Cruz-Santana et al v. Gonzalez-Ramos et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JULIE CRUZ-SANTANA, in
representation of MARTIN MEDINA DE
LA CRUZ,
Petitioners,
v.
REBECCA GONZALEZ-RAMOS, GARRETT
J. RIPA, TODD LYONS, KRISTI NOEM,
PAMELA BONDI, and W. STEPHEN
MULDROW, all in their official
capacities,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-1028 (GMM)
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Martin Medina de La Cruz’s (“Petitioner”
or “Mr. Medina”), by way of his attorney Julie Cruz-Santana,
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Urgent Motion Requesting
Order Prohibiting the Transfer of Petitioner from Puerto Rico to
Other Jurisdiction and That This Court Conduct a Bond Hearing
Forthwith (“Urgent Motion”). (Docket Nos. 1, 5).
Pursuant to the reasoning below, this Court GRANTS the Urgent
Motion as to Petitioner’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”) and HOLDS IN ABEYANCE the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus as to the remaining prayers for relief. This Court hereby
ORDERS that the United States, its agencies, and employees shall
not transfer Petitioner outside of the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico
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and that he be granted a bond hearing conducted by an Immigration
Judge under the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review (“EOIR”).
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Medina, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered
Puerto Rico without inspection on October 27, 2018. (Docket No. 1
at 4). On December 26, 2020, Mr. Medina wed in good faith Nereida
Lopez Cordova, a U.S. citizen. (Id.). They divorced on August 5,
2021, but remarried on June 25, 2022. (Id.). Mr. Medina alleges
that, during his marriage, he was subject to physical and
psychological aggression by his wife, which led him to file a
restraining order against her. (Id.). Based on the violence he
experienced in his marriage, Mr. Medina filed a petition under the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”) on September 29, 2023,
seeking protection from immigration authorities. (Id.). His case
was accepted and is pending resolution. (Id.). In the interim, Mr.
Medina has been issued employment authorizations and a prima facie
certification of protection which has been renewed on three
occasions. (Id.).
On January 18, 2026, Mr. Medina was arrested by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents at Placita
Caribe, a grocery store in the Puerto Nuevo neighborhood within
San Juan, Puerto Rico. (Id. at 2). According to the Petition for
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Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mr. Medina was relocated to Aguadilla
Processing Center, where he remains under physical custody. (Id.).
As pled, the following federal officials (collectively,
“Government”) authorize Mr. Medina’s detention: Rebecca González-
Ramos, Special Agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations
in San Juan; Garrett J. Ripa, Miami Field Office Director for ICE,
who oversees Puerto Rico’s Immigration and Removal Operations
conducted at the ICE Office in GSA Guaynabo Detention Facility;
Todd Lyons, Acting Director for ICE; Kristi Noem, Secretary of
Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General;
and W. Stephen Muldrow, United States District Attorney for the
District of Puerto Rico. (Id. at 3-4; see also Docket No. 4).
On January 21, 2026, Mr. Medina filed a verified Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Mr. Medina alleges his detention violates
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and his due process
rights of access to counsel and adequate conditions of confinement
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(Docket No. 1 at 9-12). He seeks, in part, an immediate TRO
prohibiting the Government, their agents, and employees from
transferring Petitioner out of the District of Puerto Rico until
he receives a bond hearing and until his writ of habeas corpus is
fully reviewed. (Id. at 12-13). In addition, Mr. Medina asks this
Court to grant his habeas petition and to award him reasonable
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costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Id. at 13).
To accompany Mr. Medina’s habeas petition, three other
motions were also filed on January 21, 2026. First, a Supplemental
Motion to Habeas Corpus Petition (Dkt. 1) was filed containing an
affidavit from Mr. Medina’s immigration attorney, Counsel Julie
Cruz Santana, affirming Mr. Medina’s current detention, his
likelihood of being transferred out of the jurisdiction because
there are no immigration detention centers in Puerto Rico, and the
obstacles that come with litigating in a different jurisdiction.
(Docket No. 4). Second, the Urgent Motion was filed, which asks
the Court to grant an immediate TRO. (Docket No. 5). Lastly,
Petitioner filed a Motion in Compliance demonstrating that service
had been conducted or commenced as to each Government official.
(Docket No. 6).
