Wilkins v. Trane Technology

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JANICE A. WILKINS, 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00507
) 	Chief Judge Campbell/Frensley
TRANE TECHNOLOGY, 	)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This pro se employment discrimination case is before the Court on Defendant Trane
Technology’s (“Trane’s”) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 	claim. Docket No. 11. The
motion is briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
recommends defendants’ motion be granted and the complaint be dismissed as untimely.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC,
No. 494- 2023-00282, asserting Trane, her former employer, discriminated against her based on
her race, White; age, 64; and in retaliation for complaining about a coworker’s verbal abuse and
physical assault against her. Docket No. 11-1, p. 1. On January 16, 2024, the EEOC issued a notice
of right-to-sue. Docket No. 1-1, p. 1. The notice stated: “[i]f you choose to file a lawsuit against
the respondent(s) on this charge under federal law in federal or state court, “your lawsuit must
be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice.” It further stated: “your right to sue
based on this charge will be lost if you do not file a lawsuit within 90 days.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit in this
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court. Docket No. 1. In her form complaint, she checked the box for the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) as the basis for this court’s jurisdiction. Id. at p. 3. She checked the
boxes indicating she was wrongfully terminated from employment based on her color and
gender/sex. Id. at p. 4. She left blank the section providing any description of the particulars of
her claims in the text of the charge, as well as the section concerning her request for relief. Id. pp.
4-5. Plaintiff attached to her complaint a copy of her notice of right-to-sue. Docket No1-1, p. 1.
On April 30, 2024, on initial review, the district judge ordered Plaintiff to submit an
Amended Complaint “that provides factual allegations sufficient to demonstrate a plausible, non-
speculative right to relief against Defendant.” Docket No. 5. Plaintiff responded, supplementing
her allegations and requesting additional time to retain counsel. Docket No. 6., pp. 1-3. By order
dated May 8, 2024, the district judge construed her complaint as asserting claims under Title VII
and the ADEA. Docket No. 7, pp. 1-2. The district judge granted Plaintiff an additional sixty days
to retain counsel and ordered “either (1) counsel must appear and submit an Amended Complaint,
or (2) Plaintiff must submit a pro se Amended Complaint.” The order further warned that failure
to comply or request an extension by the deadline may result in dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b).
Docket No. 7.
Plaintiff did not comply with either directive in the district judge’s order and ten months
passed with no activity in the case. On March 17, 2025, the district judge referred the matter to the
undersigned for disposition of pretrial motions. Docket No. 8. On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff served
her original complaint on defendant. Docket No. 10.
The instant motion followed. Docket No. 11. Trane contends the complaint should be
dismissed as untimely for failure to state a claim. Id. at p. 1. It argues Plaintiff failed to file suit
within the 90-day statutory limit, and accordingly, her claims, including her additional claim under
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the ADEA, are time-barred. 	Id. It further argues Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies as to her claims for alleged “color” and “gender/sex” discrimination in her complaint,
none of which were asserted by Plaintiff in her underlying EEOC charge.1 Id. It notes Plaintiff
brings suit against “Trane Technology,” but that “Trane U.S. Inc.” was Plaintiff’s former employer
and is the proper party defendant. Id. fn1. Trane further asserts Plaintiff fails to state a plausible
claim for relief in her “check the box” complaint. Id. at pp. 1-2. Trane finally argues dismissal is
proper based on Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with this court’s above-referenced orders
despite the court’s admonitions that failure to do so could result in dismissal. Id. at p. 2.
Plaintiff did not respond to Trane’s motion to dismiss. The undersigned issued a “show
cause” order directing Plaintiff to show cause no later than July 11, 2025, why her claims should
not be dismissed. The undersigned forewarned that failure to respond to the order could lead to a
recommendation that her claims be dismissed. Docket No. 13. Plaintiff responded in two separate
filings, requesting additional time to respond the motion. Docket Nos. 14-15.
