Relentless Inc et al v. U.S. Department of Commerce et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
RELENTLESS INC., et al., 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 20-108 WES
)
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
__________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
In 	this 	suit, 	Plaintiffs 	Relentless 	Inc. 	(“Relentless”),
Huntress, Inc. (“Huntress”), and Seafreeze Fleet LLC (“Seafreeze”)
(collectively, 	“Plaintiffs”) 	seek 	a 	permanent 	injunction 	and
declaratory 	judgment 	prohibiting 	Defendants1 	from 	enforcing 	an
industry-funded 	at-sea 	monitor 	mandate 	on 	Atlantic 	herring
fishermen, 	which 	was 	promulgated 	through 	the 	New 	England 	Fishery
Management Council’s Industry Funded Monitoring Omnibus Amendment
(“IFM 	Amendment”), 	see 	85 	Fed. 	Reg. 	7,414 	(to 	be 	codified 	at 	50
C.F.R. 	pt. 	648), 	and 	the 	February 	7, 	2020 	Final 	Rule 	(“Final
1 	Defendants 	to 	this 	suit 	are: 	the 	U.S. 	Department 	of
Commerce; 	Wilber 	L. 	Ross, 	Jr., 	in 	his 	official 	capacity 	as
Secretary 	of 	Commerce; 	National 	Oceanic 	and 	Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”); Neil Jacobs, in his official capacity as
Acting 	Administrator 	of 	NOAA; 	National 	Marine 	Fisheries 	Service,
a/k/a 	NOAA 	Fisheries; 	and 	Chris 	Oliver, 	in 	his 	official 	capacity
as Assistant Administrator for NOAA Fisheries.
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Rule”). 	Compl. 	1, 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	Defendants 	move 	to 	transfer 	this
action 	to 	the 	U.S. 	District 	Court 	for 	the 	District 	of 	Columbia
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, where they state they intend to move
to 	consolidate 	this 	case 	with 	Loper 	Bright 	Enterprises 	v.
Department 	of 	Commerce, 	C.A. 	No. 	20-466 	(D.D.C.), 	which 	also
challenges the IFM Amendment and Final Rule.
Pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1404(a), 	“a 	district 	court 	may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it 	might 	have 	been 	brought” 	for 	the 	“convenience 	of 	parties 	and
witnesses, 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	justice[.]” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1404(a).
In 	evaluating 	the 	appropriateness 	of 	a 	transfer 	of 	venue, 	courts
weigh 	the 	private 	interests 	of 	litigants 	and 	public 	interest
factors. 	See 	Piper 	Aircraft 	v. 	Reyno, 	454 	U.S. 	235, 	241 	n.6
(1981). 	Courts 	have 	broad 	discretion 	in 	ruling 	on 	motions 	to
transfer, but, in so doing, must consider the “strong presumption
in 	favor 	of 	the 	plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	forum 	. 	. 	. 	.” 	Coady 	v.
Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). 	The moving party
bears the burden of showing transfer is warranted. 	Id.
Here, 	Defendants 	argue 	the 	Court 	should 	transfer 	the 	case
because 	(1) 	transfer 	serves 	the 	interests 	of 	justice; 	(2) 	the
first-filed 	rule 	favors 	transfer 	because 	an 	identical 	suit 	was
filed 	in 	a 	different 	jurisdiction 	first; 	(3) 	this 	action 	could
have 	been 	brought 	initially 	in 	the 	U.S. 	District 	Court 	for 	the
District 	of 	Columbia; 	and 	(4) 	transfer 	serves 	the 	convenience 	of
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the parties. 	See generally Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to
Transfer Venue to the District of Columbia, ECF No. 10-1. 	Although
Plaintiffs 	concede 	that 	the 	U.S. 	District 	Court 	for 	the 	District
of Columbia is a possible alternative forum, Plaintiffs’ choice of
forum carries the day here.
First, 	the 	Loper 	suit 	is 	not 	identical 	because 	Plaintiffs
assert various factual and legal differences, the significance of
which 	are 	yet 	to 	be 	litigated; 	accordingly, 	the 	first-filed 	rule
does not apply. 	Second, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs
would 	not 	be 	inconvenienced 	if 	this 	matter 	were 	transferred.
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	they 	will 	proffer 	evidence 	beyond 	the
administrative 	record; 	indeed, 	the 	crux 	of 	their 	claim 	is 	that
their 	unique 	fishing 	styles 	make 	the 	IFM 	Amendment 	particularly
burdensome and costly for their vessels. 	See Compl. ¶¶ 9-11, 61.
Plaintiffs 	reside 	and 	operate 	in 	Rhode 	Island 	and 	Massachusetts,
rendering 	the 	instant 	venue 	more 	convenient 	than 	the 	District 	of
Columbia.
Finally, 	Defendants 	contend 	that 	consolidation 	would 	serve
the 	interests 	of 	justice 	because 	coordinated 	proceedings 	would
eliminate 	the 	possibility 	of 	conflicting 	orders 	and 	unnecessary
costs 	due 	to 	the 	duplication 	of 	efforts. 	This 	concern 	is
overstated. 	The Loper suit seemingly contains differences of both
law and fact, and this Court may very well have the benefit of the
decision on the cross-motions for summary judgment pending in Loper
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before deciding similar motions here. 	See Docket, Loper, C.A. No.
20-466 	(D.D.C.). 	Accordingly, 	judicial 	economy 	would 	not 	be
greatly served by transferring this matter.
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Transfer
Venue, ECF No. 10, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: August 25, 2020
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