USA v. Rasi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
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No. 2:25-cr-20017-MSN	v.
SEYED FATEH CHAPARI RASI,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Before the Court is Defendant Seyed Fateh Chapari Rasi’s Motion to Suppress, filed
July 14, 2025. (ECF No. 56.) The United States responded in opposition on August 11, 2025.
(ECF No. 65.) District Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr. referred the motion to the undersigned for
report and recommendation on July 15, 2025. (ECF No. 57.) The case was subsequently
transferred to District Judge Mark S. Norris. (ECF No. 78.)
The Court held a hearing on September 17, 2025. (ECF No. 72.) At the hearing, the
United States called no witnesses and introduced into evidence five exhibits: a drive containing
video files of an interview (Exhibit 1), a search warrant (Exhibit 2), the Criminal Complaint in
this case (Exhibit 3, also at ECF No. 1-1), a report from the Germantown Police Department
(Exhibit 4), and a form entitled Miranda Statement of Rights (“Miranda waiver form”)
(Exhibit 5).
Following the hearing, on September 29, 2025, the United States moved to supplement
the record with the Affidavit of Jonathan Williams. (ECF Nos. 74, 74-1.) That motion was
granted on September 30, 2025. (ECF No. 75.) The United States filed its motion to
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supplement, and the supplemental affidavit, under seal, explaining that the documents “disclosed
sensitive investigative capabilities that may compromise the success of other future criminal
investigations.” (ECF No. 74-1 ¶ 5.) The motion and affidavit do indeed appear to contain such
material and thus will remain under seal. In addition, the portion of this Report and
Recommendation discussing that material is filed under seal as an attachment to this docket
entry.
After careful consideration of the statements of counsel, the evidentiary exhibits, the
supplemental affidavit, and the entire record in this case, the Court recommends that the motion
be granted in part and denied in part.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
I. 	The Underlying Factual Allegations
According to the Criminal Complaint (ECF No. 1-1), this case arises from an alleged
cryptocurrency investment scam. In April 2024, the victim, K.X., a resident of Germantown,
Tennessee, responded to an online job posting and was ultimately contacted by a supervisor
named Jason. Though K.X. decided the positions were not suitable for her, she maintained
contact with Jason, who began to instruct her in cryptocurrency investing. On Jason’s advice,
K.X. began investing and downloaded the CoinMetro app to track her investments.
K.X.’s first two investments involved transfers ($2,500 and $9,500) from her Crypto.com
account. Her next three investments, however, were made in cash. On each of those occasions,
two men met K.X. at her home to collect the cash ($200,000, $300,000, and $300,000), giving
K.X. a dollar bill with a serial number that matched a “password” previously provided to K.X. by
“Customer Service.” After the collection, K.X.’s CoinMetro App balance would increase in the
corresponding amount. In July 2024, Jason convinced K.X. to liquidate her Charles Schwab
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account and wire two transfers of $100,000 each for further investing. In August, K.X. wanted
to withdraw her funds and was told she would have to pay taxes first. She then wired a total of
$300,000 for those purported taxes.
In November, Jason admitted to K.X. that her funds had not been invested but instead
used to fund his own business. He told her that her tax liability was $1,500,000 but that he
would cover $1,100,000 if she could pay the remaining $400,000. K.X. then wired a total of
$410,000, which Jason claimed was never received.
In January 2025, K.X. told her children about the situation, and they discovered that she
had been interacting with a fraudulent website and contacted the Germantown Police Department
(“GPD”). (ECF No. 65, at 2.) GPD and the FBI then worked with K.X. to set up a sting
operation. K.X. offered to make Jason an additional $150,000 payment, and Customer Service
indicated that a courier would come pick it up, again providing K.X. with a verification
password. On February 3, 2025, Rasi arrived at K.X.’s home, gave her the previously provided
password (a serial number on a $10 bill), took the cash (FBI funds), and drove away. GPD then
pulled Rasi over, arrested him at 11:52 a.m., and seized the cash and cell phone found in his car.
II. 	The Custodial Interview
Rasi was taken to a GPD facility and placed in a video-recorded interview room with two
Secret Service employees—Special Agent Morgan Morgan and Investigative Analyst Joseph
McGill. This initial interview is recorded in Exhibits 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.1 The interview begins
1 The footage provided in Exhibit 1 is separated into thirteen separate files. The file names are
numbered 1 through 13, and the files shall be referred to herein as Exhibits 1.1 through 1.13
correspondingly. All time-stamp citations herein are approximate and refer to the time elapsed
on the video file, not the time of day. The Court has reviewed all thirteen files. The description
herein of what is captured in that footage is not exhaustive and instead is limited to the
interactions necessary to decide Rasi’s Motion.
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with Morgan confirming with Rasi that he speaks English. (Ex. 1.1, at 5:15.) Though Rasi is
initially handcuffed, officers remove the handcuffs. (Id. at 7:30.) Morgan confirms that Rasi can
read and write English as well. (Id. at 8:06.) He then shows Rasi the Miranda waiver form (Ex.
5) and goes through it with him. When asked to sign, Rasi says, “I prefer to have a lawyer.”
(Ex. 1.1, at 9:09.)
Morgan continues to talk to Rasi and ask him questions, telling him that he is currently
only facing state charges and that, if Rasi cooperates with them, they will try to keep everything
at the state level versus going to the federal level. Morgan explains his desire to locate the “next
piece of the puzzle,” his belief that Rasi is not the “top dog,” and his advice that, “if you are, I
wouldn’t talk to me either.” (Id. at 9:46.) Rasi again says, “I prefer to have a lawyer.” (Id. at
10:06.) Morgan confirms that Rasi does not already have a lawyer, states that he will need a
court-appointed lawyer, and tells Rasi they will not ask him any more questions and will let GPD
“start the processing.” (Id. at 10:14.)
