Hundley v. Salisbury et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
JAMES H. HUNDLEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE SALISBURY and WILLIAM
DEVINE, in their individual and
official capacities,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 23-cv-135-JJM-PAS
ORDER
I. 	BACKGROUND
James 	H. 	Hundley, 	Jr, 	an 	inmate 	at 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Department 	of
Corrections (“RIDOC”), brings a Section 1983 action against RIDOC Acting Director,
Wayne Salisbury, and its Warden, William Devine. Mr. Hundley alleges that he was
splashed with extremely hot water while filling a bowl from a faucet, resulting in
second-degree burns to his forearm. 	He asserts that there was no safe place to put
his bowl, and no warning of the high temperature of the water. ECF No. 1.
The Defendants move to dismiss the claims for damages against them in their
official capacity; and to dismiss all claims against them in their individual capacity
for failure to state a claim. 	ECF No. 10. 	Mr. Hundley objects. 	ECF No. 12.
Mr. Hundley also moves to amend his Complaint and to appoint counsel. ECF Nos.
13, 19. Defendants object to both motions. ECF Nos. 17, 21.
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it accepts all plaintiff’s factual allegations as true to decide
whether they “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
	Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The Court may not consider “conclusory legal allegations.”
	Rodríguez-Reyes v.
Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing
Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of
P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “bald assertions, unsupportable
conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like need not be credited.”
Aulson
v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Claims for Damages Against the Defendants in Their Official Capacity
Damages under Section 1983 cannot be obtained against individuals in their
official capacity.
	Wilson v. Brown, 889 F.2d 1195, 1197 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Since [the
plaintiff] clearly sued [the Warden] in his official capacity of Warden . . . asking for
monetary damages rather than for injunctive relief, [plaintiff] has no cognizable claim
under § 1983.”). A warden is a state official for the purposes of Section 1983.
Id. See
also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68 (1989) (state officials acting in
their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and cannot be
sued for damages). 	Therefore, we GRANT the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Mr.
Hundley’s claims for damages against the two Defendants their official capacity,
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limiting Mr. Hundley to injunctive relief. 	ECF No. 1 (“I would also like for changes
to be made to ensure [safety].”).
B. 	Claims Against the Defendants in Their Individual Capacity
Mr. Hundley also sues Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Devine in their individual
capacity for allegedly failing to remedy a dangerous situation, seeking damages and
injunctive relief. ECF No. 1. RIDOC makes four arguments for why the Court should
dismiss 	these 	claims 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6): 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	proper 	claim 	for
supervisory capacity; failure to allege a plausible Eighth Amendment claim; failure
to allege a constitutional substantive due process claim; and qualified immunity.
1. 	Supervisory Capacity
The Defendants are correct that there is no respondeat superior liability under
Section 1983.
	Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358, 367 (1st Cir. 2019) (“Supervisors
cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior”) (citations omitted). But
supervisors can be held liable for their “direct acts or omissions . . . or from indirect
‘conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization.’”
	Rodriguez-Garcia v.
Mun. of Caguas, 495 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing
Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera,
431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009)). A supervisor who did not directly participate in a constitutional
violation may still be liable if his action was “
affirmatively linked” such that it could
be characterized as “‘supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence,’ or
‘gross negligence . . . amounting to deliberate indifference.’”
	Whitfield, 431 F.3d at
14 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
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Mr. Hundley has set forth a plausible claim that the supervisors may have
direct liability, not vicarious. Mr. Hundley alleges that Defendants “didn’t establish
safety mechanisms at the medium security to ensure the safety of the inmates . . .
[i]n fact, they established a dangerous environment.” ECF No. 1 at 4-6 (citing lack of
signage). Mr. Hundley states that he heard “stories of other inmates that was burned
also by this extremely hot water. 	Due to the history of other inmates being burned
in similar ways . . . indicates that the defendants obviously knew of the dangers and
failed to do anything about it.”
Id. at 6. At the pleading stage, Mr. Hundley has met
his burden to show a direct claim against both Defendants.
