Clark v. Metro Government Tennessee Davidson County et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ANTONIO CLARK, # 223067,
Plaintiff,
v.
METRO GOVERNMENT TENNESSEE
DAVIDSON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:25-cv-00868
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Antonio Clark, who is currently in custody of the Davidson County Sheriff’s
Office in Nashville, Tennessee, filed a pro se Complaint alleging violations of his civil rights.
(Doc. No. 1). The Complaint is now before the Court for initial review.
I. 	FILING FEE
Plaintiff filed an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”)
(Doc. No. 2). Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and supporting documentation,
it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in
advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) will be granted.
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
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in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all deposits
credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office to ensure that the custodian of
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the
payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the
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custodian of his inmate trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff
to his new place of confinement for continued compliance.
II. 	SCREENING STANDARDS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v. Eby,
481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Although
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991),
the Court’s “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
III. 	THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff indicates that he is a pretrial detainee. (Doc. No. 1 at 4).
The Complaint names two Defendants: “Metro Government Tennessee Davidson County”
and Officer Shawn Tikaelin, in his individual and official capacities. (Id. at 1−2). Plaintiff describes
Officer Tikaelin as a “Metro Government employee.” (Id. at 3).
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Plaintiff alleges 	that 	Officer 	Tikaelin 	arrested 	him 	without 	probable 	cause 	on
October 3, 2024, for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. (Id. at 3−4). He
further alleges that Officer Tikaelin seized $120 from him. (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff asserts that Officer Tikaelin’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment and constitute
racial discrimination. (Id.) He seeks $200,000 in punitive damages. (Id.)
IV. 	ANALYSIS
Construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged a
viable Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Tikaelin in his individual capacity. This claim will
proceed, while all other claims will be dismissed.
A. 	Claim to Proceed
“[C]laims for false arrest . . . are . . . constitutionally cognizable and . . . arise under the
Fourth Amendment.” Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 2020). “A false arrest claim
under federal law requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to
arrest the plaintiff.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Tikaelin
arrested him without probable cause. That is sufficient, if barely so, to allege a viable Fourth
Amendment claim. This claim will proceed against against Officer Tikaelin in his individual
capacity.
B. 	Claims to Be Dismissed
An official-capacity claim is equivalent to a claim against the entity that a defendant
represents. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, that appears to be Metro
Nashville. (See Doc. No. 1 at 3). Regardless, to state a viable Section 1983 claim against any
municipal entity, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendant’s policy or custom directly caused him
to suffer the alleged constitutional violation. Hardrick v. City of Detroit, Mich., 876 F.3d 238, 243
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(6th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff makes no such allegations here, so his official-capacity claims against
Officer Tikaelin and his claims against Metro Government Tennessee Davidson County will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks raise claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, they will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. “A person bringing an action under the Equal Protection Clause must show intentional
discrimination against him because of his membership in a particular class, not merely that he was
treated unfairly as an individual.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 (6th Cir. 1999). Here,
Plaintiff alleges no facts to support a viable Equal Protection claim. Indeed, he does not allege that
he is a member of a protected class. Therfore, his claim “fails at the inception.” Id.
V. 	STAYING PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff describes himself as a pretrial detainee, from which the Court infers that Plaintiff
faces ongoing prosecution for one or more of the offenses for which he was arrested. (Doc. No. 1
at 4). Later filings reinforce this conclusion. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 13 (Motion to Suppress Evidence).
Thus, the appropriate course of action is to stay this civil case for as long as it takes to resolve
Plaintiff's state criminal proceedings. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393−94 (2007) (“If a plaintiff
files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted . . . , it is within the power of the district
court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the
likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”).
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VI. 	CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim SHALL PROCEED against Officer Tikaelin in his
individual capacity. All other claims are DISMISSED. The Clerk SHALL terminate “Metro
Government Tennessee Davidson County” as a Defendant on the docket.
This action is STAYED until resolution of Plaintiff’s state criminal prosecution. The Clerk
SHALL administratively close this case. Plaintiff shall notify the Court within 45 days after the
resolution of his state-court prosecution, including any direct appeal, at which point the case may
be reopened if appropriate.
Plaintiff’s pending motions (Doc. Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16) are
DENIED without prejudice to refiling if this case is reopened.
It is so ORDERED.
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WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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