Morgan then asks Rasi if he has any questions, and Rasi says he wants to let his mother
know what has happened so that she will not worry. As Morgan is preparing to leave the room,
he asks Rasi, “Maybe we’ll talk tomorrow, the next day, if you have an attorney with you? Do
you want to talk once you get an attorney?” (Id. at 11:53.) Rasi asks him to “explain how it
works, I have to call someone?” Morgan explains that Rasi can hire a lawyer or have one
appointed if he cannot afford to hire one, and then they can talk. Rasi asks when he can get a
lawyer and is told his first court appearance will be Wednesday night (two days later), that he
will stay in custody at GPD until then, and that it is unknown whether he can get an attorney
before then. Morgan then says, “These guys here know how to get in touch with me, so if you
change your mind,” and Rasi interrupts, “So what’s going to make different if I talk to you?”
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(Id. at 13:58.) Morgan explains that, if Rasi talks to him, he can tell the judge that Rasi was
cooperative and helped further the investigation and that they would not seek federal charges.
He states that he cannot guarantee anything but would ask for leniency. Rasi says he will do
whatever it takes but first wants to let his mother know. (Id. at 14:53.)
Rasi expresses that he is worried about getting into trouble or fights in jail and is told that
the Germantown jail is small and fights do not really happen there. (Id. at 15:35.) Morgan and
McGill leave, and Rasi continues to ask questions of the officer who stays in the room (Gatlin)
about what will happen next. He also makes statements about not being in trouble before and
working hard to support his mother. The officer also explains that, as Germantown is a smaller
city, they only have court one day a week, on Wednesday.
Morgan returns and says Rasi can call his mother as long as he does so on speakerphone.
(Id. at 21:17.) Morgan asks if Rasi wants them to leave the room, and Rasi responds that it does
not matter. As the call is placed, Rasi asks what he should tell her, and the officers respond to
tell her the truth. Rasi and his mother have a conversation in Farsi. (Id. at 32:50.)2 After the
conversation, Morgan asks if she gave him any recommendations, and Rasi says he did not do
anything bad and does not know what is going on behind the scenes. (Ex. 1.1, at 36:32.)
Morgan says he does not want to talk about it unless Rasi wants to talk about it. Rasi does not
directly respond but begins to explain what happened.
2 The United States provided a summary of a translation of that conversation. (ECF No. 65,
at 4.) Rasi told his mother that “they are good people here” who “have my back,” that she
should inform Amir about what happened, that she can reach him at Amir Exchange, that “the
money was for the exchanger,” “that they know everything and are not children,” “that the
person never told him there was money in the box,” and that “the person just asked him to
‘deliver the box.’” (Id.)
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Rasi says that he was interested in going to California for a nice vacation and wanted to
help his mother have an easy life. (Id. at 37:10.) Morgan tells Rasi that he has rights, including
the right to have an attorney that they had talked about already, but that it sounds like Rasi wants
to talk and references the form that Rasi declined to sign. Morgan tells Rasi that he has the
option to talk now or wait after a couple of days in jail. Rasi says he does not want to go to jail.
Morgan explains that he is federal police and wants to know the details of what happens and that,
if Rasi cooperates and it leads to something in the federal case, he will tell the state authorities
that Rasi was helpful. Rasi says, “I will give up everything, bring the paper, I will give up
everything.” Morgan says, “so you want to talk?” Rasi responds, “there is nothing to hide.”
(Id. at 38:46.)
After Morgan leaves the room to get his notes and the paperwork, Rasi asks McGill, “I
don’t know, I really don’t know, should I wait for the lawyer? Because always they tell me
police officers they want to . . . .” McGill interrupts Rasi and says, “we can’t advise you what to
do, but, at any point, we could be thirty minutes in, you can always say ‘stop.’” (Id. at 39:06.)
Rasi says, “But you know the thing is, the thing is, maybe a lawyer can do a better job than me.
That’s what I’m saying. Maybe he can protect me somehow. Because I swear to God there’s
nothing to hide, I will tell everything to a lawyer, I’ve never done anything bad. . . .
Professionals can handle it better than me, but I will tell them everything anyway.” (Id. at
39:36.)
As Morgan reenters the room, Rasi continues, “But I don’t want to handle it in a way that
it’s going to be against me. Maybe a lawyer can handle it better than me.” (Id. at 39:53.)
Morgan says:
That is your right, one hundred percent, if you want to have your lawyer here,
totally get it. The problem is, just hear me out, we are dealing with a little bit of a
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timeline, right, because you picked up something that you were supposed to
probably take somewhere else. When that doesn’t get to said place, things start
happening, right? Things like, questions come up, and your phone starts ringing,
but you’re not answering your phone because we have it. You see what I’m
saying? So then that slows down our investigation, or it hampers our
investigation. We can’t take that next step without you, right? And the sooner we
get cooperation from you, we can move on, does that make sense? But again,
totally your choice, . . . if we wait and we talk like tomorrow or the next day when
you have an attorney and a lot of this stuff is now what we call stale, we can’t act
on it. And that doesn’t mean that you didn’t cooperate with us, it just means that
we weren’t able to take that next step, so now our focus is going to come back to
you. You see what I’m saying? Totally up to you man, I don’t want to pressure
you one way or the other. If you want to talk to us, all I’d ask is you sign this, and
that is just saying that you’re going to talk to us without an attorney. . . . Or, you
can say, you know what, I’m going to wait, I’m going to have an attorney while I
talk. Completely up to you. We will not force you to do anything.
(Id. at 40:28.) After a long pause, Rasi says, “I really don’t know what to do,” and Morgan
offers to step out to give him time to think. (Id. at 42:12.) Rasi responds, “no, no, when you
guys are here I feel actually better.” Morgan reiterates that he cannot talk about the case unless
the form is signed, offers to talk about something else, and then asks what Rasi’s mother said.