2. 	Eighth Amendment
Mr. Hundley asserts that the Defendants violated his right under the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is
confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”
Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted). 	Specifically, prison officials must “take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
	Id. (citing
Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). 	To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim,
Mr. Hundley must allege that the conditions of his confinement that purportedly
violated his rights were objectively serious (i.e., posing a “substantial risk of serious
harm”); and that the Defendants had a “deliberate indifference to [an inmates’] health
or safety.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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Even though the standard for establishing an Eight Amendment violation is
high, Mr. Hundley, a self-represented plaintiff, has sufficiently pleaded an Eighth
Amendment claim. 	He claims that the Defendants knew about this dangerous
condition and yet did nothing about it. He also alleges that he suffered serious harm
as a result in terms of second-degree burns and permanent scarring on his left arm.
ECF No. 1 at 4-5. At the pleading stage, this claim survives the Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss.
3. 	Fourteenth Amendment
Mr. 	Hundley 	believes 	he 	was 	deprived 	of 	a 	lack 	of 	due care 	from 	the
Defendants, who should have protected him against and/or warned him of the
extremely hot temperature of the water coming from the faucet. 	ECF 1 at 4-6. 	He
alleges that Defendants acted “negligently or recklessly” in failing to remedy the
situation, either by keeping the water temperature too high, failing to warn of the hot
water, failing to install a place for bowls to be set down under the faucet, or locating
the water basin too closely to the faucet (as examples of how this protected liberty
interest was violated).
Id.
Because Mr. Hundley is currently incarcerated, we view this case under the
Eighth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause.
See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (“[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due
process, must be the guide.”) (citing
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994),
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denying rehearing, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994)). Mr. Hundley is not a pretrial detainee and
has plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of his
confinement.
	Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (pretrial
detainees are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth, but the
“deliberate indifference” standard applies to either claim)
. 	For these reasons, we
GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the substantive due process claim.
4. 	Qualified Immunity
Finally, 	the 	Defendants 	assert 	that 	the 	claims 	against 	them 	should 	be
dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. 	“Unless the plaintiff's
allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (citation omitted). 	The singular basis
to support the Defendants’ claim for qualified immunity is that Mr. Hundley “has
failed to allege State Defendants violated his Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment
rights regarding the alleged ‘dangerous condition’ of the hot water spigot, and
therefore, his Complaint fails to allege that State Defendants violated any clearly
established constitutional right such that State Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity.” ECF No. 10-1 at 12. But as stated above, the Court has found
that the treatment Mr. Hundley received in prison and the conditions under which
he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. 	This is clearly
established law as set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 	See
Farmer, 511
U.S. at 832. At the pleading stage, these claims are not barred by qualified immunity.
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C. 	Motion to Amend
Mr. Hundley moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend his Complaint to add
Jason A. Butterworth as a defendant. 	ECF No. 13. 	He says that he has just
determined the full name of the correctional officer that worked in the area where his
injuries occurred. The Defendants object, arguing that he fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. ECF No. 17. They argue that because Mr. Hundley has
failed to articulate a constitutional injury, the amendment is futile.
Id. Because the
Court has ruled that Mr. Hundley has properly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim,
the Defendants’ objection is not well-taken. 	The Court GRANTS Mr. Hundley’s
Motion to Amend his Complaint. ECF No. 13.
D. 	Motion to Appoint Counsel
Finally, Mr. Hundley ask the Court to appoint him counsel. ECF No. 19. The
Defendants object. 	ECF No. 21. 	Because the Court has limited resources available
to locate counsel to take a pro bono appointment, the Court generally reserves
appointment for cases that are, at a minimum, complex. Mr. Hundley has presented
a straightforward factual and legal case and to date has represented himself well.
The Court therefore DENIES without prejudice Mr. Hundley’s Motion to Appoint
Counsel but will reconsider if this matter is scheduled for trial.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment claim and claims for damages
against individuals in their official capacity, but allowing the Eighth Amendment
claim to proceed against Defendants in an individual capacity. 	ECF No. 10. 	The
Court GRANTS the Motion to Amend and joins Mr. Butterworth as a defendant on
all remaining claims. ECF No. 13. The Court DENIES without prejudice the Motion
to Appoint Counsel. ECF No. 19.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ John J. McConnell Jr.
_________________________________
John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge
December 5, 2023
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