023, Plaintiff emailed a complaint letter to Haribo’s management and its German parent
company, seeking to benefit from a “mutual separation” with the company and alleging race
discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation (See Dkt. #32 at ¶ 93; Dkt. #51 at p. 13; Dkt. #64-
1 at p. 34). About two months later, on May 12, 2023, Haribo granted Plaintiff’s request for
separation, listing her request as the sole reason for her termination (Dkt. #51 at p. 16). By June 8,
2023, Plaintiff had declined at least one of Haribo’s severance offers, and both parties could not
agree on an appropriate resolution to Plaintiff’s “mutual separation” proposal (Dkt. #51-1 at p. 48).
Although Plaintiff had successfully parted with her yearly salary at that time, she was not
so quick to part with her company property. Instead, Plaintiff remained in extended and strategic
possession of a company-owned Mercedes-Benz GLB 250, an Apple iPhone 12, a Dell Latitude
7400 Laptop, and various other items of property (the “Company Property”) (Dkt. #51 at p. 17).
In the weeks following Plaintiff’s termination, Haribo turned to Michael Best & Friedrich LLP
(“Michael Best”) for assistance in retrieving the Company Property. Communication between
1 Plaintiff was approached for recruitment multiple times by Haribo and was ultimately hired shortly after she “had
the pleasure of being one of the speakers at a conference covering the topic of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion”
(Dkt. #51-1 at p. 83).
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 2 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
3
Plaintiff and Michael Best quickly revealed Plaintiff’s intent to hold the Company Property subject
to her “voice [being] properly heard” and the subsequent execution of an “amicable separation
agreement,” or until Plaintiff could use the items to defend herself at trial (Dkt. #54-1 at pp. 18,
20). Following Plaintiff’s silence in the face of five separate written requests for the Company
Property, Michael Best contacted two police stations about the issue, indicating that Plaintiff had
“stole[n] the company’s property” (Dkt. #51 at p. 16; Dkt. #54 at p. 21). The affair ended when
law enforcement officers confronted Plaintiff about the Company Property at her home (allegedly
in front of her daughter) and the vehicle was repossessed (Dkt. #51 at p. 16). The rest of the
Company Property remains in Plaintiff’s possession at the time of this opinion (Dkt. #51 at p. 34).
Later that year, on or around November 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
and retaliation with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) (Dkt. #32
at ¶ 120). The EEOC notified Plaintiff of her right to sue on May 23, 2024 (Dkt. #32 at ¶ 121).
Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint against Defendants on August 21, 2024 (Dkt. # 1). After a year
of litigation, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint against Defendants on May 16, 2025
(Dkt. #32), asserting multiple claims against both. Against Haribo specifically, Plaintiff sought
recovery for: (1) discrimination based on race and sex under Title VII and Texas Labor Code
§ 21.051 (Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 123–30); (2) discrimination based on disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) (Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 131–37); (3) racial discrimination under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 138–45); (4) retaliation under Title VII and Texas Labor Code
§ 21.055 (Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 154–59); and (5) hostile work environment harassment (Dkt. #32 at
¶¶ 146–53). Against both Haribo and Michael Best, Plaintiff sought recovery for: (1) defamation
(Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 160–66); (2) malicious prosecution (Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 171–74); and (3) intentional
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 3 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
4
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 167–70).2 Plaintiff’s claims arise from five
alleged incidents, listed below in approximate chronological order:
(a) Incident 1: In April 2022, a black Haribo employee informed
Plaintiff that a white director of human resources employee had
repeatedly used the word “lynched” during meetings in the
presence of black associates (Dkt. #32 at pp. 8–9; Dkt. #51-1 at p. 16).
Specifically, the white employee stated that he would personally “be
lynched” if a report was not submitted by the black employee by a
specific date (Dkt. #51-2 at p. 35).
(b) Incident 2: In December 2022, Plaintiff was allegedly demoted and
asked to take on the workload associated with an additional senior
position (Dkt. #32 at ¶ 79).
(c) Incident 3: Prior to the end of 2022, Plaintiff observed a male
employee complain that men should not be excluded from attending
a “girls night out” dinner (Dkt. #51-2 at p. 23; Dkt. #51-1 at p. 32).
