Flores v. Capital Machine Technologies, Inc. et al

2:24-cv-00081TxedMar 20, 2026

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
JASON FLORES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAPITAL MACHINE TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., ACCURPRESS, and ACCURPRESS
AMERICA,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CASE NO. 2:24-CV-00081-RSP
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court are the Accurpress Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert
Economist Lisa McGuff’s Testimony and Brief in Support (“McGuff Daubert”), Dkt. No. 75,
Motion to Strike and Daubert Challenges (“Lake Daubert”), Dkt. No. 71, Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (“Failure to Warn MSJ”), Dkt. No. 76, Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Causation MSJ”), Dkt. No. 77, and Defendant Capital Machine Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Innocent Seller MSJ”), Dkt. No. 74. The Motions are fully briefed, and the
Court held a motion hearing on March 5, 2026. For the following reasons and for the reasons set
forth during the hearing, the Failure to Warn MSJ is granted as to Plaintiff’s strict liability claim
for marketing defect and denied otherwise, and all other Motions are denied.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Daubert Standard
An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
2
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Courts have broad discretion to make
determinations about whether an expert’s proposed testimony satisfies Rule 702. See Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149, 152 (1999); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93 (1993).
The appropriate factors to consider are dictated by the question of whether the expert’s
testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant for the jury to consider; the Court’s role under
Daubert is limited to that of a gatekeeper. See United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 424 (5th
Cir. 2010); Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391–92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying
Fifth Circuit law); Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249–50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The trial
court’s role as gatekeeper [under Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the
adversary system. . . . Thus, . . . a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing into
a trial on the merits”). As the Supreme Court explained, “vigorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302
F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002).
Despite being relevant and reliable under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
evidence may still be excluded for violating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Estech Sys. IP,
LLC v. Carvana LLC, 2023 WL 3292881, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2023).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a) (emphasis added); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Any evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). “[T]he
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 2 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
3
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
[dispute] of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48 (emphasis added). The substantive law
identifies the material facts, and disputes over facts that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not
defeat summary judgment. Id. at 248. A dispute is “genuine” when the evidence is “such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The moving party must
identify the basis for granting summary judgment and evidence demonstrating the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. McGuff Daubert (Dkt. No. 75)
Accurpress raises several arguments for excluding Ms. McGuff’s damages opinions. Dkt.
No. 75 at 6–13. First, Accurpress argues that Ms. McGuff’s earning capacity analysis should be
excluded under Daubert because she allegedly failed to calculate damages as a measure of
Plaintiff’s future earning potential subtracted from his past potential. Id. at 6–8. Second,
Accurpress complains that these same capacity opinions are improper because Ms. McGuff
assumed he would be employed as a “steel worker” until the age of sixty-seven, a job in which he
had his highest earnings, and which he left before the time of his accident. Id. at 10–12. Third,
Accurpress argues that Ms. McGuff’s analysis of household labor should be excluded because she
allegedly does not account for Plaintiff’s post-injury capability to perform household labor. Id. at
8. Fourth, Accurpress argues that Ms. McGuff’s earning capacity and household labor analyses
should be excluded under Rule 403 because such analyses will be “confusing and misleading”
without comparison to Plaintiff’s post-injury abilities. Id. at 9–10. Fifth, Accurpress argues that
Ms. McGuff’s prosthetics opinions should be excluded because Mr. Lake’s opinions should be
excluded. Id. at 12.
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 3 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
4
As the Court explained during the hearing, loss of earning capacity is different from lost
wages, and, while it is helpful to compare after-injury earnings, that is not required here. See
Matbon, Inc. v. Gries, 288 S.W.3d 471, 486 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009) (“[E]ven an unemployed
person can recover for lost earning capacity.” (citations omitted)); Lowery v. Spa Crafters, Inc.,
No. Civ. A SA03CA0073, 2004 WL 1824382, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2004) (“While recovery
for loss of future earning capacity does not require a showing of lost earnings, if plaintiff’s earning
capacity is not totally destroyed, but only impaired, the extent of his loss may best be shown by
comparing his actual earnings before and after his injury.”). Plaintiff counsel also persuasively
raised during the hearing that there will be evidence that his current position is as a sheltered
employee, which could end prematurely and may not properly reflect his future earnings.
Moreover, Ms. McGuff’s calculations represent familiar calculations within the purview of an
economist based on actuarial data that is typical in a tort case such as this one. And because the
Court denies the Lake Daubert, as explained below, the Court need not reach Accurpress’s fifth
argument.
