Lee v. Rowland et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
LEVAR LEE # 351692,
Plaintiff,
v.
BUCKY ROWLAND, Sheriff of Maury
County Jail, individually and in their
official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 1:25-cv-00034
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Levar Lee, an inmate of the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”) in
Whiteville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights. (Doc.
No. 1).
Plaintiff also filed an Application for Leave for Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”) (Doc. No. 5), a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 6), a Motion for Extension of
Time to Comply with the Court’s instructions regarding the IFP Application (Doc. No. 7), and a
“Request/Letter re summons and additional filings” (Doc. No. 8). The Court must begin with the
filing fee.
I. FILING FEE
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and supporting documentation
(Doc. Nos. 5, 9), it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the
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full filing fee in advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 5) is GRANTED. His Motion
for Extension of Time to Comply (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all
deposits credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in
the account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the HCCF to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account
complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. If
Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his inmate trust fund
account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of confinement
for continued compliance.
II. MOTIONS
Plaintiff has filed two motions in addition to an Amended Complaint.
A. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. No. 6). The Supreme Court has held
that “an indigent’s right to appointed counsel . . . exists only where the litigant may lose his
physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
Thus, unlike in criminal proceedings, there is no constitutional right to an appointed counsel in a
civil action, such as this action. Willett v. Wells, 469 F. Supp. 748, 751 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), aff’d,
595 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); see Williamson v. Autorama, Inc., No. 91-5759, 947 F.2d 947 (6th
Cir. 1991) (citing Willett favorably). The appointment of counsel for a civil litigant is a matter
within the discretion of the district court and will occur only under exceptional circumstances.
Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993).
In support of his request for counsel, Plaintiff states that he is unable to afford counsel, his
imprisonment greatly limits his ability to litigate, he believes the issues in this case are complex,
he has limited access to a law library, and Plaintiff has been unable to obtain a private attorney.
(Doc. No. 6 at 1). Plaintiff’s circumstances are typical to most incarcerated pro se plaintiffs.
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Plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel.
His Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B. “Request/Letter re summons and additional filings”
In his “Request/Letter re summons and additional filings” (Doc. No. 8), Plaintiff asks
several questions about the Notice Regarding Consent of the Parties he received from the Court
such as what is the benefit of agreeing to case assignment to a magistrate judge. (Id. at 1).
Each case is assigned randomly to two judges—a district judge and a magistrate judge. A
litigant cannot choose his judges. District judges are appointed by the President of the United
States and confirmed by the United States Senate pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. District
judges are appointed for life and cannot be removed unless impeached. Magistrate judges are
appointed by the district judges of the Court to eight-year terms. They may and often do serve
more than one term. It is common for a magistrate judge to handle pre-trial matters (to supervise
discovery, set schedules, and attempt to settle the case) and other parts of the case assigned to the
magistrate judge by the district judge.
If all parties agree, a plaintiff may consent to have his whole case heard by the magistrate
judge. After a district judge orders the transfer of a case, a magistrate judge may conduct any and
all proceedings in the case, including the trial. If the case is appealed, it will go directly to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. There are a number of benefits to consenting to proceed before a
magistrate judge. District judges are required to give priority to federal criminal trials, which often
are lengthy and complicated. By consenting to proceed before a magistrate judge, a litigant may
find that his lawsuit moves along more quickly.
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Additional information is available in free resources the Court has developed for pro se
litigants. Plaintiff may request a full copy of the Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights Handbook by
contacting the Clerk’s Office in writing or by telephone.
III. PLRA SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
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A. Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a cause of action against
any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of
Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint
Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 10), which is now the operative
pleading in this case. The allegations of the Amended Complaint are assumed true for purposes of
the required PLRA screening.
The Amended Complaint alleges that, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Maury County
Jail in Columbia, Tennessee, the air vent in Plaintiff’s cell was completely covered with rust, mold,
and unknown substances. On January 29, 2024, a foreign object from the air vent landed in
Plaintiff’s eye. Plaintiff was taken to the jail’s medical department, and Defendant Nurse Genie
observed Plaintiff’s eye and told him “she couldn’t see anything and there was nothing further she
could do.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff asked Nurse Genie to “rinse and flush his eye out”, but she said the
eye flush station was not functional. (Id.)
Several hours later, officers escorted Plaintiff to the Maury Regional Hospital emergency
room. There, nurses flushed the foreign object out of Plaintiff’s eye. He was then returned to the
Maury County Jail. Plaintiff requested to be taken to an outside optometrist or ophthalmologist,
and Defendant Penny (a nurse practitioner) told Plaintiff that he would need to pay $15 to get a
referral to an outside doctor. Defendant Penny prescribed steroid eye drops. Plaintiff believes that
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she did so to avoid the county incurring the expense of sending Plaintiff to an outside physician
for examination and treatment.
Plaintiff alleges that, afterwards, he suffered for ten weeks with blurred vision, making him
unable to read or write, and continued to seek outside care. Nurse Vanessa ultimately scheduled
Plaintiff an appointment with an outside optometrist in April 2024. The optometrist diagnosed
Plaintiff with a coronary abrasion and prescribed bi-focal glasses. Before the foreign object fell
into Plaintiff’s eye, he had perfect vision.
