United States of America v. Busby

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 2:25-cr-20016-MSN
CHRISTOPHER BUSBY,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY DEFECTIVE SEARCH WARRANT
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations (ECF Nos. 61 &
62, “Report”). The Report recommends that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained
by Defective Search Warrant (ECF No. 42, “Motion”) be denied. 	The government had no
objections to the Report. (ECF No. 67.) Defendant made objections to the Report (ECF No. 65),
and the government has responded to those objections. (ECF No. 67). The matter is now ripe for
this Court’s review.
BACKGROUND
Defendant’s Motion alleges that a search warrant issued for a hotel room, Room 208 at the
Starlite Inn, in Memphis, Tennessee, was deficient for several reasons and that firearms recovered
from the hotel room should be excluded as evidence in this matter. Defendant attached the alleged
search warrant at issue, along with its supporting affidavit, to his Motion. (See ECF Nos. 42, 42-
1.) And the facts asserted in Defendant’s Motion are drawn from the alleged search warrant and
supporting affidavit. 	(See ECF No. 42 at PageID 58–59.) 	The government’s response to the
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Motion also attached the alleged search warrant and supporting affidavit. (See ECF No. 56-1.) In
addition, the government included an alleged Parole Certificate signed by Defendant from the State
of Tennessee Board of Parole as an exhibit to its response. 	(See ECF No. 56-2.) 	And in its
response, the government argued in part that the officers did not need probable cause to search the
hotel room because, at the time of the search, Defendant was a parolee who had agreed to
warrantless searches of his “person, vehicle, property, or place of residence,” by any “law
enforcement officer, at any time without reasonable suspicion.” (See ECF No. 56 at PageID 88–
89; ECF No. 56-2.)
The Motion was referred to the Magistrate Judge, who set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing. At the hearing, however, the government announced that it would not be putting on any
proof because the Motion attacked only the sufficiency of the warrant and affidavit. (ECF No. 68
at PageID 129.) The Magistrate Judge noted that she was not sure the government’s interpretation
of the Motion was correct, but that it was up to the parties to decide what proof, if any, they would
put on. 	(Id. at PageID 130.) And indeed, neither party put on witnesses nor introduced other
evidence. 	(See ECF No. 61 at PageID 107.) 	Both parties made arguments, and the Magistrate
Judge issued her Report based only on the Motion, the government’s response, and the attachments
to those filings, including the search warrant, its supporting affidavit, and the parole certificate.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59, a district
court may refer a motion to suppress to a magistrate judge for the preparation of a report and
recommendation. “The magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings and
enter on the record a recommendation for disposing of the matter, including any proposed findings
of fact.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(1). If a party files timely objections to the recommendation, the
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district court must consider those objections de novo and “accept, reject, or modify the
recommendation.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or
conclusions results in forfeiture of those objections. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2).1
“The filing of objections to a magistrate [judge]’s report enables the district judge to focus
attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). Therefore, objections to a magistrate judge’s report must be
“specific.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). Vague, general, or conclusory objections are improper, will
not be considered by the reviewing court, and are “tantamount to a complete failure to object.”
Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380
(6th Cir. 1995) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate [judge]’s report, which fails to specify the
issues of contention, does not satisfy the requirement that an objection be filed. The objections
must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious.”); Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“An ‘objection’ that
does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate [judge]’s suggested resolution, or
simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in
this context.”). The Court need not review—under a de novo or any other standard—those aspects
of a report and recommendation to which no objection is made. 	Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
150–52 (1985).
1 Although the text of the Rule 59(b)(2) provides that a failure to object “waives a party’s
right to review,” the Sixth Circuit has clarified that a failure to object is not a waiver, but a
forfeiture. Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019) (“We clarify that forfeiture,
rather than waiver, is the relevant term here.”) (explaining, “Thomas v. Arn held that ‘the failure
to file objections to the magistrate’s report waives the right to appeal the district court’s
judgment,’” but Arn preceded the Supreme Court’s clarification in United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 733 (1993).) 	The difference matters because forfeited issues may nevertheless be
considered on appeal in certain circumstances. Id. (citing Harris v. Klare, 902 F.3d 630, 635–36
(6th Cir. 2018)).
