Chapman v. Godfrey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
BILLIE JOE CHAPMAN,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 1:24-cv-01106-STA-jay
DEMETRIC GODFREY, WARDEN,
Respondent.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT
COUNSEL (ECF NO. 63) AND MOTION TO RECUSE (ECF NO. 70), CONSTRUING
AMENDED PETITION (ECF NO. 69) AS A MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING
LEAVE TO AMEND § 2254 PETITION, DENYING § 2254 PETITION, DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN
GOOD FAITH, AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Petitioner Billie Joe Chapman has filed a habeas corpus petition (the “§ 2254 Petition”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Chapman has also filed (1) a motion to appoint
counsel (ECF No. 63), (2) a motion to recuse the undersigned (ECF No. 70), and a proposed
amended § 2254 petition (ECF No. 69), which the Court construes as a motion to amend. For the
following reasons, Chapman’s motions and the § 2254 Petition are DENIED.
STATE COURT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 1, 2021, a Madison County grand jury returned an indictment charging
Chapman with theft of property over $1,000, vandalism under $1,000, and burglary. (ECF No.
26-11 at PageID 516-19.) On August 2, 2021, another Madison County grand jury returned an
indictment charging Chapman with aggravated burglary, theft of property over $2,500, vandalism
under $1,000, and sixteen (16) counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. (Id.
at PageID 520-39.)
The trial court referred Chapman to Pathways of Tennessee, Inc., “for an evaluation to
determine competency to stand trial, mental condition at the time of the crime[,] and diminished
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capacity.” (ECF No. 26-3 at PageID 408.) On May 14, 2021, Pathways submitted a letter to the
trial court indicating that Chapman was competent to stand trial, understood “the nature or
wrongfulness” of his acts at the time he committed them, and did not have “a mental disease and/or
defect that interfered wit his capacity to form the requisite culpable mental state(s).” (Id.)
On September 7, 2021, Chapman appeared before the trial court for guilty plea
proceedings. (Id. at PageID 410.) Chapman pled guilty to all charges set forth above. (Id. at
PageID 420-21.) Prior to entering his plea, Chapman indicated that he was not impaired by any
alcohol, narcotics, or other drugs or medication. (Id. at PageID 415.) Chapman understood his
trial rights and understood that he was giving them up by pleading guilty. (Id. at PageID 415-18.)
When asked by the trial judge if his guilty plea was “being entered freely and voluntarily,”
Chapman responded, “Yes.” (Id. at PageID 419.) Chapman indicated that no threats, promises,
or force had been applied to make him plead guilty. (Id. at PageID 420.) Chapman fully
understood what he was doing by pleading guilty. (Id. at PageID 422.) Chapman understood his
sentencing exposure. (Id. at PageID 422-27.) Chapman did not have any questions and noted that
he wanted to go forward with his guilty pleas. (Id. at PageID 428-29.) The trial court sentenced
Chapman to a “total effective sentence of 13 years in the Tennessee Department of Corrections as
a Range 3 persistent offender.” (Id. at PageID 436.) The trial court entered judgments on
September 10, 2021. (ECF No. 26-11 at PageID 546-87.)
On January 28, 2022, Chapman returned to the state court and filed what he called a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 206-15.) On January 31, 2022, the State
filed a response and requested that Chapman’s pleading be treated as a petition for post-conviction
relief because Chapman was challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea. (Id. at PageID 219-
21.) On February 16, 2022, the post-conviction court noted that Chapman’s pleading would be
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treated as a petition for post-conviction relief and appointed counsel to represent Chapman. (Id.
at PageID 222-23.)
The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing for Chapman’s petition on
August 22, 2022. (ECF No. 26-2.) Chapman’s trial counsel and Chapman himself testified at the
hearing. (See generally id.) On September 13, 2022, the post-conviction court denied Chapman’s
post-conviction petition. (ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 332-33, 335-36.)