(d) Incident 4: In February 2023, Plaintiff witnessed an employee
director of Haribo attend a dinner with other employees and ask the
waiter to bring a cake to two presumably heterosexual male
employees. According to Plaintiff, the employee director
subsequently informed the waiter in a joking fashion that the two
men were “gay” and that it was their anniversary (See Dkt. #32 at
¶¶ 82–84). As the waiter left, one of the subjects of the joke
“laughed amusingly with the other mostly white employees”
(Dkt. #32 at ¶ 84).
(e) Incident 5: On March 9, 2023, Plaintiff’s assigned mentor employee
encouraged her to wear more clothes like her “pink suit” she had
previously worn at a sales meeting. The mentor stated that it would
be useful for future meetings, reportedly telling Plaintiff that her
pink suit ensures “you will stand out—that’s the type of impact you
want to have in the business life” (Dkt. #32 at ¶¶ 90–92).
After over a year of litigation, Defendants filed the present Motions seeking summary
judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims (Dkt. #51; Dkt. #54). On October 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed her
2 Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim was dismissed by this Court in a previous ruling but has nevertheless
re-appeared on the face of the Motions (Dkt. #61).
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 4 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
5
Response (Dkt. #64). Defendants filed their Joint Reply on October 27, 2025 (Dkt. #72). The
matter is now ripe for adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Summary judgment
is proper under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are
material. Id. The trial court “must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment.” Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d
598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its
motion and identifying “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant bears the burden
of proof on a claim or defense for which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come forward
with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or
defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Where the nonmovant bears
the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by showing that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmovant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v. Dall. Morning News,
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 5 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
6
Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has carried its burden, the nonmovant
must “respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Byers, 209 F.3d at 424 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49). A
nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or
arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden. Rather,
the Court requires “significant probative evidence” from the nonmovant to dismiss a request for
summary judgment. In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Court must consider
all of the evidence but “refrain from making any credibility determinations or weighing the
evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS
I. Sex and Race Discrimination under Title VII
After careful review of the record and the arguments, the Court is not convinced that
Defendants have met their burden demonstrating that there is no material issue of fact as to
Plaintiff’s Title VII claims entitling Defendants to judgment as a matter of law.
II. Racial Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
After careful review of the record and the arguments, the Court is not convinced that
Defendants have met their burden demonstrating that there is no material issue of fact as to
Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim entitling Defendants to judgment as a matter of law.
III. Retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and Texas Labor Code § 21.055
Plaintiff centers her retaliation claims on four issues. First, she claims Haribo demoted her
in December 2022 (Dkt. #32 at ¶ 156). Second, she claims that the pay raise she received from
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 6 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
7
Haribo was less than what other non-black employees received (Dkt. #32 at ¶ 156). Third, she
claims that Haribo dissuaded employees (or, at a minimum, herself ) from making complaints about
discrimination (Dkt. #32 at ¶ 157), and finally, she claims that she was involuntarily terminated
(Dkt. #64 at p. 19). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s alleged involuntary termination is
sufficient to defeat Haribo’s motion for summary judgment, it addresses Plaintiff’s retaliation
claims in light of the alleged involuntary termination alone.
“[D]iscrimination claims brought under . . . the Texas Labor Code are evaluated under the
same analytical framework as Title VII claims.” Jackson, Jr. v. Corp. Serv. Co., No. CV H-11-4404,
2013 WL 11309365, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2013) (first citing Black v. Pan Am. Labs., L.L.C., 646
F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2011); then citing Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2010)),
aff’d sub nom. Jackson v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 601 F. App’x 280 (5th Cir. 2015). Title VII’s anti–
retaliation provision “‘forbids an employer from discriminating against an employee or job
applicant because that individual opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII or made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in a Title VII proceeding or investigation.’” Id. (quoting
§ 2000e–3(a)). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, district courts apply “the
familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework” to determine whether a plaintiff’s
retaliation claim survives summary judgment. Brown v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 406 F. App’x 837,
839 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1112 (5th Cir. 1998).
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
providing evidence of three elements, namely that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in an activity protected
by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (3) a
causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Id. at
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 7 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
8
840. “Once the plaintiff makes his prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the
defendant-employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing
McInnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2000)). If the employer
successfully articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action,
“the burden then shifts back upon the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the articulated reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id.
