USA v. Medina et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. No. 21-cr-62-JJM-PAS

ANDRES GARAY,
Defendant.

REVISED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER!

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Chief Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Andres Garay’s Motion to Suppress based on his
detention and the search and seizure of his car. ECF No. 54. Mr. Garay alleges that
there was no probable cause for his arrest and therefore the evidence derived from
his arrest is the fruit of the poisonous tree. See id. at 1-2. The government contends
that leading up to Mr. Garay’s arrest, police made various observations of Mr. Garay
and a gray Toyota Camry that led them to suspect that he was involved in a drug
trafficking conspiracy with Edgar Medina-a conspiracy that involved two armed men
abducting a United States Postal Service (“USPS”) employee. See ECF No. 55 at 1.

I. BACKGROUND?2
Two unidentified individuals abducted a USPS employee at gunpoint. During

the abduction, the two individuals asked the USPS employee about a package that

1 This Memorandum & Order (“M&O”) replaces the M&O filed on August 18,

2022. ECF No. 68.
2 Because the parties both rely on the affidavit of Postal Inspector Richard F.

Atwood (ECF No. 55-1) for their facts, the Court will do the same.

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the Post Office had delivered to an address on Melrose Avenue in Providence, Rhode
Island from Puerto Rico.

After speaking to witnesses about the abduction of the postal employee,
investigators searched USPS proprietary databases for inbound parcels from Puerto
Rico that might be connected to folks involved in the parcel previously delivered to
Melrose Avenue. The investigators found that one person (i.e., the same IP address)
inquired into the tracking status of two packages: one to be delivered to Melrose
Avenue (“Melrose Ave Parcel”) and one to be delivered to an apartment on Harris
Avenue (“Harris Ave Parcel”). Both packages were shipped from Puerto Rico.? “[Tlhe
handwriting on the label for both parcels, based on [the] training and experience [of
Inspector Atwood], appeared to be the same.”4 ECF No. 55-1 at 4. One of the names
associated with the Melrose Ave Parcel was Mr. Medina, and the name associated
with the Harris Ave Parcel was Mr. Medina’s mother. Shortly after the Harris Ave
Parcel was delivered, Mr. Medina’s mother retrieved the package from the apartment

mailbox, and then an individual in a gray Toyota arrived at the building. That

3 “Despite being sent on the same date, the parcels listed different senders,
were sent from different post offices in Puerto Rico, and/or were sent to different
recipients and/or address in Rhode Island. However, the parcels were tracked by the
same IP address, causing officials to believe that the parcels were related, despite
efforts of the sender(s) to conceal the connection between the parcels.” ECF No. 55-1
at 4n.1.

4 The inspector’s statement that the handwriting seemed similar is challenged
by Mr. Garay because the inspector is not a handwriting expert. But, to determine
probable cause, a trained law enforcement officer’s (or perhaps even a lay person’s)
opinion that handwriting is similar is a reasonable factor to be considered. As the
government correctly points out, “general handwriting comparisons are proper even
for jurors, expert opinion ... is not necessary.” ECF No. 160 at 4. See, eg., United
States v. Keene, 341 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2003).

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individual walked into the apartment and left soon after “carrying a bag with a large
item inside.” Jd. at 6.

Further, a review of USPS database showed that a parcel from Puerto Rico was
delivered to Mr. Medina at George Waterman Road, Johnson, Rhode Island (“GW
Road Parcel”) with handwriting resembling the Melrose Ave Parcel and the Harris
Ave Parcel. Jd. at 6-7.

Postal inspectors came to learn that another parcel was shipped to “Mr.
Medina [on] George Waterman Rd Johnston, RI 02919,” (“GW Parcel 2”). Jd. at 8. “A
review of USPS databases . . . revealed [that] the return address did not exist.”5 Jd.
at 8. Inspector Atwood “learned that either the same individual or device that was
querying the status of GW PARCEL 2... was also querying the status of alnother]
parcel shipped from Puerto Rico” to an address on Atlantic Avenue in Providence
(“Atlantic Ave Parcel”). Jd. at 8-9. Again, the return address for the Atlantic Ave
Parcel did not exist. Furthermore, “the same individual or device that was querying
the status of the ATLANTIC AVE PARCEL was also querying the status of a parcel”
shipped on the same day from Puerto Rico to an address on Congress Avenue in

Providence (“Congress Ave Parcel”). Jd, at 8. Once more, the return address for the

Congress Ave Parcel did not exist.®

5 “The sender’s name... was the same last name as an individual who received
mail at... George Waterman Road.” ECF No. 55-1 at 8.

