Woods v. Vanwinkle et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DURRELL WOODS # 0031471,
Plaintiff,
v.
f/n/u VANWINKLE, Deputy, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:24-cv-01385
JUDGE RICHARDSON
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Durrell Woods, a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Rutherford County
Adult Detention Center (“RCADC”) in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
against f/n/u Vanwinkle and f/n/u Duggin, both RCADC deputies. Plaintiff alleges violations of
his civil rights. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff also has filed an Application for Leave to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) (Doc. No. 2) and a supplement to the complaint (Doc. No.
5).
The Court must resolve the filing fee before moving to the required screening of the
prisoner complaint.
I. FILING FEE
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and supporting
documentation (Doc. No. 2), it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from
which to pay the full filing fee in advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is
GRANTED.
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
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plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all
deposits credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in
the account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the RCADC to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account
complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. If
Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his inmate trust fund
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account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of confinement
for continued compliance.
II. PLRA SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
A. Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against
any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured
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by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of
Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Facts Alleged in the Complaint
The allegations of the complaint are assumed true for purposes of the required PLRA
screening. Plaintiff filed a supplement to the complaint (Doc. No. 5), which the Court also
considers.
The complaint alleges that in March 2024, Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff in that they
placed him in the same housing pod as his “charge partner,” with whom Plaintiff got into a fight.
(Doc. No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff “feel[s] this is grounds for a lawsuit seeing how we should have never
been in the same pod due to our conflict of interest.” (Id. at 6; Doc. No. 5 at 1). Plaintiff alleges
that housing him with this individual “shows a lack of care and negligence” on the “facility.” (Id.)
After the fight, Defendants placed Plaintiff in solitary confinement.
The complaint also alleges that the conditions of Plaintiff’s thirteen-hour stay in solitary
confinement were unconstitutional. According to Plaintiff, fecal matter was spread all over the
walls, floors, toilet, and sink. The odor allegedly gave Plaintiff a headache, made him nauseous,
and affected his mental health. Allegedly, Plaintiff repeatedly asked for cleaning supplies, and
Defendants never brought them. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Duggin laughed at Plaintiff
instead. Allegedly, other officers ultimately provided Plaintiff with cleaning supplies, and Plaintiff
later was relocated to another cell. For weeks following his time in solitary confinement, Plaintiff
allegedly had nightmares about it.
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The complaint further alleges that individuals, whom the complaint does not specify,
retaliated against Plaintiff after he filed this lawsuit. Allegedly, Plaintiff was: charged with, and
found guilty of, unwarranted disciplinary infractions; threatened with pepper tray and having the
water turned off to his cell; threatened to be sent into protective custody; and called multiple
names. The complaint alleges that Officer Trutter issued the disciplinary charges and Sergeant
Ciaro found Plaintiff guilty of all charges.1
Plaintiff contends that he should not have to pay his medical bill for seeing the nurse for
the headaches and nausea he experienced after having been in solitary confinement.
The complaint also alleges that Plaintiff’s “commissary” was stolen “because they
wouldn’t let [him] pack his own things . . . .” when Plaintiff moved cells. (Doc. No. 1 at 10). The
complaint does not identify who “they” are.
The complaint seeks “financial” compensation for Defendants “putting [his] life in danger,
and the health hazard that the unsanitary cell caused [him], pain and suffering due to the
humiliation [he] had to endure, and the mistreatment and negligent [he] went thru [sic].” (Id. at 11;
Doc. No. 5 at 7).
C. Analysis
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the conditions of his
confinement. The complaint names two Defendant deputies in their individual and official
capacities. (See Doc. No. 1 at 2).
1. Official Capacity Claims
Because “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
1 Neither Officer Trutter nor Sergeant Ciaro are named as Defendants to this action.
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(1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)),
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants Vanwinkle and Duggin are thus treated as
claims against their employer, Rutherford County.
A local government like Rutherford County “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy
or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To state a municipal-liability claim
under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or custom.” Nichols
v. Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit,
876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional “policy” or “custom”
by demonstrating one of the following: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative
enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the
existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of
tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th
Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts from which the Court could conclude that an
official policy or custom of Rutherford County resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights.
The complaint does not refer to any official policies or customs. Thus, the complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted under Section 1983 against Rutherford County. All such
claims will be dismissed.
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2. Individual Capacity Claims
The Court moves now to Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Defendants
Vanwinkle and Duggin. Many of Plaintiff’s allegations concern the conditions of his confinement.
The Court will begin with those claims.
a. Conditions-of-Confinement Claims
It is well-settled that “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Pfeiffer v. Butler Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, No. 1:10CV672, 2012
WL 1203557, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2012) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994)). The Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates from “cruel and unusual punishments,”
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which includes “extreme deprivations” that deny “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “But the
Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees like [plaintiff].” Greene v. Crawford Cty.,
Michigan, 22 F.4th 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Graham ex rel. Est. of Graham v. Cty. of
Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 382 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004)). State pretrial detainees are instead protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Greene,
22 F.4th at 605; Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other
grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 n.9 (2007).