Chapman appealed the denial of his post-conviction petition to the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”). (Id. at PageID 337.) In his brief on appeal, Chapman raised one
claim of ineffective assistance, asserting that counsel “should have made sure that [Chapman] was
properly evaluated for competency and insanity.” (ECF No. 26-4 at PageID 457.) The TCCA
affirmed the denial of Chapman’s post-conviction petition. See Chapman v. State, No. W2022-
01333-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 5572932, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2023) (ECF No. 26-6.)
In its opinion, the TCCA noted that Chapman “implies that he was not competent and did not
understand his guilty plea.” Id. at *6. The TCCA rejected that argument. Id. The TCCA rejected
Chapman’s pro se pleadings seeking rehearing on September 12, 2023. (ECF No. 26-7 at PageID
490.) On November 20, 2023, the Tennessee Supreme Court (“TSC”) denied Chapman’s
application for permission to appeal. (ECF No. 26-10 at PageID 512.)
The record reflects that on October 23, 2023, Chapman filed a motion for the correction of
an illegal sentence with the trial court. (ECF No. 26-12 at PageID 668-74.) The trial court denied
that motion on June 10, 2024. (Id. at PageID 712-17.)
On July 22, 2024, Chapman returned to the trial court and filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. (Id. at PageID 742-47.) The trial court dismissed that petition on August 1, 2024.
(ECF No. 26-13 at PageID 817-24.) The trial court denied Chapman’s motions for reconsideration
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on August 16, 2024. (Id. at PageID 827.) The TCCA affirmed the dismissal of Chapman’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus on April 15, 2025. See Chapman v. State, No. W2024-01228-CCA-
R3-HC, 2025 WL 1113389, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2025) (ECF No. 55-1).
Chapman also filed various petitions for mandamus, all of which were denied by the state
appellate courts. (ECF Nos. 26-16, 26-17, & 26-18.)
FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
This is not the first § 2254 petition that Chapman has filed regarding these state criminal
proceedings. Chapman filed a § 2254 petition on September 19, 2022. See Chapman v. Wardlow,
No. 1:22-cv-01203-STA-jay, 2023 WL 9119924, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2023). Chapman
ultimately filed a second amended petition. See id. The Court directed Chapman to show cause
“why his second amended petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court
remedies.” Id. In lieu of responding, Chapman filed numerous motions, including a motion for
an extension of time to file a third amended petition. Id. The Court granted Chapman’s motion
for an extension of time and directed Chapman to file his third amended petition within 28 days.
Id. Chapman did not do so. On December 6, 2023, the Court dismissed the second amended
petition without prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at *2.
Chapman filed the instant pro se § 2254 Petition on May 7, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) He raises
the following grounds for relief: (1) his guilty plea was involuntarily entered; (2) the judges
overseeing his criminal proceedings had conflicts of interest; and (3) he was forcibly committed
to the Jackson General Hospital and forced to “take mind-altering drugs” for treatment. (Id. at
PageID 2-9.)
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After the Court granted Chapman leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6),
Chapman filed a slew of various motions, including several motions to appoint counsel. On
January 21, 2025, the Court addressed those motions, dismissed Chapman’s conflict of interest
allegations raised in Ground Two pursuant to Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts (“Habeas Rules”), and directed Respondent to respond to
Grounds One and Three and file the relevant portions of the state court record. (ECF No. 22.) On
February 10, 2025, Respondent filed the state court record (ECF No. 26) and a response (ECF No.
27). Respondent argues that Grounds One and Three are procedurally defaulted, Ground One
lacks merit, and Ground Three is not cognizable under § 2254. (See generally ECF No. 27).
