Spence v. Hamilton County, Tennessee et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
RONALD WESLEY SPENCE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CERION CARSON, MICHAEL CRAIG,
and HAMILTON COUNTY,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:24-cv-054
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Dumitru
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
This is an action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which Plaintiff, through counsel,
alleges that Defendants Craig and Carson used excessive force against him in the Hamilton
County Jail (Doc. 14). Now before the Court is Defendant Hamilton County’s motion for
summary judgment asserting that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies
prior to filing this action and the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims (Doc. 57), in
support of which it filed various exhibits (Docs. 57-1–4) and a memorandum (Doc. 58). Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition to this motion (Doc. 77), in support of which he filed an affidavit
(Doc. 77-1). Defendant Hamilton County filed a reply (Doc. 80). Plaintiff also filed a motion
for sanctions as to Defendant Craig for his failure to answer discovery requests despite a prior
Court order requiring him to do so, and a memorandum in support of that motion (Docs. 88, 89).
Defendant Craig has not filed a response, and his time for doing so has passed.
E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a).
As the record establishes (1) that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies prior to filing this action, as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires; (2)
that Defendant Hamilton County is entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s state law claim under
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302; and (3) that Plaintiff’s claim for indemnification is subject to
dismissal, Defendant Hamilton County’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57) will be
GRANTED. Also, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 88) will be DENIED without
prejudice.
I. 	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
While Defendant Hamilton County seeks summary judgment (Doc. 57), Plaintiff asserts
in his response that the Court should address certain arguments therein under the standard set
forth in Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 77). Accordingly, the Court
sets forth both standards.
A. 	Standards
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). As such, the moving party
has the burden of conclusively showing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Smith v.
Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1979).
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense for which a defendant bears the burden of
proof. Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, when a defendant
moves for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds, he “must show that the record contains
evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no
reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Id. at 455–56 (citation modified).
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Also, in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[,]” a court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[A] formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[,]” nor will “an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Thus, a reviewing court asks whether the complaint
contains “factual content that allows [it] to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In making this determination, the Court construes the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and assumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint. See Thurman v. Pfizer, Inc., 484 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2007). This assumption of
truth, however, does not extend to “allegations that are conclusory or require unwarranted
inferences based on the alleged facts[,]” Newberry v. Silverman, 789 F.3d 636, 640 (6th Cir.
2015), or to a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986).
B. 	Background
Plaintiff alleges that (1) on February 7, 2023, Defendants Craig and Carson used
excessive force against him in a manner that violated his constitutional rights, and (2) Defendant
Hamilton County is liable for the tortious acts of Defendants Craig and Carson under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 8-8-302 and must indemnify Plaintiff for any tort judgment against the individual
Defendants (See, generally, Doc. 14).
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It is undisputed that, after the force incident underlying the amended complaint, an
internal investigation showed that Defendants Craig and Carson violated various policies of
Defendant Hamilton County (Doc. 14, at 7; Doc. 58, at 16–17).
However, with its motion for summary judgment, Defendant Hamilton County filed
sworn proof that while Plaintiff filed numerous grievances in the Hamilton County Jail between
October 21, 2022, and January 31, 2025, it has no record of any grievance from Plaintiff
regarding the February 7, 2023, force event underlying the complaint (Doc. 57-1, at 2; Doc. 57-
4). Defendant Hamilton County also filed the applicable Hamilton County Jail grievance
policies and procedures, which provide in relevant part that “[i]nmates will be informed of the
grievance process through the Inmate Handbook and during the orientation process. The
grievance system and assistance will be readily available to inmates regardless of their
classification status” (Doc. 57-3, at 1–2). The grievance policies and procedures further provide
that an inmate may file a grievance through a kiosk or a grievance form, if the kiosk is not
available, and that an inmate must file a grievance within ten days of an incident (Id. at 2–4).
Additionally, in its memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment,
Defendant Hamilton County asserts that it is immune from Plaintiff’s claim under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 8-8-202 under Tennessee law, and that Plaintiff’s claim for indemnification is not
cognizable because Defendants Craig and Carson were not acting within the scope of their
employment in the incident underlying the complaint (Doc. 58, at 7–17).
