Taylor v. Bullard et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT COLUMBIA
COREY TAYLOR 	)
)
v. 	) 	NO. 1:24-cv-00052
)
SEBASTIAN BULLARD 	)
TO: 	Honorable Eli J. Richardson, United States District Judge
R E P O R T 	A N D 	R E C O M E N D A T I O N
This prisoner civil right action was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial
proceedings. See Memorandum Opinion and Order entered July 29, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 8).
Pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 28)
filed by Defendant Sebastian Bullard. 	Plaintiff opposes the motion. 	For the reasons set out
below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the motion be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Corey Taylor (“Plaintiff”) is an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”) currently confined at the Turney Center Industrial Complex (“Turney Center”) in
Only, Tennessee. He filed this lawsuit pro se and in forma pauperis on May 16, 2024, seeking
various forms of relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights alleged
to have occurred at the Turney Center in April-May 2024. See Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1).
Upon initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A,
the Court found that Plaintiff stated a colorable First Amendment claim against Sebastian
Bullard 	(“Defendant”), 	a 	correctional 	officer 	at 	the 	Turney 	Center, 	based 	on 	Plaintiff’s
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allegations that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for pursuing a prison grievance. 	See
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5-6. 	Plaintiff’s claims against another correctional officer
were dismissed upon initial review. Id. at 6-7.
After Defendant Bullard filed an answer (Docket Entry No. 13), a scheduling order was
entered that provided for a period of pretrial activity in the case, including a period for discovery.
All scheduling order deadlines have now expired. 	A trial date has not been set in the case
pending resolution of the motion for summary judgment.
II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM
Plaintiff 	generally 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	often 	doesn’t 	follow 	prison 	policy 	and
unnecessarily antagonizes inmates, particularly inmates who are Muslims, by speaking to them
in a hostile and demeaning manner, by “repeatedly” searching their cells, and by “taking items
such as pens and toilet paper” from inmates’ cells. See Amended Complaint at 2.
The events at issue in the case, however, involve a small number of interactions between
Plaintiff and Defendant that took place over the span of a week in April 2024. 	During the
evening of April 24, 2024, Plaintiff was in the cell of another inmate when Defendant came to
the cell and told Plaintiff that he needed to leave the cell. Plaintiff alleges that the other inmate
was a Muslim Imam and that he and Plaintiff were privately speaking about a death that had
occurred in Plaintiff’s family. 	Plaintiff objected to how Defendant spoke to him and filed a
prison grievance against Defendant for “staff misconduct malfeasance” based on the incident.
See Grievance #365590/24-161, dated April 24, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 28-3 at 19-20). 	In the
grievance, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant “got smart” during the incident and spoke in an ill-
mannered, hostile, and rude way, and that Defendant’s behavior did not comport with TDOC
policy, ABA and ACA standards and “all that the TDOC stands for in rehabilitation, respect,
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dignity, and humane welfare of the incarcerated.” 	Id. 	Although the grievance was directed at
only the incident between Plaintiff and Defendant in the cell, Plaintiff had 13 other inmates sign
the grievance and asserted that the “treatment that I speak of” has also happened to these other
inmates. 	Id. at 20. 	In his grievance, Plaintiff requested that Defendant not be allowed to
continue to perform his duties. 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that he told another staff member, Sgt.
Ricketts, about Defendant’s conduct and about the grievance and that Ricketts agreed with
Plaintiff that Defendant’s conduct was wrong.1
Plaintiff alleges that five days later, on April 29, 2024, Defendant engaged in acts of
harassment against him because of the grievance. 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant again told
Plaintiff to leave the cell of another inmate and also cursed at Plaintiff. 	Plaintiff alleges that
when he went to lunch that day, Defendant searched him despite Plaintiff having already walked
through a metal detector and said to him “I am [going to] show you how to fuck with me.” See
Complaint at 2. Plaintiff alleges that he reported both incidents to Sgt. Ricketts, who said that he
had spoken to Defendant.