At this emergency juncture, the Court only addresses whether
to issue a TRO.1
1 To the extent that this Court must review Petitioner’s habeas petition –
without deciding the merits of the habeas itself - to review Petitioner’s prayer
for a TRO, it has the jurisdiction to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(providing federal courts with jurisdiction to review habeas petitions filed by
immigration detainees who assert that they are “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). Moreover, as pled,
Petitioner alleges having exhausted his administration remedies. See (Docket
No. 1 at 4). Nevertheless, this Court currently refrains from deciding the writ
of habeas corpus. See also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 510 F.3d 1,
11 (1st Cir. 2007).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) controls this Court’s
analysis. TROs can be issued with or without notice to the adverse
parties.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
Courts have interpreted the standard for issuing a TRO “the
same as [those] for a preliminary injunction.” Servicios Legales
de P.R., Inc. v. Union Independiente de Trabajadores de Servicios
Legales, 376 F. Supp. 3d 163, 166 (D.P.R. 2019) (citation omitted).
In order for a court to grant a TRO, a plaintiff “‘must establish
[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
[4] that the injunction is in the public interest.” Peoples Fed.
Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2012)
(quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008)). Petitioner “bears the burden of demonstrating that these
four factors weigh in its favor.” Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-
Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006).
A TRO, like a preliminary injunction, is “an extraordinary
and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right.” Peoples
2 Notice has been provided. See (Docket No. 6) (demonstrating service was
conducted on Government officials Ms. González-Ramos and Mr. Muldrow and the
remaining Government officials have been tendered service by certified mail);
Muñiz-Negrón v. Worthington Cylinder Corp., No. 17-CV-1985-RAM, 2021 WL 5313002,
at *2 (D.P.R. Aug. 16, 2021).
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Fed. Sav. Bank, 672 F.3d at 8-9 (quoting Voice of the Arab World,
Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011);
accord Mass. Coal. of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civ. Def.
Agency & Off. of Emergency Preparedness, 649 F.2d 71, 76 n.7 (1st
Cir. 1981). “[T]rial courts have wide discretion in making
judgments regarding the appropriateness of” TRO relief. Sanchez v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2009). Thus,
granting a TRO is “a matter for the discretion of the district
court and is reversible, of course, only for an abuse of
discretion.” Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641
F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
III. APPLICATION OF LAW
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To assess whether Petitioner is likely to succeed on the
merits in requesting a bond hearing, the Court must first address
the threshold question of which statute provides the Government
with the legal basis to detain Mr. Medina.
The INA affords the Government the authority to detain certain
noncitizens. Importantly, the INA differentiates between mandatory
detention and discretionary detention. Only the latter provides a
detainee with an entitlement to a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge. Two statutory provisions control this
distinction: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226.
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Section 1225 governs the detention of noncitizens who have
not been “admitted” under the INA. As relevant here, Section 1225
provides for inspection of “[a]ll [noncitizens] . . . who are
applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or
readmission to or transit through the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(3). An “applicant for admission” is defined as “[a
noncitizen] present in the United States who has not been admitted
or who arrives in the United States . . . .” Id. § 1225(a)(1).
Notably, Section 1225(b)(2) marshals a mandatory detention scheme
by providing that, for noncitizens who are “applicant[s] for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that a
[noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen] shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a [for full removal proceedings].”
Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Detention under Section 1225(b)(2) is
generally mandatory, and the statute does not provide for bond
hearings. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Section 1226, by contrast, governs the “usual removal
process” and affords noncitizens procedural protections not
available in expedited removal proceedings. See Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Under Section
1226, a noncitizen who is “arrested and detained” faces three
potential outcomes: the Attorney General “may continue to detain
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the arrested [noncitizen]”; the Attorney General “may release the
[noncitizen] on bond of at least $1,500”; or the Attorney General
“may release the [noncitizen] on conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a). Section 1226(a) therefore “establishes a discretionary
detention framework for noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-
11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *1 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025).
Where removal and detention of a noncitizen is discretionary,
rather than mandatory, Section 1226(a) entitles a noncitizen to an
initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the
opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence,
the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when
circumstances materially change. See also Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022); Doe v. Tompkins, 11
F.4th 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding that the Government bears the
burden of proving at an initial bond hearing held under Section
1226(a) that (1) a noncitizen poses a danger to the community based
on clear and convincing evidence, or (2) the noncitizen poses a
flight risk based on a preponderance of the evidence); Brito v.
Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 246 (1st Cir. 2021) (same).