Haribo contends that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework for two reasons: (1) there was no “protected activity” prior to her termination; and (2)
there was no adverse employment action because Haribo honored Plaintiff’s request for a “mutual
separation” (Dkt. #51 at pp. 31–32). At the outset of its analysis, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff
has offered uncontroverted evidence that she made a complaint to Haribo regarding race
discrimination, gender discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment on March 11, 2023
(Dkt. #64 at pp. 19–20). Thus, Haribo’s first argument, that Plaintiff took no protected activity
prior to her termination on May 12, 2023, is without merit. See, e.g., Dixon v. Moore Wallace, Inc.,
236 F. App’x 936, 937 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (an employee engaged in a protected
activity under Title VII when she sent a letter to the human resources manager complaining of
race discrimination).
Haribo’s second argument is also insufficient to support summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
retaliation claims. Both parties recognize that Plaintiff’s complaint to Haribo contained the
following language: “to be very clear this not a letter of resignation but a request to begin a mutual
separation” (Dkt. #51 at p. 23 (emphasis added)). Both parties further recognize that Plaintiff sent
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 8 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
9
a follow-up email to Haribo asking for an “immediate investigation” into the alleged discrimination,
along with an “amicable separation request” (Dkt. #51-1 at p. 87). The parties disagree as to
whether her subsequent termination can constitute an “adverse employment action” necessary for
Plaintiff to succeed under Title VII (Dkt. #51 at p. 24; Dkt. #64 at pp. 19–20).3
While an employer’s acceptance of a voluntary resignation is not an adverse employment
action, this Court is cautious to unilaterally deem Plaintiff’s March 11, 2023 letter as a
“resignation” capable of precluding her retaliation claims. See Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d
556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A resignation is actionable under Title VII . . . only if the resignation
qualifies as a constructive discharge.”). Although Plaintiff requested separation from Haribo, she
expressly disclaimed any interpretation of her notice or follow-up email as a “resignation” and
further attempted to condition the termination of her employment on the receipt of certain benefits
(Dkt. #51 at p. 23). Plaintiff’s notice and accompanying email to Haribo thus suggest the presence
of motives beyond mere resignation and together present an issue ripe for jury determination.4 As
a result, summary judgment is improper on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
3 Plaintiff further complained that Haribo temporarily isolated her from other employees and its internal systems as
the company investigated her discrimination claims (Dkt. #64 at pp. 19–20). Defendant has introduced evidence
that Plaintiff was placed on two months of paid leave following her notice of alleged discrimination (Dkt. #72 at
p. 16). Because these actions cannot constitute an “adverse employment action” under Title VII, the Court sees fit
to simply mark them and move on. See, e.g., Knatt v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of E. Baton Rouge Par., 327 F. App’x 472,
484 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The entire peer review cannot be an adverse employment action, because ‘an adverse
employment action consists of ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging,
promoting, and compensating.’” (quoting Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 282 (5th Cir. 2004)).
4 District courts in other circuits have considered this issue in a similar fashion. See Zarling v. Abbott Labs., No.
21-CV-23 (MJD/JFD), 2023 WL 2652575, at *6, 13 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2023) (denying summary judgment based
on a fact issue regarding termination or acceptance of a “mutual separation” request); see also Franklin v. Maximus,
Inc., No. 21-CV-4367, 2024 WL 5077767, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2024) (marking the difference between an
employer accepting an employee’s severance agreement offer and an employer terminating the employee), aff’d,
No. 25-1038, 2025 WL 3175260 (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025).
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 9 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
10
IV. Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff supports her hostile work environment claim with the five incidents previously
listed and discussed in this opinion. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim,
and that a jury could not find that she was subjected to an objectively hostile work environment on
the basis of her race, sex, or gender.
To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) she belongs to a
protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained
of was based on her membership in the protected group; (4) the harassment complained of affected
a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known
of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. Smith v. Harvey, 265 F.
App’x 197, 202 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Importantly, the workplace must be permeated with
discriminatory behavior that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a discriminatorily hostile
or abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (citing Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 67 (1986)). This standard “can be determined only by looking
at all the circumstances, which may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. Finally, “[t]he
alleged conduct must be objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive.” West v. City of Houston,
960 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added).
