USA v. Needham

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY JEROME WISE,
Defendant.
4:20-CR-40104-02-KES
AMENDED ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
Defendant, Jerry Jerome Wise, and co-defendant, Damara CJ Needham,
were charged in a superseding indictment with two counts of conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
846. Docket 36. Wise moves to suppress “[a]ll evidence seized during the
search of the vehicle during the July 27, 2020, traffic stop[.]” Docket 82 at 1.
Wise was a passenger and Needham was the driver at the time of the stop.
Docket 103 at 3. Wise alleges that “law enforcement illegally prolonged the
stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.”
Docket 82 at 1. The United States opposes Wise’s motion to suppress. Docket
95. The court referred Wise’s motion to Magistrate Judge Veronica Duffy under
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Magistrate Judge Duffy recommends that Wise’s
motion to suppress be denied. Docket 103 at 36. Wise filed objections to the
Report and Recommendation. Docket 109. After a de novo review of the Report
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and Recommendation and the record, the court adopts the Report and
Recommendation and denies Wise’s motion to suppress.
LEGAL STANDARD
This court’s review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court reviews de novo any objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendations with respect to dispositive matters that are timely made and
specific. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Because motions to
suppress evidence are considered dispositive matters, a magistrate judge’s
recommendation regarding such a motion is subject to de novo review.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673
(1980) (holding that dispositive motions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) are subject
to de novo review by the district court). In conducting a de novo review, this
court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see
also United States v. Craft, 30 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994).
FACTS
A complete recitation of the facts can be found in Magistrate Judge
Duffy’s Report and Recommendation. Docket 103. Wise does not object to the
Report and Recommendation’s statement of the facts, and the United States
did not file any objections. The court has conducted a de novo review of the
evidence and incorporates herein the facts as set forth in Magistrate Judge
Duffy’s Report and Recommendation.
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DISCUSSION
“A passenger may suppress evidence found in a vehicle when an
unreasonably extended traffic stop causes the search.” United States v. Davis,
943 F.3d 1129, 1132 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d
1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 2008)). The Report and Recommendation states, and Wise
agrees, that whether he has standing to challenge the search as a passenger
turns on whether the stop was unreasonably extended. Docket 103 at 19;
Docket 109 at 7. The Magistrate Judge concluded that because the stop was
not unreasonably extended, Wise does not have standing to challenge the stop
and suppress evidence obtained from the stop and subsequent search. Docket
103 at 20-27. Wise objects to that conclusion and argues that because the stop
was unreasonably extended, he has standing and the court should suppress
evidence obtained from the search. Docket 109 at 7.
Wise does not dispute that the initial traffic stop for speeding in a
construction zone was proper. Docket 103 at 17. Instead he argues that “tasks
tied to writing citations for the traffic violation and impersonation offense
reasonably could have been completed expeditiously[.]” Docket 109 at 8. Wise
insists that the tasks tied to the initial stop and impersonation or false
identification offense could have been completed shortly after 20:21:38 as
indicated by Trooper Peterson’s dashboard camera video. See id. at 6 (noting
that 7 minutes and 30 seconds into the dash camera footage is “approximately
between 20:21:27 and 20:21:38”); see also Docket 100 (video entered as exhibit
1 at the suppression hearing). And under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
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348 (2015), Wise argues that Trooper Peterson’s actions after that point in time
show that he unreasonably extended the stop. See Docket 109 at 6-8, 11.
In Rodriguez, a driver was stopped by law enforcement after he briefly
swerved onto the shoulder of the road. 575 U.S. at 351. The driver readily
produced for the officer his license, registration, and proof of insurance, and
the officer issued a written warning to the driver. Id. at 351-52. But although
the officer had “got[ten] all the reasons for the stop out of the way,” he did not
consider the car’s occupants “free to leave.” Id. at 352. The officer then walked
his drug dog around the vehicle over the driver’s objection. Id. The drug dog
alerted on the vehicle and a large quantity of methamphetamine was found. Id.
The driver was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance and he moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the stop had
been unreasonably extended. Id. The district court denied the driver’s motion
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 353.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reiterated that an officer’s mission during
a traffic stop typically includes “such inquiries [as] checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver,
and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 355.
