Vasu Holdings, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
VASU HOLDINGS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
INC.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:24-cv-00034-JRG-RSP
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Opinions of Vasu’s Survey Expert,
Dr. Andres Groehn. Dkt. No. 123. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant Samsung seeks to strike portions of the report of Plaintiff’s survey expert Dr.
Andres Groehn. Dr. Groehn’s report seeks to assign an economic value to the “increased battery
life and the Wi-Fi/Cellular network transition” feature of the accused products. Dkt. No. 124-2 at
¶ 15. Dr. Groehn’s Report notes that his analysis requires an assessment of consumer demand to
“quantify demand for Samsung’s products” with and without these features. Id. Dr. Groehn’s report
then assigns a dollar value to these features. Id.
Dr. Groehn’s report surveys approximately 1000 people on various smartphone features,
including manual/automatic network switching and increased battery life. Dr. Groehn then applied
a statistical model to the data, whereby he compared the price of competing smartphones with and
without the polled features, to create an estimated value for each feature. The network switching
feature’s value was based on the feature’s estimated battery savings, and the amount Dr. Groehn
estimated consumers would pay for this increased battery life. Id. at ¶ 125-26. Dr. Groehn’s report
does not assess infringement or invalidity of the asserted patents. Id. at ¶ 10.
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Dr. Groehn’s report is relevant to the damages calculations for three asserted patents, U.S.
Patent Nos. 8,886,181 (“the ʼ181 Patent”), 10,368,281 (“the ʼ281 Patent”) and 10,419,996 (“the
ʼ996 Patent”). The ʼ181, ʼ281, and ʼ996 Patents teach different ways to switch between different
wireless networks. For example, the ʼ181 Patent Claim teaches a method of simultaneously
establishing connection to a second, stronger, network without losing connection to the first.
Similarly, the ʼ281, and ʼ996 Patents include timers to “wake up” the second antenna after a
specified period of time, and if certain conditions are met.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Rule 702 requires a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as
to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied with regard to a particular expert’s proposed
testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). District courts are accorded broad discretion in making
Rule 702 determinations of admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether
particular expert testimony is reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified
various factors that the district court may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony
should be admitted, the nature of the factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated
by the ultimate inquiry—whether the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be
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helpful to the finder of fact and thus to warrant admission at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600
F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010).
Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert
testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited
to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and
relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law)
(“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial
court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”); Pipitone v.
Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under
Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.’ . . . Thus, while
exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing
into a trial on the merits,” quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note). As the Supreme
Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461
(5th Cir. 2002).
III. 	ANALYSIS
In their Motion, Defendants contend that Dr. Groehn’s report is too broad, because it covers
technology outside the scope of the asserted patents, namely battery life. Dkt. No. 123 at 14. To
support this assertion, Defendants rely on Fractus v. Samsung, where economic expert testimony
was stricken under Daubert because it was too broad. 2011 WL 7563820 (E.D. Tex, April 29,
2011). There, the asserted patents taught improvements to internal cell phone antennas.
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Conversely, the expert testimony considered the value consumers place on external antennas, as
compared to internal antennas. Defendants argue that Fractus is analogous, because Dr. Groehn’s
report covers battery life, rather than just the “switching” taught by the ʼ181, ʼ281, and ʼ996
Patents. 	Finally, in their Reply, Defendants argue that Dr. Groehn’s report is not based on
“technical input,” but rather on the expert opinion of others, and is thus impermissible. Dkt. No.
167 at 5.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Fractus is distinguishable, because saving battery life
and automatic switching are core features of the inventions, as they are mentioned in all three
asserted Patents’ specifications. Dkt. No. 150 at 1. They argue that Fractus is distinct, because
here, battery savings are a core benefit to the consumer justifying the inclusion of the accused
features, rather than the irrelevant “external” antennas discussed by the expert in Fractus. Further,
Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s expert, Dr. Lanning, discusses automatic switching as a benefit to
the ʼ181 Patent. Finally, Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply dismisses Defendant’s “technical input” argument
as directly contradicted by this Court’s Headwater v. Samsung decision, which found that an expert
can rely on the technical data of other experts, so long as the underlying data is admissible. 2024
WL 4712953 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2024).
The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s citation to Fractus. In Fractus, the court stuck
expert testimony regarding an entirely different subject – whether consumers prefer internal or
external cell phone antennas – whereas the damages were based on the estimated increase in profits
for the patented improvements in internal antenna design. Here, the battery savings and network
switching are core features of the ʼ181, ʼ281, and ʼ996 Patents, given the mention in their
preambles. Further, Plaintiff’s expert used these battery life improvements as a proxy for how
much consumers would pay for the accused improvements.
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Finally, because this Court denied Defendant’s Motion to strike Dr. Cole and Cooklev’s
reports, and found them admissible, the Court cannot accept Defendant’s argument that this report
does not rely on “technical input,” or that the “technical input” it relies on is inadmissible.
Because Dr. Groehn’s opinions use battery life to discuss the economic value of the accused
instrumentalities, there remains no question of their admissibility, and the Court will deny
Defendant’s Motion to Strike.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Motion is DENIED.
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____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 1st day of February, 2026.
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