Rasi says that she knows everything and that “I never expected to be this bad. I said, something
normal, right? What is it bad about it?” Rasi reiterates that he does not know what to do.
McGill again says that Rasi can start talking and stop at any time. (Id. at 43:35.) Rasi
responds, “the only reason, I swear to God, I want the lawyer to handle it because he knows the
law, I don’t. You know, so I would say everything to him anyway.” McGill reiterates that he
cannot give Rasi guidance about what he should do and says that they will need to leave at some
point to continue the investigation, the only question is whether Rasi will help. Rasi reiterates
wanting to help but wanting a lawyer, and McGill tells him he can either talk to them today alone
or Wednesday with his lawyer. The three men continue discussing the benefits of Rasi’s help
now and Rasi’s concerns about talking without a lawyer.
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Morgan says, “Let me ask you this question, and you don’t have to answer it, but is there
a lot to the story or a little to the story?” (Id. at 51:51.) Rasi says “very little.” Morgan says that
is what he assumed but that he does not want to pressure Rasi. Rasi responds that he does not
feel pressured and appreciates them. Morgan confirms that Rasi is a Canadian citizen of Persian
heritage. When Rasi begins to say more, Morgan interrupts and says “I just don’t want you to
say it and like, you know, unless you want to say it and talk, let’s talk about it all and get it done
with, or we’ll wait a couple days and you know hope that whoever you were taking that money
to is still waiting on it.” Rasi begins to say something, and McGill stops him, and Morgan says,
“I’m just speaking all hypothetical because I assume you were taking that money somewhere
else, and probably getting a piece of it, and that’s what you were going to use to help your mom.
Right?” Rasi then says, “I wish I didn’t,” and Morgan responds, “I know, man.”
After more discussion, Rasi says, “Is there any way I don’t go to jail?” (Id. at 54:45.)
Morgan says he does not think so but that he will check with the state police. After Morgan and
McGill leave the room, and Gatlin reenters, Rasi says “One wrong decision.” (Id. at 55:45.)
Gatlin responds, “Happens all the time, all the time.” Rasi says, “Learn to say no.”
Morgan and McGill return and confirm that Rasi will go to jail. (Exh. 1.2, at 00:39.)
After staying in Germantown for a night or two, they will take him to downtown Memphis.
Morgan says there is nothing he can do, “it’s a lot of money for a small town.” Rasi asks if the
person he got the money from is a bad person, and Morgan says he wants to talk about all of that
but that he understands Rasi’s reservations. Morgan says they are going to leave, and Rasi says
he does not want them to go. McGill then says, “You know dominos? Like if you hit a domino
and it falls? Right now you’re in that phase that if you hit the domino, the stacks, the points on
your side, they’re going to stack up fast, and that’s great when Morgan talks to the Germantown
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PD, the prosecutor, that’s great for you. In two days, in three days, if there’s no dominos‒” Rasi
interrupts and says, “I want to talk.” (Id. at 2:39.)
Morgan gives Rasi the Miranda waiver form and has him read it aloud. Rasi expresses
concern that his statements will be used against him. Morgan tells him that his statements will
only be used if Rasi is the ringleader or if Rasi is lying. (Id. at 4:28.) Rasi asks if a lawyer could
explain it better, would his charges be less. (Id. at 7:00.) Morgan says he thinks that a court-
appointed attorney would tell Rasi to “talk to the feds.” After more discussion, Rasi signs the
form. (Id. at 9:50.)
The interview begins. (Id. at 11:05.) Rasi explains that, about a week prior, a family
friend named Amir asked him if he knew of anyone who could make a cash delivery, and Rasi
offered to do it. Rasi confirmed that the delivery was not drugs or guns, just cash. Amir bought
Rasi a plane ticket, gave him a credit card, and told him to pick up the cash and drive it to
California. Amir did not give Rasi the name or address of the recipient in Los Angeles. Amir
gave him the phone number and address of “the Chinese lady.” Rasi took a picture of a $10 bill
and sent it to Amir. When he met the lady, he showed her the $10 bill to verify the number
given to her by Amir, and she gave him the bag. Rasi knew there was money in the bag but did
not know how much. Rasi was supposed to get paid $3,000 when he got home. Rasi gave the
agents Amir’s name and the location of his shop. Rasi also gave them the passcode to unlock his
Android phone, which is a swipe pattern that Rasi explains how to perform.
At the agents’ direction, Rasi calls his mother to tell her not to call Amir, so that Amir
will not find out he has been arrested. (Id. at 42:35.) She agrees and offers to cooperate as well,
and they all discuss next steps. After that conversation, the agents give Rasi a form to give
consent for them to search his phone, but he declines to sign it. (Id. at 55:40.) He shows them
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again how to perform his swipe pattern to unlock his phone. They make plans for how they will
reach out to Amir, and the agents leave, telling Rasi to contact them if he thinks of other helpful
information. (Ex. 1.3, at 11:28.)
Exhibit 1.4 is a recording of Rasi’s next encounter with the agents, later that day.
Morgan and McGill tell Rasi he will be kept in Germantown indefinitely and will not be
transferred to the “big jail.” (Ex. 1.4, at 1:20.) They take a video of Rasi opening his phone and
tell him to call Amir. (Id. at 5:12.) Morgan has Rasi initial the Miranda waiver form again.
When Rasi turns on the phone, they see that Amir has not tried to contact him, so they decide not
to call Amir because it might raise suspicions. They make tentative plans to call Amir later that
night. (Id. at 24:35.)
In Exhibit 1.5, Rasi is brought back into the interview room because he told a jailer he
wanted to speak with the agents. Rasi tells the agents he wants to contact Amir, and he suggests
a text. (Ex. 1.5, at 00:45.) When the phone is taken off airplane mode, they see that Amir has
still not attempted to contact him. Rasi tells them that Amir had told him to take the money to
Mehti when he gets to Los Angeles. (Id. at 3:00.) Rasi texts Amir and tells him he is stopping
for the night and will contact him when he gets to Los Angeles. Rasi also agrees to travel to Los
Angeles if necessary.
