Woodraska v. Young et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD JAMES WOODRASKA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DARIN YOUNG,CHIEF WARDEN,IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MIKE LEIDHOLT,
CABINET SECRETARY,IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JEREMY BAKER,SERGEANT,IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;Z. LENTSCH,
SERGEANT,IN HIS INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY; AND TAYLOR YOST,SCO,IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;
Defendants.
4:21-CV-04I20-RAL
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS AND 1915A SCREENING
DISMISSING IN PART AND DIRECTING
SERVICE IN PART
Plaintiff, Richard James Woodraska, filed a pro se eivil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Doc. I. Woodraska moves for leave to proeeed in forma pauperis and has filed a prisoner
trust account report. Docs. 2 and 6. This Court now screens Woodraska's complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 19I5A.
I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Woodraska filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 2, and a prisoner trust
account report. Doc. 6, showing average monthly deposits of$84.13 and an average monthly
balance of negative $8.43. Doc. 3. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act(PLRA), a prisoner
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who "brings a eivil aetion or files an appeal in forma pauperis ... shall.be required to pay the full
amount of a filing fee." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).'"When an inmate seeks pauper status, the only
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issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceedings or over a period
oftime under an installment plan.'" Henderson v. Norris. 129 F.3d 481,483(8th Cir. 1997)
(quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth. 114 F.3d 601,604(6th Cir. 1997)).
The initial partial filing fee that accompanies an installment plan is calculated according
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), which requires apayment of20 percent ofthe greater of:
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the 6-m6nth
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.
Based on the information regarding Woodraska's prisoner trust account, this Court grants
Woodraska leave to proceed in forma pauperis and waives the initial partial filing fee. 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)("In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action ...
for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial
filing fee.").
In order to pay his filing fee, Woodraska must"make monthly payments of20 percent of
the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
statute places the burden on the prisoner's institution to collect the additional monthly payments
and forward them to the court as follows:
After payment ofthe initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to
make monthly payments of20 percent of the preceding month's income credited
to the prisoner's account. The agency having custody ofthe prisoner shall forward
payments from the prisoner's account to the clerk ofthe court each time the
amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The installments will be collected pursuant to this procedure. The Clerk
of Court will send a copy ofthis order to the appropriate financial official at Woodraska's
institution. Woodraska remains responsible for the entire filing fee, as long as he is a prisoner.
See In re Tvler. 110 F.3d 528, 529-30(8th Cir. 1997).
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II. 1915A Screening
A. Factual Background
Woodraska sues Chief Warden Darin Young in his official capacity, Cabinet Secretary
Mike Leidholt in his individual and official capacity, and Sergeant Jeremy Baker, Sergeant Z.
Lentsch, and SCO Taylor Yost in their individual capacities. Doc. 1 at 3-5. Woodraska claims
that on February 10, 2021, at about 6:10pm, he was assaulted by Defendants Baker, Lentsch, and
Yost. Doc. 1 at 7-8. He alleges that Defendant Baker broke his leg and kneed him while
Defendants Lentsch and Yost kneed him in the face, punched him, and twisted his leg after he
said it was broken. at 9. Defendant Yost also told the other two to kill Woodraska, and one of
the officers placed his knee on Woodraska's neck until he passed out. Id He also alleges that
Defendant Lentsch hit his head against a holding cell wall. Id at 7. As a result ofthis attack,
Woodraska claims that his face was bruised and his leg was broken, which required surgery. Id
at 9. He also claims that he struggles with severe mental health issues related to the use offorce.
Id In the attached appeal of his request for administrative remedy filed with the South Dakota
Department of Corrections, Woodraska also alleges that he was sprayed with five cans of pepper
spray during the incident and that he was not taken to the hospital despite his injuries. Doc. 1-1 at
2.
Woodraska brings claims for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment against
Defendants Baker, Lentsch, and Yost. Id at 4, 10. He'seeks a restraining order against these
defendants because he fears retaliation and $150,000 in punitive damages for excessive force. Id
at 9. He also brings claims against Defendant Young for failure to properly train officers and
against Defendant Leidholt for approving an inadequate use offorce poficy. See id at 7, 9.
B. Legal Standard
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A court when screening under § 1915A must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the
complaint. Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell. 56 F.3d 35, 36(8th Cir. 1995). Civil rights and pro
se complaints must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94(2007); Bediako
V. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004). Even with this construction,"a pro se
complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions." Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1337(8th Cir. 1985); see also Ellis v. Citv of Minneapolis. 518 F. App'x 502, 504(8th
Cir. 2013). Civil rights complaints cannot be merely conclusory. Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151,
152(8th Cir. 1993); Parker v. Porter. 221 F. App'x 481,482(8th Cir. 2007).
A complaint"does not need detailed factual allegations ...[but] requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of action will not
do." Bell AtL Corp. v. Twomblv,550 U.S. 544, 555(2007). If a complaint does not contain these
bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate. Beavers v. Lockhart. 755 F.2d 657,663 (8th Cir. 1985).
Twomblv requires that a complaint's factual allegations must be "enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true."
Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 555; see also Abdullah v. Minnesota. 261 F. App'x 926, 927(8th Cir.