In his affidavit in response to Defendant Hamilton County’s summary judgment motion,
Plaintiff asserts in relevant part that (1) when he first entered Hamilton County custody, he was
not given guidance regarding how to file a grievance before filing a lawsuit and had never filed a
lawsuit before; (2) he was never provided an inmate handbook or any written jail policy, any
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instruction on how to file a grievance, or any instruction regarding the PLRA requirements; (3)
he met with investigators about “the beating,” told the investigators he planned to file a lawsuit,
and assumed the investigators were conducting an investigation; and (4) had he known that he
had to file a grievance, he would have done so (Doc. 77-1, at 1).
Additionally, in his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
asserts that the Court should consider arguments in the summary judgment motion for which
Defendant Hamilton County does not cite affidavits in the record under the Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss standard, specifically pointing out that Defendant Hamilton County’s assertion that
Defendants Craig and Carson were not acting within the scope of their employment is not
supported by an affidavit (Doc. 77, at 1–4). Plaintiff then sets forth the standard for Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss before stating that (1) Defendant Hamilton County improperly
argues that it is entitled to immunity under the Tennessee Government Tort Liability Act
(“GTLA”); (2) that Tennessee has waived its sovereign immunity for “ordinary negligence” of
government employees; and (3) that Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 “funnels” claims against county
deputies to “the county in which the sheriff serves” such that “[a]ctions for the non-negligent
misconduct of deputies . . . may therefore be covered by Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-301 et. seq., in
the appropriate cases” (Id. at 4–10) (citing Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 610 (Tenn.
1987)).
Plaintiff then states that the intentional torts of “battery, assault, the intentional infliction
of emotional distress (‘IIED’), and civil conspiracy” alleged in his complaint occurred during the
course and scope of the individual Defendants’ employment, and that he does not allege Monell
liability on the part of the County (Id. at 10). Plaintiff further asserts that the GTLA should not
override federal law in a manner that would “swallow broad classes of claims . . . simply because
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they can be characterized as relating to or arising from federal rights” (Id. at 11–12). Plaintiff
therefore states that his constitutional claims against Defendants Carson and Craig are separate
from his battery, assault, IIED, and civil conspiracy claims, and that he should be able to hold the
County liable for his common law claims under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 (Id. at 13).
C. 	Analysis
1. 	Exhaustion
While Plaintiff states in his amended complaint that he sues Defendant Hamilton County
under § 1983 and seeks damages from this Defendant under § 1983 due to the violation of his
constitutional rights (Doc. 14, at 1–2), in the portion of that complaint setting forth Plaintiff’s
claims, he specifies that (1) he sues only one or both of the individual Defendants for the federal
and state claims set forth in counts 1–10 of his amended complaint, and (2) he sues Defendant
Hamilton County only for his claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 and for indemnification
based on his assertion that the individual Defendants were acting within the scope of their
employment at the time of the relevant incident (Id. at 8–17). Even more confusingly, while
Plaintiff first states in his response in opposition to the summary judgment motion that he does
not seek to hold Defendant Hamilton County liable under § 1983 for any theory of municipal
liability and the PLRA exhaustion requirement does not apply to his state law claims against this
Defendant (Doc. 77, at 10–16), he then also argues that his lack of knowledge of the PLRA
exhaustion requirement excuses his failure to exhaust his available remedies prior to filing this
lawsuit (Id. at 17–20).
Regardless, for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendant Hamilton
County has established that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as all his
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§ 1983 claims in his complaint prior to filing this action, and Defendant Hamilton County is
therefore entitled to summary judgment on any such claims against it.1
The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 501 n.2 (“[T]he obligation to
exhaust administrative remedies before resort to federal court is a mandatory one.”). This statute
requires “proper exhaustion” of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93
(2006).