Exhibit 1.6 is a recording from the next morning, with Rasi meeting with Morgan and
another agent. They discuss that Amir had called the night before at 11:45 and then sent a
message saying “keep me posted.” (Ex. 1.6, at 3:01.) Rasi messages a reply saying that
everything is good. The agents again have Rasi initial the Miranda waiver form.
Exhibit 1.7 shows Rasi meeting with Morgan and McGill again. Rasi is again asked to
initial the Miranda wavier form. (Ex. 1.7, at 3:08.) They discuss that Amir sent two texts,
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providing the name of an individual named Mike in Los Angeles with instructions for Rasi to
contact him when he got there.
Exhibit 1.8 shows Rasi meeting with Morgan and other agents. Rasi initials the Miranda
waiver form again. (Ex. 1.8, at 00:29.) They discussed that Amir sent two more texts, asking
why Rasi was not answering. They discuss possible responses and the ways in which Rasi is
expected to cooperate to locate Mike. They generally plan for Rasi to continue communication
with Amir and Mike from Memphis, while the agents travel to California to deliver the money in
a sting operation.3
Exhibit 1.10 shows Rasi meeting with agents, who tell Rasi that he has received another
call on his phone. Rasi signs another Miranda waiver form. (Ex. 1.10, at 11:19.) Rasi asks
about contacting the Canadian embassy. The agents tell Rasi they are going to dismiss state
charges, get him to federal court today, then put him in a hotel. They text Mike, and he calls, but
they do not answer. They continue to discuss the operation. The interview continues in
Exhibit 1.11. As Rasi prepares to be taken to federal court, he again asks about contacting the
Canadian embassy.
Exhibit 1.12 appears to show Rasi with agents after he has returned from federal court.
They continue to discuss the operation.
The timing of the interview shown in Exhibit 1.13 is unclear. Rasi is panting and crying
in distress. He tells the agents about the difficulties he has experienced in his life. They
continue to discuss the operation and what will happen in Rasi’s case.
3 Exhibit 1.9 shows the conclusion of this interview and does not appear to contain any relevant
evidence.
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On February 3, 2025, Rasi was charged in a Criminal Complaint with fraud and wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349. (ECF No. 1.) On February 27, 2025, a federal
grand jury returned an indictment charging Rasi with one count of money laundering conspiracy
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). (ECF No. 26.)
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Rasi first argues that the warrantless arrest, seizure, and search of his car were in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and seeks suppression of all evidence gathered as a result of
those acts. Rasi also seeks suppression of statements he made during his interviews with the
agents and all evidence derived therefrom as violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Finally, Rasi seeks suppression of evidence acquired from a search of his cell phone.
I. 	The Legality of the Arrest, Seizure, and Search of the Car
Rasi briefly argues the warrantless arrest and search of his car violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. “‘It is beyond debate that an arrest made without probable cause’ is unreasonable
and ‘violates the Fourth Amendment.’” Frenchko v. Monroe, 160 F.4th 784, 796 (6th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697, 714 (6th Cir. 2016)). Conversely, “[a]
warrantless arrest is reasonable if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
committed a crime in the officer’s presence.” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 56 (2018)). “Probable cause is a ‘low bar’” and “exists if the facts and circumstances
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Moore, 999 F.3d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 2021); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)).
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Rasi does not offer much in support of his argument, maintaining only that “[a]t the time
of delivery the Defendant had broken no law and was given the money to be transported to
California in exchange for nothing,” that GPD “conducted a traffic stop without a traffic
infraction,” and that the subsequent arrest and search were warrantless. (ECF No. 56, at 1.) In
response, the United States relies on the Criminal Complaint and the GPD report, which detail
the probable cause for Rasi’s arrest on February 9, 2025. Specifically, the GPD report indicates
that GPD Det. Phelan was contacted by FBI Agent Palmer on January 14, 2025, who “advised
that a Germantown resident, [K.X.], has been scammed out of at least $800,000 in cash.” (Ex. 4,
at 8.)
Agent Palmer stated that [K.X.] was lead [sic] under false pretenses to withdraw
money from her bank account, which would then be given to “bank associates” in
Germantown, and the money would then allegedly be invested into
cryptocurrency.
Agent Palmer stated [K.X.] met two individuals in front of [[K.X.’s residence] on
three different occasions between April [and] June 2024. During two of the
transactions, the subjects arrived in a white Lexus SUV, likely with New York
Tags. During the other transaction, the subjects arrived in a dark colored sedan.
During all three transactions, the driver was the same male Asian subject. The
passenger in two of the transactions was an Asian male, and in the other
transaction was a male white.
It is believed that these subjects are traveling to Germantown from New York,
and are active participants in the pig-butchering scam.
(Id.) The Criminal Complaint further details that, on February 3, 2025, Rasi met with K.X. at
her residence to pick up $150,000 cash and that, after Rasi gave K.X. a password that matched
one previously provided to her by “Customer Service,” he drove away with the cash. (ECF No.
1-1 ¶ 17.)
The United States has demonstrated that Rasi’s arrest was supported by probable cause.
The officers had reason to believe K.X. was the victim of a scam and that the scammers were
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going to contact her for more money. When Rasi showed up at K.X.’s home and collected
$150,000, the officers were warranted in their belief that Rasi was one of those scammers.
Furthermore, as explained in the Criminal Complaint, “[b]ecause [Rasi] knew when and where to
arrive to pick up the cash and because [Rasi] possessed the password provided by the fraudulent
CoinMetro Customer Service, Your Affiant knows that [Rasi] has coordinated this cash pick up
with other coconspirators in the fraud scheme and conspiracy.” (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 18.) The
officers had probable cause to arrest and seize Rasi, and no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred.