Defendant then came to Plaintiff’s cell a few hours later and ordered Plaintiff to step out
while his cell was searched. Plaintiff contends that this was harassment because the cells in the
housing unit had already undergone cell inspections that day. 	Unpleasantries between the men
were exchanged, and Plaintiff alleges that Defendant told him word to the effect of “you want to
fuck with me so I am [going to] fuck with you.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff states that he initially refused to
1 The Court notes that, although the outcome of the grievance is not clear from the
complaint, copies of the grievance procedure documents provided by Defendant as exhibits to his
motion for summary judgment show that the grievance was denied based upon a prison
supervisor’s response that Plaintiff was out of place by being in another inmate’s cell and that
Defendant was correct in directing Plaintiff to exit the cell. See Docket Entry No. 28-3 at 14-17.
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leave his cell unless Defendant called for a sergeant but that he ultimately stepped out of his cell
while Defendant searched the cell and removed red pens from the cell. Plaintiff alleges that Sgt.
Smith eventually arrived at the cell, at which time Plaintiff recounted his recent history of
problems with Defendant but that Smith, while agreeing with Plaintiff that Defendant was
wrong, nonetheless escorted Plaintiff to segregation because Defendant had reported that
Plaintiff had threatened to “kick [Defendant’s] ass.” Id. at 2-3. That evening, Defendant issued
a disciplinary report to Plaintiff for the disciplinary offense of threatening an employee based on
Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff stated that he was “going to kick your ass” during the cell
search. See Docket Entry No. 1-1 at 2–4.
Plaintiff pled guilty to the charge on May 2, 2024, but alleges that he was advised to do
so by his inmate advisor so that he would avoid additional time in segregation that would
accompany being found guilty of the charge after a hearing and that he “was forced to sign the
charge under duress and intimidation.” 	See Amended Complaint at 3. 	Plaintiff asserts that he
was scheduled to be released from segregation on May 8, three days after the date his Complaint
was signed.
III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESPONSE
Defendant seeks summary judgment in his favor under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 	In support of his motion, Defendant provides a memorandum of law (Docket
Entry No. 29), a statement of undisputed material facts (“SUMF”) (Docket Entry No. 30), his
own declaration (Docket Entry No. 28-1), the declaration of correctional officer Lance Hansen,
who spoke with Plaintiff while the cell search was occurring (Docket Entry No. 28-2), and
excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and exhibits attached thereto (Docket Entry No.
28-3).
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Defendant admits to the basic underlying events of this lawsuit but denies that any of his
actions violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 	He further asserts the defense of qualified
immunity to any damage claims. Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment
because Plaintiff cannot establish that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that
he acted with a retaliatory motive when he issued the disciplinary report. 	Specifically,
Defendant argues that the grievance filed by Plaintiff fails to constitute protected activity
because the undisputed evidence shows that (1) the grievance complained only about how
Defendant spoke to Plaintiff and thus involved a frivolous and de minimis matter and (2) the
underlying conduct that Defendant confronted Plaintiff about prior to the grievance, being in
another inmate’s cell, was conduct that violated prison rules and regulations. 	Defendant also
argues that he could not have been motivated to file the disciplinary report in retaliation for the
grievance because there is a lack of evidence showing that he knew about the grievance prior to
the disciplinary report. He further contends that, even if he had such knowledge, he would have
nonetheless issued the disciplinary report because of Platiniff’s threatening and disruptive
behavior during the cell search that led to the disciplinary charge, a disciplinary charge to which
Plaintiff pled guilty.
In response to the motion, Plaintiff submits a response (Docket Entry No. 33), a
memorandum (Docket Entry No. 34), a response to Defendant’s SUMF (Docket Entry No. 35),
his own declaration (Docket Entry No. 37) and affidavit (Docket Entry No. 38), and copies of
grievance records (Docket Entry No. 31-1).2 	Plaintiff argues that: (1) the Court has already
decided and adjudicated the merits of his legal claim in the decision rendered after initial review;
2 Plaintiff also filed motions to exclude Defendant’s declaration and supporting evidence,
motions which were denied by Order entered July 7, 2025 (Docket Entry No. 43).
