Vasu Holdings, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
VASU HOLDINGS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
INC.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:24-cv-00034-JRG-RSP
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Samsung’s Daubert Motion and Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of
Dr. Todor Cooklev. Dkt. No. 131. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendants seek to strike portions of the report of Plaintiff’s infringement expert, Dr.
Cooklev. Dr. Cooklev’s report is relevant to the infringement determination for four asserted
patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 8,886,181 (“the ʼ181 Patent”), 10,206,154 (“the ʼ154 Patent”),
10,368,281 (“the ʼ281 Patent”), and 10,419,996 (“the ʼ996 Patent”). Defendant’s Motion seeks to
strike his expert report with respect to the ʼ181, ʼ281, and ʼ996 Patents. These patents teach
different ways to switch between different wireless networks. For example, the ʼ181 Patent teaches
a method of simultaneously establishing connection to a second, stronger, network without losing
connection to the first. Similarly, the ʼ281, and ʼ996 Patents include timers to “wake up” the second
antenna after a specified period of time, and if certain conditions are met.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product
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of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Rule 702 requires a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as
to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied with regard to a particular expert’s proposed
testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). District courts are accorded broad discretion in making
Rule 702 determinations of admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether
particular expert testimony is reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified
various factors that the district court may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony
should be admitted, the nature of the factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated
by the ultimate inquiry—whether the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be
helpful to the finder of fact and thus to warrant admission at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600
F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010).
Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert
testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited
to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and
relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law)
(“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial
court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”); Pipitone v.
Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under
Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.’ . . . Thus, while
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exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing
into a trial on the merits,” quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note). As the Supreme
Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461
(5th Cir. 2002).
III. 	ANALYSIS
In their Motion, Defendants first contend that Dr. Cooklev’s report improperly adds new
infringement accusations through his identifications of new accused features. Dkt. No. 131 at 2.
They argue that Dr. Cooklev’s report is untimely, like the infringement allegations rejected by the
Court in Plaintiff’s June 18, 2025, Amended Infringement Contentions (Dkt. No. 100-1).1 Id. For
example, Defendants contend that Dr. Cooklev’s report adds 68 accused “timers” to the 6 in the
infringement contentions. Id. at 3. Defendants argue that this addition “flouts” EDTX Patent Rule
3-1(c), which requires plaintiffs to timely disclose infringement contentions. Id. at 10.
Defendants contend that Dr. Cooklev’s joint infringement opinions should be stricken
because they lack evidentiary support and misstate the law. Id. at 10. Defendants argue that Dr.
Cooklev’s joint infringement opinions do not cite any evidence, and are otherwise unrelated
because different legal standards, entities, and timelines apply. Id. at 10-11. Defendants further
argue that Dr. Cooklev’s report misstates the law on § 271(a) (direct infringement) with respect to
third parties. Id. at 12-13. They contend that Dr. Cooklev misstates the law on third-party joint
infringement, because he mistakenly identifies the end users, rather than third parties, as the
beneficiaries. Id. They further reason that Dr. Cooklev fails to establish that defendants “direct and
1 In their Motion, Defendants concede that there is no overlap between the rejected amended infringement
contentions and the new accused features in Dr. Cooklev’s report. Dkt. No. 131 at 10.
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control” the third parties in his demonstration that Defendant’s products are interoperable with
mobile networks.
Finally, Defendants argue that the portions of Dr. Cooklev’s report that provide claim scope
make improper claim construction arguments. Defendants argue that Dr. Cooklev construes the
terms “sleep mode” and “active mode” to include limitations on power consumption. Id. at 15.
They argue this is ultimately confusing to a jury.
In response, Plaintiff points to specific disclosures in the infringement contentions that map
to Dr. Cooklev’s report. They argue that infringement contentions need not disclose specific
evidence or proof of infringement, unlike expert reports, which do require such specificity. They
cite to ROY-G-BIV Corp. v. ABB, Ltd., and add that what expert reports cannot add are additional
infringement theories. 63 F. Supp. 3d 690, 699 (E.D. Tex. 2014). Plaintiff argues that Dr. Cooklev’s
report is proper because it merely adds support to the existing infringement theories, and does not
advance any new theories Id. at 3.
Plaintiff argues that it properly disclosed the evidentiary support for the joint infringement
theories during discovery. Id. at 12. It adds that the interrogatory responses provide the evidentiary
support, and form Dr. Cooklev’s evidentiary basis. Plaintiff argues that Akamai Technologies v.
Limelight Networks, 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015), lays out the correct standard for joint
infringement:
Direct infringement under § 271(a) occurs where all steps of a claimed method are performed
by or attributable to a single entity…Where more than one actor is involved in practicing the
steps, a court must determine whether the acts of one are attributable to the other such that a
single entity is responsible for the infringement. We will hold an entity responsible for others'
performance of method steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or
controls others' performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.
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It adds that in a joint enterprise, four requirements must be met, including a “community of
pecuniary interest.” Id. at 10232; Dkt. No. 151 at 13. It contends that because a court can consider
the entire “community” for joint infringement, the “end user” beneficiaries are within the scope of
the joint enterprise. Because their infringement is within the joint enterprise, Plaintiff argues that
it can properly factor into a joint infringement analysis. Plaintiff argues that the close integration
between Defendant and the network providers, including conditions on network configuration
settings, indicates that Defendants “direct or control” the network providers. Id. at 14.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Cooklev did not improperly construe claims. Instead, it
contends he merely applied the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. Id. at 15. It adds that
Defendants do not argue that Dr. Cooklev’s report departs from the terms’ plain and ordinary
meanings.
First, the Court finds persuasive Plaintiff’s arguments that the additional accused features
Dr. Cooklev’s report discloses do not introduce any new infringement theories and are thus proper.
Dr. Cooklev’s report maps his accused features to the already disclosed infringement theories. Like
ROY-G-BIV, Dr. Cooklev’s report does not extend Plaintiff’s case, and materially differs from
Plaintiff’s rejected infringement contentions, which accuse new products. Conversely, Dr.
Cooklev’s report clarifies which features within the already-accused devices infringe. Because Dr.
Cooklev’s report does not add new infringement theories, the Court is of the opinion that it should
not be stricken on these grounds.
2 Joint enterprise’s four requirements are:
1. 	an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group;
2. 	a common purpose to be carried out by the group;
3. 	a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and
4. 	an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 491 cmt. c.
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The Court is also persuaded that Dr. Cooklev’s report properly relates to Plaintiff’s
interrogatory responses, already disclosed in discovery, for joint infringement. Because end users
benefit from the accused features, Dr. Cooklev’s report properly states the law that end users can
be beneficiaries for a joint enterprise. The Court is further persuaded that Dr. Cooklev’s report
properly states the law for joint infringement. Like Akamai, a joint enterprise exists between
Defendant and the carriers, given the heavy integration and conditions on network access. This
indicates the requisite level of control required to “direct or control” the network providers.
Because this raises a factual dispute best left to the jury, and because Dr. Cooklev applied the
correct legal standard, the Court is of the opinion that it cannot be stricken on these grounds.
Finally, the court is persuaded that Dr. Cooklev’s report does not improperly perform claim
construction. There, he merely read the claims to conclude that a “sleep” mode consumes less
power than an “active” mode. Such a distinction is readily apparent to a person of ordinary skill.
Because there is thus no claim construction, the Court is of the opinion that it should not be stricken
on these grounds.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED.
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____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 4th day of February, 2026.
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