C. Analysis
The Amended Complaint names the following Defendants: Bucky Rowland, Sheriff of
Maury County; Deborah Wagonshultz, Maury County Jail Administrator; Jane Doe, Nurse
Practitioner at Maury County Jail (“Nurse Penny”); and Jane Doe, Registered Nurse at Maury
County Jail (“Nurse Genie”). Each Defendant is sued in his or her individual and official
capacities. (Doc. No. 10 at 1-2). Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth Amendment rights.
It is well-settled that “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Pfeiffer v. Butler Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, No. 1:10CV672, 2012
WL 1203557, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2012) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994)). The Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates from “cruel and unusual punishments,”
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which includes “extreme deprivations” that deny “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “Not
every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950,
954 (6th Cir. 1987). “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
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their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-
confinement claim.” Id.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he faced a
sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate
indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims); see
also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to
conditions-of-confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective
and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-37. To satisfy the
objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the subjective prong, an official must
“know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough
that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”
Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.”
Id. at 836. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
Construed liberally, the Amended Complaint alleges conditions-of-confinement claims
and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs claims under the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
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1. Conditions of Confinement
The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk to his
health or safety because an air vent in his cell was “completely covered with rust, mold, and other
unknown substances and/or liquids.” (Doc. No. 10 at 2). Courts have recognized health risks
attendant to the presence of asbestos or mold. See, e.g., Taylor v. Madison Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t,
No. 19-1230-JDT-cgc, 2019 WL 6718676, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2019) (stating “[e]xposure
to black mold may constitute an objectively serious risk of serious harm to inmate health under the
Eighth Amendment”). But Plaintiff does not allege that he was actually exposed to mold, and he
does not allege that any Defendant knew that housing Plaintiff in that particular cell would expose
Plaintiff to mold.
Nonetheless, the allegations of the Amended Complaint support the inference that Plaintiff
suffered health consequences because of his exposure to a foreign object that fell out of the vent
and into Plaintiff’s eye on January 29, 2024. Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts that
support the inference that Defendants were aware that the air vents posed any risk of harm
generally or that Defendants were aware that the air vents might pose a particular risk of harm to
Plaintiff. Stated differently, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants were aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm from the air vents and then disregarded that risk. Thus, Plaintiff
has failed to allege facts to support his conclusory statements that Defendants, acting in their
individual capacities, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by housing him in the cell with the
complained-of air vents.
Moving now to Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims, when a defendant is sued in his or her
official capacity as an employee of the government, the lawsuit is directed against “the entity for
which the officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993). Here,
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the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants are employees of the Maury County Jail, which
is operated by Maury County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 10 at 2). Thus, a claim of governmental
liability requires a showing that the alleged misconduct is the result of a policy, statement,
regulation, decision, or custom promulgated by Maury County or its agent. Monell Dep’t of Social
Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). In short, for Maury County to be liable Plaintiff under Section
1983, there must be a direct causal link between an official county policy or custom and the alleged
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989);
Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 693); Regets v.
City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 393 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449,
456-57 (6th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by
demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative
enactment; (2) that an official with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the
existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom or
tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478.
Here, the allegations of the Amended Complaint are insufficient to state a claim for
municipal liability against Maury County under Section 1983. The complaint does not identify or
describe any of the county’s policies, procedures, practices, or customs relating to the incidents at
issue; the complaint does not identify any particular shortcomings in training or supervision or
how those shortcomings caused the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights; and it does not identify
any other previous instances of similar violations that would have put the county on notice of a
problem. See Okolo v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 892 F. Supp.2d 931, 944 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). To
the extent the Amended Complaint alleges that the Sheriff or Jail Administrator knew that the
vents in Plaintiff’s cell were unsanitary and failed to take action to remedy the alleged
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unconstitutional 	conditions 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	confinement, 	“[m]ere 	blanket 	assertions 	that
[Defendants] ‘tolerated’ or ‘condoned’” the conditions “aren’t enough.” Howse v. Hodous, 953
F.3d 402, 411 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 402 (6th Cir. 2016)).
Consequently, the Court finds that the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to state a
claim for municipal liability against Maury County. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against
Defendants in their official capacities (which are claims against Maury County) therefore must be
dismissed.
2. Medical Care
The Eighth Amendment “forbids prison officials from ‘unnecessarily and wantonly
inflicting pain’ on an inmate by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ towards the inmate’s serious
medical needs.” Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 535 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)). An Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against an individual actor has objective and subjective components. Farmer,
511 U.S. 825, 834; Blackmore, 390 F.3d 890, 895. The objective component requires showing “the
existence of a “sufficiently serious” medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501
U.S. 294, 298). “[A] medical need is objectively serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897. In this Court’s
opinion, a foreign object in one’s eye constitutes a sufficiently serious medical need.