Excepted from the general rule of discretionary detention
under Section 1226(a) are noncitizens involved in specific
enumerated criminal activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Under
Section 1226(c), in accordance with the Laken Riley Act enacted
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in January 2025, the Government is required to detain certain
noncitizens who fall within the statute’s criminal categories.
1. Discretionary detention applies as to Mr. Medina
Here, as pled, Mr. Medina entered the country without
authorization in 2018, has a pending VAWA self-petition for
eligibility to become a lawful permanent resident as a victim of
domestic violence, and was “arrested and detained” by ICE officials
in January 2026. See generally (Docket No. 1). Given that Section
1226(a) governs detention for noncitizens who were “arrested and
detained” while residing in the United States, interpreting
Section 1225(b)(2) to apply to this same category would render it
and amendments under the Laken Riley Act superfluous. See Gomes,
2025 WL 1869299, at *6-7 (outlining statutory interpretation of
Section 1226(a) and Section 1225(b)(2) that demonstrates that an
arrest and detention of noncitizens residing in the United States
cannot fall under Section 1225(b)(2)). Such an interpretation
would also conflict with the INA’s structural distinction between
arriving applicants for admission and noncitizens already present
in the United States and arrested within the country.
Thus, at this juncture, based on the allegations in the
petition, the Court finds that Section 1226(a)’s discretionary
regime likely governs the detention because Mr. Medina was arrested
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while residing in the United States. This interpretation aligns
with the statutory distinction between arriving applicants for
admission (governed by Section 1225) and noncitizens who are
already present in the United States and are later arrested and
detained (governed by Section 1226). Applying Section 1225(b)(2)
to this factual posture would blur that distinction and render
Section 1226(a) effectively redundant, contrary to basic
principles of statutory interpretation. Nor, with the information
that this Court has before it, has Mr. Medina disclosed any
criminal record at all, which could otherwise subject him to the
mandatory detention exception outlined under Section 1226(c). See
generally (Docket No. 1); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19,
26-27 (1st Cir. 2021); Rodriguez-Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196.
Accordingly, the Court proceeds under the assumption that
Section 1226(a) applies, subject to further factual development.
2. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits
Where removal and detention of a noncitizen is discretionary,
rather than mandatory, Section 1226(a), entitles a noncitizen to
an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the
opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence,
the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when
circumstances materially change. Rodriguez-Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1202;
see also Doe, 11 F.4th at 2.
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From the record before this Court, it appears that Petitioner
did not receive a bond hearing. See (Docket No. 1 at 8-9). As
alleged by Petitioner, the Government purportedly bases its
decision to not grant a bond hearing by resting upon a recent
decision issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). This administrative
decision found that Immigration Judges do not have jurisdiction
over custody redeterminations for noncitizens who were present in
the United States without admission. Id. at 220-28. This Court,
however is not bound by BIA interpretations that conflict with the
statutory text or controlling circuit precedent. See Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024) (noting “agencies
have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities,”
but “(c)ourts do”).
That is, district courts that have considered this issue have,
after conducting persuasive, well-reasoned analyses of the
statutory language and legislative history, rejected Matter of
Yajure Hurtado’s interpretation and routinely upheld the right to
a bond hearing under circumstances akin to those of Petitioner.
See, e.g., Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 29 n.11 (D. Mass.
2025) (noting the court’s disagreement with the BIA’s analysis in
Yajure Hurtado); Elias Escobar v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-12620, 2025 WL
2823324, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); Moreira Aguiar v. Moniz,
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No. 25-CV-12706, 2025 WL 2987656, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2025);
Tomas Elias v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-540, 2025 WL 3004437, at *3 (D.R.I.
Oct. 27, 2025); Lora-Salazar v. Ripa, No. 26-CV-1014-MAJ (D.P.R.
Jan. 13, 2026) (Docket Nos. 5, 13). In the same vein, district
courts have similarly rejected the adoption of a broad
interpretation of 1225(b)(2) that would, consequently, generate
overlap with Section 1226(a) as to erroneously deny the
noncitizen’s right to a bond hearing. See generally Jimenez v. FCI
Berlin, Warden, 799 F. Supp. 3d 59 (D.N.H. 2025); Rodriguez v.
