Williams v. Westrum et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
VELDER O. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHAD WESTRUM, individual capacity;
DALTON, individual capacity; BUTLER,
individual capacity; MCCLURE,
individual capacity; GROSS, individual
capacity; HEALY, individual capacity;
TREADWAY, individual capacity;
SHERIFF NELSON, individual capacity;
HARRIS, individual capacity; WINKEL,
individual capacity; and DOES 1-50,
individual capacity,
Defendants.
4:21-CV-04163-KES
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Velder O. Williams, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1. This court screened Williams’s complaint, dismissing
it in part and directing service upon defendants in part. Docket 6. Specifically,
Williams’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Sioux Falls
Police Department Officer Chad Westrum in his individual capacity and his
Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim against Westrum
and Sioux Falls Police Department Officer Joel Dalton in their individual
capacities survived screening, and Williams’s remaining claims were dismissed.
See id. at 17. Defendants now move for summary judgment. Docket 20.
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Williams moves for judgment, reconsideration of this court’s screening order,
and appointment of counsel. Dockets 27, 28, 31.
I. 	Factual Background
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court recites the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Under Local Civil
Rule 56.1.A, a party moving for summary judgment must present each material
fact “in a separate numbered statement with an appropriate citation to the
record in the case.” A party opposing summary judgment “must respond to
each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement of material facts
with a separately numbered response and appropriate citations to the record.”
D.S.D. Civ. LR 56.1.B. “All material facts set forth in the movant’s statement of
material facts will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the
opposing party’s response to the moving party’s statement of material facts.”
D.S.D. Civ. LR 56.1.D. Here, Williams filed three motions since defendants filed
their motion for summary judgment, but he did not respond to defendants’
motion for summary judgment, and he has not filed a statement of material
facts presenting each material fact in a separate numbered statement. See
Dockets 27, 28, 31. All material facts in defendants’ statement of material facts
are deemed admitted, but this court will also recite Williams’s version of the
facts.
The facts under defendants’ statement of material facts are: that on April
2, 2019, Detective Holbeck of the Sioux Falls Police Department was observing
405 ½ South Willow Avenue, an address whose occupants were suspected of
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the distribution of controlled substances. See Docket 21 ¶ 2. He watched a
GMC Envoy approach a nearby house at 409 South Willow Avenue, an address
whose occupants were also suspected of being associated with drug activity. Id.
¶ 3. Law enforcement watched a man leave the GMC Envoy, enter the house at
409 South Willow, then return to the GMC Envoy and drive away. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.
The GMC Envoy was associated with Jeff Moore, who was known to the Sioux
Falls Police Department for his history of drug activity. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. A 1999 silver
Pontiac Bonneville then parked in front of 409 South Willow, and a Black man
exited the vehicle and entered 409 South Willow. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. This man was
later identified as Velder Williams. Id. ¶ 12. The GMC Envoy returned to 409
South Willow, and Williams met Moore outside. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Moore removed a
black backpack from his vehicle, and he and Williams entered the house at 409
South Willow. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Then, Moore emerged from the house without the
backpack and drove away. Id. ¶ 17. At this point, law enforcement was able to
visually identify Moore. Id. ¶ 18.
Two more vehicles arrived at 409 South Willow, and their drivers, both
men, entered the house. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. One of the men left with Williams in the
Bonneville. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23-24. At that time, the man with Williams was carrying
the backpack. Id. ¶ 22. Law enforcement followed Williams and the other man
to another location on 8th Street. Id. ¶ 25. The other man left the Bonneville
with the backpack, and Williams returned in the Bonneville to 409 South
Willow, then drove away again. Id. ¶¶ 27-29. Law enforcement contacted Officer
Westrum, provided a description of the Bonneville, informed Westrum that the
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Bonneville had left a house associated with drug activity, and asked Westrum
to find independent probable cause to stop Williams. Id. ¶¶ 30-32. Westrum
followed Williams, and Williams failed to maintain his lane while making a right
turn from South Western Avenue to 49th Street. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Williams does
not dispute that he committed this traffic violation. Id. ¶ 35 (citing Docket 1 at
1). A white Ford F-150 also committed the same traffic violation. Id. ¶ 36.