Chapman then filed twenty-three (23) more motions, as well as his reply (ECF No. 38) to
Respondent’s response. On March 21, 2025, the Court addressed Chapman’s motions, warned
Chapman that his filing of “numerous duplicative, redundant, and frivolous motions” was “an
abuse of the judicial process and waste[d] judicial resources,” and warned Chapman that the Court
would not consider further motions from him. (ECF No. 53 at PageID 1250.) The Court warned
Chapman that if he “continues in his abuse of the judicial process, the Court may impose sanctions
against [him], including a monetary fine.” (Id. at PageID.1251.)
Undeterred, Chapman filed three additional motions. On April 16, 2025, Respondent
supplemented the state court record with the TCCA’s opinion affirming the dismissal of
Chapman’s state habeas corpus petition. (ECF No. 55.) On September 8, 2025, the Court denied
Chapman’s motions and again warned Chapman that the Court would not consider further motions
from him. (ECF No. 62.) The Court again warned Chapman that if he “continues in his abuse of
the judicial process, the Court may impose sanctions against [him], including a $100 monetary
fine per violation.” (Id. at PageID 1346.)
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On September 11, 2025, Chapman filed another motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 63.)
On October 20, 2025, Chapman appealed the Court’s September 8, 2025, Order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (ECF No. 65.) On November 26, 2025, the Sixth
Circuit dismissed Chapman’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 67.)
On January 9, 2026, Chapman filed a document entitled “Petitioner’s Nunc Pro Tunc
Motion for Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241” and a motion to recuse the undersigned. See
Chapman v. Godfrey, No. 1:26-cv-01009-JDB-jay (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). On February
5, 2026, Judge Breen construed the petition as one brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, noted that
Chapman already had a pending § 2254 petition before this Court, and directed the Clerk to file
Chapman’s petition and motion in the instant action for further consideration by the undersigned.
See Order, id. (ECF No. 5).
PENDING MOTIONS
A. 	Motion to Appoint Counsel
On September 11, 2025, Chapman filed a motion to appoint counsel to represent him in
these proceedings. (ECF No. 63.) Chapman argues that counsel should be appointed to represent
him because he is mentally disabled. (Id. at PageID 1348.) This is the fifth motion to appoint
counsel Chapman has filed in these proceedings arguing that counsel should be appointed because
of his mental disability. On January 21, 2025, the Court denied Chapman’s first four motions to
appoint counsel. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 190-91.) Chapman presents no reason to revisit that
determination in his instant motion. Accordingly, Chapman’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF
No. 63) is DENIED for the reasons previously set forth by the Court in its January 21, 2025 Order.
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B. 	Motion to Recuse
Chapman has filed a third motion for the undersigned District Judge to be recused from
this case. (ECF No. 70.) Chapman alleges that the undersigned is related to Judge Blake Anderson
of Jackson, Tennessee. (Id. at PageID 1433.) Chapman contends that the undersigned is “a
sympathizer towards private prison employees [and] CoreCivic,” and that the undersigned “shows
favoritism and does not order [these individuals] to stop the violations of mail, law library, and
materials.” (Id. at PageID 1434.) Chapman again takes issue with the fact that the undersigned
dismissed Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01203. (Id.) Chapman also suggests that the undersigned has
refused to address Ground Two of his § 2254 Petition, alleging a conflict of interest. (Id.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 4559a), a judge shall be disqualified “in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Circumstances under which a judge must disqualify
himself include circumstances where a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(1). A judge must recuse himself if, knowing all of the circumstances, a reasonable,
objective person would question the judge’s impartiality. See United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d
592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990). “The standard is an objective one; hence, the judge need not recuse
himself based on the subjective view of a party no matter how strongly that view is held.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A judge’s participation in the proceedings or prior
contact with related cases cannot support a demand for recusal. Id. “A judge is presumed to be
impartial, and a litigant seeking disqualification bears the burden of alleging facts that would lead
a reasonable person to question the neutrality of the judge.” United States v. Adams, 38 F.3d 1217,