Nessinger, No. 25-CV-505, 2025 WL 3306576 (D.R.I. Oct. 17, 2025);
Doe v. Moniz, 800 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D. Mass. 2025); Loa Caballero
v. Baltazar, No. 25-CV-3120, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22,
2025); dos Santos v. Noem, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14,
2025); Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-CV-12664-PBS, 2025 WL
2809996 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025) (granting a preliminary injunction
to release a Petitioner unless provided with a bond hearing
compliant with Hernandez-Lara).
This Court joins its sister courts. This Court finds that
Petitioner has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the
merits of his claim that, because he is being detained pursuant to
Section 1226(a), he is entitled to a bond hearing.
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B. Irreparable Harm
The Court turns next to the irreparable harm prong of a TRO
analysis. When evaluating the expedition of equitable relief,
“[an] injunction should issue only where [it is] essential in order
effectually to protect . . . rights against injuries otherwise
irremediable.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312
(1982) (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
Here, the “irremediable” injury would be threefold: detention;
removal from this Court’s jurisdiction pending Mr. Medina’s habeas
corpus proceedings; and the ensuing, imminent consequences that
such removal would have on his person and his rights.
Without a bond hearing, Mr. Medina faces a potentially
prolonged period of detention, depriving him of his liberty.
Ferrara v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 (D. Mass. 2005)
(“Obviously, the loss of liberty is a . . . severe form of
irreparable injury.”). During this time, Mr. Medina would also
face a substantial risk of confinement in facilities that courts
have repeatedly found raise serious health, safety, and due process
concerns. See, e.g., Mercado v. Noem, 800 F. Supp. 3d 526, 545
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (discussing allegations of “significant
overcrowding, pervasive unsanitary conditions, lack of basic
hygiene resources, insufficient food and water, inadequate
sleeping conditions, substandard medical care, and extremely
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significant restrictions on attorney-client communications” in a
New York immigration detention center).
Importantly, the Court must note that Mr. Medina, as alleged,
is a survivor of domestic abuse and is currently petitioning for
a pathway to permanent residency under VAWA. See (Docket No. 1 at
4). Saddling Mr. Medina with such conditions of confinement -
without a bond hearing with a proper evaluation of the specific
circumstances that pertain to him - would only add to the heavy
psychological toll being a survivor of gender-based violence
places on his shoulders. These considerations are directly
relevant to an individualized custody determination at a bond
hearing. Remaining behind bars would likely exacerbate this as he
would likely not receive the mental and medical treatment needed
as a survivor of gender-based violence.
Moreover, without a TRO, Mr. Medina would be likely be
transferred to an immigration detention facility in mainland
United States and separated from his counsel – which raises grave
concerns as to his constitutional right to access to counsel.
As such, the Court finds this factor also weighs in Mr.
Medina’s favor.
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
The remaining preliminary injunction factors - the balance of
equities and the public interest - “merge when the Government is
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the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)
The First Circuit has repeatedly held that where, as here,
the Government is likely acting contrary to the plain text of
federal law, the balance of equities weighs against it. See New
York v. Trump, 133 F.4th 51, 71 (1st Cir. 2025); New Jersey v.
Trump, 131 F.4th 27, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2025). Relatedly, it is well-
settled that “there is generally no public interest in the
perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” Rhode Island v. Trump,
155 F.4th 35, 50 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
Indeed, this Court understands that the opposite is true:
proper enforcement of immigration laws is in the public interest;
and the Government will not be harmed by - nor do they have an
interest in - the violation of the plain text of federal law. See,
e.g., Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9 n.7.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the verified
certification of counsel contained therein, accompanying motions,
and the sworn affidavit submitted, (Docket Nos. 1, 4-5), this Court
finds at this juncture that irreparable harm is likely to befall
Mr. Medina if the TRO is denied.
As such, this Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion as to
Petitioner’s request for a TRO and HOLDS IN ABEYANCE the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus as to the remaining prayers for relief.
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This Court ORDERS that the Government shall not transfer Petitioner
outside of Puerto Rico and that he be granted a bond hearing before
an Immigration Judge, no later than February 2, 2026 at 5:00 P.M.
The Government shall inform by February 3, 2026 whether such bond
hearing has been held and its outcome. The Government must also
file a pleading responsive to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ and
Habeas Corpus by February 3, 2026 at 5:00 P.M. This Order grants
only temporary injunctive relief and does not adjudicate the merits
of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on January 22, 2026.
/s/ Gina R. Méndez-Miró
GINA R. MÉNDEZ-MIRÓ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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