Butler II v. Newton Nissan of Gallatin, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
REGINALD THOMAS BUTLER, II 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-00722
) 	Judge Richardson/Frensley
NEWTON NISSAN OF GALLATIN, 	)
INC. AND GROW FINANCIAL CREDIT)
UNION, 	)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ Motions for a More Definitive Statement
(Docket Nos. 6 and 10). The Plaintiff had not responded to the motions, so the undersigned issued
a show cause order giving the Plaintiff until February 23, 2026, to respond to the motions or to
show cause why this action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. Docket No. 14. For
the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that this matter be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE and that the Defendants’ motions for more definitive statement
(Docket Nos. 6 and 10) be DENIED AS MOOT.
BACKGROUND
This action was removed from the Chancery Court of Sumner County, Tennessee on June
30, 2025. Docket No. 1. This matter was referred to the undersigned on February 5, 2026. Docket
No. 13.
The Defendants filed the instant motions for a more definitive statement on July 3, 2025
(Docket No. 6) and July 22, 2025, (Docket No. 10). When Plaintiff failed to respond to the motions,
the Court entered an Order on February 9, 2026, for the Plaintiff to show cause by February 23,
2026, why his claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Docket No. 14. Plaintiff
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was forewarned that his failure to respond to the Court’s Order may lead to a recommendation that
his claims be dismissed. Id. Plaintiff has not responded to the motions or the Court’s show cause
order.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) “confers on district courts the authority to dismiss
an action for failure of a Plaintiff to prosecute the claim or comply with the Rules or any order of
the Court. Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Department, 529 F. 3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008)(citing
Knoll v. AT & T, 176 F. 3d 359, 362-3 (6th Cir. 1999)); Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F. 3d 700,
704 (6th Cir. 2013)(“It is well settled that a district court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a
lawsuit for failure to prosecute.”). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules provides that “[c]ivil suits
that have been pending for an unreasonable period of time without any action having been taken
by any party may be summarily dismissed . . . without prejudice to refile or to move the Court to
set aside the order of dismissal for just cause.” Local Rule 41.01(a)(dismissal for unreasonable
delay. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a tool for district courts to manage their dockets and
avoid unnecessary burdens on opposing parties and the judiciary. See Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 736
(quoting Knoll, 176 F. 3d at 363).
The Court considers four factors in determining whether dismissal under Rule 41(b) is
appropriate: (1) the willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the plaintiff; (2) whether the opposing party
has been prejudiced by the plaintiff’s conduct; (3) whether the plaintiff was warned that failure to
cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) the availability and appropriateness of other, less drastic
sanctions. 	Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep’t, 529 F. 3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008). 	A
dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) constitutes an adjudication on the merits unless
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the dismissal order states otherwise. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 	The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has noted, however, that dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh sanction” and should only
apply in extreme situations where there is a “clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the
plaintiff.” 	Carter, 636 F. 2d at 161, quoting Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 586 F. 2d 382,
385 (5th Cir. 1978).
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal of
an action if a Plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the Court. See, Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F. 2d 108, 109 (6 th Cir., 1991). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be granted some latitude
when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is
no cause 	for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements that a lay person
can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se litigants has limits.”
Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F. 3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
When a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily understood court-imposed deadline,
there is no basis for treating that party more favorably than a party who is represented. Id.
Additionally, Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars
of cases that have remained dormant because of inaction or dilatoriness of the party seeking relief.”
Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630 (1962).
This is not a case of a plaintiff simply filing documents past deadlines or filing inadequate
briefs. See Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F. 3d 586, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the
district court abused its discretion by granting a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute).
Giving due consideration to each of the factors, the Court finds that dismissal for failure to
prosecute is an appropriate and necessary sanction, as no alternative sanction “would protect the
integrity of pre-trial procedures.” Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F. 2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980).
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B. 	The Case at Bar
The undersigned finds that dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is appropriate because the four relevant factors, considered under the “relaxed” standard
for dismissal without prejudice show a record of delay, refusal to advance the case and failure to
comply with the Court’s orders by the Plaintiff.
1. 	Bad Faith, Willfulness, or Fault
A plaintiff’s actions demonstrate bad faith, willfulness, or fault where they “display either
an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of [plaintiff’s] conduct
on those proceedings.” Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F. 3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mulbah,
261 F. 3d at 591(6th Cir 2001)). Although there is no indication that the Plaintiffs’ failure to file a
response to the defendants’ motions for a more definitive statement by the deadline was driven by
bad faith, he is still “at fault for failing to comply with the Court’s Order[ ].” Malott v. Haas, 2017
WL 1319839, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL
1244991 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2017); see id. (finding that first factor weighed in favor of dismissal
where plaintiff had failed to respond to the defendants’ summary judgment motion, despite
receiving additional time to do so, and had failed to respond to the court’s show-cause orders).