2008)(noting that a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all '
material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory). Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss them if they are "(1)
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fiivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or(2)seek[]
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
C. Official Capacity Claims ^
Woodraska has sued Defendants Young and Leidholt in their official capacities. Doc. 1 at
3. Both defendants were employees of the South Dakota Department of Corrections at the time
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ofthe incident in question. Id As the Supreme Court has stated, "a suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's
office." Will V. Mich. Dep't of State Police. 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) Cciting Brandon v. Holt. 469
U.S. 464,471 (1985)). Thus, it is a suit against the state itself. While "[§] 1983 provides a federal
forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties ... it does not provide a federal forum for
litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties." Id. at 66.
The Eleventh Amendment generally acts as a bar to suits against a state for money
damages unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity. Id. But when an official capacity
claim is asserted for injunctive relief against a state officer, the defense of qualified immunity
does not applv. See Pearson v. Callahan. 555 U.S. 223, 242-243 (2009). Here, Woodraska
appears to seek injunctive relief only against Defendants Yost, Baker, and Lentsch, and not
against Defendants Young and Leidholt. Doc. 1 at 9. Thus, his complaint appears to seek only
money damages against the two prison administrators sued in their official capacities.
Woodraska's claims against Defendants Young and Leidholt are the equivalent of claims for
money damages against the state of South Dakota. The state of South Dakota has not waived its
sovereign immunity to allow Woodraska's official capacity claims. Thus, the defendants are
protected against the sort of official capacity claims that Woodraska has pleaded.
D. Individual Capacity Claims
Woodraska sues Defendants Baker, Lentsch, and Yost in their individual capacities for
the alleged excessive use offorce and Defendant Leidholt in his individual capacity for
approving an inadequate use offorce policy. Id. at 3-4, 7. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners fi-om the "unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain." Hudson v. McMillian. 503 U.S. 1, 5(1992). In considering an Eighth Amendment
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claim for excessive force, the "core judieial inquiry ...[is] whether force was applied in a good-
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faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."
Wilkins v. Gaddy. 559 U.S. 34, 37(2010)(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). In evaluating
whether the force was reasonable and in good faith, courts may consider the need for applying
force, the relationship between that need and the amount offorce utilized, the threat the
responsible officials reasonably pereeived, any efforts used to diminish the severity of a forceful
response, and the extent of the injury inflicted. Walker v. Bowersox. 526 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th
Cir. 2008).
Woodraska provides little information about the circumstances under which excessive
foree was allegedly used against him, nor does he provide documentation of his injuries. See
Doc. 1. But Woodraska attached aNotiee of Rejeetion of his appeal ofthe denial of
administrative remedy,in which Defendant Leidholt aeknowledges that Woodraska suffered a
fracture, which was'discovered the day after the incident. Doc. 1-1 at 1. The Notice of Rejection
justifies the use of foree as a means of self-defense because Woodraska ran out of his holding
cell and threatened Defendants Baker, Lentsch, and Yost with a broken broom handle. Id Given
the severity ofthe injuries and the degree of force alleged, Woodraska has stated a claim
sufficient to survive § 1915A screening for excessive force against Defendants Baker, Lentsch,
and Yost.
As to the claim against Defendant Leidholt for approving an inadequate use offorce
policy, Woodraska makes no factual allegations as to what the policy was or how the policy was
inadequate. Also, Woodraska has not stated the relief he seeks from Defendant Leidholt.
Woodraska has not alleged suffieient facts to state a claim about any use offorce poliey at this
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time. Thus, his claim against Defendant Leidholt is dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).
III. Order
Accordingly, it is -
ORDERED that Woodraska's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 2, is granted and
his initial filing fee is waived. It is further
ORDERED that the institution having custody of Woodraska is directed that whenever the
amount in Woodraska's trust account, exclusive of fiinds available to him in his fi-ozen account,
exceeds $10.00, monthly payments that equal 20 percent ofthe funds credited the preceding month
to the Woodraska's trust account shall be forwarded to the U.S. District Court Clerk's Office under
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), until the $350 filing fee is paid in full. It is further
ORDERED that Woodraska's excessive force claim against Defendants Baker, Lentsch,
and Yost in their individual capacities survives 28 U.S.C. § 1915A screening. It is further
ORDERED that Woodraska's claim against Defendant Young in his official capacity is
dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l). It is further
ORDERED that Woodraska's claim against Defendant Leidholt in his individual and
official capacities is dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
and 1915A(b)(l). It is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall send blank summons forms and U.S. Marshals Service
Form (Form USM-285) to Woodraska so that he may cause the complaint to be served upon
Defendants Baker, Lentsch, and Yost. It is further
ORDERED that Woodraska shall complete and send the Clerk of Courts a separate
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summons and USM-285 form for each defendant. Upon receipt of the completed summons and
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USM-285 forms,the Clerk ofCourt will issue the summons. Ifthe completed summons and USM-
285 form are not submitted as directed, the complaint may be dismissed. It is further
ORDERED that the United States Marshals Service shall serve the completed summonses,
together with a copy of the complaint. Doc. 1, and this order upon the defendants. It is ftirther
ORDERED that the defendants will serve and file an answer or responsive pleading to the
amended complaints and supplement on or before 21 days following the dale of service or 60 days
ifthe defendant falls under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3). It is finally
ORDERED that Woodraska will keep the court informed of his current address at all times.
All parties are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by the court's Civil Local Rules
while this case is pending.
DATED August if",2021.
BY THE COURT;
ROBERTO A. LANGI
CHIEF JUDGE
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