Westrum decided to pull Williams over and not the Ford F-150 because the
Ford F-150 was not suspected of drug activity. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.
Westrum positioned his vehicle behind the Bonneville and observed
Williams “making furtive movements under the driver side seat.” Id. ¶¶ 39-40
(citations omitted). Westrum activated his siren, and Williams did not
immediately pull over; instead, he continued to reach under his seat. Id. ¶¶ 41-
42. Fifteen seconds later, Westrum activated his siren a second time, and
Williams “eventually pulled over approximately sixty seconds after the first
siren.” Id. ¶¶ 43-44. Westrum informed Williams of the reason for the stop and
requested Williams’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
Williams responded that he did not have a valid driver’s license and provided
his name and date of birth. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. Westrum discovered that Williams
had an outstanding warrant for violation of his 24/7 sobriety program for
possession of a controlled substance. Id. ¶ 53; Docket 24 ¶ 11. Dispatch called
Dalton to the scene to provide backup. Docket 21 ¶ 54.
Westrum did not inform Williams of the warrant at this point, and
Williams stated that he was driving to his girlfriend’s house. Id. ¶¶ 55, 58.
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When Westrum asked Williams where he had been, Williams claimed that he
was returning home from the grocery store. Id. ¶ 59. Williams also claimed that
he had no record, then admitted that he had three DUI convictions in
Aberdeen. Id. ¶¶ 60-61. Williams again denied that he had any other
interactions with law enforcement, except for arrests for minor things such as
paying tickets or paying child support late. Id. ¶ 66.
Williams denied that there were any weapons or illegal substances in the
car. Id. ¶ 70. Westrum asked about Williams’s drug use, and Williams claimed
that he did not use drugs other than marijuana in the 1990s. Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
Williams denied that he was on a 24/7 sobriety program, and Westrum
informed Williams of the warrant for his arrest. Id. ¶¶ 73, 76. Westrum asked
Williams for consent to search the Bonneville, and Williams did not consent to
a search. Id. ¶ 77. Westrum and Dalton, who had arrived on the scene, then
arrested Williams. See id. ¶¶ 78-79. Westrum explained to Williams his basis
for probable cause to search the vehicle, describing Williams’s movements
before being pulled over and the warrant. Id. ¶ 80. Westrum also relied on the
information he received from the law enforcement officers who were observing
409 South Willow. Id. ¶ 81. Dalton searched underneath the driver’s seat and
found a glass pipe with burnt residue and copper wool. Id. ¶¶ 82-83. After
finding a pipe that they believed was used for illegal drugs, Westrum and
Dalton searched the rest of the Bonneville. Id. ¶¶ 84-85. The burnt residue in
the pipe was later determined to be cocaine. Id. ¶ 86.
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In his complaint, Williams claims that Westrum pulled him over because
he is Black. Docket 1 at 1. He claims that Westrum did not pull over two other
vehicles, including a truck driven by a White man. Id. Williams attaches
previous court filings to his complaint in which he alleged that his car was
searched without his consent and without an applicable exception to the
Fourth Amendment. Docket 1-1 at 6, 9. In these filings, he alleged that
Westrum stated in the police report, “[g]iven his movements prior to the stop,
Officer Dalton checked under the driver’s seat to ensure a weapon was not
stashed.” Id. at 6.
II. 	Motion for Reconsideration
Williams filed a motion in which he seeks to reopen the claims in his
complaint that were dismissed without prejudice on screening. Docket 28. This
court construes Williams’s motion as a motion for reconsideration. See id. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has traditionally instructed courts to consider
motions for reconsideration either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Sanders
v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1988). Rule 60(b) authorizes a
court to relieve a party from a final judgment under the following
circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered 	evidence 	that, 	with 	reasonable 	diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; 	it 	is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed 	or 	vacated; 	or 	applying 	it 	prospectively 	is 	no 	longer
equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Other than stating his desire to reopen the screened and dismissed
claims, Williams provides no justification for reconsideration. See Docket 28.