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THE REPORT AND DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
The Report recommends denying Defendant’s Motion because Defendant was on parole at
the time of the search and had consented to searches of his person and residence without a warrant
or reasonable suspicion. (ECF No. 61 at PageID 107.) Because the Magistrate Judge found the
government’s argument about parole conclusive, she did not reach Defendant’s other arguments
about the warrant. 	(Id.) As to the use of GPS in locating the Hyundai Tucson, the Magistrate
Judge concluded that, if this was construed as a search of Defendant’s person or vehicle, then
Defendant had consented to the search as a condition of parole. (Id. at PageID 108.) Alternatively,
if it was not Defendant’s vehicle, the Magistrate Judge found that Defendant did not have Fourth
Amendment “standing” to challenge the search. (Id.)
In his objections, Defendant asserted that the parole certificate could not be relied on
because it was “not admitted as evidence, not authenticated, not subject to confrontation or cross-
examination, and which did not give the lower court any length of time the parole was to last.”
(ECF No. 65 at PageID 114.) Defendant, however, did not make either of these arguments to the
Magistrate Judge, so Defendant’s parole status appeared to be uncontested. 	However, because
Defendant has now objected, this Court must review the issue de novo. 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3).
And after a de novo review, this Court finds that the parole certificate is insufficient to show that
Defendant was on parole at the time of the search at issue2 because the length of Defendant’s parole
cannot be determined from the face of the document. 	Because the Report’s findings and
recommendations were based on Defendant being on parole at the time of the search, the Court
2 In its response to Defendant’s objections, the government says that, according to
Defendant’s parole officer, his parole was set to expire on November 30, 2024. (ECF No. 67 at
PageID 124.) 	The government’s response cites “Exhibit A” in support, but there was nothing
attached to its response. (Id.)
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will not adopt those findings or recommendations. The Court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law are set forth below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following findings of fact are based solely on the search warrant and supporting
affidavit. As recounted above, Defendant attached the warrant and its supporting affidavit to his
motion, and the government also attached those same documents to its response. 	Neither party
challenged the authenticity or accuracy of those documents or the factual statements therein. The
parties chose not to present testimony or other evidence at the evidentiary hearing that was set
before the Magistrate Judge on the Motion, and neither party has requested that this Court hold a
de novo hearing or reopen proof.
The search warrant was issued based on the affidavit of Detective Adkins with the Shelby
County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”). (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) The affidavit was signed on
October 25, 2023, and at that time, Detective Adkins had five years of law enforcement experience,
including two years as an investigator. (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) According to the affidavit,
SCSO deputies responded to a call regarding a car burglary “in the early morning hours” of
October 16, 2023. (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) The victim of the car burglary told officers
that his CZ handgun and $1,000 in cash were stolen from his 2012 Nissan Rogue. (ECF No. 42-
1; ECF No. 56-1.) 	The victim provided surveillance video of the auto burglary to the SCSO
deputies, which showed “a male subject, approximately 6’0 in height, wearing dark clothing, a hat,
and a face cover unlawfully enter” the victim’s car. (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) 	As the male
subject on the video walked away, he had “a very distinct limp in his walk.” (ECF No. 42-1; ECF
No. 56-1.) Detective Adkins asserted that the male subject’s appearance and limp were consistent
with an individual named Christopher Busby, who Detective Adkins said was a “documented Auto
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Burglar” that he was familiar with from his “extensive history” investigating other auto burglaries
committed by Busby. 	(ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) 	Video from other surveillance cameras
showed a Hyundai Tucson with Tennessee license plate 086-BKYX entering the “immediate area
of the Auto Burglary” at approximately 1:30 a.m. on October 16, 2023. (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No.
56-1.)
At some point, Detective Adkins learned that the Hyundai Tucson was registered to EZ
Auto Rental at 2747 Lamar Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee. 	Nine days after the auto burglary,
Detective Adkins went to EZ Auto Rental and spoke with the owner, Mr. Kim, who gave him
information about the individual who had rented the Hyundai Tucson. (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No.
56-1.) And, as it turned out, that person was “known by Detective Adkins to be an immediate
family member of Christopher Busby.” 	(ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) 	Mr. Kim also gave
Detective Adkins the current location of the Hyundai Tucson, which was the Starlite Inn at 2996
S Third Street in Memphis. 	(ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) Another detective then reviewed
surveillance video from the Starlite Inn, which showed a male subject matching Busby’s
description “leave the suspect vehicle and gain entry into room #208.” (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No.