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(2) Defendant has waived the arguments raised in his motion for summary judgment because
they were not previously raised by motion or answer; and, (3) Defendant has engaged in bad
faith and fraud by presenting confusing, irrelevant, and/or false evidence and arguments. He also
argues that Defendant has not rebutted his allegations and proof of a constitutional violation and
that Defendant has not shown that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Relying primarily on his
own declaration and affidavit, Plaintiff contends that genuine issues of material fact exist that
require that his claim proceed to trial.
In reply, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s response to the SUMF lists disputed facts
without actually citing to any supporting evidence. 	Defendant further asserts that the affidavit
and declaration submitted by Plaintiff mostly repeat the allegations that are made in his
complaint or set out statements that are either not based upon personal knowledge or are directly
contradicted by the evidence submitted in support the motion for summary judgment. See Reply
(Docket Entry No. 42).3
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Peffer v. Stephens, 880 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir.
2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine factual disputes
3 After Defendant filed his reply, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a sur-reply and to take
untimely discovery depositions. 	The Court denied both motions. 	See Order entered July 29,
2025 (Docket Entry No. 46).
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from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 	Anderson, at
249-50. “The moving party may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that
negates an element of the non-moving party’s claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence
to support the non-moving party’s case.” 	Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citation and quotations omitted). 	“In response, the nonmoving party must present ‘significant
probative evidence’ that will reveal that there is more than ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.’” Miller v. Maddox, 866 F.3d 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Philip
Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993)). The party opposing the motion for summary
judgment may not rely solely on the pleadings but must present evidence supporting the claims
asserted by the party. Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003). 	In
other words, to defeat summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present
affirmative evidence to support his or her position; a mere "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient.
Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
In the end, there must be evidence upon which the trier of fact could reasonably find in favor of
the non-moving party. Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595.
In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must “look beyond
the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial.”
Sowards v. Loudon Cnty., 203 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000). 	In
doing so, the Court must view the evidence and all inferences drawn from underlying facts “in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” 	See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Constitutional Standards
A claim brought under Section 1983 requires that (1) a defendant act under color of state
law and (2) a defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.
Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012). 	In the instant case,
there is no dispute that the first requirement has been met.
As to the second component, the constitutional right alleged to have been violated by
Defendant is Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to be free from unlawful retaliation. 	A prison
inmate retains First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. See Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 	Among these rights is the right to pursue grievances against prison
officials. Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, a prison inmate may bring a
claim that a prison official retaliated against the inmate based on the inmate’s use of an
administrative prison grievance system. 	See Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 264 (6th Cir.
2018); Violett v. Reynolds, 76 F.App'x 24, 27 (6th Cir. 2003).
To establish a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiff must set forth evidence
that shows: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that
would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and,
(3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was
taken at least in part because of the protected conduct. Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 699
(6th Cir. 2005) (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has the
burden of proof on all three elements. Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F.App'x. 553, 556 (6th Cir.
Dec. 8, 2003).
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With respect to the causation element, the Supreme Court has clarified that “[i]t is not
enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was
injured—the motive must cause the injury. 	Specifically, it must be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning
that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory
motive.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 399 (2019) (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,
260 (2006) (finding that although it “may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional
motive,” an official's “action colored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a
constitutional tort if that action would have been taken anyway”)).
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil suits for damages, so long as
their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” 	Rieves v. Town of Smyrna, Tennessee, 959 F.3d 678,
695 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The doctrine of
qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Reich v. City of Elizabethtown, Ky., 945
F.3d 968, 978 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Chappell v. City of Cleveland,
585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Once the defense of qualified immunity is raised by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the
burden to show that qualified immunity does not apply. Reich, supra. The Court is to employ a
two-part test to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity.
Rieves, 959 F.3d at 695. 	It must consider (1) whether the official’s conduct violated a
constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established. 	Wright v.
City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 864 (6th Cir. 2020). The Court may address these two questions in
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any order, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), and the defendant official is entitled
to qualified immunity if either question is answered in the negative. 	Gordon v. Bierenga, 20
F.4th 1077, 1082 (6th Cir. 2021).
C. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Claim
After reviewing the parties’ filings, the Court finds that, while some factual disputes do
exist, there are no genuine issues of material fact that require resolution of Plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim at trial. 	The evidence before the Court is simply not sufficient to
permit a reasonable jury to find in Plaintiff’s favor at trial. 	Accordingly, summary judgment
should be granted to Defendant on the claim.
The Court first addresses and rejects several general arguments against summary
judgment that are made by Plaintiff. 	Plaintiff argues that the Court has already resolved and
determined legal and factual issues in the Memorandum Opinion and Order that was issued upon
the initial screening of the lawsuit. See Plaintiff’s Response at 2-3 and 5. This argument has no
merit. Although the Court found upon initial screening that Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient
to permit his claim against Defendant to survive initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A and to require that process issue to Defendant, the threshold for a claim to pass initial
screening is significantly lower than what is required to survive a properly supported motion for
summary judgment. 	Thus, the Court’s finding that a claim survives initial screening does not
somehow foreclose Defendant’s summary judgment arguments for the dismissal of the claim.
See Sublett v. Bryant, 2017 WL 11773742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 1, 2017) (“The district court's
determination that [plaintiff’s] retaliation claim survived initial screening neither prevented the
defendants from filing motions for summary judgment nor supported dismissal of their motions
for summary judgment.”); Bishawi v. Ne. Ohio Corr. Ctr. (NEOCC), 2017 WL 1029105, at *2
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(N.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2017) (“determination that plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to withstand
the initial screening, set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, cannot be relied upon to
defend summary judgment, as the standard of review is entirely different from the one used to
evaluate a summary judgment motion.”); Taylor v. Buckles, 2017 WL 778241, at *7 (E.D. Tenn.
Feb. 23, 2017) (noting the significantly different standards utilized at the screening stage and the
standard for summary judgment).
The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant has waived
summary judgment arguments because they are made for the first time in the instant motion. See
Plaintiff’s Response at 1-2. 	Evidentiary based arguments are appropriately raised for the first
time in a motion for summary judgment because such arguments are generally not amenable to
being raised in a motion brought under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, the defense of qualified immunity was raised in Defendant’s answer and is a
defense that may be asserted at the summary judgment stage even if it was not pursued in a
motion to dismiss. 	See Baar v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 476 F.App'x 621, 625 (6th Cir.
2012); English v. Dyke, 23 F. 3d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 1994). Finally, Plaintiff relies upon a state
rule of civil procedure to support his argument.4 However, this federal case is not governed by
state procedural rules. 	Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prod., Inc., 757 F.3d 540,
546 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The general rule, of course, is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ...
apply to all civil cases brought in federal courts.”); Stanley v. MTP-Paseo Phase II Leasehold,
LLC, No. 3:25-CV-00272, 2025 WL 2813886, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2025) (Cambpell, J.)
4 Although Plaintiff references “Rule 12.08,” see Plaintiff’s Response at 2, there is no
such federal rule of civil procedure and the Court presumes that Plaintiff is referring to Rule
12.08 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
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(“Because this case is in federal court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply, not Tennessee
state procedural rules.”).
The Court also finds nothing in the record that supports Plaintiff’s contention that
Defendant has acted in bad faith and perpetrated a fraud upon the Court by presenting what
Plaintiff believes is false or misleading evidence and by presenting arguments that Plaintiff
believes are irrelevant or that are meant to confuse the issues. See Plaintiff’s Response at 4. The
great majority of summary judgment motions that come before the Court, like the instant motion,
involve the parties presenting contradictory versions of the evidence and equally contradictory
legal arguments. Such a truism is wholly unremarkable and is not an indicator of bad faith.
Turning now to Defendant’s arguments for summary judgement on Plaintiff’s claim, the
Court finds it most expedient to address the first element of the qualified immunity analysis and
determine whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable finding that Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated. The Court finds that it does not.