But the Court also noted that “the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain
unrelated investigations” if they do not “lengthen the roadside detention.” Id. at
354 (citations omitted). “An officer, in other words, may conduct certain
unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not
do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion
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ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 355. The Court
concluded that “if an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously,
then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete the stop’s
mission.” Id. at 357 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court remanded the case for
the Eighth Circuit to review the district court’s determination that reasonable
suspicion did not exist to extend the stop. Id. at 353, 357-58.
While the Supreme Court’s analysis in Rodriguez is relevant here, the
facts are distinguishable. In Rodriguez, the driver readily produced his license
and vehicle information allowing the officer to promptly check the driver’s
information and issue a warning. Id. at 351-52. Here, the driver of the vehicle,
Needham, initially provided Trooper Peterson with an identification card that
indicated she was “not eligible” for a license, and she provided a rental
agreement for a different vehicle than the one she was driving. Docket 103 at 5,
7. And Needham’s repeated insistence that her license was in fact valid caused
Trooper Peterson to make multiple attempts to verify, using his computer, the
information Needham provided. Id. at 6, 8-9. Trooper Peterson also
accompanied Needham from his patrol vehicle to her vehicle two times during
the stop to retrieve documents that she insisted would corroborate her license
and rental agreement. Id. at 8, 10. Thus, the time it took Trooper Peterson to
complete the tasks tied to the initial stop was prolonged by Needham’s inability
to produce the documentation needed to complete those tasks and her
insistence that she would ultimately be able to do so.
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Beyond the factual distinctions, Rodriguez is also distinguishable based
on when law enforcement extended the stop. In Rodriguez, the officer initiated
a drug investigation after he had completed the tasks associated with the initial
traffic stop, and he did so without reasonable suspicion. 575 U.S. at 352. But
here, it was Trooper Peterson’s observation of a glass jar “consistent with
dispensary type marijuana” in Needham’s vehicle that, when considered along
with her route and demeanor, gave him reasonable suspicion to extend the
stop. Docket 103 at 21; Docket 101 at 27, 31-32. At that point—about
20:29:49 on the video—Trooper Peterson had not determined whether
Needham had a valid license, and he had not seen a valid rental agreement for
her vehicle. See Docket 103 at 10. Trooper Peterson saw the glass jar when he
and Needham approached her vehicle to allow Needham to retrieve the rental
agreement while Trooper Peterson checked the VIN number. Id. at 10-11. Thus,
Trooper Peterson was in the middle of completing the tasks tied to the initial
traffic stop when reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arose allowing him to
extend the stop.
Wise argues that “by [20:21:38] in the traffic video, Trooper Peterson had
already built his case and had the information required to complete the
speeding violation and impersonation offense.” Docket 109 at 8. This argument
overstates Trooper Peterson’s certainty at that point in the stop, and it
misstates the information provided by Needham. By that time, Trooper
Peterson “believed Ms. Needham may have given him a false driver’s license
number to deceive him,” but Needham insisted that Trooper Peterson was
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mistaken, the license number was correct, and she could corroborate it. Docket
103 at 7 (emphasis added). As a result, Trooper Peterson continued the stop in
order to complete the tasks related to the initial stop and to investigate
Needham’s possible use of a false identification. Id. at 7-10. The fact that
Trooper Peterson heeded Needham’s defenses and permitted Needham to
produce what she claimed were corroborating documents shows that he was
diligent in accurately1 completing the tasks tied to the stop, not that he was
dilatory. Trooper Peterson may not have completed those tasks as expeditiously
as Wise would prefer, but that is not the test. The court finds that Trooper
Peterson took the time reasonably required to complete the stop. See
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357. Thus, the stop was not unreasonably extended,
and Wise does not have standing to challenge the search.
CONCLUSION
Because Wise does not have standing to challenge the search, it is
ORDERED that the report and recommendation (Docket 103) is adopted
in full, Wise’s objection (Docket 109) is overruled, and Wise’s motion to
suppress (Docket 82) is denied.
Dated April 11, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 The court’s prior order on the motion to suppress (Docket 123) used the word
“inaccurately” instead of “accurately.”
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