1 In its reply, Defendant Hamilton County argues that the PLRA exhaustion requirement applies
to all of Plaintiff’s claims, including his state law claims, in support of which it cites Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), as well as cases from the Second, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits
(Doc. 80, at 3–4). But Defendant Hamilton County did not make this argument in its
memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment (Doc. 58). To the contrary, in its
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant Hamilton County
specifically separated its PLRA exhaustion arguments (Id. at 5–7) from its arguments for
dismissal of the state law claims (Id. at 7–17). Thus, it is apparent that Defendant Hamilton
County first presents its argument that the PLRA exhaustion requirement bars Plaintiff’s state
law claims in its reply, which is improper. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th
Cir. 2008) (noting that it is improper for a party to present new proof or raise new arguments in a
reply, and that courts therefore treat arguments that a party raises for the first time in a reply as
waived) (citation omitted).
Regardless, none of the cases upon which Defendant Hamilton County relies for this
assertion that the PLRA exhaustion requirement applies to Plaintiff’s state law claims directly
state or hold that the PLRA exhaustion requirement applies to state law claims. See, generally,
Porter, 534 U.S. 516; Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146 (2nd Cir. 2001); McKinney v. Carey, 311
F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002); Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2003). And the Court
notes that the Sixth Circuit has specifically stated that a plaintiff could pursue his state law
claims after his federal claims were dismissed pursuant to the PLRA exhaustion requirement.
Napier, 636 F.3d at 226 (noting that after the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s federal
claims pursuant to the PLRA exhaustion requirement and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that
dismissal, the plaintiff was still free to pursue his state law claims).
Thus, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims based on the PLRA
exhaustion requirement.
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To properly exhaust his claims, a prisoner must utilize every step of the prison’s
procedure for resolving his grievance and follow the “critical procedural rules” in a manner that
allows prison officials to review and, where necessary, correct the issues set forth in the
grievance “on the merits.” Troche v. Crabtree, 814 F.3d 795, 798 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Reed-
Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at
92 (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines . . . because no
adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
course of its proceedings.”). “There is no uniform federal exhaustion standard [and] [a] prisoner
exhausts his remedies when he complies with the grievance procedures put forward by his
correctional institution.” Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2017).
As set forth above, the parties agree that Plaintiff failed to file a grievance regarding the
force incident underlying his complaint prior to filing this action. In his response to the
summary judgment motion and the affidavit filed with that response, however, Plaintiff attempts
to excuse this omission by stating that no jail official provided him a grievance handbook and/or
informed him of the PLRA requirement that he file a grievance prior to bringing a lawsuit, and
that he assumed jail officials were investigating the force incident (Doc. 77, at 17–20; Doc. 77-
1).
But Plaintiff’s affidavit and response in opposition to the summary judgment motion are
most notable for what they do not say. Specifically, Plaintiff does not testify or cite any proof
that the Hamilton County Jail’s grievance system would not provide him relief, that he did not
know how to file a grievance, that the applicable grievance procedures were so confusing they
were indecipherable, or that any jail official prevented him from accessing the inmate handbook
containing the grievance procedures or filing a grievance regarding the incident underlying his
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complaint in any way. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016) (providing that a
prisoner may be excused from complying with the exhaustion requirement where (1) there is no
possibility for relief through use of the procedure; (2) when the rules are so confusing as to
render them essentially unknowable; and (3) when prison officials “thwart inmates from taking
advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation”).
Moreover, Defendant Hamilton County sets forth undisputed proof that (1) Plaintiff knew
how to file a grievance in the Hamilton County Jail, as he filed many grievances prior to and
after the incident underlying his complaint including grievances about officers (Doc. 57-4); (2)
information regarding the grievance process is available to inmates electronically in kiosks that
are contained throughout the jail (Doc. 57-1, at 2); (3) Defendant Hamilton County has policies
and procedures to inform inmates of the grievance process during orientation and through the
inmate handbook (Doc. 57-3, at 1); (4) the grievance system and assistance is “readily available”
to inmates (Id. at 2). And while Plaintiff at least implies that jail officials’ failure to inform him
of the PLRA requirement that he file a grievance before filing a lawsuit somehow excuses his
failure to file a grievance, Plaintiff does not cite any case law to support this assertion. It is
apparent that Plaintiff filed numerous electronic grievances (Doc. 57-4), and information
regarding the grievance process is made available on the electronic kiosks (Doc. 57-1, at 1).