Thus, the only potentially applicable circumstance here is “any other reason
that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6),
a party must show that “exceptional circumstances have denied the moving
party a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim and have prevented the
moving party from receiving adequate redress.” Harley v. Zoesch, 413 F.3d 866,
871 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Williams makes no showing of
exceptional circumstances that have denied him a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his claims. See Docket 28; Harley, 413 F.3d at 871 (citation omitted).
“Motions under Rule 59(e) ‘serve the limited function of correcting
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence’ and
‘cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise
arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry of
judgment.’ ” Ryan v. Ryan, 889 F.3d 499, 507 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United
States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Williams has not shown a manifest error in law or fact, and he tenders no legal
theories and raises no arguments that could not have been offered or raised
prior to entry of judgment. See Docket 28. Further, a motion under Rule 59(e)
“must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e). Williams’s motion, considered under Rule 59(e), is untimely. See
Docket 6. Thus, Williams’s motion for reconsideration (Docket 28) is denied.
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III. 	Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
A. 	Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this
burden by presenting evidence that there is no dispute of material fact or by
showing that the nonmoving party has not presented evidence to support an
element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, “[t]he
nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must
demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a
genuine issue for trial.” Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). The underlying substantive law
identifies which facts are “material” for purposes of a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48
(emphases omitted).
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Essentially, the availability of summary judgment turns on whether a
proper jury question is presented: “The inquiry performed is the threshold
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other
words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved . . .
in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. While pro se prisoners are entitled to the
benefit of liberal construction at the pleading stage, pro se prisoners are
subject to the summary judgment standard set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Quam v. Minnehaha Cnty. Jail, 821 F.2d 522, 522 (8th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district court is not required to “plumb the record
in order to find a genuine issue of material fact.” Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
87 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996).
B. 	Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Williams brings a claim against Westrum in his individual capacity for
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.
Docket 1 at 1, 4-5. Defendants argue that Westrum is entitled to qualified
immunity because he did not violate Williams’s rights when he stopped
Williams because the stop was not racially motivated. Docket 22 at 12-13.
The doctrine of qualified immunity “shields government officials from
liability in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly
established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009)). To
determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the
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court considers (1) whether the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, demonstrate the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right,
and (2) whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of
the alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The court
may consider the elements in any order, and if either of the elements is not
met, then the official is entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race[.]” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (noting that a selective enforcement of the law claim arises under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). To prevail on a
selective enforcement of the law claim, a plaintiff must show that the officer
exercised discretion to enforce the law on account of race, “which requires
proof of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose.” Johnson v.
Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2003). In this case, Williams has not
offered proof of either a discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect.
“Proving discriminatory purpose is no simple task.” Gilani v. Matthews,
843 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff, 779
F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2015)). Williams must offer evidence that Westrum
pulled him over because of his race. See id. Defendants contend that under
Clark v. Clark, 926 F.3d 972, 980 (8th Cir. 2019), Williams must prove that he
was stopped “solely on the basis of race[.]” Docket 22 at 12. In Clark, the
Eighth Circuit stated, “To prove an equal protection claim in the context of a
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police interaction, [a plaintiff] must prove that the officer exercised his
discretion to enforce a law solely on the basis of race.” 926 F.3d at 980 (citing
Crooks, 326 F.3d at 999-1000). But in United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823
(8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit stated, “To show discriminatory purpose, the
claimant must show the official’s decision to enforce the law was at least
partially based on race.” Recently, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged uncertainty
regarding the correct standard for an equal protection violation arising out of a
law enforcement decision. Saunders v. Thies, 38 F.4th 701, 714-15 (8th Cir.
2022). But the Eighth Circuit did not “conclusively resolve” the issue because
the plaintiff “failed to show that the officers were motivated in any part by [his]
race[.]” Id. at 715.
Here, Williams has failed to show that Westrum’s decision to pull him
over was motivated in any part by Williams’s race. Westrum was instructed to
pull Williams over because Williams was suspected of engaging in drug activity.
Docket 21 ¶¶ 30-32. He then observed Williams commit a traffic violation, and
he pulled Williams over for that traffic violation. Id. ¶¶ 34, 38. Williams has put
forth no evidence that Westrum was motivated by race, and he does not
dispute that he did commit a traffic violation. See id. ¶ 35. Thus, Williams has
failed to show discriminatory purpose.