56-1.) The affidavit averred that a search warrant for Room 208 at the Starlite Inn would “assist
in several ongoing investigation regarding TCA 39-13-1002.” The affidavit was signed and dated
October 25, 2023. (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.) The search warrant was issued the same day.
The search warrant specified the place to be searched as “The Starlite Inn Room #208 at
2996 S Third St, Memphis, TN 38109,” and the property to be seized as “Firearms, Firearm
Accessories, Burglary Tools, Documents of Identification, and any other Stolen Property/Evidence
related to the crime of TCA 39-13-1002 Burglary.” (ECF No. 42-1; ECF No. 56-1.)
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
First, Defendant argues that the use of GPS to locate the Hyundai Tucson violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. Second, Defendant argues that the search warrant for the room at the
Starlite Inn was defective because it was not based on probable cause and was not sufficiently
particular.
A. 	Use of GPS to Locate Hyundai Tucson
The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
“Fourth Amendment rights are . . . personal,” meaning that a defendant must show his own
Fourth Amendment rights were violated to justify suppression. United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th
371, 374 (6th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). To show that his own Fourth Amendment rights were
violated, a defendant must show that he “had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises
searched.” Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 403 (2018) (citation modified); see United States
v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038, 1041–42 (6th Cir. 2024). To have a legitimate expectation of privacy,
the defendant must show that (1) he had “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and his
“expectation must also be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” 	Rogers, 97
F.4th at 1041–42 (citation modified). Whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy
is determined “on a case-by-case basis, considering among other factors the defendant’s
proprietary or possessory interest in the place to be searched, his right to exclude others, and
whether he was legitimately on the premises.” 	Id. at 1042 (citation modified). 	“It is the
defendant’s burden to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or
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items seized.” United States v. Whipple, 92 F.4th 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2024); see, e.g., Russell, 26
F.4th 375.
For the reasons set forth below, the one-time use of GPS to locate the Hyundai Tucson did
not violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
First, GPS was used to locate a rental car that was rented by someone other than Defendant,
and Defendant has not shown that he had lawful possession or control over that car. See Byrd v.
United States, 584 U.S. 395, 409 (2018). It is also not clear whether Defendant drove the vehicle
or was a passenger. See Rogers, 97 F.4th at 1042–43; Russell, 26 F.4th at 377. The affidavit states
only that the surveillance footage shows him “leave the suspect vehicle.” 	For these reasons,
Defendant has not shown he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car’s location.
Second, even if Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Hyundai Tucson’s
location, there was still no Fourth Amendment violation because the one-time use of GPS to find
the car’s current location was not a search.
Defendant focuses his argument on Carpenter v. United States, which involved the
government obtaining cell-site location information (CSLI) for the defendant’s phone over a period
of just over 127 days. 	585 U.S. 296, 301–02 (2018). 	The Supreme Court held that this was a
search, and the government was required to get a warrant to execute the search. Id. at 313, 316.
But Carpenter involved location information for the defendant’s phone over several months. The
Court described the decision as a “narrow one,” and noted that the issue of real-time CSLI was not
before it. Id. at 316.
The GPS location information here is more akin to real-time CSLI, and whether that
implicates the Fourth Amendment was expressly left open by Carpenter. 585 U.S. at 316. Pre-
Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit found that real-time tracking of a defendant’s cell phone for seven
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hours did not constitute a search. See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1018 (6th Cir. 2017).
Post-Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit, like the Supreme Court, has continued to leave open whether
“Carpenter’s holding applies with equal force to real-time CSLI.” United States v. Ennis, No. 21-
1093, 2022 WL 976930, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2022). Two post-Carpenter decisions from other
Circuit Courts of Appeals, however, suggest that obtaining real-time CSLI is not a search. 	See
United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 391–92 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding that obtaining real-time
CSLI for about six hours while the defendant travelled on public roads was not a search); United
States v. Howard, 858 F. App’x 331, 332–34 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that 22 hours of GPS
monitoring while the defendant was driving on public roads was not a search).
Again, the Carpenter decision was a “narrow one,” and it expressly left open whether real-
time CSLI implicated the Fourth Amendment. And because Riley’s holding, that six hours of real-
time location monitoring was not a search, is not inconsistent with Carpenter, Riley continues to
control the outcome here. See Prod. Sols. Int’l, Inc. v. Aldez Containers, LLC, 46 F.4th 454, 458
(6th Cir. 2022) (“A prior published decision of this Court remains controlling authority unless an
inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision.”