On July 30, 2025, the undersigned issued a second show cause order, granting Plaintiff
until October 1, 2025 to respond to the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 16. Plaintiff responded in
a one-page notice stating she was “ready to continue” but did not address defendant’s motion.
Docket No. 17.
On October 31, 2025, the undersigned issued a third show cause order, directing Plaintiff
to respond to defendant’s motion no later than November 21, 2025, again forewarning that failure
to do so could result in dismissal of her action and that no further extensions would be granted.
1 The EEOC charge is public record. Faibisch v. University of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 802 (8th
Cir. 2002) (holding that EEOC charge was public record, and therefore motion to dismiss was not
converted to one for summary judgment by the attachment of a copy of the EEOC charge); see
also Kovac v. Superior Dairy, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 857, 862-63 (N.D. Ohio 2013)).
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Docket No. 18. 	Plaintiff responded, reiterating the allegations in her complaint and without
addressing the merits of defendant’s motion. Docket No. 19.
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in [the] complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to
raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A plaintiff is not required to include detailed
factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing
a complaint, the court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred because she failed to file suit within
ninety days of receiving her notice of right-to-sue. Docket No. 12, p. 8. The undersigned agrees.
Under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-
to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626e. 	Although at one time federal courts
held that the 90-day limitation period was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal suit, later
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Supreme Court cases disagreed. See, e.g., Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1984) (per curiam). Thus, the 90-day limitation period is not jurisdictional but rather is
similar to a statute of limitations. See Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509, 521 (6th
Cir. 2021) (concluding plaintiff’s claims were timely where she filed suit within 90 days of
receiving notice of right-to-sue).
Federal courts have strictly enforced Title VII's 90-day statutory limit. Graham–
Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 2000); Williams
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 143 F.Supp.2d 941, 944 (W.D. Tenn. 2001). The Supreme Court has
made clear that Title VII's procedural requirements, including the 90-day limitations period, “are
not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.” Baldwin County
Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (per curiam ). Strict enforcement of the
limitations period is favored because, “experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural
requirements is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). Dismissal of a complaint filed after 90 days of receiving a right-
to-sue is appropriate even where a plaintiff proceeds pro se because the plaintiff still has “a
responsibility to meet the requirements of the law.” Lomar v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2000 WL
1888715, at *6 (6th Cir. 2000).
Here, the EEOC issued its notice and right-to-sue on January 16, 2024. Docket No. 1-1, p.
1. Therefore, Plaintiff’s filing deadline was ninety days later, April 15, 2024. This Circuit permits
a presumptive five-day rule for receipt of the right-to-sue notice, permitting two days for postal
delivery of a right-to-sue notice beyond the three-day period allowed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(e), thus permitting a 95-day filing deadline. See Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis
Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 558 & n.9 (6th Cir. 2000); Baldwin County Welcome
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Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 & n. 1 (1984) (notice of right-to-sue is presumed received
three days after it was mailed, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e).)
Plaintiff acknowledged that she received her notice right-to-sue from the EEOC, but did
not state when she received it. 	Docket No. 1, p. 5. 	Assuming the Sixth Circuit’s 5-day rule,
plaintiff’s complaint was therefore due no later than Saturday, April 20, 2024. As the due date fell
on a Saturday, the next succeeding business day is regarded as the date of the last day prescribed
for filing the document, in this case Monday, April 22, 2024. Fed. R.Civ.P. 6. Plaintiff filed this
suit on April 23, 2024. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to file suit within 95 days of the right-to-sue
notice and as a result, all of the claims asserted by Plaintiff in her Complaint are time-barred. See
Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1157 (2013)
(when the allegations in the complaint, as well as public records attached thereto, affirmatively
show that the claim is time-barred, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.”). 	The
undersigned therefore recommends defendant’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED and the
complaint be dismissed as untimely. In light of this holding, the court need not address Trane’s
other arguments in support of dismissal.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends defendants’ motion to dismiss
(Docket No. 11) be GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
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and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge
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