Because the officers had that probable cause, they also had probable cause to search
Rasi’s car and seize his phone. “Under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United States v.
Watson, 142 F.4th 872, 881 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580
(1991); United States v. Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th 432, 438 (6th Cir. 2025)). As explained above,
the officers had probable cause to believe that Rasi’s car contained evidence of a crime—
namely, the $150,000 cash. And they reasonably seized Rasi’s cell phone given their
conclusions about his coordination with alleged co-conspirators. None of these acts constitute
Fourth Amendment violations or taint any evidence collected as a result.
II. 	The Legality of the Interrogation
Rasi also seeks suppressions of the statements he made in custody. In Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 180 (1984), the Supreme Court held “that a suspect subject to custodial
interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during
questioning, and that the police must explain this right to him before questioning begins.” Davis
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v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994). This procedural safeguard helps ensure that the Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected. Id. (quoting Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443‒44 (1974)). If a suspect knowingly and intelligently “waives his right
to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question
him. But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to
further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates
conversation.” Id. at 458 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372‒76 (1979); quoting
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484‒85 (1981)). Absent either of those conditions, the
suspect “is ‘not subject to further interrogation by the authorities,’” and “[a]ll questioning must
cease.” United States v. Zakhari, 85 F.4th 367, 375 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S.
at 484‒85; Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam)).
The Miranda safeguards “apply to express questioning and . . . ‘its functional
equivalent.’” United States v. Chalmers, 554 F. App’x 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298‒99 (1980)). The functional equivalent of express questioning
is “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect.” Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600‒01 (1990)). “However,
statements uttered ‘freely and voluntarily’ are admissible in evidence . . . .” United States v.
Chalmers, 554 F. App’x 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). “The
burden is on the government to show a proper waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. (citing
Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 554 (6th Cir. 2000)).
At issue in this case is (A) whether Rasi actually invoked his right to counsel and, if he
did, whether he reinitiated conversation with the agents, (B) whether Rasi knowingly waived his
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Fifth Amendment rights, and (C) whether any of his statements fall under the protection of a
proffer agreement. The parties do not dispute the custodial nature of the interrogation.
A. 	Invocation of the right to counsel
The United States concedes that Rasi invoked his right to counsel at some point but
argues that Rasi reinitiated questioning by law enforcement. The Court must therefore first
“determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel” and at what point. Davis,
512 U.S. at 458 (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 95). That “objective inquiry . . . ‘requires, at a
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for
the assistance of an attorney.’” Id. at 459 (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529
(1987); quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)). Officers need not cease
questioning upon an “ambiguous or equivocal” reference to an attorney such “that a reasonable
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel.” Id. (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 458).
But “a suspect need not ‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don’” and must only
“articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer
in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id.
(quoting id. at 476 (Souter, J., concurring)). “Nor must the accused appear unshakeable in his
decision or enthusiastic about calling counsel.” Zakhari, 85 F.4th at 377 (citing Smith, 469 U.S.
at 97 (finding invocation based on “Uh, yeah. I’d like to do that”); Yenawine v. Motley, 402 F.
App’x 997, 998 (6th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“I might need to speak with my lawyer about
whether I should talk with you.”); Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 1998) (“I’d just
as soon have an attorney.”); United States v. Wysinger, 683 F.3d 784, 790‒91 (7th Cir. 2012) (“I
mean, but can I call one now? That's what I’m saying.”); Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 91 (2d
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Cir. 2011) (“I think I should get a lawyer.”); Cannady v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 752, 755 (11th Cir.
1991) (“I think I should call my lawyer.”)).4
Here, Rasi’s invocation of his right to counsel was clear and unequivocal and came right
at the beginning of the interview. Once the agents got settled and removed Rasi’s handcuffs, the
interview began as follows:
Morgan: 	Alright, man. Can you read and write English? Speak English,
obviously?
Rasi: 	Yes.
Morgan: 	We got some questions for you, but before we ask you any questions,
we got to read you your rights. I’ll read that to you, and I’ll also make
sure that you can read it.
“You must understand your rights before we ask you any questions.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned.
If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent
you before any questioning, if you wish.” If you decide at any time to
stop the questioning and not answer any questions or make any
statements, that’s okay.
This says that you have read the statement of rights, you understand
your rights, and you’re willing to answer questions without a lawyer
present. That’s just going to be us talking. If you agree to that, I’m
going to get you to sign here—I’m sorry, print your name and then sign
here. I’ll be a witness, and Mr. McGill will also be a witness, and I’ll
fill in all this stuff. That cool?
Rasi: 	So, you said that, what [unintelligible] statement of . . .
Morgan: 	So, these are your statements of rights, right here, what I just read to
you‒
Rasi: 	I prefer to have a lawyer, you know?
Morgan: 	Okay. That’s fine.
4 The parentheticals in this citation are taken verbatim from the citations in Zakhari.
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(Ex. 1.1, at 8:04‒9:12.) Special Agent Morgan then explained why it would be in Rasi’s best
interest to talk to them, and Rasi responded, “You know, honestly, I did, this, only, I just, I prefer
to have a lawyer.” Morgan asked if Rasi had a lawyer, Rasi responded that he did not, Morgan
said he would need a court-appointed lawyer, and Morgan then said, “Alright, so we won’t ask
you any questions, we won’t tell you anything else. We will, I’ll get back with Germantown and
let them start the processing.” (Id. at 9:12‒10:16.)