1994 WL 589509, at *2 (6th Cir. 1994).
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Chapman has failed to allege sufficient facts to meet his burden. First, the undersigned is
not related to Judge Blake Anderson. Chapman also fails to allege sufficient facts to support his
conclusory allegation that the undersigned is biased towards prison employees and CoreCivic. As
he did in his previous two motions for recusal, Chapman argues for recusal based on the Court’s
dismissal of his prior § 2254 petition for failure to prosecute. (Compare ECF No. 54 at PageID
1252-53 and ECF No. 30 at PageID 925-27 with ECF No. 70 at PageID 1434.) Petitioner’s
dissatisfaction with the Court’s ruling in another case is insufficient to satisfy the objective
standard for recusal. Likewise, the fact that the Court dismissed Ground Two, Chapman’s
allegation of a conflict of interest, in its January 21, 2025, Order is insufficient to satisfy this
standard. See Sammons, 918 F.2d at 599.
To the extent Chapman takes issue with denial of access to the prison law library and the
handling of his mail, the Court has already informed Chapman that these claims “should be brought
in a civil rights action, not this proceeding.” (ECF No. 22 at PageID 193.)
For these reasons, Chapman’s motion to recuse (ECF No. 70) is DENIED.
PROPOSED AMENDED § 2254 PETITION
As noted above, the § 2254 petition that Chapman submitted in Civil No. 1:26-cv-1009 has
been filed in this action. (ECF No. 69.) Chapman reiterates the grounds for relief that he raised
in his initial § 2254 Petition, as well as new claims of judicial misconduct, the issuance of an illegal
warrant, and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See id.) Because Chapman did not include
these new claims in his § 2254 Petition, the Court construes the amended § 2254 petition as a
motion to amend.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 applies to Chapman’s motion to amend. See Habeas
Rule 12 (stating that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not
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inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under
these rules”). Under Rule 15, “the court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When evaluating the interests of justice, the Court
considers the following factors: “[u]ndue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad
faith by the moving party, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259
F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2001); see Woolbright v. Crews, No. 18-5131, 2018 WL 7247245, at *4
(6th Cir. July 9, 2018) (considering factors in context of motion to amend § 2254 petition).
“A motion for leave to amend may be denied for futility if the court concludes that the
pleading as amended could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Midkiff v. Adams Cnty. Reg’l
Water Dist., 409 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Amendment would be futile in the context of a habeas petition where the petitioner’s claims are
time-barred under § 2244(d) and do not relate back to the original petition. See Wiedbrauk v.
Lavigne, 174 F. App’x 993, 999-1000 (6th Cir. 2006).
An amendment relates back to the date of the original petition when “the amendment
asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). “[W]hen a
prisoner files an original petition within the one-year deadline, and later presents new claims in an
amended petition filed after the deadline passes, the new claims relate back to the date of the
original petition if the new claims share a common core of operative facts with the original
petition.” Hill v. Mitchell, 842 F.3d 910, 922 (6th Cir. 20160 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). An amendment does not relate back “when it asserts a new ground for relief supported
by facts that differ in both time and typer from those in the original pleading.” Id. (internal
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quotation marks and citation omitted). Any “new” facts generally may differ only in specificity
(not in kind) from those originally alleged. See Watkins v. Stephenson, 57 F.4th 576, 581 (6th Cir.
2023).
Here, Chapman’s new claims are raised for the first time in the federal habeas proceedings
nearly two years after the case was initiated, do not relate back to the original § 2254 Petition, and
are untimely. For these reasons, amendment would be futile. Chapman’s motion to amend (ECF
No. 69) is DENIED.
FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW STANDARD
The statutory authority for federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state
custody is provided by § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under § 2254, habeas relief is available only if the prisoner
is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a).
The availability of federal habeas relief is further restricted where the petitioner’s claim was
“adjudicated on the merits” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In that circumstance, the
federal court may not grant relief unless the state-court decision “‘was contrary to’ federal law
then clearly established in the holdings of [the Supreme] Court; or . . . ‘involved an unreasonable
application of’ such law; or . . . ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts’ in light
of the record before the state court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)) (citations omitted)).