Therefore, for these reasons and the reasons set forth during the hearing, the Court finds
that Ms. McGuff’s earning capacity and household labor opinions are sufficiently relevant and
reliable to survive Daubert. The Court also finds that the probative value of such opinions is high,
while the danger of them being “confusing and misleading” is low, such that Rule 403 does operate
to filter them out. Accordingly, the McGuff Daubert (Dkt. No. 75) is DENIED.
B. Lake Daubert (Dkt. No. 71)
Accurpress levies similar Rule 702 and 403 arguments against Plaintiff’s prosthetics
expert, Mr. Lake. Dkt. No. 71 at 4–7. First, Accurpress argues Mr. Lake’s opinion that Plaintiff
needs prosthetics is unreliable because he did not consult “treating physicians” or conduct
“functional capacity exams.” Id. at 4–5. Second, Accurpress complains that Mr. Lake’s opinions
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 4 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
5
on the maintenance costs (ranging from 10–20% of the cost of the prosthesis) of the three he
recommends are based solely on his experience and are inconsistent with alleged normative
industry data (reflecting 3%). Id. at 5–7. During the hearing, Accurpress’s counsel raised an
additional argument that Mr. Lake’s opinions on the prosthesis are unreliable because Plaintiff has
not had an amputation yet in the two-and-a-half years since his accident, which is a prerequisite to
fitting a prosthesis.
The last argument improperly assumes Plaintiff could afford an expensive and potentially
elective amputation surgery, given his circumstances. Neither that argument nor the others justify
exclusion. See BHI Energy I Power Servs. LLC v. KVP Holdings, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-1981, 2024
WL 1809499, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2024) (“[F]or expert testimony on topics that lack . . .
exactness . . . courts should consider factors such as the expert’s professional experience . . . . Rule
702 does not prohibit an expert from reaching an opinion based on the expert’s experience,’ and
‘a witness’s experience . . . can provide a reliable basis . . . .’” (citations omitted)); Smiley v. N.H.
Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-1094, 2021 WL 292449 (M.D. La. Jan. 28, 2021) (“Simply disagreeing with
the underlying facts relied on . . . is not grounds for excluding [an] expert under Daubert.” (citation
omitted)); Burroughs Diesel, Inc. v. Baker Petrolite, LLC, No. 2:18-CV-26, 2019 WL 5395452
(S.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2019), (citation omitted) (“An expert’s failure to conduct testing does not
necessarily render his opinion unreliable.”). While Accurpress raises a slew of additional
arguments, Dkt. No. 71 at 7–8, it provides no basis for such arguments grounded in Mr. Lake’s
opinions or the facts, and Plaintiff sufficiently rebuts them in its response, see Dkt. No. 82 at 1–7,
so the Court does not address them further. Similarly, for these reasons and the reasons set forth
during the hearing, the Court finds that Mr. Lake’s prosthetics opinions are sufficiently reliable.
Thus, the Lake Daubert (Dkt. No. 71) is DENIED.
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 5 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
6
C. Failure to Warn MSJ (Dkt. No. 76)
First, Accurpress argues that it had no duty to warn Plaintiff because the risk was “open
and obvious,” as there is a “pinch point where the ram comes down to bend the sheet metal,” and
Plaintiff knew “that the subject press brake did not have a light curtain or presence sensing device,”
“was trained on how to operate” it, and knew “that his hand would be crushed if he placed it in the
point of operation” but did so anyway. Dkt. No. 76 at 9, 11. Second, Accurpress argues that any
alleged failure to warn was not a cause of Plaintiff’s injury because “Plaintiff was aware of the
risk of placing his hand in the point of operation and did so anyways,” so Plaintiff cannot show
that had there been a warning, he would not have been injured. Id. at 11–12. Third, Accurpress
argues that Plaintiff cannot prove his marketing defect claims because he has not proffered expert
testimony on what rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, whether the warning and
instructions provided were sufficient, and whether such warnings caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at
12–13. Fourth, Accurpress argues that it cannot be liable for a marketing defect because it warned
operators not to put “any part of their body” “in the point of operation” “without adequate
safeguarding” and “unless the brake is de-energized” or it may result in “severe crush injuries,”
and Plaintiff did exactly that, resulting in the same type of harm it warned against. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff first responds that the risks were not “open and obvious” because the question is
objective, not based on Plaintiff’s subjective awareness, and a specific heightened, non-obvious,
risk, that was not warned against, existed for operation in “multiple users” mode and in “foot”
mode. Dkt. No. 91 at 6–8. Second, Plaintiff responds that, as to causation, while he was generally
aware of the danger, the “issue is really whether the machine should be in operation at all in its
unguarded state,” and Accurpress’s failure to warn of safe operating procedures in accordance with
OSHA (rather than the 4 inches instruction) caused his injuries. Id. at 9–10. Third, Plaintiff
responds that its own expert opined during deposition that a user manual that merely references
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 6 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
7
OSHA and ANSI standards and “push[es] down responsibility for labeling and guarding to an end
user” could be inadequate, that the manual should have had a warning about needing additional
guarding when used by more than one person, and that Accurpress’s expert admitted that
conflicting information in training and warnings can create confusion. Id. at 10–11. Fourth,
Plaintiff argues that Accurpress’s warnings were not adequate because such warnings left end users
with the “incorrect impression that they were operating a compliant press brake correctly and
safely.” Id. at 11–12.