Further, Williams cannot show discriminatory effect. “To establish
discriminatory effect, [the plaintiff] must show people of another ethnicity
violated the law and the law was not enforced against them.” Gilani, 843 F.3d
at 348 (citing Bell, 86 F.3d at 823). Williams and the driver of the Ford F-150
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must be similarly situated “in all relevant respects” to demonstrate selective
enforcement of the law. See Saunders, 38 F.4th at 714 (quoting Gilani, 843
F.3d at 348). Defendants argue that the driver of the Ford F-150 was not
similarly situated to Williams because “[t]he Ford F-150 was entirely unrelated
to the [drug activity] surveillance[.]” Docket 22 at 13 (citing Flowers v. City of
Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 2009)).
In Flowers, the plaintiff sued his neighbor, a police officer, after the
officer directed coworkers to investigate and harass the plaintiff because he
believed the plaintiff was responsible for or connected to gang-related graffiti in
the neighborhood. 558 F.3d at 796-97. The plaintiff argued that he lived at “the
only home on the block with black residents, and that he and his family were
the only persons investigated when graffiti appeared in the area.” Id. at 798.
The plaintiff was new to the neighborhood when the graffiti appeared, and a
gang investigator had told the officer that the plaintiff was “the uncle of a
member of a gang to which the graffiti related.” Id. The Eighth Circuit found
that these factors “plainly distinguish[ed] [the plaintiff] from others in the
neighborhood who were longstanding residents and not identified by the gang
unit.” Id. Thus, the plaintiff “was not similarly situated in all relevant respects
to the other inhabitants of his neighborhood block.” Id.
Here, Williams cannot show that he was similarly situated to the driver of
the Ford F-150. Although he and the driver of the Ford F-150 both committed
the same traffic infraction, Williams was suspected of drug activity and the
driver of the Ford F-150 was not. Docket 21 ¶¶ 34-37. Thus, as in Flowers,
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suspicion of criminal activity “plainly distinguish[es]” Williams from the driver
of the Ford F-150. See 558 F.3d at 798. Williams has failed to show
discriminatory effect. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on
this claim.
C. 	Fourth Amendment Claim
Williams brings a claim against Westrum and Dalton in their individual
capacities for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches. Docket 1 at 1, 4-5. Defendants argue that Westrum
and Dalton are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate
Williams’s rights when they searched his vehicle without a warrant under the
automobile exception. Docket 22 at 15-18.
“Although a warrantless search usually constitutes a per se Fourth
Amendment violation, the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement permits the warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle by
officers possessing probable cause to do so.” Cronin v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1187,
1197 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970)).
“Probable cause exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person could believe there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place.” United States v.
Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 418 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 2003)).
In the court filings attached to his complaint, Williams claimed that his
car was searched without his consent. See Docket 1-1 at 6. He also claimed
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that Westrum and Dalton lacked probable cause to search his car. See id. at 6,
9. Defendants respond that probable cause existed because of the collective
knowledge of law enforcement. Docket 22 at 15-18.
“When multiple officers are involved in an investigation, probable cause
may be based on their collective knowledge and need not be based solely on the
information within the knowledge of the arresting officer as long as there is
some degree of communication.” United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 453
(8th Cir. 2011). The Eighth Circuit has applied this collective knowledge
doctrine to nonconsensual automobile searches. See United States v. Aguilera,
625 F.3d 482, 486 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d
1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2001)). “[T]he validity of a search ‘may be based on the
collective knowledge of all of the law enforcement officers involved in an
investigation if . . . some degree of communication exists between them[.]’ ”
Gillette, 245 F.3d at 1034 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Gonzalez, 220 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Here, when Westrum followed and pulled over Williams, he was in
communication with other law enforcement officers who were engaged in drug
activity surveillance at 409 South Willow, and Dalton was in communication
with Westrum when they arrested Williams and searched Williams’s vehicle.
