Rivera Pimentel v. Harrell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
Luis Miguel Rivera Pimentel, # 0023745,
Plaintiff,
v.
Melissa Harrell,
Defendant.
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No. 3:25-cv-01487
Judge Trauger
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Luis Miguel Rivera Pimentel, who is currently in the custody of the Rutherford
County Jail in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of his civil
rights. (Doc. No. 1). The complaint is now before the court for an initial review pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
I. 	FILING FEE
The 	plaintiff 	has 	filed 	an Application 	for 	Leave 	to 	Proceed 	In 	Forma 	Pauperis
(“IFP Application”) (Doc. No. 2). Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the
filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of the plaintiff’s IFP Application and
supporting documentation, it appears that the plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from
which to pay the full filing fee in advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is
GRANTED.
Under § 1915(b), the plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing
fee. 	The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides
prisoner-plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the
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remainder in installments. Accordingly, the plaintiff is hereby ASSESSED the full civil filing fee
of $350, to be paid as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to the [plaintiff’s] account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in the [plaintiff’s] account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from the
plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all deposits
credited to the plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the court must clearly identify the plaintiff’s name and the
case number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United
States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the Rutherford County Jail to ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff’s
inmate trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of
the filing fee. If the plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of
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his inmate trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows the plaintiff to his
new place of confinement for continued compliance.
II. 	SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
A. PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman,
838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept
a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
B. Factual Allegations and Claims
The plaintiff sues Melissa Harrell, the Rutherford County Clerk of Courts. (Doc. No. 1
at 2). The plaintiff alleges that he is the defendant in a criminal prosecution in Rutherford County.
(Id. at 5). The Rutherford County Clerk’s Office has rejected the plaintiff’s pro se filings in his
criminal case because he is represented by counsel. (Id. at 5−6). The plaintiff asserts that this
violates his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 6).
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C. Analysis
Based on the PLRA standards, the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The United States Constitution does not provide a criminal defendant the right to self-
representation unless he waives the right to counsel. United States v. Steele, 919 F.3d 965, 975
(6th Cir. 2019); see United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 681 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is well
settled that there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation.”); United States v. 	Conder,
423 F.2d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 1970) (“[F]or purposes of determining whether there has been a
deprivation of constitutional rights a criminal defendant cannot logically waive or assert both
rights. The defendant must make a choice. . . .”).
The Tennessee Constitution likewise provides no right to self-representation while a
defendant is also represented by counsel. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 573−74 (Tenn. 2004)
(“Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions guarantee the right of an accused to self-
representation or to representation by counsel . . . . Neither the United States Constitution nor the
Tennessee Constitution grants the accused the right to ‘hybrid representation,’ i.e., permitting both
the defendant and counsel to participate in the defense.” (citations omitted)).
Here, the plaintiff alleges that he is represented by counsel in his state criminal
proceedings. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). He therefore has no constitutional right to represent himself by
filing pro se motions in those same proceedings. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, and the court will now dismiss his complaint and this
action.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
The plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
The plaintiff’s IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
The plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 3), Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (Doc. No. 4), and Motion for Emergency Ruling (Doc. No. 5) are DENIED as moot.
Final judgment shall now issue in accordance with Rule 58(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
It is so ORDERED.
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Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge
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