Smalls v. Shelby County (Sheriffs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
SHEQUITA SMALLS, on behalf of )
DERRICK SMALLS, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-02579-SHL-tmp
)
SHELBY COUNTY, )
)
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Shequita Smalls’s
Complaint, filed on June 9, 2025 (ECF No. 2), as well as her
amended complaint, filed on November 20, 2025 (ECF No. 9).1 Because
Smalls is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court must screen the
complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons
below, the undersigned recommends that Smalls’s complaints be
dismissed.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for
management of all pretrial matters for determination or report and
recommendation, as appropriate.
2The court granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
October 31, 2025. (ECF No. 7.)
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This case involves the tragic death of Shequita Smalls’s
husband, Derrick Smalls. Shequita Smalls’s complaint is brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of Derrick Smalls’s
Fourth Amendment rights and “excessive force, failure to provide
medical care, or civil rights violations.” (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID
6.) However, the original complaint provides no further factual
allegations to support her claim. In an order sua sponte granting
Smalls leave to file an amended complaint on October 31, 2025, the
undersigned noted that Smalls had attached to her original
complaint several exhibits containing medical records that
provided some background regarding Derrick Smalls’s death. (ECF
No. 8.) The medical reports seem to indicate that the decedent was
in custody undergoing the process of being released when he became
non-compliant and was placed in a restraint chair, after which he
became unresponsive. (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 26, 36, 42-43.) He was
then taken to the hospital where he passed away during treatment.
(Id. at PageID 9.) Based on these records, the undersigned granted
Smalls leave to amend her complaint.
In the amended complaint, Smalls lists the names of jailers
at the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office, medical staff at the jail,
and airport police officers without specifying any alleged
unconstitutional actions taken by any particular individual. (ECF
No. 9 at PageID 2-3.) She also claims there is “evidence now
available [to] demonstrate[] that (1) Derrick Smalls was
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experiencing a trauma-induced psychotic episode, (2) standard
mental health crisis protocols were not initiated, (3) custodial
staff failed to provide timely medical assessment, and (4)
subsequent restraint and handling procedures contributed to his
medical deterioration.” (Id. at PageID 5.) Smalls describes how
her husband “was observed pacing and talking to himself prior to
release[,]” the “Detention Response Team (DRT) entered with shock
gloves[,]” and he was “placed in a restraint chair and subsequently
ended up on the floor.” (Id. at PageID 7.) The amended complaint
states that “portions of the footage were not visible, and key
events could not be clearly observed.” (Id. at PageID 8.) Smalls
ends her amended complaint with a conclusory statement that
“[t]hese conditions are consistent with severe psychological
distress occurring after prolonged restraint, inadequate medical
assessment, and potentially delayed emergency intervention,”
without specific allegations as to such misconduct by any
particular Shelby County agent or officer. (Id. at PageID 9-10.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 Screening
1. Standard of Review
This court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints
and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
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against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A claim is plausible on its face if the
‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.’” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.
Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678); see also Crestman as Next Friend to Wooden v. Metro.
Gov’t of Nash. and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., No. 24-6018, 2025 WL
2650582, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 2025). Without factual
allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not entitled to
the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally
construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011);
Kremer v. Unilever, PLC, No. 24-cv-01410, 2025 WL 2674556, at *6
(M.D. Tenn Sept. 18, 2025). Even so, pro so litigants must adhere
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891
F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), and the court cannot create a claim
that has not been spelled out in a pleading. See Brown v.
Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y
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of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003); Wooden v. Lee,
No. 24-cv-01052, 2025 WL 2678796, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 18,
2025).
2. Section 1983 Claims
Smalls’s complaint is styled as an action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 2, 9.) “To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must first identify a constitutional right, then show
that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of
that right.” Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 109
F.4th 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Troutman v. Louisville Metro
Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020)). In a case
brought against municipal defendants such as the County, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege the existence of an unlawful policy
or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978); see also Hart v. City of Grand Rapids, 138 F.4th 409, 425
(6th Cir. 2025). Even though Smalls’s complaint sufficiently
alleges a constitutional violation, she does not provide any
factual allegations to support that the municipal defendant had an
unlawful policy or custom that deprived Derrick Smalls of a
constitutional right.
“Unlike states, . . . local governments, municipalities, and
counties are considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983[.]” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 814 (6th Cir. 2003);
see also Wright v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 144 F.4th 817, 827 (6th
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Cir. 2025). However, a municipality cannot be held liable under §
1983 for the constitutional violations of its employees on a theory
of respondeat superior. Morris v. City of Memphis, No. 19-cv-2874-
MSN-tmp, 2021 WL 1878357, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2021) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Rather, the [County] may be held only
directly liable ‘for unconstitutional policies, practices, or
customs that were the moving force behind the deprivation of
plaintiffs’ rights.” Id. (quoting Pethel v. State Dep’t of Children
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-469-TAV-HBG, 2020 WL 6827791, at *16 (E.D.
Tenn. Nov. 20, 2020) and citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (internal
quotations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has identified “at least four avenues”
through which a plaintiff may prove the existence of a
municipality’s unlawful policy or custom. Franklin v. Franklin
Cnty., 115 F.4th 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Thomas v. City
of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). These include:
“(1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official agency
policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-
making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or
supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of
federal rights violations.” Id. “In the context of [§] 1983
municipal liability, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have
interpreted Iqbal’s standards strictly.” Epperson v. City of
Humboldt, Tenn., 140 F. Supp. 3d 676, 685 (W.D. Tenn. 2015)
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(quoting Hutchison v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.,
685 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (M.D. Tenn. 2010)) (additional citations
omitted); see also Stacy v. Clarksville Police Dep’t, 771 F Supp.
