USA v. Hickman et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
EDMOND GASAWAY
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CASE NUMBER 1:96-CR-54-5-MJT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Defendant, Edmond Gasaway (“Gasaway”), filed a pro se Motion for Early
Termination of Supervised Release. (Doc. #779.) Gasaway’s supervising Probation Officer in the
Eastern District of Texas prepared a report stating that the probation office is opposed to early
termination of supervised release. The Government reported to the probation department that it is
also opposed to early termination. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Local Rules for the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, and a specific referral order (doc. #784),
this motion is before the undersigned United States magistrate judge for review and submission of
a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 3, 1997, Gasaway was sentenced after pleading guilty to Count 1: Conspiracy
to Interfere with Commerce by Threats or Violence, Counts 14 & 16: Interference with Commerce
by Threats or Violence, and Counts 15 & 17: Use or Carry a Firearm in Relation to a Crime of
Violence. Gasaway was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 14, and 16,
to be served concurrently; 60 months as to Count 15, to run consecutively with any other sentence;
and 240 months as to Count 17, to run consecutively to any other sentence, for a total term of
imprisonment of 387 months, followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release in
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each count. On April 18, 2024, the court granted an order reducing the total term of imprisonment
to 378 months. (Doc. #751.) On May 28, 2024, Gasaway began his term of supervised release in
the Eastern District of Texas. His term of supervision is scheduled to expire on May 27, 2027.
In his motion, Gasaway asks the court to terminate his supervision after serving just over
18 months of his supervision term. (Doc. #779.) He states that he has successfully complied with
the terms of his release, has been gainfully employed, and poses no danger to the community due
to his age of 60 years old and statistics supporting findings of low recidivism for offenders over
65 years of age. (Id.)
II. DISCUSSION
A court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 35531, terminate a term of
supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year
of supervised release, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
relating to the modification of probation, if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the
conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
District courts enjoy considerable discretion in determining when the interest of justice
warrants early termination. United States v. Tacker, 672 F. App’x 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lynn, No. S90- 00053(P),
2022 WL 2446328, at *3 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 2022). Compliance with the terms of supervised
release and with the law alone is not enough to merit early termination because such conduct is
1 Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history
and characteristics; the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense; the need to deter criminal conduct; the need to protect the public; the need to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner; the kinds of sentences and sentencing ranges established for defendants with similar characteristics
under applicable Sentencing Commission guidelines and policy statements; any pertinent policy statement of the
Sentencing Commission in effect on the date of sentencing; the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similar
defendants; and the need to provide restitution to the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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expected and required. United States v. Seymore, No. CR07-358, 2023 WL 3976200, at *1 (E.D.
La. June 13, 2023) (“[C]ourts have generally held that something more than compliance with the
terms of [supervised release] is required to justify an early termination . . . .” (quoting United States
v. Smith, No. 10-cr-53-DPJ-FKB, 2014 WL 68796, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 8, 2014)); United States
v. Pittman, No. 3:15-CR-221-O(1), 2020 WL 6564724, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020) (finding
that the conduct of the defendant did not warrant early termination of supervised release, as the
defendant sought relief based on his circumstances and the alleged conduct of others) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)). There must be a showing of “exceptional circumstances to justify the court’s
exercise of its discretion to terminate his supervised release early or any circumstances that render
his term or conditions of release either too harsh or inappropriately tailored to serve Section
3553(a)’s goals.” United States v. Hartman, No. 3:00-CR-228-B, 2013 WL 524257, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 18, 2013), R. & R. adopted, 2013 WL 540490 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2013); see also United
States v. Guidry, No. 3:19-CR-332-S, 2020 WL 908542, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2020) (“Caselaw
is also consistent in that early termination is discretionary and is warranted only in cases where the
defendant shows changed circumstances, such as exceptionally good behavior.”) (quoting United
States v. Jones, No. V-11-21, 2013 WL 2417927, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2013), R. & R. adopted,
2020 WL 906303 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2020)).
Although it appears that Gasaway has been compliant while on supervised release, the
court agrees with probation and the government that his compliance merely demonstrates that he
is fulfilling the baseline expectation for anyone on supervised release. “[C]ompliance with the
terms of supervised release and with the law alone is not enough to warrant early termination; such
conduct is expected and required.” Guidry, 2020 WL 908542, at *1.
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Gasaway’s history includes violent crimes involving the use of firearms. Gasaway
personally disposed of a firearm used during one of the robberies to kill a victim and injure other
victims. While his compliance to date should be commended, continuing him on supervision
would provide him the best opportunity for success. Requiring Gasaway to complete his entire
term of supervised release will safeguard against the reoccurrence of criminal activity and protect
the community.
Generally, early termination of supervised release is not granted unless there are serious
medical concerns, substantial limitations on employment, or extraordinary post-release
accomplishments that would warrant such a release. See United States v. Andrews, No. 3:15-CR-
2-CWR-LRA-1, 2022 WL 21295450, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 11, 2022); United States v. Pittman,
No. 3:15-CR-221-O(1), 2020 WL 6564724, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020). Gasaway does not
identify any circumstances in his motion requiring early termination and is instead seeking such
simply for complying with the conditions imposed by the court. He states that he is seeking early
termination to seek other employment opportunities; however, his probation officer states that his
conditions do not restrict his ability to obtain or maintain employment. Although Gasaway appears
to be on the right path, the court believes that completion of his full term of supervised release
appropriately reflects the seriousness of his offense, deters future criminal conduct, and provides
the needed structure for his continued rehabilitation.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion (doc. #779) should be
DENIED.
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IV. OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), each party to this action has the right to file
objections to this Report and Recommendation. Objections to this Report must (1) be in writing,
(2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be
served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report, and (4) be
no more than eight (8) pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(2);
E.D. TEX. CRIM. R. CR-59(c). A party who objects to this Report is entitled to a de novo
determination by the United States district judge of those proposed findings and recommendations
to which a specific objection is timely made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(3).
A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy
of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States district
judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–
77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings
of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States district judge, see Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
.
___________________________________
Christine L Stetson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this the 24th day of February, 2026.
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