Vasu Holdings, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
VASU HOLDINGS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
INC.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:24-cv-00034-JRG-RSP
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Vasu Holding, LLC’s Motion to Strike the Testimony of Julia
Rowe. Dkt. No. 127. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Vasu seeks to strike portions of the expert report of Julia Rowe, Defendants’
damages expert. Ms. Rowe’s report is relevant to the royalty calculations for four asserted patents,
U.S. Patent Nos. 8,886,181 (“the ʼ181 Patent”), 10,206,154 (“the ʼ154 Patent”), 10,368,281 (“the
ʼ281 Patent”), and 10,419,996 (“the ʼ996 Patent”).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Rule 702 requires a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as
to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied with regard to a particular expert’s proposed
testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
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Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). District courts are accorded broad discretion in making
Rule 702 determinations of admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether
particular expert testimony is reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified
various factors that the district court may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony
should be admitted, the nature of the factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated
by the ultimate inquiry—whether the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be
helpful to the finder of fact and thus to warrant admission at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600
F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010).
Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert
testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited
to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and
relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law)
(“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial
court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”); Pipitone v.
Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under
Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.’ . . . Thus, while
exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing
into a trial on the merits,” quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note). As the Supreme
Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
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means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461
(5th Cir. 2002).
III. 	ANALYSIS
In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Rowe’s report must be stricken, because it is
factually deficient. Plaintiff argues that Ms. Rowe’s conversion from lump sum agreements into
running royalty rates is factually insufficient, because the factors she relied upon are not specific
enough. Dkt. No. 127 at 5-6. They cite to EcoFactor Inc. v. Google LLC to argue that “some basis”
must be present for such a conversion to be proper. 137 F.4th 1333. Plaintiff argues that there is an
insufficient technological link between the asserted patents and these lump sum agreements. Dkt.
No. 127 at 9-12. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Rowe’s analysis is unreliable, because she lacks
the requisite technological training to discuss technology issues in her report, and because she
relies on Mr. Lanning’s expert report for her NIA analysis, which Plaintiff argues is deficient. Id.
at 13-14.
In their reply, Defendants argue that Ms. Rowe’s report sufficiently links both the lump
sum agreements to royalty rates, and to the accused technology. Dkt. No. 148 at 6-7. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s reliance on EcoFactor is misplaced, because she uses Samsung’s sales
figures to calculate a per-unit royalty amount from the lump sum calculations. Further, Defendants
contend that she relies on Mr. Lanning’s testimony to establish a technical link between the patents
and the prior lump sum agreements. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s disputes do not speak
to the reliability or sufficiency of the evidence, but rather its weight, an issue they contend is
properly raised to a jury.
The Court is persuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike attacks
the weight of Ms. Rowe’s report, rather than its reliability or sufficiency. In their Reply, Defendants
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point to information that links her royalty calculations to the lump sum payments. Finally, given
the Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Mr. Lanning’s expert report, Ms. Rowe’s report
properly relies upon his technical analysis for her NIA and Georgia Pacific Factor 13 opinions.
Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to show methodological deficiencies in Ms. Rowe’s expert
report.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Motion is DENIED.
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____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 1st day of February, 2026.
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