Bordages v. Tenet Healthcare Corporation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
JAMES HARRY HERBERT BORDAGES
JR.,
Plaintiff,
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No. 2:25-cv-02615-TLP-atc
v.
TENET HEALTHCARE CORPORATION,
ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL, UNKNOWN
EMPLOYEES OF TENET
HEALTHCARE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES
MILITARY, UNKNOWN LAW
ENFORCEMENT ENTITIES AND
OFFICERS, STATE OF TENNESSEE,
UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES OF THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, JACK VAN
DURAN, EDUARDO CABIAGO, JACK
VAN DUREN’S WIFE, and JOHN VAN
DUREN,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
AND ORDER DENYING PENDING MOTIONS
On June 2, 2025, Plaintiff James Harry Herbert Bordages filed a pro se Complaint against
Defendants Tenet Healthcare Corporation (“Tenet”), St. Francis Hospital (“St. Francis”),
unknown employees of Tenet, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Military,
unknown law enforcement entities and officers, the State of Tennessee, and unknown employees
of the State of Tennessee. (ECF No. 1.) On June 13, 2025, Bordages filed his First Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 6.) On June 24, 2025, Bordages filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, which was subsequently granted. (ECF Nos. 8, 16.) Pursuant to Administrative Order
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No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for management
and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and recommendation as appropriate.
Since filing his First Amended Complaint, Bordages has also submitted numerous other
filings. On August 19, 2025, Bordages filed his Second Amended Complaint (which he styled as
his First Amended Complaint), in which he added Defendants Jack Van Duran, Eduardo
Cabiago, Jack Van Duren’s wife, and John Van Duren. (ECF No. 22.) He has also filed
multiple other documents in support of his complaints (ECF Nos. 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21),1 as
well as a motion for discovery (ECF No. 9), a motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior
convictions (ECF No. 11), a motion to appear remotely via video conference (ECF No. 18), and
a motion to compel service of process (ECF No. 24).
For the following reasons, it is recommended that this case be dismissed sua sponte,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court
denies Bordages’s pending motions as moot in light of these recommendations.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Proposed Findings of Fact
Bordages is no stranger to litigation in the Western District of Tennessee. On January 27,
2012, he filed a complaint against Sports Clips, Inc. (Case No. 2:12-cv-02060-JDT-dkv,
“Bordages I”), and on October 28, 2015, he filed a complaint against numerous governmental
1 Though these additional submissions appear unnecessary, and their purpose is unclear, the
Court will consider them for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, and the Court will
construe these documents and his three complaints together herein. See Harper v. Shelby Cnty.
Gov’t, No. 2:15-cv-2502-STA-cgc, 2016 WL 737947, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2016) (citing
Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)) (“When a Court considers whether
dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate, the Court may consider the complaint and
attached exhibits, as well as any public records, so long as they are referred to in the complaint
and are central to the claims contained therein.”).
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and private entities, including Sports Clips (Case No. 2:15-cv-02708-STA-atc, “Bordages II”).
Both Bordages I and Bordages II involved his allegations that some combination of Sports Clips,
various federal and state governmental agencies, healthcare providers, and media companies
“conspired to plant a chip in Bordages’s scalp during a routine haircut” in April 2010 to remotely
surveille and conduct experiments on him. Bordages II, 2015 WL 9267086, at *1 n.1 (W.D.
Tenn. Nov. 5, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 9295994 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 18, 2015). Both Bordages I and Bordages II were dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction as frivolous. Id. at *3. Since those dismissals, Bordages has filed a dozen other
cases in the Western District of Tennessee—including this case—some of which have been
dismissed as frivolous, and some of which remain pending.2
Bordages’s Complaint is extremely nebulous and difficult to follow. But, as best as the
undersigned can determine, at issue in this case are Bordages’s allegations that “revive[] and
expand[] upon” the claims he brought in Bordages I and Bordages II “stemming from a
biomedical device unlawfully implanted in or about April 2010.” (ECF No. 1, at 1.) He claims
that, “[f]or over fifteen years, Plaintiff has been systematically and deliberately targeted by
Defendants for unauthorized biomedical experimentation, biometric surveillance, and genetic
2 Four other cases filed by Bordages are currently pending before the undersigned pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 2013-05: Case Nos. 2:25-cv-02615-TLP-atc, 2:25-cv-02617-MSN-atc,
2:25-cv-02682-SHL-atc, and 2:25-cv-02717-MSN-atc. At least two of these other four cases are
directly related to his allegations from Bordages I and Bordages II. See, e.g., Bordages v. T-
Mobile Corp., Case No. 2:25-cv-02617-MSN-atc, ECF No. 1, at 2 (W.D. Tenn. June 16, 2025)
(“This complaint is filed in connection with the facts and circumstances underlying (Civil Action
No. 2:25-cv-02562-TLP-atc) and asserts distinct but interrelated constitutional claims arising
from unlawful use of telecommunications infrastructure.”); Bordages v. U.S. DOJ, Case No.