Haribo argues that summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment
claim for two reasons: first, that Plaintiff has not introduced evidence to indicate the presence of
any “severe or pervasive conduct based on race or sex that affected a term or condition” of her
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 10 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
11
employment beyond her subjective opinion; and second, that Haribo did not fail to take prompt
remedial action (Dkt. #51 at pp. 29–30; Dkt. #72 at pp. 11–12). Of the two, Haribo’s first argument
more readily supports summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, as
Plaintiff has raised evidence in her Response suggesting that the in-office use of the phrase
“lynched” occurred at least twice after an employee informed Haribo’s human resources
department of the issue (Dkt. #64-1 at p. 42). Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim thus
stands or falls according to the severity and pervasiveness of the facts supporting the alleged
workplace harassment.
The Court begins its analysis of Haribo’s remaining argument by noting that Plaintiff meets
the first element of a hostile work environment claim by virtue of being a black woman. See, e.g.,
Noiel v. Roseland Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 24-40520, 2025 WL 1219196, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2025)
(per curiam). However, the five incidents brought forward by Plaintiff, considered together, are
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in support of the second and fourth elements of
her hostile work environment claim, that she was “subjected to unwelcome harassment” sufficient
to “affect[] a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” Harvey, 265 F. App’x at 202. This
finding is predicated on the Supreme Court’s repeated holding that “simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
788 (1998) (emphasis added). Each incident complained of by Plaintiff is at most “‘the equivalent
of a mere utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive feelings,’ but [does] not suffice to survive
summary judgment.” Id. at 744–45 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22).
Furthermore, Plaintiff “cannot show that her harassment was frequent or pervasive,” as every issue
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 11 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
12
she complains of is either “isolated or infrequent.” West, 960 F.3d at 742 (finding summary
judgment appropriate where incidents complained of occurred “once,” “twice,” or merely
“occasionally”).
For instance, the first alleged incident of harassment concerns Plaintiff’s belief that a white,
naturalized immigrant employee had used the term “hanged” and “lynched” in the presence of a
certain black employee (Dkt. #32 at pp. 8–9). However, the evidence presented indicates that the
white employee was using the term in reference to his own person in a self-derogatory manner, and
that the term was not used more than three or four times over a period of months (Dkt. #51-2 at
p. 35). As the Supreme Court has noted, “‘mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which
engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ would not affect the conditions of employment to [a]
sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII.’” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (1986) (first quoting
Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971); then quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). The remaining incidents involve a subjectively insufficient pay
raise, an increased workload assignment, and a string of one-off comments made by different
employees over the course of a year. Furthermore, although the workplace comments appear to
form the backbone of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, the evidence presented indicates
that they are all either indirect, innocent in nature and effect, or simply disconnected from
Plaintiff’s membership in a protected class or her employment at Haribo altogether. Plaintiff’s five
alleged incidents, taken together, are thus utterly insufficient to support her hostile work
environment claim in the context of summary judgment. See Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts
of State of Tex., 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999).
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 12 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
13
The Fifth Circuit’s emphasis that “Title VII was only meant to bar conduct that is so severe
and pervasive that it destroys a protected classmember’s opportunity to succeed in the workplace”
is not lost on this Court. Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of State of Tex., 168 F.3d 871, 874
(5th Cir. 1999). In its Motion, Haribo raised evidence that Plaintiff was retained through multiple
employment restructuring protocols, provided a pay raise according to her workplace evaluation,
and received an “Achieves Expectations” rating from her supervisor (Dkt. #51 at p. 29). In
response to Haribo’s presentation, Plaintiff stated her conclusory opinion that “the ongoing
harassment affected her ability to continue her employment” and that she became “anxious and
was intimidated and believed that by making a complaint against the executives of the company
there was little chance she could continue in her employment” (Dkt. #64 at p. 18). None of
Plaintiff’s allegations rise above mere conjecture and are wholly unsupported by any facts to bring
them out of the realm of Plaintiff’s subjective opinion. In light of the Fifth Circuit’s repeated
“caution[] that ‘conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate
to satisfy’ the nonmovant's burden in a motion for summary judgment,” this Court finds that
Plaintiff’s blanket statements have failed to raise a fact issue on either the objective nature of the
alleged harassment or the impact that any such alleged harassment had on her employment. Ramsey
v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 79
F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 13 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
14
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Haribo created or tolerated a hostile or abusive work environment.5 A jury could not
rationally infer that the conduct of Haribo was objectively “sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile work environment,” and her claim must
therefore be dismissed with prejudice on that ground. Jackson v. Cheddar’s Inc., No. CIV.A.6:02-
CV-101-C, 2003 WL 23315465, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2003).