A state court’s decision is contrary to federal law when it “arrives at a conclusion opposite
to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law,” or when “the state court confronts
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at”
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an “opposite” result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). An unreasonable application
of federal law occurs when the state court, having invoked the correct governing legal principle,
“unreasonably applies the . . . [principle] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409.
For purposes of § 2254(d)(2), a state court’s “factual determination is not unreasonable
merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first
instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). The Sixth Circuit construes § 2254(d)(2) in
tandem with § 2254(e)(1) to require a presumption that the state court’s factual determination is
correct in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d
301, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). A state court’s
factual findings are therefore “only unreasonable where they are ‘rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence and do not have support in the record.’” Moritz v. Woods, 692 F. App’x 249, 254 (6th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Pouncy v. Palmer, 846 F.3d 144, 158 (6th Cir. 2017)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Before a federal court will review the merits of a claim brought under § 2254, the petitioner
must have “exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A). To be properly exhausted, a claim must be “fairly presented” through “one
complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 848 (1999).
The exhaustion requirement works in tandem with the procedural-default rule, which
generally bars federal habeas review of claims that were procedurally defaulted in the state courts.
Id. at 848. A petitioner procedurally defaults his claim where he fails to properly exhaust available
remedies (that is, fails to fairly present the claim through one complete round of the state’s
appellate review process), and he can no longer exhaust because a state procedural rule or set of
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rules have closed-off any “remaining state court avenue” for review of the claim on the merits.
Harris v. Booker, 251 F. App'x 319, 322 (6th Cir. 2007). Procedural default also occurs where the
state court “actually . . . relied on [a state] procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition
of the case.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985). To cause a procedural default,
the state court’s ruling must “rest[] on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question
and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (citing
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. 257, 263 (1871)).
A petitioner will be entitled to federal court review of the merits of a claim that was
procedurally defaulted if he demonstrates “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of
the alleged violation of federal law[.]” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The ineffectiveness of post-
conviction trial counsel may be cause to excuse the default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 423 (2013) (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1,
14, 16-17 (2012)).
A petitioner may also overcome a procedural default by establishing a “gateway” claim of
actual innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995). To open the gateway, a prisoner
must “support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—
that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. He must also show that, in light of the new evidence,
“it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Id. at 327.
ANALYSIS
The following two grounds from Chapman’s § 2254 Petition remain before the Court: (1)
Chapman’s guilty plea was involuntarily entered (Ground One); and (2) Chapman was forcibly
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committed to the Jackson General Hospital and forced to “take mind-altering drugs” for treatment
(Ground Three). (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2-9.)
A. 	Ground One: Voluntariness of Plea
As his first ground for relief, Chapman alleges that he “was under forced anti-psychotic
and psychotropic [drugs] at the time of [his] plea agreement hearing.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.)
According to Chapman, he did not know what was happening during the plea hearing and merely
followed his attorney’s cues to say yes or no. (Id. at PageID 2, 6-7.) Chapman contends that his
plea was forced and “compelled by trickery.” (Id. at PageID 3.) Chapman argues that he “never
said or pled guilty or nolo contendere on record.” (Id. at PageID 7.)
Respondent argues that Chapman has procedurally defaulted this claim for relief because
he did not present it to the TCCA during his post-conviction appeal. (ECF No. 27 at PageID 901-
02.) On post-conviction appeal, Chapman raised one claim of ineffective assistance, asserting that
counsel “should have made sure that [Chapman] was properly evaluated for competency and
insanity.” (ECF No. 26-4 at PageID 457.) However, in its opinion affirming the dismissal of
Chapman’s state post-conviction petition, the TCCA noted that “[Chapman] implies that he was
not competent and did not understand his guilty plea.” Chapman, 2023 WL 5572932, at *6. Given
that the TCCA did address the validity of Chapman’s guilty plea, the Court declines to conclude
that Chapman has procedurally defaulted his first claim for relief.