Docket 21 ¶¶ 30-35, 38-44, 79-85. Thus, the collective knowledge of all law
enforcement officers involved in the drug activity surveillance at 409 South
Willow can be imputed to Westrum and Dalton when they decided that
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probable cause existed to search Williams’s vehicle. See Gillette, 245 F.3d at
1034 (citing Gonzalez, 220 F.3d at 925).
Defendants argue that Westrum and Dalton relied on the following facts
when they believed they had probable cause to search Williams’s vehicle under
the automobile exception: the previous drug activity surveillance of South
Willow Avenue, numerous individuals entering and leaving 409 South Willow
on April 2, 2019, the presence of Moore at 409 South Willow with a black
backpack, Williams entered 409 South Willow with Moore, the black backpack
being placed in Williams’s vehicle and subsequently removed, Williams’s
passenger fumbled with something in his lap, Williams returned to 409 South
Willow and left again, law enforcement requested that Westrum find probable
cause to stop Williams, Williams was seen making movements under the
driver’s seat while Westrum was following him, Williams failed to immediately
pull over, Williams claimed that he was returning from the grocery store and
that he had no criminal history, and the existence of an outstanding warrant
for Williams’s arrest for violation of his 24/7 sobriety program for possession of
a controlled substance. Docket 22 at 19-20. They also relied on the discovery of
a pipe they believed was used for illegal drugs to establish further probable
cause to search the rest of the vehicle. Id. at 18. Given the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person could believe that evidence of a crime
would be found in Williams’s vehicle. See id. at 18-20; Murillo-Salgado, 854
F.3d at 418 (citing Wells, 347 F.3d at 287).
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Williams, through his attached court filings, argues that the justification
for the search provided at the time of his arrest was to “ensure a weapon was
not stashed.” Docket 1-1 at 9. Defendants argue that Westrum “characterized
the search as a weapons search, as opposed to a drug search, so as not to burn
the ongoing investigation.” Docket 22 at 18 n.7 (citing Docket 24 ¶ 16). The
United States Supreme Court has explained that “the fact that the officer does
not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken
as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Whren,
517 U.S. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). In
other words, this court must consider whether the information known to and
imputed to Westrum and Dalton objectively justified the search, rather than
whether Westrum’s description of his justification for the search at the time
was sufficient. See id. (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 138). As described above, these
circumstances provided probable cause to search Williams’s vehicle. See
Docket 22 at 18-20; Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d at 418 (citing Wells, 347 F.3d at
287).
Defendants further argue that even if Williams’s Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable search was violated, he cannot establish
that the right in question was clearly established. Docket 22 at 19-21. “A right
is clearly established if its contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Carroll, 658
F.3d at 827 (quoting Brown, 574 F.3d at 499). To show that a right was clearly
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established, the plaintiff must provide either “controlling authority . . . which
clearly established the rule on which [he or she] seek[s] to rely” or “a consensus
of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have
believed that his actions were lawful.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617
(1999). The Supreme Court has noted, however, that “a general constitutional
rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to
the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has
[not] previously been held unlawful[.]” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
271 (1997) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). Qualified
immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986).
Here, Williams cannot show that the right in question was clearly
established. Even if the facts known to and imputed to Westrum and Dalton
were objectively insufficient to provide probable cause to search Williams’s
vehicle, Westrum and Dalton were not unreasonable to believe that probable
cause existed. See Carroll, 658 F.3d at 827 (citing Brown, 574 F.3d at 499).
Williams provides no controlling authority or consensus of cases of persuasive
authority that show Westrum and Dalton’s actions to be unlawful. See Wilson,
526 U.S. at 617. This court does not find that a general constitutional rule
applies here with obvious clarity as described in Lanier. See 520 U.S at 271.
Thus, the right in question was not clearly established, and Westrum and
Dalton are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
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Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. 	That Williams’s motion for reconsideration (Docket 28) is denied.
2. 	That 	defendants’ 	motion 	for 	summary judgment 	(Docket 20) 	is
granted. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor
on all claims.
3. 	That Williams’s motion for judgment (Docket 27) is denied as moot.
4. 	That Williams’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket 31) is
denied as moot.
Dated March 6, 2023.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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