Rasi’s first statement that he would prefer to have a lawyer when asked to sign the
Miranda form is an unmistakable invocation of his right to counsel. Moreover, after making that
statement and receiving additional information from Morgan about the benefits of proceeding
without an attorney, Rasi persisted in his invocation, again stating that he preferred to have a
lawyer. Any reasonable officer would understand those statements to be an invocation; indeed,
Morgan recognized it exactly as such, telling Rasi he would not ask any more questions after
Rasi said for the second time that he would prefer to have a lawyer. See Zakhari, 85 F.4th at 377
(citing Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004), as finding invocation where, as part of the
totality of the circumstances, “the interrogator construed the statement as an invocation”). Rasi’s
invocation of his right to counsel was clear, and the agents should have ceased questioning him
at that point.
The United States acknowledges Rasi’s invocation5 but argues that Rasi reinitiated the
questioning. “[I]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to
further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and
(b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.” United States v. Hitchings,
5 The United States does not directly address whether Rasi’s two statements that he preferred to
have a lawyer constitute invocation, but it does concede that Rasi “conclusively requested
counsel” later in the interview. (ECF No. 65, at 10 (citing Ex. 1.1, at 44:02).)
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No. 23-3265, 2024 WL 1465081, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024) (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 95).
“If the police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has
been no break in custody), the suspect’s statements are presumed involuntary . . . even where the
suspect executes a waiver . . . .” Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177). “This is designed to
prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”
Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177) (internal quotations omitted).
On the other hand, a reinitiation by the defendant is a statement “that evinces ‘a
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.’” United States v.
Scott, No. 2:08-cr-20202-JPM, 2013 WL 1908053, at *35 (W.D. Tenn. May 7, 2013) (quoting
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045‒46 (1983) (plurality)). “[A]n Edwards initiation
occurs when, without influence by the authorities, the suspect shows a willingness and a desire to
talk generally about his case.” Id. (quoting United States v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir.
1994)). Where “the ‘accused himself initiate[s] further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police,’ his earlier invocation of the right to counsel no longer control[s].”
Hitchings, 2024 WL 1465081, at *8 (quoting Bush v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 573 F.
App’x 503, 513 (6th Cir. 2014)). A defendant does not reinitiate, however, merely by making “a
necessary inquiry arising out of incidents of the custodial relationship.” Scott, 2013 WL
1908053, at *35 (quoting Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045‒46).
Though the conversation between Rasi and the agents was reinitiated multiple times
throughout the interaction, the United States has failed to demonstrate that Rasi was the one
reinitiating questioning. First, after Special Agent Morgan initially concluded the interview,
telling Rasi he would tell Germantown to start the processing, Rasi responded, “I really
appreciate you.” (Ex. 1.1, at 10:15‒50.) Morgan then asked Rasi, “You got any questions for
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me?” (Id.) Rasi responded that he wanted to communicate with his mother because he did not
want her to worry. (Id.) That exchange demonstrably does not constitute reinitiation by Rasi—
Morgan initiated the exchange, not Rasi, and Rasi’s question about being able to contact his
mother is precisely the type of “inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship”
that does not trigger an Edwards exception. Whaley, 13 F.3d at 967 (quoting Bradshaw, 462
U.S. at 1045‒46); see also id. (“As we and other circuits have made clear, not every statement
from a suspect’s mouth shows such a desire [to talk generally about his case].” (citing United
States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1992) (indicating desire to keep belongings separate
from those of co-defendant is not initiation); Desire v. Att’y Gen. of Cal., 969 F.2d 802, 804‒05
(9th Cir. 1992) (asking codefendant “Did you tell him everything?” in front of an officer not
initiation); Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 1992) (asking officer “Where
are my children?” not initiation); Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 845‒46 (11th Cir. 1987)
(asking question in response to police officer’s interrogation not initiation));6 United States v.
Clay, 320 F. App’x 384, 388‒89 (6th Cir. 2009) (providing examples of incidental inquiries,
“such as the request for water or to use the phone”).
Then, as he was leaving, Morgan asked Rasi, “Maybe we’ll talk tomorrow, the next day,
if you have an attorney with you? Do you want to talk once you get an attorney?” (Ex. 1.1, at
11:53.) Rasi responded by asking how he can get an attorney. Again, Rasi did not initiate that
interaction, and, in any event, his question does not indicate willingness to discuss his case. If
anything, it confirms his interest in having counsel.
The conversation then turned back to a discussion of how talking to the agents was in
Rasi’s best interest—but, again, Morgan initiated that discussion, not Rasi. Morgan said,
6 The parentheticals in this citation are taken verbatim from the citations in Whaley.
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“[t]hese guys here know how to get in touch with me, so if you change your mind,” and Rasi
interrupted, “So what’s going to make different if I talk to you?” and then the discussion ensued.
(Id. at 13:58.) This type of repeated pressure to talk—after Rasi’s multiple clear invocations of
his right to counsel—is precisely what the Supreme Court sought to prevent in Davis. 512 U.S.
at 458 (“This ‘second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel[]’ is ‘designed to
prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”
(citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176; Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)); see also
Zakhari, 85 F.4th at 375 (holding that Edwards’s “bright-line prohibition” against continued
interrogation “prevents investigators from ‘wear[ing] down the accused’ in ‘explicit or subtle,
deliberate or unintentional’ ways so as to convince him ‘to incriminate himself notwithstanding
his earlier request for counsel’s assistance.” (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 98)). Though
“badgering” may be too strong a word in this instance—the interactions between Rasi and the
agents were nothing but cordial—the agents nonetheless made repeated efforts to convince Rasi
to talk to them. Under Davis, Rasi’s response to those efforts cannot be said to be the kind of
initiation “without influence by the authorities” required by Edwards.
Next, when the agents arranged Rasi’s call with his mother, Rasi made several
unsolicited statements. Those statements, and his conversation with his mother, are not protected
under Miranda. See Chalmers, 554 F. App’x at 446 (finding “statements uttered ‘freely and
voluntarily’” admissible (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478)).
