Robinson v. Stevens et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JANETTE EBONY ROBINSON,
#459360,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEQUAN STEVENS, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:25-cv-00707
JUDGE RICHARDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Janette Robinson, a state inmate in custody at the West Tennessee State
Prison (WTSP), filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), an application
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2), and a Motion for Appointment of
Counsel. (Doc. No. 3.)
This case is before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s IFP application and Motion, and for
initial review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. PAUPER STATUS
Subject to certain statutory requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2), (g), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to proceed as a pauper, without prepaying the $405 filing
fee. Because Plaintiff’s IFP application complies with the applicable statutory requirements and
demonstrates that she lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee, the IFP application (Doc. No. 2)
is GRANTED.
Nevertheless, prisoners bringing civil lawsuits or appeals are “required to pay the full
amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Where the prisoner proceeds IFP, the fee is $350
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instead of $405, see id. § 1914(a)–(b) & Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule, provision 14 (eff. Dec. 1,
2023), and may be paid in installments over time via an assessment against his inmate trust
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is ASSESSED a $350 filing fee. The fee will be collected in
installments as described below.
The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of her trust
account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a)
20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average
monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when
the balance in her account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350
filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which
Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining
to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from her present place of confinement,
the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to her new place of
confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the
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Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.
To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
Court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). A viable claim is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the Complaint plausibly
alleges (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2) that the deprivation was
caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ and
‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted
factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville, Michigan,
87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must afford the pro se Complaint
a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
B. Factual Allegations
The Complaint claims that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated on April 12,
2025, when she was confined at the Debra K. Johnson Rehabilitation Center in Nashville.1 (Doc.
No. 1 at 5, 7.) On that day, after Plaintiff “put [her] hands up in submission and cooperation,” she
1 All of the following facts in this paragraph are alleged in the Complaint and, consistent with the discussion above,
taken as true for present purposes.
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was attacked in her cell by correctional officer Dequan Stevens, who first struck her with his fist
and then stomped her face, head, and back. (Id. at 5.) Correctional officers Corey Mongremory
and A. Atwood also repeatedly punched Plaintiff. (Id.) Atwood then “maced [Plaintiff] in the face
while [she] was in a[] fetal position.” (Id.) Plaintiff began to vomit and could not breathe because
“Cert/Tact Force Ruban” had his knee on her neck. (Id. at 6.) After Sergeant Jasmine Cooper yelled
at Ruban, “‘that’s enough[,] get off of her!’”, Ruban removed his knee from Plaintiff’s neck and
then told Plaintiff not to test him again, after which he punched Plaintiff in the forehead. (Id.) All
of this was witnessed by Cooper, Sergeant George Stubbs, and two correctional officers who are
not named as Defendants. (Id. at 7.) Major Fredrick Estes came to Plaintiff’s cell thirty minutes
later but refused to provide medical attention, medication, or food trays for over 24 hours. (Id.)
Plaintiff suffered internal and external injuries from this beating and had a “CAT Scan scheduled
with x-rays.” (Id.) She asks the Court to award damages against Defendants Stevens, Mongremory,
Atwood, and Ruban for their use of excessive force; against Defendants Cooper and Stubbs for
failing to intervene while the other officers assaulted Plaintiff; and against Defendant Estes for
denial of prompt medical care. (Id.)
C. Analysis
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the use of
excessive force against convicted inmates. The “core judicial inquiry” in considering such a claim
is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). In addition to this subjective inquiry, there is also an objective
component to Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims, which requires the pain inflicted to be
sufficiently serious. Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v.
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Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). However, the Court may not apply a “de minimis
injury” test to such claims, as “the judicial inquiry should focus on ‘the nature of the force rather
than the extent of the injury.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 384 (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34).
The Complaint alleges that Defendants Stevens, Mongremory, Atwood, and Ruban
assaulted Plaintiff with their fists, feet, and knees, resulting in injuries and pain sufficient to cause
Plaintiff to vomit and pass blood in her urine and stool. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff allegedly had
her hands up in a submissive posture prior to this assault in her cell. Presuming the truth of these
allegations, the Court finds that the serious nature of the force, the maliciousness of its application,
and the seriousness of the resulting injury are colorably established for purposes of initial review.
Further factual development may reveal otherwise and may even vindicate the level of force used.
