Robertson v. State of Tennessee et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
JEFFERY ROBERTSON #242492,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
NO. 1:24-CV-00056
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Jeffery Robertson, an inmate of the Turney Center Industrial Complex in Only, Tennessee,
has filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights.
(Doc. No. 1). He filed an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”)
(Doc. No. 2) then subsequently paid the full civil filing fee (Doc. No. 8). His IFP Application (Doc.
No. 2) therefore is DENIED AS MOOT.
I. PLRA SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the complaint on the same
grounds as those articulated in Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court
must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
Case 1:24-cv-00056 Document 11 Filed 02/26/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

2
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint
The allegations of the complaint are assumed true for purposes of the required PLRA
screening.
The complaint alleges that Defendants have failed to provide Plaintiff with the transcript
in his state-court criminal case, Case No. 19338, of the bond hearing that occurred on February 3,
1997. Plaintiff states that he has requested this transcript multiple times over the past twenty-six
years. (Doc. No. 1 at 4).
As relief, the complaint seeks the transcript from Plaintiff’s bond hearing or, alternatively,
for the Court to “dismiss” the charges against him. (Id. at 6).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiff brings his claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state
law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To
state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
Case 1:24-cv-00056 Document 11 Filed 02/26/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

3
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527,
533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The complaint lists claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. No.
1 at 3). The complaint does not provide any additional elaboration of Plaintiff’s claims beyond
“[t]he defendants used their offices to stop the legal process repeatedly blocking me from getting
tangible evidence allowed by law by the state of Tennessee.” (See Doc. No. 1 at 3-4). As best the
Court can discern, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have violated his First Amendment rights
because he wishes to pursue unspecified litigation pertaining to his state-court criminal case and
he believes he cannot do so without a copy of his bond hearing transcript. It is unclear what the
basis of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is. The Court understands the complaint to assert that
Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff with the requested bond hearing transcript violates his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even assuming that all defendants all qualify as persons acting under color of state law for
purposes of Section 1983, Plaintiff has not established the deprivation of a federal right under the
First, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment. An indigent defendant appealing his conviction has a
constitutional right to a transcript of his trial and other relevant proceedings furnished by the
government, at least where such transcripts are necessary for his appeal. See Thigpen v. Kane, No.
3:18-cv-00487, 2018 WL 238852, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 25, 2028) (citing Bentley v. United
States, 431 F.2d 250, 253 (6th Cir. 1970)). But Plaintiff here does not allege that Defendants have
denied him access to transcripts that are necessary to his appeal. In fact, Plaintiff already has
pursued a direct appeal of his conviction, see State v. Robertson, 130 S.W.3d 842 (Tenn. 2003), as
Case 1:24-cv-00056 Document 11 Filed 02/26/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

4
well as an appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief.1 See Robertson v. State, No. M2007-
01378-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 277073 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009), perm. app denied (June
15, 2009).
Importantly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a particularized need for a transcript. See
Tolliver v. South Carolina, No. 1:14-341-JMC-SVH, 2014 WL 12814497, at *3 (D. S.C. Mar. 6,
2014) (citing United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832, 833-34 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding inmate has no
right to a free copy of a transcript “merely to comb through the record in the hope of discovering
some flaw”)). Plaintiff has completed a direct appeal of his conviction and an appeal of the denial
of post-conviction relief. In his complaint, he does not explain why he needs the bond hearing
transcript now, seventeen years after the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to review the
appellate court’s denial of post-conviction relief. In documents attached to his complaint, Plaintiff
states that “there is pertinent information that he requires” in the bond hearing transcript. (Doc.
No. 1-1 at 1). Plaintiff does not explain what that “pertinent information” is or why he needs it
now. Neither has he explained how the denial of the transcript at this time under these
circumstances constitutionally injured him. The mere recitation of legal conclusions without any
supporting factual allegations, even when made by a pro se litigant, does not state a claim for relief.
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1983 upon which relief can be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening of the complaint required by PLRA, the Court finds that
the complaint fails to state Section 1983 claims upon which relief can be granted. Thus, this case
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
1 In any event, Plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to a transcript to prepare for a post-
conviction hearing. See Rickard v. Burton, 2 F. App’x 469, 470 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
Case 1:24-cv-00056 Document 11 Filed 02/26/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

5
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
It is so ORDERED.
______________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:24-cv-00056 Document 11 Filed 02/26/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>