Furthermore, the Defendant Hamilton County’s policies and procedures outline that inmates are
made aware of the grievance process both during orientation and through the inmate handbook
(Doc. 57-3). Plaintiff’s declaration that he was never provided with “anything . . . that instructed
[him] on how to file such a grievance” is implausible, especially given that he filed numerous
grievances prior to the incident on February 7, 2023. (Doc. 77-1.)
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Also, Plaintiff’s assertion that jail officials were investigating the incident underlying his
complaint does not excuse his failure to file a grievance, as the Sixth Circuit has held that an
internal investigation is not a substitute for exhaustion through the prison’s administrative
grievance procedure. See Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 504 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Freeman v.
Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999)).
As such, no reasonable jury could find that the grievance procedure was unavailable to
Plaintiff, such that it could excuse his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
filing this action, and Defendant Hamilton County is entitled to summary judgment on any
§ 1983 claims against it.
2. 	State Law Claims
As set forth above, the only two claims for which Plaintiff specifically seeks to hold
Defendant Hamilton County liable are (1) a claim under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302
and (2) for indemnification under Tennessee law (Doc. 14, at 15–16). The Court will address
these claims in turn.
a. 	GTLA
Plaintiff’s first state claim against Defendant Hamilton County relies on Tennessee Code
Annotated § 8-8-302 (Doc. 14, at 15–16). This statute provides in relevant part that:
[a]nyone incurring any wrong, injury, loss, damage or expense resulting from any
act or failure to act on the part of any deputy appointed by the sheriff may bring
suit against the county in which the sheriff serves; provided, that the deputy is, at
the time of such occurrence, acting by virtue of or under color of the office.
Defendant Hamilton County asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the GTLA for this claim
because it is based upon the same acts giving rise to Plaintiff’s § 1983 civil rights claims (Doc.
58, at 7–16).
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In response, Plaintiff asserts that the Court should categorize Defendant Hamilton
County’s GTLA immunity argument under Rule 12(b)(6) that Tennessee has waived its
sovereign immunity for “ordinary negligence” of government employees, and that Tennessee
Code Annotated § 8-8-302 “funnels” claims against county deputies to “the county in which the
sheriff serves” such that “[a]ctions for the non-negligent misconduct of deputies . . . may
therefore be covered by Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-301 et. seq., in the appropriate cases” (Doc. 77,
at 4–10) (citing Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 610 (Tenn. 1987)). Plaintiff further
asserts that the intentional torts of “battery, assault, the intentional infliction of emotional distress
(‘IIED’), and civil conspiracy” alleged in his complaint occurred during the course and scope of
the individual Defendants’ employment, that the GTLA should not override federal law in a
manner that would “swallow broad classes of claims . . . simply because they can be
characterized as relating to or arising from federal rights,” that his constitutional claims against
Defendants Carson and Craig are separate from his battery, assault, IIED, and civil conspiracy
claims, and that he should therefore be able to hold the County liable for his common law claims
under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302 (Id. at 11–13).
Regardless of whether the Court applies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard or the summary
judgment standard to Defendant Hamilton County’s argument that it is entitled to immunity from
Plaintiff’s claim for relief under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302, it is persuasive. Unless
the GTLA specifies otherwise, it provides blanket immunity for all governmental entities in suits
for injuries resulting from the exercise of governmental duties. Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617
F.3d 864, 871–2 (6th Cir. 2010); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a). However, the GTLA
removes governmental immunity where a governmental employee, acting within the scope of his
employment, causes an injury to a plaintiff through a negligent act or omission. Tenn. Code
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Ann. § 29-20-205. In such cases, governmental immunity is removed, and the GTLA shields
only the employee with immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-205 & 29-20-310(b). But there is
also an exception (to this exception) for claims arising out of “infliction of mental anguish,
invasion of right of privacy, or civil rights,” which means that, for such claims, the individual
employee may be held liable, while the government retains its general shield of immunity. Id. §
29-20-205(2); Johnson, 671 F.3d at 871–72 (finding civil rights exception applied when
plaintiff’s claim for negligence arose out of the same circumstances giving rise to her civil rights
claim under § 1983).