V. Disability Discrimination
In her Response, Plaintiff stated that she “concedes her Americans with Disability Act
claim” (Dkt. #64 at p. 6 n.1). Because “[a] party’s concession of an issue means the issue is waived
and may not be revived,” further review Plaintiff’s ADA claim is unnecessary. Smith v. United
States, 328 F.3d 760, 770 (5th Cir. 2003).
VI. Defamation
Plaintiff’s defamation claim addresses Defendants’ filing of an allegedly false police report
concerning her continued possession of the Company Property as discussed in detail above.
Defendants argue that summary judgment on Plaintiff’s defamation claim is warranted on two
grounds: first, that Plaintiff failed to bring the claim within one year of its accrual, in violation of
5 Fifth Circuit precedent highlights just how impossibly far the facts from this case are from supporting a sufficiently
severe hostile work environment claim. See Hockman, 122 F. App’x at 745 (finding that summary judgment on a
hostile work environment claim was proper where allegations of six separate and personal incidents between a female
employee and male employer contained facts suggesting the employer had made inappropriate comments to the
employee, “slapped her on the behind with a newspaper,” grabbed her “breasts and behind,” and “held her cheeks
and tried to kiss her,” among other things. The Fifth Circuit found the relevant comments were “boorish and
offensive, but not severe,” and noted that no estimation was given regarding the repetitive nature of the conduct);
see also White v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 457 F. App’x 374, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding summary judgment
against a hostile work environment claim where an employer’s use of the n-word and multiple racial phrases in an
employee’s presence was found to consist of “isolated incidents” and “pale in comparison, both in severity and
frequency, to the kinds of verbal harassment that this court and other circuits have held would support a Title VII
hostile work environment claim”).
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 14 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
15
the statute of limitations outlined in Section 16.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code; and second, that the police report cannot constitute a “false statement” as required by Texas
law (Dkt. #51 at pp. 32–34; Dkt. #54 at p. 21). In response, Plaintiff claims that an applicable
discovery rule rescues her claim from the traditional limits imposed by the statute of limitations
and that the report contained an actionable “false statement” because she had no “inten[t] to
deprive” Haribo of its property, “but rather [intended] to ensure that she could properly defend
herself in any dispute” (Dkt. #64 at pp. 21–22). Because the Court finds that the applicable statute
of limitations bars Plaintiff’s defamation claim, it need not resolve the issue of the alleged falsity
contained in the report.
Section 16.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code establishes a one-year
statute of limitations for defamation claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.002(a). “The
statute of limitations generally accrues when the allegedly defamatory material is circulated or
published, but the discovery rule may toll accrual.” Tu Nguyen v. Duy Tu Hoang, 318 F. Supp. 3d
983, 1011 (S.D. Tex. 2018). The discovery rule applies solely where “the nature of the plaintiff’s
injury is both inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable.” Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d
924, 930 (Tex. 2011) (citation modified). “An injury is inherently undiscoverable if by its nature, it
is ‘unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.’” Id.
(quoting S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1996)).
The Court begins its analysis of Plaintiff’s defamation claim where it began: with the initial
filing of the police report. The origin of the report is found in a statement that Michael Best
provided to police on June 9, 2023, and the report itself was physically created on June 12, 2023
(Dkt. #51 at p. 33). As noted above, law enforcement officers acted on the report by visiting Plaintiff
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 15 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
16
at her home on June 14, 2023 (Dkt. #54 at p. 20). Defendants argue that the cause of action accrued
on that date because the law enforcement officers informed Plaintiff of the existence of the report,
while Plaintiff alleges that she was merely made aware of a “complaint” at that time (Dkt. #54 at
p. 20; Dkt. #64 at p. 20). Had additional evidence not been entered into the record, this factual
dispute might have posed an intriguing question of material fact for the jury to determine. However,
Plaintiff’s argument is irreparably undermined by the evidence currently before the Court. Indeed,
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that on the day of the confrontation, June 14, 2023, Plaintiff
wrote to an attorney for Defendants claiming that the police “deemed this an invalid and false police
report,” and that she wanted to “caution you, and your office, regarding the dishonest manner that
you filed these police reports” (Dkt. #51-1 at p. 49 (emphasis added)).