(citation modified)). For that reason, the single instance of obtaining the real-time GPS location
of the Hyundai Tucson was not a search.
Finally, Defendant has not shown there was governmental action. 	Because “the Fourth
Amendment proscribes only governmental action . . . it doesn’t apply to a search or seizure—even
an unreasonable one—conducted by a private individual not acting as an agent of the government
or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.” United States v. Powell, 836
F. App’x 391, 394 (citation modified).
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In the Sixth Circuit, courts apply a two-part test to determine “when a ‘private’ person acts
as the government’s agent.” Id. For the Fourth Amendment to apply, the defendant must show
that (1) the police instigated, encouraged, or participated in the search, and (2) the private
individual engaged “in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigative
efforts.” Id.
All that is known from the record here is that sheriff’s deputies initiated the contact with
Mr. Kim by going to EZ Auto Rental. But the record contains no additional information about the
officers’ interaction with Mr. Kim or Mr. Kim’s intent in providing the location of the Hyundai
Tucson to police. Without more, Defendant has not shown governmental action.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant has not shown that his Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when Mr. Kim obtained the Hyundai Tucson’s current location and gave it to police.
B. 	The Search Warrant
The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “identify the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.” United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation modified);
United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 2018) (“The Fourth Amendment demands that
a search warrant particularly describe the places law enforcement may search and the things they
may seize.”). Warrants may be issued only if there is probable cause establishing “a nexus between
the place to be searched and the evidence sought.” United States v. Florence, No. 24-3729, 2025
WL 2539022, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025) (citing United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 347, 349 (6th
Cir. 2011)); Reed, 993 F.3d at 447 (explaining there must be “a probable-cause ‘nexus’” that
“connect[s] these two together” (citations omitted)).
But “[p]robable cause is ‘not a difficult standard to meet.’” United States v. Florence, No.
24-3729, 2025 WL 2539022, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025) (citing United States v. Whitlow, 134
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F.4th 914, 919 (6th Cir. 2025)). It is merely “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than
prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” United States v. O’Connor, 723 F. App’x 302,
306 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation modified) (quoting United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir.
2000)). “The critical question is whether there was a ‘fair probability’ that the officers would find
evidence of criminal wrongdoing in the location to be searched.” Florence, 2025 WL 2539022, at
*2 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
The other requirement, particularity, is intended “to prevent general searches by requiring
a neutral judicial officer to cabin the scope of the search to those areas and items for which there
exists probable cause that a crime has been committed.” United States v. Chaney, 921 F.3d 572,
581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). A warrant may fail to satisfy the particularity requirement
when (1) it does not provide enough information “to guide and control the agent’s judgment in
selecting what to take,” or (2) “the category of things specified is too broad in the sense that it
includes items that should not be seized.” Chaney, 921 F.3d at 581.
“There is no formula that determines whether a warrant is sufficiently particular.” Id. at
585. 	When deciding whether a warrant is sufficiently particular, courts give warrants “a
commonsense contextual reading.” 	United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2018).
How specific the warrant must be “depends on the crime involved and the types of items sought.”
Chaney, 921 F.3d at 585; United States v. Banks, 684 F. App’x 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2017).
If the purpose of the warrant is to search for and seize “illicit property or contraband,” then
a general reference to things such as “drugs” or “narcotics” is sufficient. 	See United States v.
Campbell, 256 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Meadows,
No. 3:19-CR-95-TAV-HBG-2, 2019 WL 6258068, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 18, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-CR-95-TAV-HBG-2, 2019 WL 6255837 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 22,
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2019) (explaining that, because “[f]irearms are evidence of drug trafficking,” they can be “seized
pursuant to a search warrant directed at narcotics,” even if the warrant lacks an “explicit reference
to or independent probable cause to search for firearms”). Similarly, “naming only the generic
class of items” will suffice if “the precise identity of goods cannot be ascertained at the time the
warrant is issued.” 	United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation
modified). And, “in some circumstances, a warrant that empowers police to search for something
satisfies the particularity requirement if its text constrains the search to evidence of a specific
crime.” Chaney, 921 F.3d at 585 (citation modified); Castro, 881 F.3d at 965. However, “a warrant
referring to stolen property of a certain type is insufficient if that property is common.” Wheeler
v. City of Lansing, 660 F.3d 931, 941 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); United States v. Blakeney,
942 F.2d 1001, 1026–27 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding search warrant was overbroad in using “the
generic term jewelry, when an inventory of the items taken during the . . . robbery was available
to the agent applying for the search warrant”).