It is apparent from Plaintiff’s amended complaint as a whole that his state law claims for
assault and battery, IIED, and civil conspiracy against Defendants Craig and Carson are based on
the same acts on which he relies for his § 1983 civil rights claims against these Defendants (Doc.
14, at 13–15). Specifically, Plaintiff does not rely on any new facts to support these claims, but
instead merely relies on and/or reasserts the same facts as supporting state law claims and sets
forth legal conclusions regarding those facts and claims (Id.). As such, Defendant Hamilton
County is entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302 claim
under the GTLA. Bryant v. McCoig, No. 3:15-CV-475, 2018 WL 3892427, at *10 (E.D. Tenn.
Aug. 14, 2018) (holding that because the plaintiff’s “assault and battery claim . . . clearly ar[ose]
out of the same circumstances giving rise to his § 1983 claims,” it “falls under the civil-rights
exception to the TGTLA, and the [municipality] retains its immunity”) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, Defendant Hamilton County has immunity from Plaintiff’s Tennessee
Code Annotated § 8-8-302 claim under the GTLA, and it is DISMISSED.
b. 	Indemnification
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states in relevant part that
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Tennessee law provides that the County is directed to pay any tort judgment for
compensatory damages for which its employees are liable within the scope of their
employment activities. . . . The individual defendants were employees of the
County and acted within the scope of their employment in committing the actions
described herein.
(Doc. 14, at 16). Defendant Hamilton County, however, argues that Plaintiff’s amended
complaint allegations make it clear that the individual Defendants’ acts underlying Plaintiff’s
claims were outside of the scope of their employment and that this indemnification claim is not
cognizable (Doc. 58, at 16–17). It appears that both Plaintiff and Defendant Hamilton County
are incorrect about the parameters of this claim. Nevertheless, this claim is subject to dismissal
for the reasons set forth below.
First, in his amended complaint, Plaintiff does not cite a Tennessee statute that requires
Defendant Hamilton County to indemnify him for his tort claims against the individual
Defendants. However, in their motion for summary judgment, Defendant Hamilton County
asserts that the only Tennessee statute that would support this indemnification claim is
Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-310(d), and Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-310(d) provides as follows:
Local governmental entities shall have the right, as a matter of local option, to elect to
insure or to indemnify their employees for claims for which the governmental entity is
immune under this chapter arising under state or federal law upon such terms and
conditions as the local government may deem appropriate; provided, that such
indemnification may not exceed the limits of liability established for governmental
entities in § 29-20-403 except in causes of action in which the liability of governmental
employees is not limited as provided in this chapter.
Confusingly, however, while Defendant Hamilton County points out that this statutory
provision only allows governments to elect to indemnify employees, both parties assert that the
determination of whether Defendant Hamilton County must indemnify Plaintiff pursuant to this
claim is dependent only upon whether the individual Defendants were acting within the scope of
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their employment (Id.; Doc. 77, at 10). But this reference to the scope of the individual
Defendants’ employment appears to be based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-310(a),
which provides that:
The court, before holding a governmental entity liable for damages, must first
determine that the employee’s or employees’ act or acts were negligent and the
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, that the employee or employees acted within
the scope of their employment and that none of the exceptions listed in § 29-20-
205 are applicable to the facts before the court.
However, neither party explains the interplay between Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(a) and (d)
or cites any cases doing so, nor has the Court located any such cases.
Regardless, to the extent Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-310(a) applies to Plaintiff’s
indemnification claim, application of this provision would mean that Defendant Hamilton
County would again be immune from indemnification pursuant to the GTLA’s exception for
civil rights contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205, as set forth above.