While Plaintiff attempts to color her written words as a misinterpretation of her own state
of mind, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s express use of the phrase “false police report” and
“dishonest manner” indicates clear awareness of the existence of potentially defamatory material
that could have easily been uncovered by the exercise of a minimal amount of due diligence. Far
from being “inherently undiscoverable,” Plaintiff not only personally experienced the downstream
effects of the police report in her confrontation with the police, but also referenced, in her own
words, the allegedly “invalid and false police report” in the unique context of the Company
Property dispute on July 14, 2023 (Dkt. #51-1 at p. 49). See S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 7.
That is not all. Plaintiff further testified that she physically received the police report from
her attorney around “three or four days” after July 19, 2023 (Dkt. #51-1 at p. 56). Because
“discovery of a particular injury is dependent not solely on the nature of the injury but on the
circumstances in which it occurred and plaintiff’s diligence as well,” the Court finds that the
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 16 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
17
discovery rule cannot apply to toll Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Id. Plaintiff’s decision to file her
Original Complaint on August 21, 2024, over a year after the end of July 2023, is thus fatal to her
defamation cause of action under Texas law (Dkt. #1).
VII. Malicious Prosecution
The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim (Dkt. #61).
Specifically, it found that Plaintiff had failed to plead facts, taken as true, to satisfy the first element
of a malicious criminal prosecution cause of action (Dkt. #61 at pp. 6–9). Although this Court
invited Plaintiff to introduce additional facts supporting her malicious prosecution claim by
amending her pleadings, Plaintiff has instead elected to stand by her Second Amended Complaint
(Dkt. #32). As a result, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim remains dismissed in its entirety and
warrants no further discussion.
VIII. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s IIED claim should be dismissed because it cannot be
applied in its appropriate gap-filling capacity in this case (Dkt. #51 at p. 34; Dkt. #54 at p. 29).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that this Court’s previous dismissal of her malicious
prosecution claim permits her to bring an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on the
same factual foundation as her defamation claim (Dkt. #64 at p. 24).
Under Texas law, “a plaintiff may not bring an [intentional infliction of emotional distress]
claim when other statutory remedies are available for the underlying conduct.” Pacheco v. Zanios
Foods, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 508, 512 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger,
144 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004)). IIED “is a ‘gap-filler’ tort never intended to supplant or
duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies.” Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814,
816 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 447). “Even if other remedies do not explicitly
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 17 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
18
preempt the tort, their availability leaves no gap to fill.” Id. This remains true even where, as here,
Plaintiff’s alternate avenues of recovery are denied. Williamson v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp.
2d 431, 471 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (granting summary judgment on an IIED claim for its failure to act as
a “gap filler” while also granting summary judgment on the claims it was associated with).
Plaintiff’s inability to bring her malicious prosecution claim on account of its prior dismissal
is not relevant to this Court’s determination that IIED is inappropriate as a matter of law.
Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 448 (“a plaintiff’s failure to establish his or her [alternative] claim does
not mean that the plaintiff has a claim for [IIED]. If the gravamen of a plaintiff’s complaint is the
type of wrong [another] remedy was meant to cover, a plaintiff cannot maintain an IIED
claim . . . .”). Under the facts presented by her Second Amended Complaint and her Response to
the pertinent Motions, Plaintiff has supported her IIED claim exclusively on the same false police
report that constitutes the sole issue behind her defamation claim discussed above (Dkt. #64 at
pp. 24–25). As a result, Plaintiff’s IIED claim cannot fulfill its purpose as a “gap-filler” tort and is
appropriately dismissed at summary judgment. See id.