Based on the undisputed evidence, 5 Plaintiff cannot meet the first element of his
retaliation claim because his April 24 grievance was not protected conduct. While a prisoner has
a First Amendment right to file a grievance against prison officials, the Sixth Circuit has
reiterated “the right to file grievances is protected only insofar as the grievances are not
5 The Court pauses at this point to acknowledge that Defendant correctly asserts in his
reply that, although Plaintiff filed a response disputing Defendant’s SUMF, Plaintiff does not
actually cite to any evidence in support of most of his disputes. Local Rule 56.01(e)(3) requires
that evidentiary citations be set out to support a disputed factual statement. 	Rule 56(c)(1)(A)
likewise requires genuinely disputed facts to be supported by citating to particular parts of
materials in the record. 	Merely disputing a statement and then signing and dating the disputed
statement without reference to actual supporting evidence, as Plaintiff has done with virtually all
of his disputed facts (Plaintiff does refer to the grievance at issue in two of his disputes), does not
suffice. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s response to the SUMF is of little practical use in pointing the
Court to any basis for ascertaining the presence of disputed material facts.
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‘frivolous.’” Maben, 887 F.3d at 264 (quoting Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir.
2000)). As acknowledged by the Sixth Circuit in Maben, “cases in this Circuit appear to suggest
that a prisoner's grievance is frivolous when the underlying grievance itself is de minimis.” 887
F.3d 252, 264–65 (6th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). 	See Ziegler v. State of Michigan, 90
F.App’x. 808, 810 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding a grievance frivolous when the prisoner complained
that the prison officer should “not be able to conduct a non-invasive pat-down search” of her);
White–Bey v. Griggs, 43 F.App’x. 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding grievances that “concerned
being required to use a typewriter rather than a computer, and being required to sit quietly in
defendant's office after being told again that there was no computer available for him to use” to
be frivolous and not to “rise to the level of protected conduct”); Scott v. Kilchermann, 230 F.3d
1359, 2000 WL 1434456, at *1–2 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding a grievance frivolous when the inmate
complained that he had been subject to verbal abuse).
The undisputed evidence shows that the April 24 grievance concerned only Plaintiff’s
objection that Defendant was rude, unprofessional, antagonistic, or disrespectful when he spoke
to Plaintiff and told him to exit the other inmate’s cell. 6 	A grievance about the rude or
disrespectful way that Defendant spoke simply involves such a trivial and de minimis matter that
it fails to rise to the level of protected conduct that is necessary to implicate the constitutional
protections of the First Amendment. 	See Good v. Spencer, 2022 WL 9813754, at *4-5 (W.D.
6 Even though Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that Defendant engaged in targeted acts of
harassment toward Muslim inmates, repeatedly searched the cells of Muslim inmates, and took
items of personal property from Muslim inmates, the grievance he filed was not about any of
these events and addressed only Plaintiff’s complaint about the manner in which Defendant
spoke to Plaintiff and about his unprofessionalism during the encounter on April 24, 2024. See
Docket Entry No. 31-1 at 1-2. Indeed, in his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Defendant was “a
new officer” and that the April 24 encounter was his “first encounter” with Defendant. 	See
Plaintiff’s Deposition at 26, lines 12-13.
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Mich. July 19, 2022) (finding that the plaintiff's complaints that an officer closed the dayroom
eight minutes early, used profanity, and reviewed his prisoner file were de minimis), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4354269 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2022); Sampson v. Davis,
2022 WL 2760061, at *3 (W.D. Mich. May 12, 2022) (finding that grievances complaining of
verbal abuse in a prison setting are de minimis and therefore frivolous and do not constitute
protected conduct), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2753565 (W.D. Mich. July
14, 2022). 	Likewise, a prisoner's verbal altercation with an officer and/or challenge to an
officer's authority is not protected conduct. 	See Higgs v. Easterling, 2012 WL 692610, at *14
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 2, 2012); Caffey v. Maue, 679 F.App'x 487 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 2017) (holding that
an inmate's act of calling guards unprofessional was a challenge to the guards’ authority that was
not protected by the First Amendment). The frivolous and de minimis nature of the grievance is
even more so in light of the undisputed evidence showing that the grievance was denied because
Defendant was correct in telling Plaintiff to exit the cell and thus the cause behind Defendant’s
interaction with Plaintiff was to enforce the prison’s rules.7
The Court also finds that, even if Plaintiff were found to have engaged in protected
activity, the evidence before the Court falls short of supporting a reasonable conclusion that the
causation element of the retaliation claim is satisfied. 	The causation element requires evidence
that shows that the adverse action in question was taken at least in part because of the protected
conduct. Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 699.