2:25-cv-02717-MSN-atc, ECF No. 1-2, at 1 (W.D. Tenn. June 16, 2025) (“Over a fifteen-year
period, Plaintiff has been subjected to unlawful surveillance, exploitation, false imprisonment,
medical experimentation without consent, suppression of legal redress, and coordinated
obstruction by federal and state officials.”).
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data extraction” and that he “was subjected to non-consensual biological monitoring and
manipulation through covert medical procedures, nano-biotechnologies, and experimental
devices designed to interface with neurological and cellular processes, all without medical
necessity, oversight, or consent.” (ECF No. 6, at 2.) Bordages further contends that the
“electromagnetic and biological weapons were deployed to cause sleep deprivation,
psychological torment, and physical suffering as a means of controlling, silencing, or further
subjugating him to unlawful experimentation” and that “Defendants engaged in acts of
psychological and physiological torture, including targeted harassment, deprivation of rest and
nutrition, and manipulation of bodily and cognitive functions.” (Id. at 3.)
Bordages alleges that Defendants have targeted him because he has a rare blood type that
“acts as a universal template. Nano-probes monitor and record his cellular activity, which can be
transmitted remotely to labs for synthetic tissue and organoid creation. The cell lines are
Platforms that have been cataloged which have most probably shared with other research
facilities globally.” (ECF No. 22, at 4–5.) Bordages asserts that he is entitled to compensation
from Defendants resulting from their persistent remote surveillance, mind control, torture, and
exploitation of him since April 2010 and from the profits that they have earned by remotely
studying and harvesting his “unique physiology.” (Id. at 3–5.) Bordages brings claims for
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act, and international human rights norms, along with a litany of state and federal laws
concerning torts and privacy. (ECF No. 6, at 3; ECF No. 22, at 5–8.) Among other relief,
Bordages seeks injunctive relief “to prevent further use of Plaintiff’s DNA, body, and mind for
experimentation or surveillance” and $100 billion in compensatory and punitive damages. (ECF
No. 1, at 2.)
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II. 	Proposed Conclusions of Law
A. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) Screening
Under Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), the Clerk of the Court will only issue summonses in cases
with non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs who are proceeding in forma pauperis at the Court’s direction
after the Court conducts a screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that provision, the Court shall
dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” This Report and Recommendation constitutes the Court’s
screening.
B. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As part of the § 1915(e) screening process, the Court must determine whether Bordages
has pled a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maney v. Kreulen, No. 3:24-cv-
01132, 2024 WL 4871731, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2024) (dismissing the case during the
§ 1915(e) screening process for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); McRee v. Renasant Bank
Legal Dep’t, No. 16-cv-2879-JDT-dkv, 2017 WL 31470, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2017) (same).
“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) if the facts, accepted as true and viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Nesselrode v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-4206, 2018 WL 6975166, at *2 (6th Cir. June
18, 2018). “Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers and are thus liberally construed.” Woodson v. Woodson, No. 2:22-mc-00003-TLP-
tmp, 2022 WL 16985602, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, 2022 WL 16963997 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022) (citing Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). “Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure, . . . and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out in a pleading.”
Id. (citations omitted).
“A district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the
allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Id. (quoting Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999)). “A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally.” Eshleman v. Chester Cnty.,
No. 1:15-cv-1106-JDT-egb, 2015 WL 13744665, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2015), report and
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 843390 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2016) (citing Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual
allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. “Any complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29). “Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as
frivolous give ‘judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Id. at 471
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
“Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, a judge does not have to accept ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual allegations as
true.” Id. at 471 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28); see
also Huey v. Raymond, 53 F. App’x 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district court [is] given
discretion to refuse to accept without question the truth of plaintiff’s allegations that are ‘clearly
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baseless,’ a term encompassing claims that may be fairly described as fanciful, fantastic,
delusional, wholly incredible, or irrational.” (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33
(1992)); Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (“[T]he district courts, who are ‘all too familiar’ with factually
frivolous claims, are in the best position to determine which cases fall into this category. Indeed,
[§ 1915(e)’s] instruction that an action may be dismissed if the court is ‘satisfied’ that it is
frivolous indicates that frivolousness is a decision entrusted to the discretion of the court
entertaining the in forma pauperis petition.” (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
C. 	The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Bordages’s Frivolous Claims
Bordages’s overarching contention in this case, a repackaging of claims he brought in
Bordages I and Bordages II, is that, since April 2010, he has been targeted by Defendants for
unauthorized experimentation, surveillance, mind control, torture, and genetic data extraction
through covert procedures and technologies. (ECF No. 6, at 2; ECF No. 22, at 3–5.) Courts in
the Sixth Circuit uniformly find these kinds of claims to be frivolous and dismiss them out of
hand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction during the § 1915(e) screening process. See, e.g.,
Burnes v. Clinton, 238 F.3d 419, at *1 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (affirming
dismissal of the case as frivolous when the plaintiff alleged that “[t]hat the named defendants
were subjecting her to electronic surveillance, mind-reading, and remote torture”); Huey, 53 F.