IX. Applicability of the Attorney Immunity Doctrine
In the interest of a fully exhaustive review of the pleadings, the Court concludes its opinion
by addressing Michael Best’s best alternative argument for summary judgment: whether the claims
raised against it are barred by attorney immunity under Texas law. Under the attorney immunity
doctrine, attorneys are protected “against a non-client’s claim when the claim is based on conduct
that (1) constitutes the provision of ‘legal’ services involving the unique office, professional skill,
training, and authority of an attorney and (2) the attorney engages in to fulfill the attorney’s duties
in representing the client within an adversarial context.” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631
S.W.3d 65, 78 (Tex. 2021). “An attorney who pleads the affirmative defense of attorney immunity
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 18 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
19
has the burden to prove that his alleged wrongful conduct . . . is part of the discharge of his duties
to his client.” Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2015). The Fifth Circuit has
recognized that “attorney immunity is properly characterized as a true immunity from suit, not as
a defense to liability.” Ironshore Eur. DAC v. Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., 912 F.3d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 2019).
Both parties implicitly agree that all of Plaintiff’s claims against Michael Best stem from
the publication of an allegedly false police report (Dkt. #54 at p. 18; Dkt. #64 at pp. 22–23). Michael
Best argues that the creation and subsequent filing of the police report fell within the scope of the
attorney immunity doctrine, while Plaintiff’s sole contention in her Response is that Michael Best
was not given express authorization by Haribo to take either action and thus cannot seek refuge
under the attorney immunity doctrine (Dkt. #64 at p. 23).
Plaintiff’s argument misinterprets the legal standard proposed by the attorney privilege
doctrine. The uncontroverted evidence indicates that Haribo retained Michael Best in a
representative capacity to negotiate Plaintiff’s separation and to recover the Company Property
(Dkt. #32 at ¶ 113–114; Dkt. #72 at p. 23). In consideration of the Fifth Circuit’s “broad”
application of the doctrine, the Court finds that the creation and filing of a police report to facilitate
the return of the Company Property “falls squarely within the scope of the firm’s representation
of its client,” and this remains true whether Haribo expressly authorized the action or not. Troice v.
Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., 921 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation modified) (“Although not
limitless, the doctrine’s application is broad.”); Ironshore, 912 F.3d at 767; see also King v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. A-14-CV-740 LY, 2014 WL 11429329, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2014)
(collecting cases) (“[T]he immunity granted legal counsel is not limited to the litigation context.”),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-0740-LY, 2014 WL 11443911 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 17,
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 19 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
20
2014). The attorney privilege doctrine asks the Court to consider whether the relevant conduct is
“the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties to his client,” not
whether a specific action or legal strategy was expressly authorized by the client. See Cantey, 467
S.W.3d at 482 (citation modified). Given that attorneys routinely create and file police reports on
behalf of their clients according to their particular knowledge and skill, Michael Best’s actions
constitute valid expressions of its professional duties owed to Haribo.
Furthermore, Michael Best has raised sufficient evidence to prove that it filed the allegedly
false police report in an adversarial context. Plaintiff’s separation from Haribo involved her
strategic retention of Company Property to secure a favorable severance agreement. Michael Best
was retained to address this contentious situation and resolve it in Haribo’s favor. Thus, although
Michael Best’s “conduct did not occur during formal litigation, the context was sufficiently
adversarial and litigation-like” to support its attorney immunity defense. Dorrell v. Proskauer Rose
LLP, No. 3:16-CV-1152-N, 2017 WL 6764690, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017).
Under the facts presented, this Court refuses to “conclude that [Michael Best’s] actions
‘did not involve the provision of legal services,’ or that [it] engaged in acts that were ‘entirely
foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 816 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir.
2016) (first quoting Cantey, 467 S.W.3d at 482; then quoting Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex.
134, 137 (1882)). As a result, the Court finds that Michael Best has successfully availed itself of the
attorney immunity defense, and that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate for Plaintiff’s claims
against Michael Best on that ground.
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 20 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>
21
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Haribo of America, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. #51) should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Additionally, it is ORDERED Defendant Michael Best & Friedrich LLP’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. #54) should be GRANTED, and Defendant
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s ADA claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Case 4:24-cv-00759-ALM Document 78 Filed 12/16/25 Page 21 of 21 PageID #:
<pageID>

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.