Following the call, Special Agent Morgan again initiated substantive conversation with
Rasi, asking if Rasi’s mother gave him any recommendations. (Ex. 1.1, at 36:30.) Though Rasi
responded by starting to explain what happened, he did not initiate that exchange. Morgan then
reiterated the benefits of cooperation and referenced Rasi’s right to counsel, and Rasi indicated
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that he wanted to talk. (Id. at 37:10‒38:46.) But Rasi continued to question whether he should
have a lawyer and expressed his impression that a lawyer, as a professional, could handle the
situation better than he could. Morgan then raised the time-sensitive nature of the situation,
telling Rasi that, if he waited for his lawyer to talk to them, that would “slow[] down our
investigation,” and then the agents would not be “able to take that next step” in the investigation,
so that their “focus is going to come back to you.” (Id. at 39:00‒41:31.) The purpose of those
statements, even if true, was to convince Rasi to waive the right to counsel he had already
invoked.
After Rasi again expressed doubt, Morgan offered to change the conversation and talk
about something else. (Id. at 42:33‒57.) Instead of doing that, however, Morgan asked Rasi
what his mother said—again reinitiating substantive discussion about the investigation. (Id. at
42:57‒43:21.) The discussion that followed was thus prompted by the agents, not initiated by
Rasi. Though the United States argues that Rasi “clearly re-engaged agents” at 53:55 of Ex. 1.1
(ECF No. 65, at 11), that portion of the video is in the middle of the continuous conversation
initiated by Morgan (and, any event, is far from clear re-engagement).
The agents then left the room, and Rasi again made unsolicited statements—“one wrong
decision” and “learn to say no”—that are not protected by Miranda. When the agents returned,
however, Morgan entered the room telling Rasi he was going to jail. (Ex. 1.2, at 00:37.) After
more discussion of time being of the essence, Rasi finally agreed to sign the Miranda waiver
form, made the bulk of the incriminating statements at issue, and provided the agents with the
swipe pattern to access his phone. (Id. at 9:50‒42:40.) As with the interactions discussed above,
that discussion was initiated by the agents.
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The United States concedes that Rasi’s statements from 44:02 to 53:55 of Ex. 1.2 should
be suppressed. (ECF No. 65, at 11.) That portion of the interview, however, is not
distinguishable from the rest—all of Rasi’s statements, other than those made unsolicited or to
his mother, were prompted by continued questioning from the agents after Rasi had invoked his
right to counsel. As such, under Edwards, Rasi’s statements should be suppressed because the
agents, not Rasi, initiated all of those post-invocation interactions.
The United States argues that many of Rasi’s references to wanting counsel were
ambiguous or ambivalent. Those statements, however, came after his initial, clear invocation of
his right to counsel, as discussed above. Rasi’s later statements expressing ambiguity cannot
override his prior invocation.
It is “intolerable” to “use an accused’s subsequent responses to cast doubt on the
adequacy of the initial request. No authority, and no logic, permits the
interrogator to proceed on his own terms and as if the defendant had requested
nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be induced to say something casting
retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to speak through an
attorney or not at all.”
Zakhari, 85 F.4th at 375‒76 (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 98‒99) (cleaned up). The ambiguity
Rasi expressed appears to be a direct result of the agents’ post-invocation examination of all the
reasons Rasi should not wait for a lawyer and should talk to them now. Regardless of whether
those reasons were valid, the agents offered them after Rasi had already unambiguously invoked
his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and without Rasi reinitiating the interrogation, in violation
of Edwards. And any effort by this Court to resolve the ambiguity would defeat one of the
purposes of Edwards: “Edwards conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be
expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness, and implements the protections of
Miranda in practical and straightforward terms.” Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151
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(1990). The key point is that Rasi’s invocation of his right to counsel was unambiguous. Any
statements he made to the agents after that invocation should be suppressed.
B. 	Knowing waiver of Miranda rights
Rasi’s statements are also subject to suppression because the Miranda warning provided
by the agents was inadequate. The United States has offered an alternative position that, even if
the initial interrogation is suppressible, Rasi reinitiated discussions with the agents later that
night when he asked a jailer to call the agents back to the station—a reinitiation that would
trigger an Edwards exception. (See Ex. 1.5.) As an initial matter, it is far from certain Rasi’s
actions would constitute an Edwards reinitiation, given that his prior statements are suppressible
due not to an inadequate or non-existent Miranda warning, but rather to a coercive Davis
violation, as discussed above. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985) (“[A]fter an
accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is
never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He
can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later
confession may always be looked upon as fruit of the first. But this Court has never gone so far
as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually
disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.”
(quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1947))); Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943
F.2d 1020, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975),
as requiring exclusion of “a confession so tainted by a previous coerced confession so as to be
coerced itself,” but noting that “Brown has been limited, however, to cases of actual coercion” by
Elstad). But the Court need not engage in that analysis due to the additional Miranda violation
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arising from Special Agent Morgan’s misstatements of the law, which preceded any additional
statements initiated by Rasi.
A valid waiver of Miranda rights requires officers to disclose both the right to remain
silent and the right to counsel. United States v. Daniels, No. 24-3260, 2026 WL 45026, at *3
(6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). That waiver must
be not only voluntary, but also knowing, a “requirement [that] ensures that suspects know of
both the ‘nature’ of the abandoned rights and the ‘consequences’ of waiving them.” Id. (quoting
Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). “[S]uspects need not understand ‘every possible consequence’ of
speaking to the police,” but “[t]hey must know just the basics: that they have the right not to talk
to the police, to talk only with counsel present, and to discontinue talking at any time. And they
must know of the main consequence of speaking: that the police may use their statements against
them.” Id. (quoting and citing Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 261 (6th Cir. 2009); Colorado
v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987); United States v. Crumpton, 824 F.3d 593, 607‒08 (6th Cir.
2016)).