6 The individuals to whom the Atlantic Ave Parcel and the Congress Ave Parcel
were shipped did not live there. “[Nlarcotics traffickers often use fictious sender
names, along with existing return addresses, on parcels containing controlled
substances or proceeds from the sale of controlled substances.” ECF No. 55-1 at 4

nol.

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A Magistrate Judge authorized search warrants for the GW Parcel 2, the
Atlantic Ave Parcel, and the Congress Ave Parcel. A Rhode Island State Trooper's
narcotic trained K-9 “reacted in a positive manner” to each parcel, “indicating the
presence of a narcotic odor.” See id. at 10-11. The police then executed the search
warrant, revealing all three parcels had “a white powdery substance, which field
tested positive for cocaine. The collective weight from all three parcels was 3.25
kilograms (3250 grams).” Jd. at 11.

On the day these parcels were to be delivered, surveillance was set up around
the George Waterman Road residence. Mr. Garay arrived at roughly 8:30 a.m. ina
gray Toyota Camry. There, an individual met with both Mr. Medina and Mr. Garay
outside. Mr. Garay then left the George Waterman Road location and was seen on
Congress Avenue later that morning. The Toyota Camry was parked down the street
from the package’s destination. Mr. Garay walked down the street, and turned
around, returning to his car. He “exitled] the parking spot, travelled] past [the]
Congress Avenue [delivery location] at a slow rate of speed, and later returnled] to
the same parking spot.” Jd. at 12. After the police took Mr. Medina and another
confederate into custody, “the surveillance team then responded to the Toyota Camry

... occupied by [Mr.] Garay and took him into custody.” Id, at 15.
The police then searched Mr. Garay’s Toyota Camry. Law enforcement officials

uncovered

one black expendable baton .. ., one black Taser... and two black surgical
masks .... The black surgical masks match the description provided by [the
USPS worker] VICTIM-1 as being worn by the individuals who held him at

gunpoint.

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Id. at 15.

The grand jury issued a Second Superseding Indictment charging Mr. Garay
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine,
kidnapping, possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of
cocaine, and attempted possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or
more of cocaine. ECF No. 81 (Counts 1-4).

II. DISCUSSION’

Mr. Garay alleges that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him and
therefore the Court should suppress the evidence gathered from a post-arrest search
of his car his car as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

“Law enforcement officers may effect warrantless arrests provided that they
have probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a
crime.” United States v. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, q 26 (1st Cir. 1995). “Probable
cause exists when police officers, relying on reasonably trustworthy facts and

circumstances, have information upon which a reasonably prudent person would

7 An evidentiary hearing is not needed here because the Court has determined
that Mr. Garay has not made a “sufficient threshold showing that material facts were
in doubt or dispute.” United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2009). “A
hearing is required only if the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that
material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved
on a paper record. Most importantly, the defendant must show that there are factual
disputes which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to the requested relief.”
United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v.
Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir. 1996)) (upholding district court’s decision to forgo
evidentiary hearing on motion to suppress)). The Court grants Mr. Garay’s request
to supplement the record with the inventory sheet. ECF No. 62 at 1.

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believe the suspect committed or was committing a crime.” United States v. Centeno-
Gonzélez, 989 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Burhoe, 409 F.3d
5, 10 (1st Cir. 2005)). “Probable cause is also a ‘commonsense, nontechnical
conception[] that dealls] with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.””® United States
v. Burhoe, 409 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (citing Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)). Therefore, “[p]robable cause must be
evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances.” United States v. Uricoechea-
Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 165 (1st Cir. 1991).