7 Although Plaintiff argues that he was not reported by Defendant for being in the other
inmate’s cell, see Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 5-6, the Court does not find this fact to be material.
Prison guards certainly have the discretion to address rule violations by prison inmates in various
way, including giving a simple verbal directive as opposed to formally issuing a disciplinary
report.
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Plaintiff presents no direct evidence that Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s April 24
grievance at the time of the events on April 29 when Plaintiff was ultimately issued the
disciplinary report. Defendant has presented his own declaration stating that he was not aware of
the grievance before the April 29 events. 	See Declaration of Bullard at ¶¶ 6 and 12. 	Although
Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s evidence and contends that Defendant “was aware” of the
grievance, see Plaintiff’s Response to SUMF at ¶¶ 	6 and 2 and Plaintiffs’ Declaration at ¶¶ 11
and 12, Plaintiff’s contentions that Sgt. Ricketts informed Defendant of the grievance and that
Defendant was aware of the grievance as a result of the protocols for processing grievances are
based upon speculation by Plaintiff. 	Plaintiff has not offered an affidavit or declaration from
Sgt. Ricketts nor offered any evidence showing that Defendant was informed of the grievance
during the grievance processing protocol. 	Finally, there is nothing set out in Plaintiff’s own
declaration or affidavit that directly, or even indirectly, supports Plaintiff’s assertion that
Defendant had prior knowledge of the grievance at the time of the events on April 29.
Plaintiff’s asserts that a retaliatory motive on the part of Defendant can be inferred from
Defendant’s alleged statements to Plaintiff on April 29 that “I am [going to] show you how to
fuck with me” and “you want to fuck with me so I am [going to] fuck with you.” 	For the
purposes of determining the summary judgment motion, such statements must be assumed to be
true. 	However, as vulgar and hostile as the statements are, they do not refer to Plaintiff’s prior
grievance or directly reflect a retaliatory animus against Plaintiff’s protected conduct. 	Indeed,
the statements can reasonably be viewed as reflecting general animosity toward Plaintiff rather
than a retaliatory animus. Given the lack of any evidence of Defendant’s prior knowledge of the
grievance and the lack of any other evidence that would tend to infer a retaliatory motive on the
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part of Defendant, these statements, even if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, offer
only a scintilla of evidence in favor of Plaintiff’s claim
Even if Plaintiff’s evidence of the two statements were sufficient to infer that Defendant
had a retaliatory animus toward Plaintiff, however, the Court finds that this is not enough to
support Plaintiff’s claim because the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant would have
issued 	Plaintiff 	the 	disciplinary 	charge 	regardless 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	protected 	activity. 	The
undisputed evidence shows that when Defendant came to Plaintiff’s cell on April 29 to initiate a
cell search, Plaintiff was not compliant with the Defendant’s directive to exit his cell and to
permit the cell to be searched but, instead, he refused to leave the cell and demanded that a
sergeant or other officer come to the cell. Plaintiff disputes that he made a threat to Defendant to
“kick [Defendant’s] ass” at the time, but it is nonetheless clear from the undisputed evidence that
there was a heated interaction between Defendant and Plaintiff concerning the cell search and
that Plaintiff was initially non-compliant and agitated.8 The Court finds that the factual question
about exactly what Plaintiff said to Defendant fails to rise to the level of a genuine issue of
material fact given the undisputed fact that Plaintiff was not compliant and was acting
disruptively during the cell search.