While Plaintiff is correct that Texas law only requires expert evidence of a marketing defect
claim in strict liability cases, or in negligence cases where the alleged negligence is not within the
experience of a layman, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Gillies, 343 S.W.3d 205, 211 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2011), the Court finds that the expert testimony Plaintiff points to is lacking as to several
elements of a strict products liability marketing defect claim, Emerson Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 601
S.W.3d 813, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. 2021). Specifically,
the experts’ opinions fail to establish that “(3) the product contains a marketing defect (4) the
absence of a warning and/or instruction renders the product unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate
user . . . and (5) the failure to warn and/or instruct constitute a causative nexus in the [plaintiff]’s
injury.” Id.
Thus, summary judgment is proper as to strict liability on this basis. As to the negligence
claim, the Court finds that the source of the marketing negligence claim, as Plaintiff characterizes
it— the risk of injury from the press in its unguarded state in the absence of a warning not to use
it in such state and whether that absence caused Plaintiff’s subsequent injury—does not require “a
technical or scientific explanation; it is within the jury’s ability to determine on its own what
caused the accident and resulting injuries.” Rentech Steel, L.L.C. v. Teel, 299 S.W.3d 155, 161
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 7 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
8
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2009) (citation omitted). Genuine disputes of material fact as to those issues
remain and defeat summary judgment on the negligence claim; Accurpress’s other arguments to
the contrary are unpersuasive.
Consequently, for those reasons and for the reasons set forth during the hearing, the Court
finds that Accurpress’s Failure to Warn MSJ (Dkt. No. 76) should be and hereby is GRANTED
as to no strict product liability for a marketing defect and DENIED otherwise.
D. Causation MSJ (Dkt. No. 77)
Accurpress raises two arguments for a lack of causation. Dkt. No. 77 at 11–16. First,
Accurpress argues that nonparty ACS (Plaintiff’s employer) is the sole cause of Plaintiff’s injuries
because “Accurpress offered optional presence sensing devices that ACS did not purchase,” “ACS
had an obligation under OSHA to ensure the [press] was adequately guarded based on” its use, it
“agreed to provide all necessary point of operation guarding”, and ACS added but subsequently
removed guarding from the device of its own accord, after which Plaintiff was injured. Id. at 12–
14. Second, Accurpress argues that its own conduct and the alleged design defect in the press were
not substantial factors in causing Plaintiff’s injuries, this time urging that, because ACS failed to
purchase the optional equipment, recognized a safety issue and installed guarding but subsequently
removed it for various reasons, that “to the extent that someone is responsible for the fact that the
[press] did not have a presence sensing device, . . . [it] is ACS and ACS alone.” Id. at 14–16. In
both arguments, Accurpress depends heavily on and analogizes to Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake,
719 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Tex. 2025). Dkt. No. 77 at 11–14.
However, Werner is not analogous. It involved the suit of a passenger in a first vehicle,
which crossed a median into the path of a large truck. Werner, 719 S.W.3d at 529. Though the
court found that the truck driver’s speed was negligent, and “but for” him driving at that speed the
accident would not have occurred, the court declined to find it a “substantial factor” because all of
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 8 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
9
the truck driver’s negligence occurred before the driver of the first vehicle’s own negligence in
causing him to lose control of his own vehicle and cross a “42-foot grassy median into oncoming
highway traffic.” Id. at 534. As Plaintiff persuasively points out, Dkt. No. 90 at 8–9, the court
declined to extend its holding to even analogous automobile cases involving design defects.