But at this early stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allow her claims under the Eighth
Amendment and the state law of assault and battery (see Doc. No. 1 at 3) to proceed against
Stevens, Mongremory, Atwood, and Ruban in their individual capacities.
The Complaint seeks to hold Defendants Cooper and Stubbs liable for watching their
fellow officers attack Plaintiff without intervening. Depending upon the time it took for the attack
to unfold and for the blows to land before Cooper yelled at Ruban to get off Plaintiff’s neck, both
Cooper and Stubbs may be liable for failing to intervene. See Riethmeier v. Oakland Cnty., 808 F.
Supp. 3d 764, 791 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (finding it clearly established that “an officer with a sufficient
opportunity to intervene to prevent excessive force has a duty to take action to end it”) (citing
Ontha v. Rutherford Cnty., Tennessee, 222 F. App’x 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that the court
of appeals has recognized a duty to intervene where the “underlying episode of excessive force
has spanned a sufficient period of time for a nearby defendant to both perceive what was happening
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and intercede to stop it”)). This Eighth Amendment claim will proceed for further development
against Cooper and Stubbs in their individual capacities.
Allegedly, Defendant Estes responded to Plaintiff’s cell thirty minutes after the attack but
refused to provide either any medical attention for Plaintiff’s injuries or any food trays for over 24
hours. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) An Eighth Amendment violation is colorably claimed when a prison
official is deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Such a claim has both an
objective and a subjective component. As applied to this case, the objective component requires
that Plaintiff’s injuries from being beaten and maced present a sufficiently serious medical need,
see Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir. 2018), i.e., “one that is so obvious that even a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Harrison v. Ash, 539
F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). If there was such a need,
such that the subjective component needs to be assessed, the subjective component requires that
Estes understood yet consciously disregarded that need to treat Plaintiff’s condition without delay.
See Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738; see also Slone v. Lincoln Cnty., Ky., 242 F. Supp. 3d 579, 591
(E.D. Ky. 2017) (describing deliberate indifference as “something approaching a total unconcern
for [the inmate’s] welfare in the face of serious risks, or a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent
harm”) (quoting Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992)). For purposes of initial review,
the Court finds that the Complaint’s allegations are sufficient to establish a plausible claim that
Plaintiff’s medical needs were objectively serious in the wake of sustaining multiple blows from
the fists, knees, and feet of four officers, and that Estes was deliberately indifferent in failing to
respond to those needs for over 24 hours. This Eighth Amendment claim will proceed for further
development against Estes in his individual capacity.
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All Defendants are also sued for damages in their official capacities. “While ‘[p]ersonal-
capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes
under color of state law,’ individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity
they represent.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Therefore, the official-capacity claims against these officers employed
at a Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) facility2 are treated as claims against TDOC,
which is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983, but is, for these purposes, equivalent
to the State of Tennessee and therefore not a proper defendant. Hix v. Tennessee Dep t of Corr.,
196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64
(1989) (“[A] State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-101(5)
(listing Department of Correction as an administrative department of the state)). Accordingly, the
claims against Defendants “in their official capacities, as agents of [a] state administrative
department[], . . . are noncognizable” and will not proceed. Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766
(6th Cir. 2003).
III. CONCLUSION
As explained above, the Complaint in this case will be allowed to proceed against
Defendants in their individual capacities.3 With the case still in the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED as premature, without prejudice to
renewal at a later date after service of process is accomplished.
2 According to the TDOC website, “[t]he Debra K. Johnson Rehabilitation Center (DJRC), located in
Nashville, serves as the primary diagnostic center for female inmates in Tennessee” and was “[o]riginally
known as the Tennessee Prison for Women.” https://www.tn.gov/content/tn/correction/state-prisons/state-
prison-list/debra-k--johnson-rehabilitation-center.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2026).
3 The Court’s determination that the Complaint states colorable claims for purposes of this initial screening
does not preclude any Defendant from filing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
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The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons (AO 440)
and USM 285 form) for each of Defendants Stevens, Mongremory, Cooper, Stubbs, Atwood,
Estes, and Ruban. Plaintiff MUST complete the service packets and return them to the Clerk’s
Office within 30 DAYS of the entry of this Order. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of
this case. Upon return of the properly completed service packets, the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue
summons to the U.S. Marshals Service for service on the defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and
(c)(3).
This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to oversee service of process, to enter
a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any
pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if
necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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