The Due Process Clause protects detainees from being “punished prior to an adjudication
of guilt.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); see also Thompson v. Cty. of Medina, 29 F.3d
238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994). Pretrial detainees can demonstrate they are being “subjected to
unconstitutional punishment” by showing a “restriction or condition” of their confinement “is not
rationally related to a legitimate government objective or is excessive in relation to that purpose.”
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J.H. v. Williamson Cty., 951 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538);
Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 185 (4th Cir. 2018). To determine whether a condition of
confinement is “excessive,” courts analyze the “totality of [the] circumstances.” J.H., 951 F.3d at
718.
Here, the allegations of the complaint support a nonfrivolous claim that the totality of the
circumstances of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement as a pretrial detainee were excessive
relative to Defendants’ goal of maintaining jail security. The complaint alleges that the walls,
ceiling, floor, and toilet in the cell in which Plaintiff was placed as punishment was covered in
feces, including the sink. Plaintiff declined to drink water out of his sink because the water tasted
like “fecal matter.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff “was forced to where [sic] his thermal over [his]
mouth and nose,” his “head was pounding from inhaling fecal matter,” and he was “crying,
throwing up, and left to inhale another person[’]s fecal matter like[he] wasn’t a human being.”
(Id. at 9). He suffers from nightmares after the experience.
In Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020) (per curiam), the Supreme Court addressed exposure
to feces and reversed the lower court’s entry of summary judgment. The Court described the
conditions as follows:
Correctional officers confined [the inmate] in a pair of shockingly unsanitary cells.
The first cell was covered, nearly floor to ceiling, in “‘massive amounts’ of feces”:
all over the floor, the ceiling, the window, the walls, and even “‘packed inside the
water faucet.’” Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F. 3d 211, 218 ([5th Cir.] 2019). Fearing that
his food and water would be contaminated, Taylor did not eat or drink for nearly
four days. Correctional officers then moved Taylor to a second, frigidly cold cell,
which was equipped with only a clogged drain in the floor to dispose of bodily
wastes. Taylor held his bladder for over 24 hours, but he eventually (and
involuntarily) relieved himself, causing the drain to overflow and raw sewage to
spill across the floor. Because the cell lacked a bunk, and because Taylor was
confined without clothing, he was left to sleep naked in sewage. Id. at 53, 130 S.
Ct. 1175 (footnote omitted).
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Id. at 7-8. The Court held that no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that it was
constitutionally permissible to house the plaintiff under those conditions. Id. at 8-9. In doing so,
the Court also stated, “The Fifth Circuit identified no evidence that the conditions of Taylor's
confinement were compelled by necessity or exigency.” Id. at 9.
Taylor was a convicted inmate, not a pretrial detainee like Plaintiff. Thus, the constitutional
protections afforded to him were less than those afforded to Plaintiff, who (like Taylor) alleges
that Defendants placed him in a cell covered in massive amounts of feces. The complaint alleges
that Plaintiff suffered physical injuries as a result of that confinement.
The Court finds that the conditions of confinement claims against Defendants Vanwinkle
and Duggin in their individual capacities survive the PLRA screening and shall proceed for further
development.
2. Failure-to-Protect Claims
Next, the complaint alleges that Defendants should not have placed Plaintiff in a cell with
his charge partner because Defendants knew doing so posed a threat to Plaintiff’s safety.
Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence by other inmates and to take
reasonable measures to protect their safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33. Liability attaches to an
officer’s failure to protect an inmate only where the inmate demonstrates that he was “incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” and that the prison officials acted with
deliberate indifference to the inmate’s safety. Id. at 834. Historically, detainee and prisoner claims
analyzed the deliberate indifference standard “under the same rubric.” Villegas v. Metro Gov’t of
Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015),
however, the Supreme Court eliminated the subjective intent element of a detainee’s claim of
deliberate indifference in the context of excessive force, holding that the relevant inquiry is
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whether the force used purposely used was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 576 U.S. at 397-98.
Considering Kingsley, the Sixth Circuit later modified “the subjective prong of the deliberate-
indifference test for pretrial detainees” to hold that a pretrial detainee can establish deliberate
indifference by proving “more than negligence but less than subjective intent — something akin
to reckless disregard.” Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Castro
v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016)).
More recently, the Sixth Circuit took “the position that a failure-to-protect claim by a
pretrial detainee requires only an objective showing that an individual defendant acted (or failed
to act) deliberately and recklessly.” Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., 29 F.4th 721, 728 (6th Cir.
2022) (citing Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596). Specifically, liability attaches where the defendant officer
“[1] act[ed] intentionally in a manner that [2] put[ ] the plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm, [3]
without taking reasonable steps to abate that risk, and [4] by failing to do so actually cause[d] the
plaintiff’s injuries.” Stein v. Gunkel, 43 F.4th 633 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Westmoreland, 29 F.4th
at 729).