Werner, 719 S.W.3d at 536 n.4 (“If the allegation were that a defect in the design of either vehicle
contributed to the injuries, . . . our analysis of causation would require additional considerations .
. . .”). If Accurpress’s theory were correct, that a user of a product cannot make out causation for
a defect claim for injuries occurring “seven years later,” Dkt. No. 77 at 15, then seldom could any
design defect claim be allowed. But that is not the law. See Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d
251, 257–60 (Tex. 1999).
Plaintiff’s counsel also persuasively pointed out during the hearing that ACS subsequently
installed another guarding system on the press after Plaintiff’s injury, which has remained in place
since that time and has not had the same drawbacks as the previously installed third-party guarding
system that Accurpress references in briefing. Plaintiff’s counsel further pointed to evidence that
other manufacturers that compete with Accurpress install such guarding from the factory, despite
Accurpress’s arguments to the contrary. Based on these facts, the Court finds that a genuine dispute
of material fact remains at least as to whether an after-market guard installed by ACS is of the
same quality and effectiveness as the guard that would have been originally installed by
Accurpress from the factory or by Accurpress or Capital at the time of installation of the press.
Accordingly, for these reasons and for the reasons orally assigned at the hearing,
Accurpress’s Causation MSJ (Dkt. No. 77) is DENIED.
E. 	Innocent Seller MSJ (Dkt. No. 74)
Capital next argues it qualifies as an innocent seller under Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code Section 82.003 (“Statute”). Dkt. No. 74 at 10–19. During the hearing, Capital’s
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 9 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
10
counsel argued that Plaintiff failed to specifically plead exceptions it now relies on to the Statute,
is barred from doing so now, and summary judgment is therefore proper that it is an innocent seller
under the Statute and immune from liability in this action. Capital’s counsel pointed to George v.
SI Group, Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 620 (5th Cir. 2022), as requiring Plaintiff’s affirmative pleading,
rather than its own pleading as an affirmative defense. Capital’s entire argument, in briefing and
during the hearing, is based on the proposition that Plaintiff must specifically plead each exception
it intends to argue, either by verbatim recitation of language or by reference to the exception.
However, in George, the Fifth Circuit stated that, because the Statute “is not an affirmative
defense” but a “cause of action under the substantive law of products liability in Texas,” it must
be pleaded “unless” the plaintiff “pleaded facts establishing [the defendant]’s liability as a
‘nonmanufacturing seller.’” George, 36 F.4th at 620 (emphasis added); id. 620 n.5. It is therefore
sufficient to plead facts establishing Capital’s liability, rather than to reference the exception relied
upon by number or by bare recitation of language. During the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated
certain paragraphs of the Complaint factually support several of the exceptions.
The Court finds persuasive that at least exception (5) is directly supported by paragraph
35(a) of the Complaint. Exception (5) reads “that: (A) the seller made an express factual
representation about an aspect of the product; (B) the representation was incorrect; (C) the claimant
relied on the representation in obtaining or using the product; and (D) if the aspect of the product
had been as represented, the claimant would not have been harmed by the product or would not
have suffered the same degree of harm.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.003 (Vernon).
Paragraph 35(a) of the Complaint accuses Capital of making “express factual representation about
the press’s safety,” i.e., instructed ACS that staying four inches from the point of operation was
all that was needed for safe operation, “the representation was incorrect,” it was “relied upon by
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 10 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>
11
ACS” and “if the dangerous aspect of the press (i.e., its lack of a light curtain and/or laser guard)
had been as represented, Plaintiff would not have been harmed.” Dkt. No. 41 at 35(a). There is
sufficient evidence in the record to support that factual contention such that summary judgment is
not proper that Capital is an innocent seller under the Statute. Accordingly, Capital’s Innocent
Seller MSJ (Dkt. No. 74) is DENIED.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided above and during the hearing, the McGuff Daubert (Dkt. No. 75)
is DENIED; the Lake Daubert (Dkt. No. 71) is DENIED; the Failure to Warn MSJ (Dkt. No. 76)
is GRANTED as to there being no strict product liability for a marketing defect and DENIED
otherwise; the Causation MSJ (Dkt. No. 77) is DENIED; and the Innocent Seller MSJ (Dkt. No.
74) is DENIED.
.
____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 16th day of March, 2026.
Case 2:24-cv-00081-RSP Document 183 Filed 03/20/26 Page 11 of 11 PageID #:
<pageID>

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.