Watts v. Hughes et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JEFFERY R. WATTS #3911236,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFF HUGHES, Sheriff of Williamson
County, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:25-cv-00202
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NEWBERN
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jeffrey R. Watts, who is currently in the custody of the FCI-Atlanta, filed a pro se
complaint, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights. (Doc. No. 1).
Plaintiff also filed an Application for Leave for Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”) (Doc. No. 3), Motion to Notify the Court of Change of Address and Request for
Court Order (Doc. No. 8), and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Trust Fund Account (Doc.
No. 9). Plaintiff also has filed four Notices of Change of Address. (Doc. Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14). The
Court must begin with the filing fee.
I. FILING FEE
Because Plaintiff’s IFP Application did not include the required documentation, the Court
ordered Plaintiff to submit the missing certified inmate account statement by Order entered on
March 4, 2025. (Doc. No. 7). Since then, Plaintiff has experienced multiple transfers in rapid
succession. With each transfer, he has attempted to obtain the required certified inmate account
statement, but his efforts have been stymied by the frequent transfers.
The Court has received a Certificate of Trust Fund Account from the Bledsoe County
Correctional 	Facility 	(Doc. 	No. 	10), 	which 	the 	Court 	finds 	to 	be 	sufficient, 	given 	the
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circumstances. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Notify the Court of a Change of Address (Doc. No. 8)
is GRANTED and his Request for a Court Order (to obtain a certified inmate account statement)
(Doc. No. 8) is DENIED AS MOOT. Further, his Motion for Extension of Time to File Trust
Fund Account (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and supporting documentation
(Doc. Nos. 3, 10), it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay
the full filing fee in advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED.
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all
deposits credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in
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the account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the FCI-Atlanta to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust
account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing fee.
If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his inmate trust
fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement for continued compliance.
II. PLRA SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
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summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
A. Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a cause of action against
any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of
Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Facts Alleged in the Complaint
The allegations of the complaint are assumed true for purposes of the required PLRA
screening.
On March 24, 2024, Plaintiff was booked into the Williamson County Jail in Franklin,
Tennessee. At that time, Sergeant Cohen confiscated Plaintiff’s pen, paper, stamps, and envelopes
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that Plaintiff used for his legal correspondence. Plaintiff repeatedly told Sergeant Cohen that he
needed the materials back to meet a federal court deadline. An unknown officer told Plaintiff that
“if [he] did not like how things were being done by Sgt. Cohen then [Plaintiff] could file a
grievance.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff filed numerous grievances. Staff Sergeant Grey told
Plaintiff to be patient. Plaintiff sought assistance from the jail inspector on April 9, 2025, who was
accompanied by Staff Sergeant Gray. The next morning Plaintiff was transferred to the Hickman
County Jail where the conditions of his confinement are severely more restricted. He lost his appeal
in his federal sentencing case, which caused mental anguish and loss of visitation with his family.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages.
C. Analysis
The complaint names as Defendants Jeff Hughes, Williamson County Sheriff; Sergeant
f/n/u Cohen, Booking Sergeant at the Williamson County Jail; Captain f/n/u Youker, Chief Jailer
at the Williamson County Jail; and Staff Sergeant f/n/u Gray. Each Defendant is sued in his official
capacity only. (Doc. No. 1 at 2-3).
When a defendant is sued in his or her official capacity as an employee of the government,
the lawsuit is directed against “the entity for which the officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of
Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, the complaint alleges that Defendants are
employees of the Williamson County Sheriff’s Department, which is operated by Williamson
County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1 at 2-3). Thus, a claim of governmental liability requires a showing
that the alleged misconduct is the result of a policy, statement, regulation, decision, or custom
promulgated by Williamson County or its agent. Monell Dep’t of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-
691 (1978). In short, for Williamson County to be liable Plaintiff under Section 1983, there must
be a direct causal link between an official county policy or custom and the alleged violation of
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Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Burgess v.
Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 693); Regets v. City of
Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 393 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 456-
57 (6th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating
one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that
an official with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy
of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom or tolerance or acquiescence
of federal rights violations. Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478.
Here, the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability
against Williamson County under Section 1983. The complaint does not identify or describe any
of the county’s policies, procedures, practices, or customs relating to the incidents at issue; the
complaint does not identify any particular shortcomings in training or supervision or how those
shortcomings caused the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights; and it does not identify any other
previous instances of similar violations that would have put the county on notice of a problem. See
Okolo v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 892 F. Supp.2d 931, 944 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). Consequently,
the Court finds that the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to state a claim for
municipal liability against Williamson County. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendants
in their official capacities (which are claims against Williamson County) therefore must be
dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff had named the Defendants in their individual capacities, however, the
complaint fails to state Section 1983 claims upon which relief can be granted.
The complaint alleges two Section 1983 claims, both under the First Amendment: access
to court claims and retaliation claims. To state a viable access to court claim under the First
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Amendment, an inmate must demonstrate he suffered “actual injury” as a result of particular
actions of prison officials. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). This injury requirement is
not satisfied by “just any type of frustrated legal claim.” Id. “A prison official may be held liable
only to the extent his or her actions prevented a prisoner from pursuing, or cause the rejection of,
specific non-frivolous direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, or civil rights actions.” Branham
v. Bolton, No. 3:16-cv-P108-DJH, 2017 WL 2312479, at *6 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2017) (citing
Lewis). “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental, and perfectly
constitutional, consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355.
Here, although Plaintiff alleges that he lost his appeal in his federal sentencing case when
his legal materials were not returned to him, he does not allege or demonstrate that his underlying
claim is non-frivolous and that it was frustrated or impeded by Defendants. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353;
see also Clark v. Johnston, 413 F. App’x 804 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that prisoner must
demonstrate that the underlying claim allegedly prejudiced is not frivolous). “[T]he underlying
cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint,
just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding that plaintiff must “plead and prove prejudice stemming from the asserted violation”).
Thus, any access to court claims would fail, even if Plaintiff had sued Defendants in their
individual capacities.
A prisoner’s claim that prison officials have retaliated against him for engaging in protected
conduct is also grounded in the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th
Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation within the context of Section 1983, a
plaintiff must prove that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
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against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
conduct; and (3) the defendant’s conduct was substantially motivated at least in part by retaliation
for the plaintiff’s protected speech and conduct. Id. at 394-99. In addition to proving a retaliatory
motive, the plaintiff must establish that the alleged discriminatory action was punitive in nature by
showing other than de minimis harm resulting from it. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674
(1977); Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. The plaintiff has the burden of proof. Murray v. Unknown
Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003).
Filing grievances through an inmate grievance process is protected conduct. See Herron v.
Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000). While Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to acts
of retaliation—that he was transferred to the Hickman County Jail where he was subjected to
harsher conditions of confinement ̶ the complaint does not allege that any of the named Defendants
were responsible for Plaintiff’s transfer or that the transfer occurred because Plaintiff filed
grievances. Rather, the complaint simply alleges that Plaintiff’s transfer happened after he filed
grievances and complained to the jail inspector when unidentified “administrative officials at the
Williamson County Jail” contacted the Hickman County Jail to arrange the transfer because
“Williamson County would no longer hold the plaintiff for Hickman County . . . .” (Doc. No. 1 at
4).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d
108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), a court’s “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not
require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.
1979) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5
(6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
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pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir.
2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating,
“[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); Young Bok
Song v. Gipson, 423 Fed. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require
courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that
duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into
advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all
who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal
theories they should pursue.”). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of
retaliatory motive with no concrete and particularized facts would fail to state retaliation claims
under Section 1983 upon which relief can be granted, even if Plaintiff had named Defendants in
their individual capacities.
III. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening required by the PRLA, the Court finds that the allegations
of the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted via Section 1983.
Accordingly, this action is therefore DISMISSED.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
It is so ORDERED.
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____________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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