In this case, the agent contradicted Miranda in telling Rasi about the consequences of
speaking with them. After Rasi told the agents he wanted to talk, they give him the Miranda
waiver form and ask him to read it aloud. (Ex. 1.2, at 3:45.) Rasi did so and then placed his
head in his hand and paused for twenty seconds, speaking quietly to himself. (Id. at 3:45‒5:04.)
Special Agent Morgan asked Rasi if he was “good,” and Rasi responded, “Not at all.” (Id. at
5:05‒5:15.) After another long pause, Rasi again read aloud, “Anything you say can and will be
used against you,” looking up at McGill as he did so. (Id. at 5:15‒5:37.) The following
exchange ensued:
Morgan: 	That is, that is the worst way to say it. So that, if, come, we go to court,
and somebody says, like, oh well, you didn’t tell them that you were
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going to use that in the court, it says it right here. But I’ve already told
you, unless, unless we get to talking and you tell me that, yeah man,
I’m the sophisticated ringleader of this whole thing‒
Rasi: 	What does that mean?
Morgan: 	Like, you’re the top dog, you’re the big fish. Unless you tell me that,
like, I don’t know that there’s going to be much that you’re going to tell
me that’s [inaudible]‒
Rasi: 	Do I look like the big fish?
Morgan: 	Well, if you were, you probably wouldn’t have gotten a rental car, and
done, you would have taken a private jet, right, and had someone pick
you up in a limo.
Rasi: 	Thank you.
Morgan: 	So, that, we put that in there because that is the worst thing we can do
to you. We would take everything you say and use it against you in
court if we find out that you’re lying to us. Really, that would be it.
Like, if you’re lying to me, and we, you know, we’ve established this
relationship and we come to find out, like, oh no he lied to us the whole
time, well then I am going to use that against you, I’m gonna, because I
feel like we’ve come to an agreement that I’m going to tell you the
truth and you’re going to tell me the truth, and then that’s going to be
the end of it, we’re going to do our best to push everything about you to
the side and move to the next.
(Id. at 5:37‒7:03.)
As this exchange shows, the agent told Rasi that his statements would only be used
against him if he were the “big fish” in the fraud scheme or, “really,” only if he lied to the
agents. That is a misstatement of the warning required by Miranda. “This Court’s holding in
Miranda specifically required that the police inform a criminal suspect that he has the right to
remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him. There is no qualification of
this broad and explicit warning.” Spring, 479 U.S. at 577.
In light of that misstatement, the Court cannot conclude that Rasi knowingly waived his
right to counsel. See, e.g., Daniels, 2026 WL 45026, at *4 (placing the burden on the
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prosecution to show, based on a totality of the circumstances, that a Miranda waiver was
knowing and voluntary). The agent made this misstatement in direct response to Rasi’s specific
reference to the warning that anything he said would be used against him, indicating the agent’s
intent was to lessen the impact of the warning on Rasi’s willingness to talk. Add to that Rasi’s
repeated statements that he had never been in trouble before, that he was Canadian, and that he
wanted the agents to advise him what to do, all of which indicate a lack of sophistication and
knowledge regarding the Miranda waiver. Finally, and even after getting the inaccurate
assurances from Morgan, Rasi still questioned whether having a lawyer would be better, to
which Morgan responded that he thought a lawyer would tell Rasi “to talk to the Feds.” (Ex. 1.2,
at 7:20‒38.) Had the agents conceded to Rasi’s earlier demand for counsel, his attorney could
have explained to him that misstatement of the law. See, e.g., Minnick, 498 U.S. at 154 (“One
plausible interpretation of the record is that petitioner thought he could keep his admissions out
of evidence by refusing to sign a formal waiver of rights. If the authorities had complied with
Minnick’s request to have counsel present during interrogation, the attorney could have corrected
Minnick’s misunderstanding, or indeed counseled him that he need not make a statement at
all.”).
The totality of these circumstances indicates that Rasi did not understand that all of his
statements could be used against him, and thus his waiver was not knowing. The United States
has offered nothing to indicate that an accurate explanation of the warning was ever conveyed to
Rasi throughout the remainder of the interrogations admitted into evidence. The entirety of his
custodial statements—other than those made unsolicited or to his mother—should therefore be
suppressed.
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C. 	Statements made under a proffer agreement
Rasi contends, and the United States does not appear to contest, that, when Rasi was
taken to federal court, he was appointed counsel and entered into a proffer agreement with the
United States. Rasi therefore argues that any statements he made after that point to the agents
are inadmissible under the terms of the proffer agreement. The United States does not counter
this argument and instead, at the hearing, confirmed that a proffer agreement was memorialized
in writing with Rasi’s lawyer. Neither party has provided the proffer agreement to the Court, but
it appears that the United States submitted the video of those subsequent interactions for
purposes of completion and not in an attempt to argue their admissibility at trial. If the Court’s
understanding is incorrect, the United States must demonstrate why the statements are not
subject to the proffer agreement. Otherwise, the admissibility of Exhibits 1.12 and 1.13 is not at
issue because the United States is not seeking their admission.
III. 	The Legality of the Search of Rasi’s Phone
[Redacted. The unredacted portion of this Report and Recommendation is available as a sealed
attachment to this docket entry.]
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends the motion to suppress be granted in
part and denied in part. The motion to suppress evidence derived from the arrest and seizure
of Rasi and the search of his car should be denied. The motion to suppress Rasi’s custodial
statements, other than those made unsolicited or to his mother, should be granted. The motion
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to suppress evidence obtained from Rasi’s cell phone, as discussed in the portion of this
Report and Recommendation entered concurrently under seal, should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January, 2026.
s/Annie T. Christoff
ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation, a
party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy. Failure to file objections within fourteen (14) days
may constitute waiver of objections, exceptions, and further appeal.
Case 2:25-cr-20017-BCL Document 85 Filed 01/23/26 Page 29 of 29 PageID
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