Ruffin v. Grassano Properties Inc et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARY RUFFIN,
Plaintiff,
versus
GRASSANO PROPERTIES INC. and
KATRINA ROSSON,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00563-
MAC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules of Court for the Assignment of Duties
to United States Magistrate Judges, the district court referred this proceeding to the Honorable
Christine L. Stetson, United States Magistrate Judge, to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to enter
findings of fact and recommend disposition on case-dispositive matters, and to determine non-
dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72. On January 8,
2026, Judge Stetson issued a Report and Recommendation (#10) recommending that this court
conditionally dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), allowing time for Plaintiff to replead. Plaintiff has objected (#11) to the Report
and Recommendation; however, her filings necessitate some initial discussion before the court
can address Plaintiff’s objections.
I. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave
On January 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to File Objections Out of Time
and Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” (#11). This filing
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violates Eastern District of Texas Local Rule CV-7(k), which provides that “[m]otions for leave
to file a document should be filed separately and immediately before the document for which
leave is sought.” It seems, however, that Plaintiff recognized her motion’s impropriety because
she mailed a separate Motion for Leave to File Objections Out of Time (#13) to the court the
next day. Although Plaintiff does not reference the local rules in her second motion, she notes
therein that “[she] desires to file a separate stand-alone Motion for Leave” and “respectfully
requests the court grant[] [it] and accept her objections as timely” (#13 at 3). Plaintiff’s request
for leave is GRANTED.1 Accordingly, the court excuses Plaintiff’s dual motion2 and construes
it as her timely filed objections,3 which the court will now address.
II. Legal Standard
A party who timely files specific, written objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation is entitled to a de novo determination of findings or recommendations to which
the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2)–(3). To be
specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely
incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.
See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (“Frivolous,
1 The reasons Plaintiff provides for her objections’ tardiness are satisfactory. See (#13 at 2).
2 Full adherence to all applicable procedural rules are expected moving forward; failures to comply can
and will lead to motions being struck by this court or the magistrate judge. See Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168,
171 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.”).
3 Aside from a two-sentence request for leave, the filing contains only her objections. See (#11 at 2–8).
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conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.”), overruled on
other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff levies 12 objections to Judge Stetson’s Report and Recommendation. See (#11).
The first 5 objections assert that certain findings in the Report and Recommendation are
undermined by “internal inconsistenc[ies]” caused by “misapplication of the screening
standard.” (#11 at 2–4). Plaintiff faults Judge Stetson for not accepting Plaintiff’s allegations
as true and concluding that Plaintiff failed to state legally cognizable causes of action despite
identifying the “claims” Plaintiff asserted in her complaint.
Plaintiff’s first 5 objections are overruled. Judge Stetson did not misapply the screening
standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915; a de novo review of Plaintiff’s complaint (#1) confirms that
her allegations “leave[] the court unsure as to what exactly her claims are.” (#10 at 1). Plaintiff
indeed asserts legal claims, but her allegations lack the detail required to assert any plausible
claims. The court should accept well-pleaded allegations as true, but that “tenet” is “inapplicable
to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiff’s asserted “claims”
are simply “recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” which, at the pleading stage, “do not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The magistrate
judge did not recommend dismissal based on a finding that Plaintiff’s claims were “frivolous”
(#11 at 3), Judge Stetson found that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. This court agrees with
that reading of the complaint. The complaint’s allegations might suggest wrongdoing, but
without more detail, Plaintiff’s assertions are equally “compatible” with lawful behavior.4 Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 680. In other words, Plaintiff’s complaint, as pleaded, fails to “nudg[e] [her] claims
4 At least, behavior that does not give rise to liability under the Ku Klux Klan Act.
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. . . across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Objection 6 is overruled. Plaintiff argues that the Report and Recommendation erred in
concluding that her complaint did not allege state action. (#11 at 4). Plaintiff claims that she
“alleges that Defendants benefited from and participated in coordinated actions with judges,
clerks, and court personnel conduct that denied Plaintiff access to the courts, deprived her of an
impartial tribunal, and involved conspiracy with state actors.” (Id.) But Plaintiff does not make
those allegations in her complaint. As to the Defendants’ “entwinement with judicial power,”
all Plaintiff offers is that Grassano and its attorneys “leveraged judicial authority to silence
Plaintiff.” (#1 at 8). While Grassano and the Malley Law Firm are alleged to have acted in
concert to “obstruct due process” (id.), nothing in the complaint suggests that they conspired
with the courts to do so. Plaintiff does not allege “coordinated actions with state officials” (#11
at 4), she alleges that a corporation and its attorneys succeeded in litigation; nothing in the
complaint converts this conduct into state action. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–
19 (1981). As such, Objections 7 through 9 are also overruled. See (#11 at 4–6) (objecting to
finding that complaint did not plead state action in alleged conspiracy between Grassano and its
attorneys).
Objections 10 and 11 fault Judge Stetson for construing Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985
claim under “the second clause” of §1985(2) instead of “the first.” See (id. at 6–7). These
objections are overruled. As Plaintiff points out, the first clause of § 1985(2) concerns
obstruction to justice “in federal proceedings” while the second concerns that in “state-court
proceedings.” (Id. at 7); see Shaw v. Gray Media Grp., Inc., No. 23-CV-1502, 2024 WL
2031817, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2024) (quoting James v. MedicalControl, Inc., 29 F.Supp.2d
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749, 754 (N.D. Tex. 1998)). Plaintiff’s objections state that her complaint “describe[s]
interference with the due course of justice in federal proceedings.” (#11 at 7). But it does not.
The complaint’s allegations about this apparent lawsuit are insufficiently detailed; where they do
provide information, however, they reveal that at one point the lawsuit was remanded to “Civil
Court at Law No. 1” by “the Ninth Court of Appeals.” (#1 at 6). It was therefore a state-court
proceeding because Texas’s Ninth Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Jefferson County, TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 22.201(j), which has a County Court at Law No. 1, § 25.1251(a)(1), that sits in
Beaumont, § 25.1251(b), which is where Plaintiff says the allegations giving rise to her claims
occurred (#1 at 2). Thus, Plaintiff’s conspiracy-to-obstruct-justice claim falls under the second
clause of § 1985(2), not the first, and a review of the complaint confirms that Plaintiff does not
allege any race- or class-based animus as required to state her § 1985(2) claim.
Objection 12 is overruled as frivolous. Plaintiff asserts that the recommendation to
dismiss her pendent state-law claim for lack of jurisdiction cannot “extend . . . to Plaintiff’s
federal claims.” (#11 at 7). While true that it cannot, it does not. The Report and
Recommendation does not advise dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims for lack of jurisdiction
like the asserted state-law claim, it recommends dismissal based on failure to plead.
IV. Order
Plaintiff’s motion for leave (doc. #13) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s objections (doc. #11) are OVERRULED.
The Report and Recommendation (doc. #10) is ADOPTED.
Plaintiff’s claims are CONDITIONALLY DISMISSED without prejudice under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff has fourteen (14) days to replead her complaint to cure the
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pleading deficiencies identified by Judge Stetson in the Report and Recommendation. If Plaintiff
fails to replead or cure the pleading defects in her complaint, the court will dismiss all claims.
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 24th day of February, 2026.
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