Here, officers seized two Glock handguns pursuant to a warrant that was issued based on
an affidavit that outlined evidence in the investigation of a single auto burglary in which one
firearm—a CZ handgun—was stolen. 	The Court does not reach whether there was a probable
cause nexus for the warrant because, after careful consideration, the seized guns must be
suppressed because either (1) they were seized pursuant to an overbroad warrant, or (2) their
seizure was outside the scope of the warrant.
First, the warrant is overbroad. The search warrant states that the property to be searched
for is “firearms.” By using the generic term “firearms,” the warrant authorized a broader search
than was reasonable given the facts alleged in Detective Adkins’ affidavit. The affidavit described
a single burglary. And according to the affidavit, the victim of that burglary told police that his
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“CZ Handgun” was stolen from his vehicle. 	Although the affidavit says that a search warrant
would “assist in several ongoing investigations regarding TCA 39-13-1002,” it does not give
details about those investigations, including if any firearms were stolen. The bottom line is that
police had more information available to them to help identify the one firearm that was subject to
seizure based on the evidence outlined in the affidavit, but that specific information was not
included in the warrant. 	And because a firearm is not inherently contraband, that generic
description, without more, was insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v.
Peterson, 358 F. Supp. 3d 681, 686–87 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (finding inclusion of “firearms and
ammunition” was consistent with practice of describing “generic class of items to be seized” based
on officer’s assertion in warrant that he was “aware that individuals engaged in fraud and large-
scale trafficking of stolen property offenses sometimes utilize firearms to protect their illegal
property and proceeds”).
Alternatively, if the warrant was not overbroad, the seizure of the Glocks was outside the
scope of the warrant. The warrant uses the generic description “firearms,” but it references them
being needed for “the investigation of the crime of TCA 39-13-1002 Burglary,” with the note as to
probable cause saying, “See Attached,” referencing Officer Adkins’ attached affidavit. 	So, read
together, it is not far-fetched to say that the warrant authorized seizure of the firearm stolen in the
burglary that is described in Officer Adkins’ attached affidavit. See Castro, 881 F.3d at 964–65
(prefatory language in warrants saying that they were “based on ‘probable cause to believe that
evidence of violations of Texas Penal Code 29.03 (Aggravated Burglary)’ would be found on
phones” was a “‘global modifier’ that limited the scope of the warrant to evidence of aggravated
burglary” (citations omitted)); United States v. Evans Landscaping Inc., 850 F. App’x 942, 947–
48 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the particularity requirement may be satisfied via a warrant’s
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incorporation of warrant application). But, if the warrant is read as authorizing a search for and
seizure of only the firearm stolen during the car burglary described in Officer Adkins’ affidavit,
then the officers’ seizure of the Glocks was outside the scope of the warrant. Generally, if officers
want to seize items outside a warrant’s scope, they need to either request a new warrant, or the
items need to be seizable pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement.3 United States v.
Whiteside, 141 F.4th 734, 746–47 (6th Cir. 2025).
Officers here did not get another warrant. And because the government did not put on any
proof, the record is insufficient to find that officers seized the two Glock handguns pursuant to an
exception to the warrant requirement. For example, it may have been reasonable for officers to
seize the Glock handguns if the officers knew that Defendant was a felon, and the Glocks were
also in plain view.4 See Whiteside, 141 F.4th at 747–49; Childress v. Michalke, No. 10-CV-11008,
2014 WL 3819347, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2014). There is, however, no evidence about where
the Glocks were found or whether the officers knew Defendant was a felon. 	Also, the
government’s response alleges that about 47 grams of marijuana were seized, some in a mason jar
and some in a bag, along with two digital scales. So perhaps the marijuana and Glock handguns
were seized because their incriminating character was “immediately apparent.” 	See Whiteside,
141 F.4th at 748–49. But again, without any testimony or other evidence, the Court does not know
if the presence of marijuana and digital scales is why the officers seized the Glocks.