“The subjective component requires a plaintiff to show that ‘each defendant subjectively
perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the
inference, and that he then disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate
it.’” Greene v. Crawford Cnty, Mich., 22 F.4th 593, 605-06 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2022) (quoting Griffith
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v. Franklin Cnty, Ky., 975 F.3d 554, 568 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2020). This showing “entails something
more than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, and is instead “equivalent to criminal
recklessness[,]” Greene, 22 F.4th at 606 (quoting Griffith, 975 F.3d at 568).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	no 	facts 	that 	support 	an 	inference 	that 	Defendants 	Rowland 	or
Wagonshultz were made aware that a foreign object fell into Plaintiff’s eye, necessitating a need
for medical care. Where a plaintiff has not alleged that the named defendants were aware of the
serious medical need, he necessarily has not alleged that those defendants were deliberately
indifferent to that need. Therefore, as to Defendants Rowland and Wagonshultz in their individual
capacities, Plaintiff has not stated a Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to the alleged
serious medical need.
As for Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant nurse practitioner Penny in her individual
capacity, Plaintiff alleges that she misdiagnosed Plaintiff’s injury and treated it improperly. (Doc.
No. 10 at 4). However, complaints of malpractice or allegations of negligence are insufficient to
entitle plaintiff to relief. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. A prisoner’s difference of opinion regarding
diagnosis or treatment also does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 107.
Further, where a prisoner has received some medical attention, but disputes the adequacy of that
treatment, the federal courts are reluctant to second-guess the medical judgments of prison officials
and constitutionalize claims that sound in state tort law. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5
(6th Cir. 1976). In sum, generally speaking, “[w]hen a prison doctor [or nurse] provides treatment,
albeit carelessly or inefficaciously, to a prisoner, he has not displayed a deliberate indifference to
the prisoner’s needs, but merely a degree of incompetence which does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001).
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However, Plaintiff also alleges that, when Plaintiff’s “injury and vision were worsening,”
Defendant Penny prescribed steroid eye drops “to try to take a less expensive option rather than
refer Plaintiff to a professional, which would definitely be more expensive than prescribing some
eye drops.” (Doc. No. 10 at 4). Plaintiff therefore has alleged facts that Defendant Penny’s decision
was not based on medical judgment, but rather on non-medical factors such as cost. These
allegations could support a finding of deliberate indifference. See Jackson v. Corizon Health, Inc.,
596 F. Supp.3d 834, 839 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2022) (“But if Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of
material fact that the decision was not based on medical judgment, but rather on non-medical
factors such as cost, the decision of whether the subjective prong has been met must be left to the
factfinder) (citing Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 761 (6th Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring)
(“If a rational factfinder could conclude that [Defendant’s] justification for denying [Plaintiff] a
TIPS procedure was mere pretext to mask deliberate indifference, then summary judgment is
improper.”)). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Penny in her individual capacity will
proceed for further development.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Genie, a nurse, “failed to initially recognize and
acknowledge the seriousness of Plaintiff’s injury”, failed to “get Plaintiff transported to ER in a
timely manner,” and “administered misdiagnosed steroid eye drops to Plaintiff . . . .” (Doc. No. 10
at 4). Although Plaintiff believes that he should have received different or additional treatment, a
prisoner’s difference of opinion regarding diagnosis or treatment does not rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations of
negligence and/or medical malpractice do not support constitutional liability under Section 1983.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a colorable deliberate
indifference claim under Section 1983 against Defendant Genie in her individual capacity.
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Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against all Defendants fail for the same reasons
discussed above. See supra at 9-11.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening required by the PRLA, the Court finds that the allegations
of the Amended Complaint state a colorable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claim under Section 1983 against Defendant Jane Doe (Nurse Practitioner Penny)
in her individual capacity. This action shall proceed as to that claim.
In all other respects, the Amended Complaint fails to state Section 1983 claims upon which
relief can be granted. Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims against Defendants Rowland,
Wagonshultz, and Jane Doe (Nurse Genie) in their individual and official capacities are
DISMISSED. 	Likewise, 	the 	official-capacity 	claim 	against 	Defendant 	Jane 	Doe 	(Nurse
Practitioner Penny) is DISMISSED.
Plaintiff’s “Request/Letter re summons and additional filings” (Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED
insofar as the Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons (AO 440)
and USM 285 form) for Defendant Jane Doe (Nurse Practitioner Penny). Plaintiff MUST complete
the service packet and return it to the Clerk’s Office within 30 DAYS of the entry of this Order.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this case. Upon return of the properly completed
service packet, the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue summons to the U.S. Marshals Service for service
on Defendant Jane Doe (Nurse Practitioner Penny). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and 4(c)(3).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), this action is REFERRED to the
Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or
recommend 	disposition 	of 	any 	pre-trial, 	non-dispositive 	motions, 	to 	issue 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation on all dispositive motions, and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary,
under Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and the Local Rules of Court.
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The Court’s determination that the complaint states a colorable claim for purposes of this
initial screening does not preclude the Court from dismissing any claim at any time for seasons set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), nor does it preclude Defendant from filing a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
Plaintiff is forewarned that his prosecution of this action will be jeopardized if he should
fail to keep the Clerk’s Office informed of his current address.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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