App’x at 330 (affirming dismissal of the case as frivolous when the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants, among other things, poisoned his food, stuck him with needles, and otherwise
vaguely conspired against him because such allegations were “fantastic or delusional
scenarios”); Martin v. Kazulkina, No. 12-cv-14286, 2017 WL 971706, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
21, 2017) (collecting cases for the proposition that courts routinely dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction cases involving allegations of “mind control devices and chip implants” and
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similar fantastical allegations of conspiratorial remote surveillance because they are “so
obviously frivolous that even a layman can identify them and discard them”); Corwin v. CIA, No.
22-cv-12694, 2023 WL 12176998, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s complaint
consists of vague and incoherent allegations of psychotronic and mind control weapons ‘used’ to
threaten and torture him. Even with a liberal reading of the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint,
the Court is unable to discern any claims with a rational or arguable basis in law. Plaintiff’s
claims are fantastic and delusional, totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous,
devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”); Lawson v. City of Youngstown, No. 4:16-cv-
1057, 2016 WL 2868715, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 17, 2016) (dismissing the case during the
§1915(e) screening process for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “plaintiff’s fact
allegations of secret monitoring and tracking are conclusory, frivolous, and fanciful”) (collecting
cases); Walker v. City of Memphis, No. 2:15-cv-2340-JDT-tmp, 2015 WL 3852846, at *3 (W.D.
Tenn. May 28, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 3851994 (W.D. Tenn.
June 22, 2015) (dismissing the case during the §1915(e) screening process for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because “[the] complaint presents a rambling narrative of events spanning
multiple decades, containing implausible and frivolous allegations” such as “that unknown police
officers forced a ‘Control Monitor’ on him in order to read his mind” and “that television and
radio stations use the ‘Control Monitor’ to talk back to him”) (collecting cases); Phillips v.
Biden, No. 2:22-cv-61, 2022 WL 2309148, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. June 9, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2307614 (E.D. Tenn. June 27, 2022) (collecting cases for
the proposition that allegations that “the government was tracking brain waves and had subjected
[the plaintiff] to mind manipulation and torture” and that “the Government was relying on
technology, including sub-cutaneous nano-sensors to surveille” should be dismissed out of hand
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as frivolous); Shephard v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 1:21-cv-1012, 2022 WL 21295049, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2022) (“Plaintiff’s claims in her complaint are nowhere near the realm of
possible. Allegations such as mind reading . . . and transmitting messages to Plaintiff’s brain all
due to implanted microchips throughout Plaintiff’s body are not even theoretically possible . . . .
Because Plaintiff’s complaint contains nothing but totally implausible and frivolous allegations,
the Court must dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1).”).
Bordages’s allegations in this case are frivolous, such that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to even consider them. “While the Court assumes that Plaintiff earnestly believes
that he is the victim of the harmful conduct he alleges, those allegations are not plausible.
Therefore the Court need not accept them as true even if Plaintiff fervently believes they are.
The Complaint here echoes claims in other cases dismissed as implausible, frivolous, and devoid
of merit.” Crouse v. City of Murray, Ky., No. 5:24-cv-120-BJB, 2024 WL 3857333, at *2 (W.D.
Ky. Aug. 16, 2024) (collecting cases dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction as frivolous when they involved allegations of conspiratorial remote surveillance,
mind control, nano probe implants, and the like). It is therefore recommended that this case—
premised entirely on Bordages’s frivolous allegations that have no basis in fact or in law—be
dismissed sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction as frivolous.3
3 The undersigned notes that, even if Bordages’s claims were not subject to dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, they would not pass screening for failure to state a claim. For
example, Bordages’s § 1983 claims against the corporate and individual Defendants would be
subject to dismissal because he has not sufficiently pled a violation of a federal right that “was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Hudson v. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 1:21-
cv-392, 2021 WL 5782471, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2021) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also McRee v.
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III. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that this case be dismissed sua sponte
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
ORDER DENYING PENDING MOTIONS
In light of the recommendations above, Bordages’s motion for discovery (ECF No. 9),
motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior convictions (ECF No. 11), motion to appear
remotely via video conference (ECF No. 18), and motion to compel service of process (ECF
No. 24) are DENIED without prejudice as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that this case be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bordages’s pending motions are DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED this 13th day of January, 2026.
s/Annie T. Christoff
ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation
disposition, a party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within
fourteen (14) days may constitute forfeiture/waiver of objections, exceptions, and further appeal.
Renasant Bank Legal Dep’t, No. 16-cv-2879-JDT-dkv, 2017 WL 31470, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Jan.
3, 2017) (“A § 1983 plaintiff may not sue purely private parties.” (quoting Brotherton v.
Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 567 (6th Cir. 1999))). Furthermore, because his allegations directly
relate to the alleged incident at Sports Clips in April 2010 that formed the basis of Bordages I
and Bordages II, all of his claims in this case would be subject to dismissal based on, among
other things, the applicable statutes of limitations and res judicata. Because Bordages’s claims
are so clearly subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as frivolous, that analysis
is unnecessary here.
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