The standard for evaluating the voluntariness of a guilty plea is as follows:
A defendant who pleads guilty waives a number of federal constitutional rights,
including the right to a jury trial and the right to confront his accusers. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 43 (1969). Because of the importance of these rights,
reviewing courts must ensure that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and
voluntary. We therefore insist that the defendant appreciated the consequences of
the waiver, did so without coercion, and understood the rights surrendered. Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748-50 (1970); Fautenberry v. Mitchell, 515 F.3d
614, 636-37 (6th Cir. 2008). Specifically, guilty pleas “not only must be voluntary
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but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. The Supreme
Court defines a guilty plea as one “entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences.” Id. at 755.
While a defendant need not know all the possible consequences of his plea, like the
loss of his right to vote or own a gun, or the effect on future sentence[s], he must
be aware of the maximum sentence to which he is exposed. King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d
151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994); Hart v. Marion Corr. Inst., 927 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir.
1991). And, “[a]t a minimum, the defendant must understand the ‘critical’ or
‘essential’ elements of the offense to which he or she pleads guilty.” United States
v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 618-19 (1998)). The satisfaction of these requirements cannot be inferred
from the bare fact that the defendant plead guilty, because he still might not have
known what he was giving up when he did so. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 408-09 (6th Cir. 2009) (parallel citations omitted).
Chapman challenged the voluntariness of his plea in his state post-conviction petition, and
the post-conviction court denied relief after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the
post-conviction court concluded:
After a careful conclusion of the guilty plea proceedings (Exhibit #2), the Court
finds that Mr. Chapman did freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently enter
his guilty plea with the understanding of the consequences. He indicated under
oath twice that he was satisfied with the representation provided by his attorney,
Mr. Joshua Phillips, and that he fully understood everything he was doing by
entering his guilty plea, including his range of punishment. He also indicated under
oath three times that he was guilty of each of the charges to which he was pleading
guilty. He further testified during the guilty plea proceeding that no force, pressure
or threats had been applied to him to cause him to enter his guilty plea and that he
understood what he was doing by pleading guilty.
The Court finds that the advice given and the services rendered by Attorney Joshua
Phillips were well within the bounds of generally accepted professional standards.
Likewise, nothing presented in the evidence suggests that Mr. Chapman was in any
way deceived, pressured or coerced into entering his guilty plea. Likewise, there is
no evidence to suggest that the defendant, at the time of his guilty plea, desired to
go to trial in his two cases. The Court does credit Mr. Chapman’s testimony as
being truthful when he stated at the time of guilty plea that he was guilty of each
and all of the charges to which he was pleading guilty and that he wanted to plead
guilty to the State’s plea offer.
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The Court also finds that the defendant was fully advised by the Court and that he
fully understood what his sentences would be once the guilty plea was accepted by
the Court. He also understood that once his guilty plea was accepted by the Court,
that he could not withdraw his guilty plea for any reason. The Court also credits
Mr. Chapman’s testimony that he “fully understood what he was doing” by
pleading guilty on September 7, 2021.
Attorney Joshua Phillips testified at the post-conviction hearing that Mr. Chapman
understood what he was doing by pleading guilty and that he wanted to accept the
State’s plea offer of 13 years to serve as a Range III offender, even though Mr.
Chapman qualified as a “career offender.” The Court credits Attorney Phillips[’]
testimony at the post-conviction hearing that Mr. Chapman fully understood what
he was doing by pleading guilty.
The Court does not credit Mr. Chapman’s testimony at his post-conviction hearing
as being truthful to any extent. He testified under oath multiple times that he “never
pled guilty” to the charges of which he was convicted. He testified also that he
didn’t remember saying that he was guilty of anything, which the Court finds is
totally incredible and contradicted by the guilty plea proceedings transcript, and the
guilty plea forms which Mr. Chapman personally signed.