This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
2. 	Prejudice
The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] defendant is prejudiced by a plaintiff’s dilatory conduct
if the defendant is ‘required to waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the
plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide.’” Carpenter, 723 F. 3d at 707 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F. 3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also
Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 739 (same). Such prejudice typically arises in the discovery context. See,
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e.g., Harmon, 110 F. 3d at 368 (finding prejudice where plaintiff failed to respond to defendant’s
interrogatories and a related motion to compel); Wright v. City of Germantown, 2013 WL 1729105,
at *2 (W. D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2013) (finding prejudice where defendant “expended time and money
pursuing [plaintiff’s] required initial disclosures and deposition testimony”). Notably, time and
effort spent on “typical steps in the early stages of litigation[,]” such as answering a complaint or
filing pretrial motions to advance the defendant’s position, are not actions “necessitated by any
lack of cooperation” and therefore do not weigh in favor of dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 739. The Sixth Circuit explained in Schafer v. City of Defiance Police
Department that “[i]f such efforts . . . [were] alone sufficient to establish prejudice,” for the purpose
of Rule 41(b), “then every defendant who answers a complaint and responds minimally to a lawsuit
would be able to claim prejudice[,]” a “result [that] would defy common sense.” 529 F. 3d at 740.
Here, the defendants filed motions for a more definitive statement (Docket Nos. 6 and 10).
The Plaintiff’s failure to take any steps to advance the litigation does prejudice the Defendants.
All parties are entitled to a just and prompt resolution of their cases. The failure to advance
litigation, as the Plaintiff has here, prejudices the parties and reflects the type of situation where
the Court should intervene. The failure of a party to respond to dispositive motions deprives the
Court of that party’s opposition, reflects a lack of interest in the litigation and forces the Court to
address matters without the benefit of the nonmoving party’s advocacy. Thus, this factor weighs
in favor of dismissal.
3. 	Prior Notice
Whether a party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal “is a ‘key
consideration’” in the Rule 41(b) analysis. Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 740 (quoting Stough, 138 F. 3d at
615). In the Court’s scheduling order, the Parties were explicitly ordered to comply with the Local
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Rules that they were to keep both Court and opposing counsel informed of their current address.
Docket No. 14. The Order likewise warned the Parties that a failure to do so may result in a
recommendation that the action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply
with the Court’s Order. The Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss in the time required
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Court entered
a show cause order further extending Plaintiff’s deadline to December 13, 2024, to indicate why
his claim should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Docket No. 20. The Show Cause Order
further warned the Plaintiff that his failure to respond to the Order may lead to a recommendation
that his claims be dismissed. Id. The Plaintiff has not responded to the pending Motion nor this
Court’s Show Cause Order. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
4. 	Appropriateness of Other Sanctions
The less-drastic sanction of dismissal without prejudice is available and appropriate here.
Dismissal without prejudice balances the Court’s interest in “sound judicial case and docket
management” with “the public policy interest in the disposition of cases on their merits.” Muncy,
110 F. App’x at 557 n. 5; see also Mulbah, 261 F. 3d at 590–91. That is so even though the
defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. See Watsy v. Richards, No. 86-1856, 1987 WL 37151,
at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 20, 1987) (affirming dismissal of action for failure to prosecute where plaintiff
had not provided the court with a current mailing address or responded to the defendants’ motion
dismiss despite a sixty-day extension); Thomas-Wilson v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 3:14-cv-
01968, 2016 WL 4775738, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 15, 2016) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s claims
without prejudice for failure to prosecute and finding defendants’ pending motion for summary
judgment moot). Such a sanction is particularly appropriate in cases of prolonged inactivity and
where, as here, the plaintiff appears pro se. See Schafer, 529 F. 3d at 737 (noting that courts apply
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the four-factor test “more stringently in cases where the plaintiff’s attorney’s conduct is
responsible for the dismissal.” Id. (quoting Harmon, 110 F. 3d at 367)).
All four factors set forth above weigh in favor of dismissal of this case. While dismissal
under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh” sanction. Plaintiff has been given every opportunity to participate in
this litigation and has chosen not to do so. The Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity to cure
the defects and specifically advised that his failure to cooperate and comply with the Court’s orders
could lead to dismissal. No further less drastic sanction would be appropriate in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this matter be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute and for failure
to comply with the Court’s orders. The undersigned also RECOMMENDS that the Defendants’
Motions for More Definitive Statement (Docket Nos. 6 and 10) be DENIED AS MOOT.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge
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