Mr. Garay argues that there was insufficient information before his arrest that
“implicates [him] in any criminal activity.” ECF No. 54 at 7. As a result, he argues,
his arrest was without probable cause. On the other hand, the government responds
by arguing that the counter-surveillance of Mr. Garay provided trained law
enforcement officers with probable cause. The government supplements this with the
fact that Mr. Garay “met with [Mr.] Medina and a third person, and less than two
hours later parked outside 102/104 Congress Ave, where another of the drug parcels
was destined to be delivered—consequently, to a person not associated with that

address.” ECF No. 55 at 4.

8 This reasonably prudent person is that of a reasonably prudent police officer.
As the government notes in their brief, this prudence allows police officers “to draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude
an untrained person.” ECF No. 55 at 3 (internal quotations omitted) (citing United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

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The Court finds that a reasonably prudent officer would have, and did have,
probable cause to arrest Mr. Garay based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Mr.
Garay’s actions conducting surveillance in support of drug deliveries on June 8, 2021,
the morning of his arrest, when combined with the investigative information the
officers had obtained about the packages, meets the probable cause standard.

As to the packages, the handwriting on the Melrose Ave Parcel and Harris Ave
Parcel appeared to be similar. One individual queried the status of both packages,
despite them being shipped to different addresses.2 The GW Parcel 2!° was
discovered to contain cocaine, and the handwriting on the Harris Ave Parcel, the
Melrose Ave Parcel, and the GW Road Parcel were similar. A reasonable officer could
conclude that these packages were likely to contain illegal drugs.

As to Mr. Garay’s movements in the immediate area of where parcels
containing cocaine were scheduled to be delivered that day and law enforcements’
training and experience, led the investigators to reasonably conclude that Mr. Garay’s
behavior was consistent with counter-surveillance. That Mr. Garay remained in the
parked gray Toyota Camry, a vehicle already associated with the drug trafficking
operation, for several more hours until the Congress Ave Parcel was delivered,

indicates to experienced investigators that Mr. Garay was acting as a lookout and

9 “(T]he parcels were tracked by the same IP address, causing officials to
believe that the parcels were related, notwithstanding efforts of the sender(s) to
conceal the connection between the parcels.” ECF No. 55-1 at 4n.1.

10 The GW Parcel 2 had a return address from A. Parsons in Puerto Rico. Given
GW Parcel 2’s seeming connection to the Harris Ave Parcel and the Melrose Ave
Parcel, and GW Road Parcel’s connection to GW Parcel 2, it is reasonable to conclude

that they are all related.

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waiting for the drug Congress Ave. Parcel to arrive." When considered with Mr.
Garay’s “counter-surveillance” around the delivery site for the Congress Ave Parcel,
a reasonably prudent officer could “believe the suspect had committed or was
committing a crime.” The inference is that Mr. Garay was on the lookout for the
delivery of packages containing the same contents as packages previously delivered
to Mr. Medina from Puerto Rico. _
Thus, the Court finds that there was probable cause of the police to arrest Mr.
Garay.!2
Ill. CONCLUSION
When taken in their totality, the circumstances at the time of the arrest and
their investigative facts uncovered beforehand, tend to suggest that Mr. Garay was
involved in a drug conspiracy with Mr. Medina. As a result, the police had probable
cause to arrest Mr. Garay and therefore the evidence before the Court is not be

suppressed. The Court DENIES Mr. Garay’s Motion to Suppress. ECF No. 54.

11 Mr. Garay points out that “government agents had stopped another person
in the neighborhood that morning for behavior substantially similar to [Mr.] Garay’s.”
ECF No. 118 at 3. The facts that law enforcement may have suspected another of
committing a crime who in fact was innocent, does not negate the totality of the
circumstances that lead them to believe, through commendable police work, that Mr.
Garay was involved in a drug conspiracy.

12 Mr. Garay also argues that the police exceeded their constitutional scope in
searching his car. But an officer may search the entire automobile if “it is reasonable
to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 351 (2009). As reflected above, it is reasonable to presume that Mr. Garay
retrieved a package from Mr. Medina’s mother containing drugs in his Toyota Camry.
Indeed, it is part of the conspiracy. As a result, it would be reasonable for officers to
search his entire car for the package or indications towards its contents. Thus, the
search of Mr. Garay’s entire automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment, nor

were its contents fruit of the poisonous tree

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

i

pe LA

John J. McConnell, Jr.
United States District Chief Judge

August 22, 2022

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