3 Although “evidence not described in a search warrant may be seized if it is reasonably
related to the offense which formed the basis for the search warrant,” Wheeler, 660 F.3d at 939
(citation modified), there are no facts to support that was the case here.
4 This example assumes that the warrant is construed as sufficiently particular such that the
officers were lawfully present in the hotel room, as required for the plain view exception to apply.
See Whiteside, 141 F.4th at 747.
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So it is safe to say that there are a lot of unanswered questions in this matter. But what is
before the Court boils down to this: officers seized two Glock handguns pursuant to a warrant that
authorized a search for “firearms,” but the warrant affidavit described only a single auto burglary
in which a CZ handgun was stolen. 	Because more information about the stolen firearm was
available to officers but not included in the warrant, the warrant is overbroad. Alternatively, even
if the warrant is construed as sufficiently particular via reference to TCA § 39-13-1002 or
incorporation of the supporting affidavit, then the seizure of the Glocks was outside the scope of
the warrant.
C. 	The Good Faith Exception
Generally, evidence seized during an unconstitutional search should be excluded. United
States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 533 (6th Cir. 2005). When police obtain a warrant from a neutral
judge, however, the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should generally not apply
because exclusion “seeks to deter police (not judicial) misconduct.” Reed, 993 F.3d at 450. Under
this exception—dubbed the “good faith exception”—exclusion is not required if the evidence was
“obtained by police officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant that is
subsequently invalidated.” United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 2005).
The good faith exception does not apply, however, in at least four scenarios:
(1) where the issuing magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit that the
affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard for the truth;
(2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role and failed to
act in a neutral and detached fashion, serving merely as a rubber stamp for the
police;
(3) where the affidavit was nothing more than a “bare bones” affidavit that did not
provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of
probable cause, or where the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and
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(4) where the officer’s reliance on the warrant was not in good faith or objectively
reasonable, such as where the warrant is facially deficient.
United States v. Lewis, 81 F.4th 640, 647 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).
So what about the good faith exception here? 	Nothing suggests that Detective Adkins
knowingly submitted a false affidavit or otherwise acted in bad faith, nor is there anything
indicating that the magistrate judge abandoned her judicial role or failed to act in a neutral fashion.
And Detective Adkins’ affidavit was not “bare bones.” So, application of the good faith exception
boils down to whether Detective Adkins’ reliance on the warrant was in good faith and objectively
reasonable. Put differently, would a reasonable officer have known that listing only “firearms” as
the items to be searched for was deficient? 	It is a close call given the circumstances. 	Notably,
generic descriptions like “firearms” are sufficient in some circumstances, such as when officers
seek seizure of firearms as evidence of drug trafficking. But the Court has found very few cases
addressing the good faith exception for the generic use of “firearms” in other contexts.5 However,
in the context of a warrant for stolen property, the Sixth Circuit has held that a reasonable officer
would have known the warrant was deficient when it listed only general categories of items to be
seized because additional information was available to the officers that could have helped identify
the stolen items. 	Wheeler, 660 F.3d at 923–43. 	And although Wheeler dealt with qualified
5 One of the only cases the Court was able to find was United States v. Woodley, No. 15-
CR-20007, 2016 WL 1387947, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2016). 	In Woodley, the district court
declined to suppress a Bushmaster rifle and magazine found pursuant to a warrant authorizing a
search for “any and all firearms.” Id. The defendant argued that because the victim described the
weapon used in the crime as “an AK-47,” and the affidavit in support of the warrant referred to
the weapon as an “assault rifle,” the warrant’s authorization for “any and all firearms” was
overbroad. 	Id. at *2–3. 	The district court noted that there was some authority supporting the
defendant’s argument, citing United States v. Gardner, 537 F.2d 861, 862 (6th Cir. 1976), but it
declined to suppress the gun because, even if the warrant was overbroad, the good faith exception
applied. Id. But the analysis for that conclusion is not entirely clear given that it was originally
an oral ruling that was summarized in a subsequent order addressing a different motion.
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immunity, its reasonableness analysis “similarly applies to the suppression context presented
here.” United States v. Watson, 498 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335 (1986)). So, based on Wheeler, the good-faith exception does not apply, and the Glock
handguns must be suppressed.
D. 	Party Presentation and Standing
“In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation.”
Clark v. Sweeney, 146 S. Ct. 410, 412 (2025) (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S.