The Court also cannot ignore the fact that Plaintiff ultimately pled guilty to the
disciplinary charge that is alleged by him to be an act of retaliation. 	While Plaintiff correctly
points out that the 6th Circuit in Maben explicitly rejected the “checkmate doctrine” as a bar on
8 On this point, the Court notes that correctional officer Lance Hansen declares that, when
speaking with Plaintiff while the cell search was occurring, Plaintiff “became angry” about the
cell search and stated to Hansen that he would “beat [Defendant’s] fucking ass.” See Declaration
of Hansen at ¶ 4. 	Although Plaintiff asserts that this is “disputed,” see Plaintiff’s Response to
SUMF at ¶ 15, he fails to point to any actual evidence in the record that he did not make such a
statement to Hansen.
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an inmate’s ability to pursue a retaliation claim, see Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 11-12, Plaintiff
reads the holding in in Maben too expansively as it pertains to his claim. While the 6th Circuit in
Maben found, within the context of determining a motion to dismiss, that “a finding of guilt at a
prison misconduct hearing does not act as an absolute bar to a prisoner’s First Amendment
retaliation claim,” 887 F.3d at 262, the 6th Circuit nonetheless held that an inmate’s guilt of a
misconduct charge may be relevant summary judgement evidence in analyzing an inmate’s First
Amendment retaliation claim. Id. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the decision in Maben
does not prevent Defendant from presenting the guilty plea as evidence that rebuts Plaintiff’s
contention that the disciplinary charge was an act of retaliation.
Additionally, and importantly in the view of the Court, the Maben case is not directly on
point with the facts of this case because Maben involved an inmate who had contested a
disciplinary charge but was ultimately found guilty after a disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, pled guilty to the very conduct that he now alleges did not occur and that he contends
was a false disciplinary allegation against him made as an act of retaliation. 	Although Plaintiff
argues that he entered into the guilty plea under duress and because of coercion from his inmate
advisor, the Court finds little weight to such an argument. 	See Taylor v. Woods, 2019 WL
1146690, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2019) (rejecting prisoner’s contention that his guilty plea
to a disciplinary charge falls under Maben and that the guilty plea should also be discounted
because he was “coerced” into admitting he violated prison regulations by the threat of “more
severe sanctions”).
Given the context of the events and the undisputed evidence of Plaintiff’s guilty plea, the
Court finds that Defendant has adequately shown that a retaliatory motive was not the ‘but-for”
cause of the disciplinary report that he issued to Plaintiff. As already noted herein, the Supreme
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Court has clarified that “[i]t is not enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive
and that the plaintiff was injured—the motive must cause the injury. 	Specifically, it must be a
‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken
absent the retaliatory motive.” 	Nieves, 587 U.S. at 399. 	See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399 (“If
the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.”).
Finally, the Court’s overwhelming view of the facts of this case is that the case involves
what is largely a series of petty conflicts between a prison guard and a prison inmate over the
course of a few days. 	That such conflicts arose is unsurprising given the unique and stressful
prison setting. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974) (“Guards and inmates co-exist
in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and
despair are commonplace.”). However, the weighty protections of the Constitution should rarely
apply to such petty conflicts, see Owens v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 1335, 2000 WL 876766, at *2 (6th
Cir. June 23, 2000) (“The petty exchanges of insults between a prisoner and guard do not amount
to 	constitutional 	torts.”), 	and 	prison 	inmates 	may 	not 	insulate 	themselves 	from 	adverse
administrative actions or routine acts of prison management merely by filing a grievance and
then claiming that subsequent objectionable acts by prison officials are retaliatory. See Spies v.
Voinovich, 48 F.App'x 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2002).
In the end, the Court finds that Defendant has met his burden of showing an entitlement
to summary judgment on the claim because no reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence
in the record, that Plaintiff suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. 	Because the Court
finds that the evidence does not support a finding that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated, it follows that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity without the necessity of
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addressing the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis regarding whether the right at
issue was clearly established.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the motion for
summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 28) filed by Defendant Sebastian Bullard be GRANTED.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
(14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with particularity the
specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. 	See Rule
72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). Failure to file written
objections within the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District
Court's Order regarding the Report and Recommendation. 	See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Any response to the objections
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after service of objections. 	See Federal Rule 72(b)(2)
and Local Rule 72.02(b).
Signed By:
J. Gregory Wehrman
United States Magistrate Judge
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