The Court also finds that Mr. Chapman was found competent to stand trial, and
certainly was competent to enter his guilty plea on September 7, 2021.
Furthermore, Mr. Chapman testified under oath at his guilty plea that he was not
under the influence of alcohol, narcotics, or any other type of drugs or medication
that might impair his judgment on that date. The Court credits that testimony as
being truthful, which directly contradicts his untruthful testimony at his post-
conviction hearing that the Madison County Jail was “forcing” him to take
medication.
(ECF No. 26-1 at PageID 335-36 (emphasis in original).) On post-conviction appeal, the TCCA
wrote:
Petitioner implies that he was not competent and did not understand his guilty plea.
The post-conviction court found that Petitioner was “found to be competent to stand
trial, and certainly was competent to enter his guilty plea on September 7, 2021.”
Petitioner indicated under oath multiple times that he was guilty of the charges, and
Petitioner “testified during the guilty plea proceeding that no force, pressure or
threats had been applied to him to cause him to enter his guilty plea and that he
understood what he was doing by pleading guilty.” The post-conviction court did
not credit Petitioner’s testimony at his post-conviction hearing “as being truthful to
any extent,” finding Petitioner’s testimony that he never pled guilty incredible and
contradicted by the transcript and the forms Petitioner signed. “Solemn declarations
in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 74 (1977). A petitioner’s representations under oath that his guilty plea is
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knowing and voluntary create “a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral
proceedings.” Id.
Chapman, 2023 WL 5572932, at *6.
Chapman fails to establish that the TCCA’s decision affirming the rejection of any claim
by Chapman that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered was contrary to Boykin or any other
Supreme Court decision. Chapman also fails to establish that the TCCA’s decision was an
unreasonable application of Boykin or was an unreasonable determination of the facts considering
the evidence presented in state court.
When a state defendant brings a federal habeas petition challenging the voluntariness of
his plea, the state generally satisfies its burden of showing a voluntary and intelligent plea by
producing a transcript of the state court proceeding. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326 (6th
Cir. 1993); see also McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Garcia, 991 F.3d at
326). When the transcript is adequate to show that the plea was voluntary and intelligent, a
presumption of correctness attaches to the state court findings of fact and to the judgment itself.
Garcia, 991 F.2d at 326. A satisfactory state court transcript, containing findings after a
proper plea colloquy, places upon petitioner a “heavy burden” to overturn the state findings. Id. at
328; see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (holding that the factual findings
of voluntariness made by the state court are entitled to a presumption of correctness); Blackledge,
431 U.S. at 73.
Here, both the post-conviction court and the TCCA reviewed the transcripts of the plea
colloquy and the post-conviction evidentiary hearing and concluded that Chapman had been
advised of his rights, acknowledged that he was pleading guilty of his own accord and was not
coerced into pleading guilty, was not under the influence of any substances that could impair his
judgment, and understood the terms and conditions of his plea. (See ECF No. 26-3 at PageID 410-
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46.) The state courts did not credit Chapman’s testimony given at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing in light of the plea colloquy transcript. In his § 2254 Petition, Chapman merely restates
the arguments that were raised—and rejected—in his state post-conviction proceedings and
provides no argument to meet his “heavy burden” to overcome the presumption of correctness
attached to the state courts’ conclusions regarding voluntariness. See Garcia, 991 F.2d at 326.
For these reasons, Chapman’s first claim for relief lacks merit and is DENIED.
B. 	Ground Three: Forced Hospitalization and Treatment
As his third ground for relief, Chapman alleges that he was “illegally taken/kidnapped”
from the jail on February 25, 2021, taken to the Jackson General Hospital, tied to a bed, and
forcibly medicated with “mind-altering drugs.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 9.) Chapman also alleges
that he was “civilly committed” for treatment. (Id.)