371, 375 (2020)). In accordance with that principle, courts “rely on the parties to frame the issues
for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 375 (citation omitted). 	“In short: Courts are essentially passive
instruments of government.” Id. (citation modified). “They wait for cases to come to them, and
when cases arise, courts normally decide only questions presented by the parties.” 	Id. (citation
modified).
This Court endeavored to follow the party presentation principle in this case, so it did not
address Defendant’s expectation of privacy in the hotel room.
“The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967) (citation modified). And “people—whether renters, couch surfers, or nomads—have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in places that function as home.” United States v. Allen, 720
F. App’x 254, 257 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). 	So “a hotel room may be the object of
Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an office.” United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d
228, 231 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). But, as the Court already discussed when addressing
Defendant’s arguments about the use of GPS to locate the Hyundai Tucson, Fourth Amendment
rights are personal. 	Russell, 26 F.4th at 374. Which means that “defendants must establish the
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requisite connection to a place before the Fourth Amendment’s shield can apply.” United States
v. Arreola-Alvarado, 603 F. Supp. 3d 534, 540 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Here, Defendant did not provide any evidence to support that he had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the hotel room or that his expectation of privacy in the hotel room was
objectively reasonable. And it was Defendant’s burden to do so. See Whipple, 92 F.4th at 610;
Russell, 26 F.4th at 375. Because Defendant did not meet this burden, he did not show that the
Fourth Amendment’s protections applied to the search of the room at the Starlite Inn.
The government, however, did not argue that Defendant lacked standing to contest the
search of the hotel room. The closest it got to making that argument was asserting that Defendant
generally bore the burden of proof and persuasion for a motion to suppress. (See ECF No. 67 at
PageID 123.) But the government did not connect that argument to Defendant’s standing.
In addition, it is unclear whether it would be error for the Court to address the standing
issue sua sponte. See Russell, 26 F4th at 376 n.4. In the end, the better part of valor was to abide
by the party presentation principle, even though the government may still raise the issue on appeal.
See id. 375–77.
E. 	The Lack of Evidence and Reopening Proof
One final thing. The Court had, and continues to have, significant heartburn about making
decisions in this matter based on a lack of record evidence. But ultimately, it was the parties who
decided not to put on evidence at the hearing.
Adding to the confusion, both sides alluded to information in their briefs for which no
evidence was introduced. For example, the government referenced information about the dates of
Defendant’s parole and other items seized during the search of the hotel room, including
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approximately 47 grams of marijuana and two digital scales. (ECF No. 67 at PageID 124; ECF
No. 56 at PageID 86–87.) Similarly, in his objections, Defendant described the hotel room as his
residence, (see ECF No. 65 at PageID 117), but again, there was no evidence offered on this point.
And previously, in his Motion, Defendant had argued that the search warrant was for “a hotel room
that, as far as we know, the defendant had only entered once.” (ECF No. 42 at PageID 58.)
Also, despite both parties making arguments about the burden of proof, (see ECF No. 65
at PageID 64–65; ECF No. 67 at PageID 123), neither party requested that this Court hold a de
novo hearing or reopen the proof to resolve any potential issues.
But requesting to reopen the proof may have been futile in any event. The Sixth Circuit
has cautioned that district courts “should be extremely reluctant to grant reopenings.” 	United
States v. Pittman, 816 F.3d 419, 424 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation modified); United States v. Baker,
562 F. App’x 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2014). 	And the party moving to reopen a suppression hearing
must first “provide a reasonable explanation for failing to present the evidence initially.” United
States v. White, 455 F. App’x 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); United States v. Holland,
522 F. App’x 265, 270 (6th Cir. 2013). But again, no request for reopening was made, so the Court
need not hazard a guess about whether the standard to reopen could be met here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court does not adopt the Report and Recommendations
(ECF Nos. 61 & 62). 	For the reasons set forth above, the warrant was either overbroad, or the
Glocks were outside the scope of the warrant. And because the good-faith exception does not
apply, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained by Defective Search Warrant (ECF No.
42) is GRANTED.
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The ramifications of this ruling remain to be seen, but justice requires nothing less.
Upholding the rule of law is paramount regardless of the consequences—fiat justitia ruat caelum—
let justice be done though the heavens fall. “The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law
that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its
own laws . . . .” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 10th day of February, 2026.
s/ Mark S. Norris
MARK S. NORRIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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