Additionally, even if Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-310(d), standing alone, could
support Plaintiff’s indemnification claim, that claim is subject to dismissal. Specifically, as set
forth above, Plaintiff states in his amended complaint that Tennessee law requires Defendant
Hamilton County to indemnify him. But Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-310(d), which is
the only Tennessee statute the parties cite for this indemnification claim and the only Tennessee
statute the Court has located that may apply to that claim, provides only that a government entity
“ha[s] the right . . . to elect to . . . indemnify their employees for claims for which the
governmental entity is immune [under the GTLA] upon such terms and conditions as the local
government may deem appropriate[.]” Thus, a municipality is not required to elect to insure or
indemnify its employees under this statute. Chambers v. City of Chattanooga, 71 S.W.3d 281,
286 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “[w]hile the City had the option under [Tenn. Code
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Ann. § 29-20-310(d)] to insure or indemnify [its employee], we conclude the statute did not
require it to do so.”). And in his amended complaint, Plaintiff does not set forth any facts
suggesting that Defendant Hamilton County elected to indemnify its employees in a manner that
would result in this Defendant having to indemnify him for any judgment against the individual
Defendants herein. Nor has Plaintiff set forth any proof of any applicable indemnification
agreement.
As such, regardless of whether the Court applies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard or the
summary judgment standard, Plaintiff’s indemnification claim is also subject to dismissal.
D. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Hamilton County’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 57) is GRANTED.
Also, as the Court has found that the record demonstrates that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies as to all § 1983 claims in his complaint, Plaintiff shall have
fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of this order to show good cause as to why the Court
should not dismiss his § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants for this same reason.
See, e.g., Moore v. Booth, 122 F.4th 61, 66–70 (2d Cir. 2024) (reversing a district court’s grant
of default judgment against a defendant where (1) the plaintiff’s claims against all defendants
arose out of the same use of force incident; (2) the same PLRA exhaustion requirement applied
to all the plaintiff’s claims; and (3) the district court had granted the non-defaulting defendants
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted his available administrative
remedies for his claims, because the district court’s entry of a default judgment and an order
granting summary judgment based on failure to exhaust were inconsistent judgments) (citations
omitted).
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II. 	MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
In his motion for sanctions, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Craig has failed to timely
answer his discovery despite a prior Court order requiring him to do so and warning him that
sanctions may result from his failure to do so (Doc. 89, at 1–2). Plaintiff therefore requests entry
of default judgment, an order holding Defendant Craig in contempt of Court, that the Court strike
Defendant Craig’s defenses and prevent him from offering any evidence entitling him to
qualified immunity at trial, and an award of his attorney’s fees after a hearing (Id. at 4).
Defendant Craig has not responded to this motion, and his time for doing so has passed.
However, Plaintiff’s request for default judgment is procedurally improper, as he has not
complied with the two-step process contemplated by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 55(a), a plaintiff must first move for a Clerk’s entry of default,
demonstrating that a defendant has failed to plead or defend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). If a
default is entered, then the plaintiff may move the Court for entry of default under Rule
55(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Plaintiff did not comply with this two-step process by seeking
a Clerk’s entry of default prior to seeking default judgment, and therefore his request for default
is improper. See, e.g., Devlin v. Kalm, 493 F. App’x 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t was
procedurally improper for Plaintiff to move for entry of default judgment without first obtaining
an entry of default from the clerk.”).
Additionally, while the Court is concerned about Defendant Craig’s failure to answer
discovery despite the Court order requiring him to do so, it is also cognizant of Defendant
Craig’s pro se status, as well as the fact that, as set forth above, it appears that Plaintiff’s failure
to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his § 1983 claims may bar his ability to obtain relief
as to the remaining Defendants.
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As such, Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED without prejudice.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1. 	Defendant Hamilton County’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 57) is
GRANTED;
2. 	Plaintiff shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of this order to show good
cause as to why the Court should not dismiss his § 1983 claims against the individual
Defendants due to his failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to
filing this action; and
3. 	Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 88) is DENIED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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