Wright v. State of Tennessee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
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No. 2:25-cv-02630-SHL-cgc
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GRANTING DEFENDANT STATE OF TENNESSEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Charmiane G. Claxton’s Report and
Recommendation on Defendant State of Tennessee’s Motion to Dismiss, filed October 24, 2025.
(ECF No. 19.) The R&R recommends that the Court grant the State of Tennessee’s motion to
dismiss because the State’s sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff Michael Wright’s claim. (Id. at
PageID 137.) Wright filed his objections to the R&R on November 5. (ECF No. 20.)
For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS the State of
Tennessee’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2025, Wright filed a pro se complaint against the State, challenging the
constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated 36-3-103, which requires couples to obtain a
marriage license before they wed.1 (ECF No. 2 at PageID 4.) He asserts that this statute
1 Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-3-103(a) provides as follows:
Before being joined in marriage, the parties shall present to the minister or officer
a license under the hand of a county clerk in this state, directed to such minister or
officer, authorizing the solemnization of a marriage between the parties. 	Such
license shall be valid for thirty (30) days from its issuance by the clerk.
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impermissibly restrains his God-given right to marry, a right derived from the Bible and natural
law, and enshrined in both the Declaration of Independence and Article VII of the United States
Constitution. (See generally ECF No. 2.)
On August 12, the State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 12.) The State argues that this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction for two reasons. (ECF No. 13 at PageID 44.) First, Wright lacks standing, having
failed to plead a sufficient and redressable injury. (Id. at PageID 45–47.) Second, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity bars his suit. (Id. at PageID 47–48.) The State further contends that
Wright fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because “there is no legal
authority for his assertion.” (Id. at PageID 49.) The State asserts that the phrase “our Lord” in
the Constitution’s date—“the year of our Lord [1787]”—is not legally operative and, further,
“[t]here is no private right of action to enforce the Declaration of Independence.” (Id. (first
quoting U.S. Const. art. VII, and then Black v. Simpson, No. CIV.A.3:07CV-P354H, 2008 WL
544458, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 27, 2008)).)
Ten days later, Wright filed an “Affidavit of Rebuttal to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.”
(ECF No. 14.) He asserts that his injury is his inability to be married without a license, he has
clearly requested relief, the State does not enjoy sovereign immunity because he has the right to
petition the Government, and he has set forth a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id.)
On August 28, the State replied, reiterating its arguments. (ECF No. 15.) The R&R was
filed on October 24. (ECF No. 19.) Wright filed his objections twelve days later. (ECF No. 20.)
APPLICABLE LAW
A magistrate judge may submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for dismissal of a complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). “Within 14 days after
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being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2017). A district court reviews de novo only those proposed findings
of fact or conclusions of law to which a party specifically objects; the rest are reviewed for clear
error. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The sovereign
immunity guaranteed by this Amendment deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction
when a citizen sues his own State unless the State waives its immunity or Congress abrogates
that sovereign immunity.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted).
Although the Constitution does not provide directly for any right of action, Congress
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional
guarantees.” Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990). But § 1983 does not
waive State sovereign immunity. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66
(1989). And the State of Tennessee has not waived it either. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a);
Berndt v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986). However, an exception under
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows a claimant to seek prospective relief against a state
official in his or her official capacity to end a continuing violation of federal law that is being
committed by that state official.
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ANALYSIS
Wright raises two objections to the R&R, which appear to be primarily objections to
conclusions of fact. (ECF No. 20 at PageID 139.) First, Wright states that the R&R “did not
reject my point that marriage between a man and woman is an unalienable God-given right from
‘our Lord’ Jesus Christ which is also constitutionally protected.” (Id.) Second, he contends that
the R&R, along with “every judge from past cases, also failed to address the super majority of
the many constitutional violations [he] pointed out . . . regarding this flawed understanding of the
11th amendment.” (Id.) These appear to be objections of fact as to whether the R&R rejected or
addressed his arguments. The only objection as to law that the Court can discern is that, as to the
R&R’s Eleventh Amendment analysis, Wright simply asserts that its “logic was incorrect.” (Id.)
Reviewing de novo the findings of fact in the R&R to which Wright objects, the Court
finds that the R&R correctly assessed the facts. It acknowledged, first, the fact that Wright
“asserts that this statute interferes with his God-given right to be married” and, second, that he
“allege[s] violations of the United States Constitution.” (ECF No. 19 at PageID 133, 136.)
However, although the R&R was correct to acknowledge these arguments, it was not required to
analyze them because it found that the doctrine of sovereign immunity disposes of the case.
Yet, because Wright specifically objects that the R&R’s “logic was incorrect” in its
Eleventh Amendment analysis, the Court reviews de novo the R&R’s conclusion of law
concerning sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state from its
own citizens, unless Congress abrogates, or a state waives, that sovereign immunity. U.S. Const.
amend. XI; Russell, 784 F.3d at 1046. Congress has not abrogated that immunity for a § 1983
claim such as Wright’s. Will, 491 U.S. at 66. Nor has Tennessee waived it. Tenn. Code Ann. §
20-13-102(a); Berndt, 796 F.2d at 881. The Ex parte Young exception is not available to Wright,
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because he names no state official in their official capacity who is allegedly depriving him of his
rights. See 209 U.S. 123, 167 (holding that a state official cannot constitutionally act in their
official capacity “under an unconstitutional enactment of the legislature”). Thus, Wright is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment from suing the State of Tennessee for a deprivation of his
right to marry without a license. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Wright’s claim,
and it must be dismissed.
Having reviewed de novo the conclusions of the R&R to which Wright objects and
finding no error, and having reviewed the remainder of the R&R and finding no clear error, the
Court ADOPTS the R&R.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS the State of Tennessee’s motion
to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 20th day of January, 2026.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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