Sulbaran Gonzalez v. Western Tennessee Detention Facility

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
JHON ANGEL SULBARAN GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
)
)
)
) No. 2:26-cv-03251-TLP-cgc
v. )
)
)
)
)
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK,
Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Jhon Angel Sulbaran Gonzalez, a noncitizen detained in the Western District of
Tennessee, petitions pro se for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 2.)
The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the Writ should not be granted. (ECF No. 6.)
Respondent responded. (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner did not reply. For the reasons below, the Court
DENIES the Petition and DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a noncitizen who challenges the legality of his detention. (ECF No. 2 at
PageID 7, 10.) After Petitioner arrived in the United States, no immigration officer admitted or
paroled him after inspection. (ECF No. 8-1 at PageID 51.) In 2025, Petitioner was served with a
Notice to Appear, which alleged that he was removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and which ordered him to appear in immigration court. (Id.)
According to Respondent, immigration officials detained Petitioner during the execution
of a narcotics search warrant. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 47.) Since then, Petitioner has been in
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custody at the West Tennessee Detention Center. (Id. at PageID 48; see also ECF No. 2 at
PageID 10.)
Petitioner challenges his detention and requests immediate release from immigration
officials’ custody. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 11.) He has not exhausted his administrative remedies
or explained why. (Id. at PageID 3–6.) Respondent argues that the Court should dismiss the
Petition because Petitioner has failed to exhaust his remedies. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 48.)
ANALYSIS
Federal courts must require administrative exhaustion where Congress “specifically
mandates” it. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). But when, as here, no statute
mandates exhaustion, whether to require exhaustion of administrative remedies lies within
“sound judicial discretion.” See id.
In exercising that discretion, “federal courts must balance the interest of the individual in
retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests
favoring exhaustion.” Id. at 146; see Smith v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 178 F.4th 312, 325
(6th Cir. 2026) (“This rule is designed to afford the agency the opportunity to reconsider its
position in the first instance, and to promote efficient litigation.”). The institutional interests
relevant here are “protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.”
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145.
At times, the interest of the individual weighs heavily against the institutional interests at
stake. One example is when an “unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action”
creates “undue prejudice.” Id. at 146–47. Another is when administrative remedies are
inadequate because an agency is not “empowered to grant effective relief.” Id. at 147 (citation
modified). Moreover, “an administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative
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body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148. A
court may also waive exhaustion when pursuing administrative remedies would be futile.
Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 2013).
It is true that this Court has excused exhaustion for some noncitizens challenging their
detention before ruling on their petitions. That was before the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lopez-
Campos. See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026). In those cases,
administrative exhaustion was futile. See, e.g., Urrutia-Diaz v. Ladwig, No. 25-3098, 2025 WL
3689158, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2025).
But the Court now doubts that approach given the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lopez-Campos
and Respondent’s commitment to apply its holding in the many habeas cases the Court considers
each week. Soto-Vieyra v. Bullock, No. 2:26-cv-03009-TLP-TMP, 2026 WL 2634138, at *2
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2026). And given these developments, the Court finds it more appropriate
to abide by “the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before
seeking relief from federal courts.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144–45; see also Bartolon v. Bondi,
813 F. Supp. 3d 811, 825 (S.D. Ohio 2025) (“Petitioner’s apparent attempt to sidestep the BIA
appeals process in favor of habeas review highlights the need for an exhaustion requirement here
to protect agency authority, limit interference with agency affairs, and promote judicial
efficiency.”).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner must exhaust his available
administrative remedies before seeking federal judicial intervention.
CONCLUSION
Because Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court DENIES the
Petition and DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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SO ORDERED, this 13th day of October, 2026.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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