3d 1024, 1034 (M.D. Tenn. 2025).
At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Sixth Circuit has routinely
found that conclusory, speculative allegations are insufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief against a municipality. See,
e.g., Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656,
698 (6th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s municipal
liability claim where complaint failed to allege “a single fact”
suggesting that Fourth Amendment violations were the result of
defendant city’s custom or policy); D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d
378, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying four-prong custom of
tolerance standard to hold that plaintiff’s “lone, conclusory
allegation” of employee’s misconduct did not state a plausible
claim of municipal liability); see also Meyer v. Day, No. 4:25-
CV-P16-JHM, 2025 WL 1932175, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July 14, 2025)
(finding that plaintiff’s complaint did not sufficiently identify
specific officers who used force); Koren v. Neil, No. 1:21-cv-9,
2022 WL 974340, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2022) (in a case involving
a jail’s use of a restraint chair, explaining that “a plaintiff
must first identify an employee who committed the constitutional
violation” and demonstrate a causal connection between the
county’s conduct and the deprivation alleged).
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By contrast, in cases where the Sixth Circuit has found that
complaints satisfied the plausibility requirement, those
complaints contained at least some details as to the custom or
practice challenged and identified specific instances of similar
past conduct. See, e.g., Osberry v. Slusher, 750 F. App’x 385, 398
(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680) (finding that six
prior cases of alleged unconstitutional conduct identified in
plaintiff’s amended complaint “nudge[d] Osberry’s Monell claim
‘across the line from conceivable to plausible’” under Iqbal’s
pleading standard); Green v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson
Cnty., 482 F. App’x 63, 65-66 (6th Cir. 2012) (reversing dismissal
of municipal liability claim where plaintiff “did not merely allege
a policy of enforcing facially invalid state court order,” but
offered discrete statements from two county employees that this
was the county’s policy in amended complaint).
Here, Smalls does not identify any discrete examples of
similar constitutional violations within the four corners of her
original or amended complaints. She instead makes only conclusory
allegations with no further explanation that her husband’s
“ultimate death result[ed] from mishandling” and “procedural
failures by law enforcement and detention personnel—including
failure to initiate crisis response, failure to conduct intake
assessment, improper use of restraints, and delayed medical
response.” (ECF No. 9 at PageID 10-11.) “Allowing [p]laintiff’s
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single incident to support a finding of municipal liability would
‘result in the collapsing of the municipal liability standard into
a simple respondeat superior standard.’” Doe v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t,
No. 2:18-cv-02637-JPM/tmp, 2020 WL 5995507, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Oct.
9, 2020) (quoting Thomas, 398 F.3d at 432-33). Because “[t]his
path to municipal liability has been forbidden by the Supreme
Court,” Smalls’s conclusory allegations, without more, are not
sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Thomas, 398 F.3d at 433
(citations omitted); see also Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d
388, 402 (6th Cir. 2016) (“With no factual allegations showing a
formal policy or any prior incidents to support the [defendant’s]
adoption of such an informal practice or custom, [plaintiff’s]
Monell municipal-liability claim accordingly fails.”).
In sum, Smalls has not plausibly alleged that Shelby County
so inadequately failed to train its officers or ignored a pattern
of sufficiently similar constitutional violations for municipal
liability to attach. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims under §
1983 should be dismissed.
Smalls also attempts to add individual officers to be “sued
in their individual and official capacities.”3 (ECF No. 9 at PageID
3Smalls attempts to add the following individuals as defendants in
her amended complaint: Glasper Kirkland, Keith Williams, DeAngelo
Harris, Trevis Matthews, Jamar Robertson, Christian Avalos, Mario
Ross, Tremaine Turner, Camry Porter, Rozell Gulledge, Brandon
White, Rodney Jones, Dr. Oscar Webb, Gara Christian, Deanna Virges,
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2.) When a government official is sued in their official capacity,
courts treat it as “the equivalent of a suit against the
governmental entity,” so the Monell requirements would still
apply. Lane v. City of Lafollette, 490 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.
2007); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); see
also Lee v. Mayfield, No. 25-5233, 2025 WL 726856, at *2 (6th Cir.
Aug. 26, 2025); Enoch v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 818 F.
App’x 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2020). Since Smalls’s amended complaint
still fails to adequately state a § 1983 claim that would meet the
Monell standard, the amendment would be futile as to the claims
against the County and the officers in their official capacity.
Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512
(6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a proposed amendment is futile if
the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss); see also Greer v. Strange Honey Farm, LLC, 114 F.4th
605, 617 (6th Cir. 2024).
Regarding the suit against the named officers and staff
individually, Smalls merely lists them as being involved in the
encounter. (ECF No. 9 at PageID 2.) However, “damages claims
against government officials arising from alleged violations of
constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that
demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the . . . right .
Latanza Wilson, Officer DeWayne Tippett, Officer David Mastin, and
Officer Richard McCain.
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. . . [and] separately analyz[ing] the constitutionality of the
individual actions of each defendant.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d
673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l
Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also
Mobley v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:22-cv-02860-SHM-tmp, 2024
WL 712889, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2024). Smalls does not
identify how any particular individual acted to violate her
husband’s constitutional rights, nor does she provide facts
alleging which of the named officers and staff were personally
responsible for which parts of the encounter. Thus, her amended
complaint does not meet the standard of individual liability
against the officers and staff.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that
plaintiff’s complaints be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
December 4, 2025
Date
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE
SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S
OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A
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COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.
72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,
EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.
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