With these standards in mind, the Court finds that the allegations of the complaint are
insufficient to allow the inference that either Defendant demonstrated reckless disregard to “an
unjustifiably high risk of harm” to Plaintiff by placing Plaintiff into the same cell as his charge
partner. See Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). While Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants knew that charge partners should not be placed in the same cell, Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts to indicate that Defendants should have appreciated any particularized risk to
Plaintiff by placing him in the same cell as his charge partner. Plaintiff does not provide any facts
that would indicate that either Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff’s charge
partner had any ill intent toward Plaintiff prior to this incident or had a history of fighting. In sum,
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Plaintiff does not allege any facts from which “a reasonable officer in the circumstances would
have appreciated the high degree of risk involved and the obvious consequences” of Defendants’
conduct. Westmoreland, 29 F.4th at 730. See Morgan by next friend Morgan v. Wayne Cnty., Mich.,
33 F.4th 320, 327 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[a]n official who was unaware of a substantial risk may not be
held liable under the Eighth Amendment.”); Davis v. Chorak, No. 22-1839, 2023 WL 2487339, at
*3 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2023) (assuming arguendo that plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, holding that
attack “without warning” indicates lack of substantial risk and defendant officers were entitled to
qualified immunity on plaintiff’s failure to protect claims); Young v. Phillips, No. 3:22-CV-295-
TAV-JEM, 2022 WL 4360848, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2022) (finding no viable failure to
protect claim under Section 1983 where plaintiff failed to allege that defendant “knew or should
have known . . . that [assailant] had any ill intent toward [plaintiff]”). Therefore, the Court finds
Plaintiff has failed to state viable failure-to-protect claims under Section 1983 against Defendants
Vanwinkle and Duggin. Those claims will be dismissed.
3. Retaliation Claims
The complaint further alleges that unspecified individuals retaliated against Plaintiff after
he filed this lawsuit. He was charged with, and found guilty of, unwarranted disciplinary
infractions; threatened with pepper tray and having the water turned off to his cell; threatened to
be sent into protective custody; and called multiple names.
A prisoner’s claim that prison officials have retaliated against him for engaging in protected
conduct is grounded in the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir.
1999). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation within the context of Section 1983, a plaintiff
must prove that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3)
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the defendant’s conduct was substantially motivated at least in part by retaliation for the plaintiff’s
protected speech and conduct. Id. at 394-99. The plaintiff has the burden of proof on all three
elements. Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003). If the plaintiff
establishes “‘his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant,’ who may prevail on summary judgment by showing that ‘he
would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity.’” Vaughn v. Underwood,
No. 3:20-CV-P317-RGJ, 2022 WL 4693908, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2022) (quoting Thaddeus-
X, 175 F.3d at 399).
Although the complaint’s allegations may implicate concerns for which relief may be
available under Section 1983, Plaintiff fails to identity the individuals who retaliated against him
and/or failed to name those individuals as defendants to this action. Rather than dismiss the case,
however, considering Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will give Plaintiff a chance to file an
amended complaint identifying the individuals who retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit.
See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013).
4. Stolen Commissary
Next, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s commissary was stolen when Defendants
permitted another inmate to pack up Plaintiff’s belongings.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits public officers from
unlawfully taking a person’s property. However, the Supreme Court has held that, where adequate
remedies are provided by state law, the negligent or intentional loss or destruction of personal
property does not state a claim cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The Sixth
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Circuit has held that Tennessee’s statutory remedy against local governments for loss of property
affords an adequate remedy to return items either negligently or intentionally converted. See
Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 1985).
The complaint does not allege that Tennessee post-deprivation remedies are inadequate.
Neither does it allege that Plaintiff has utilized the state post-deprivation remedies available to
him. Thus, his Due Process claims will be dismissed.
5. Medical Bill
Finally, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff should not be required to pay the medical bill
for his treatment of symptoms that arose after he was confined in the feces-covered cell.
“Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, . . . pretrial detainees [like
Plaintiff] have a right to adequate medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth Amendment
rights of prisoners.” Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2001). There
is no constitutional requirement, however, that the care be provided to the inmate free of charge.
See Sickles v. Campbell Cnty., Ky., 501 F.3d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff does not allege that
his care was conditioned on his ability to pay. Thus, Plaintiff does not allege a violation of federal
constitutional law. Id. Consequently, this claim fails to state a claim under Section 1983 upon
which relief can be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening of the complaint required by the PRLA, the Court finds
that the conditions-of-confinement claims against Defendants Vanwinkle and Duggin in their
individual capacities are colorable under Section 1983. This action shall proceed as to those claims
and Defendants.
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than 30 days after entry of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order in which he identifies the individuals who retaliated against him
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for filing this lawsuit. Any amended complaint must contain all allegations, claims, and
defendants, and should not incorporate the original complaint by reference.
If Plaintiff submits a timely amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended
complaint pursuant to the PLRA upon receipt. If not, at the expiration of the 30-day period,
Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims against Defendants Vanwinkle and Duggin in their
individual capacities will be referred to the Magistrate Judge, and all other claims and Defendants
will be dismissed.
Plaintiff is forewarned that his prosecution of this action will be jeopardized if he should
fail to keep the Clerk’s Office informed of his current address.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
ELI J. RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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