Respondent argues that Chapman has procedurally defaulted this claim for relief because
he did not present it to the TCCA during his post-conviction appeal. (ECF No. 27 at PageID 901-
02.) On post-conviction appeal, Chapman raised one claim of ineffective assistance, asserting that
counsel “should have made sure that [Chapman] was properly evaluated for competency and
insanity.” (ECF No. 26-4 at PageID 457.) At no time on post-conviction appeal did Chapman
raise any argument regarding forced hospitalization and medication and civil commitment.
In his reply, Chapman vaguely alleges that he could not access the state courts and that
counsel “refused to address [his] claims under post-conviction relief.” (ECF No. 38 at PageID
1055.) Chapman has failed to show cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to overcome
the procedural default. Chapman cannot rely upon Martinez to show cause and prejudice because
“the rule announced in that case does not extend to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.” See Balducci v. Spatny, No. 25-3186, 2025 WL 2743906, at *2 (6th Cir. July 15, 2025)
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(citing Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 530-35 (2017)). Moreover, Chapman fails to show a
miscarriage of justice because he pleaded guilty and has not presented new reliable evidence of
actual innocence. For these reasons, Chapman’s third claim for relief is procedurally defaulted.
Notwithstanding Chapman’s procedural default of this claim, the claim also lacks merit.
Federal habeas relief can be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates that he “is in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Chapman’s claims
regarding forced hospitalization and treatment with civil commitment do not implicate the
judgments entered in his criminal proceedings. “While constitutional rights may be implicated in
the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs, depending on the circumstances, . . . [Chapman’s]
claim of forced administration of antipsychotic drugs, standing alone, is not a challenge to his
conviction or sentence” and, therefore, is not an appropriate claim for relief under § 2254. See
Hayworth v. United States, Nos. 3:18-cv-430-TAV-HBG, 3:14-cr-017-TAV-HBG-1, 2021 WL
1910084, at *13 (E.D. Tenn. May 12, 2021) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, while a
petitioner may challenge the constitutionality of civil commitment in a § 2254 petition, see
generally Williams v. Meyer, 346 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2003), Chapman is no longer civilly
committed as he alleges. Instead, Chapman is in custody pursuant to the judgments of conviction
entered by the Madison County Circuit court after Chapman’s guilty pleas and sentencing. Thus,
any challenge to a period of civil commitment that occurred prior to Chapman’s guilty pleas and
sentencing is moot.
For these reasons, Chapman’s third ground for relief is procedurally defaulted, lacks merit,
and is DENIED.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Chapman’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 63), motion to
recuse the undersigned (ECF No. 70), and motion to amend his § 2254 Petition (ECF No. 69) are
DENIED. Chapman’s § 2254 Petition is DENIED because Ground Three is procedurally
defaulted and because Grounds One and Three lack merit. Judgment will be entered for
Respondent.
APPEAL ISSUES
A § 2254 petitioner may not proceed on appeal unless a district or circuit judge issues a
certificate of appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1). A COA
may issue only if the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)-(3). A substantial showing is made when the petitioner demonstrates
that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). “If the petition was denied on procedural grounds, the
petitioner must show, ‘at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Dufresne v. Palmer,
876 F.3d 248, 252-53 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484).
In this case, reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the Court’s decision to
deny the § 2254 Petition. Because any appeal by Chapman does not deserve attention, the Court
DENIES a COA.
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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), a party seeking pauper status on
appeal must first file a motion in the district court, along with a supporting affidavit. Fed. R. App.
P. 24(a). However, Rule 24(a) also provides that if the district court certifies that an appeal would
not be taken in good faith, the prisoner must file his motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the
appellate court. Id.
In this case, for the same reason it denies a COA, the Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to Rule
24(a), that any appeal in this matter would not be taken in good faith. Leave to appeal in forma
pauperis is therefore DENIED.1
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of February, 2026.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 If Chapman files a notice of appeal, he must also pay the full $605.00 appellate filing fee
or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and supporting affidavit in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals within thirty days.
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