Casasnovas-Cortes v. Apex Bank et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
RAFAEL JUAN CASASNOVAS 	)
CORTES, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:25-cv-01427-JAW
)
APEX BANK, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
In this civil action, over a year after filing his complaint, the plaintiff has still
failed to effect proper service of process on one of the defendants. For a second time,
rather than simply effecting service, he argues about it. 	The court, therefore, once
again, orders counsel to properly serve the defendant to obviate an unnecessary legal
issue, and, given his intransigence, the court orders plaintiff’s counsel to show cause
as to why the court should not impose a sanction upon him. The court also concludes
that the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed as against the judicial defendants
pursuant to both the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2025, Raphael Juan Casasnovas Cortes filed a twenty-nine page
civil complaint containing four Counts against Apex Bank, Hon. Maite D. Oronoz-
Rodríguez, Hon. Sigfrido Steidel-Figueroa, and the Bureau of Alternative Methods,
claiming in Count I that the Defendants violated the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) by failing to respond to his Qualified
Written Requests (QWR), in Count II that the Defendants violated Regulation X, 12
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C.F.R. § 1024.36, by failing to respond to his Requests for Information (RFI), in Count
III that the Defendants violated Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35, by failing to
properly respond to Notices of Error (NOE), and in Count IV that the Defendants
violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution by relying on Puerto
Rico law to withhold the information Mr. Casasnovas sought. Compl. (ECF No. 1).
On December 24, 2025, Apex Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) (Apex Mot.). On January 8, 2026, Mr. Casasnovas filed
an opposition to the Apex motion to dismiss. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 31)
(Pl.’s Apex Opp’n).1 	On February 4, 2026, Apex Bank filed its reply to Mr.
Casasnovas’s opposition to Apex Bank’s motion to dismiss. 	Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to
Mot. to Dismiss Filed at Docket No. 31 (ECF No. 39) (Apex Reply).
On January 20, 2026, Hon. Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez, Hon. Sigfrido Steidel-
Figueroa, and the Bureau of Alternative Methods (the Judicial Defendants) moved to
dismiss the complaint. Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6)
(ECF No. 33) (Jud. Defs.’ Mot.). 	On February 3, 2026, Mr. Casasnovas filed an
opposition to the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 	Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss
(ECF No. 37) (Pl.’s Jud. Defs.’ Opp’n). 	On March 13, 2026, the Judicial Defendants
filed a reply. 	Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 50) (Jud. Defs.’
Reply). On March 30, 2026, the Plaintiff, with the Court’s permission, filed a surreply
1 	On January 8, 2026, Apex Bank filed a motion to deem its motion to dismiss unopposed because
Mr. Casasnovas had failed to timely file his opposition. Mot. to Deem Unopposed Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss
(ECF No. 29). On January 21, 2026, the Court rejected Apex Bank’s motion. Order on Mot. to Deem
Unopposed Def’s Mot. to Dismiss and Urgent Mot. for Leave to File Opp’n One Day Out of Time, to Deny
as Moot Def.’s Mot. to Deem Unopposed & [for] Leave to File in Excess of Page Limits (ECF No. 35).
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to the Judicial Defendants’ reply. Pl.’s Surreply to Defs.’ Reply at Docket No. 50 (ECF
No. 53) (Pl.’s Surreply).
On April 24, 2026, the Court issued an order, requiring the Plaintiff to make
service of process on Apex Bank within fourteen days of the order and to provide the
Court with proof of service. Order on Rule 12(b)(5) Mot. to Dismiss at 9 (ECF No. 54)
(Serv. Order). After obtaining an extension, the Plaintiff filed an affidavit of service
on May 15, 2026, Mot. Submitting Proof of Serv. (ECF No. 57), and attached an
affidavit of service. 	Id., Attach. 1, Aff. of Serv. 	On June 5, 2026, Apex Bank filed a
renewed motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5).
Renewed Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 60) (Apex Renewed Mot.). On June 22, 2026, the
Plaintiff filed his opposition to the renewed motion to dismiss. 	Pl.’s Opp’n to Apex
Bank’s Renewed Mot. to Dismiss and Req. for Limited-Serv. Disc., an Evid. Hr’g, or
Alternative Extension under Rule 4(m) (ECF No. 63) (Pl.’s Renewed Opp’n). On July
6, 2026, Apex Bank replied to the Plaintiff’s response to its renewed motion to
dismiss. 	Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Apex Bank’s Renewed Mot. to Dismiss and Req. for
Limited-Serv. Disc., an Evid. Hr’g, or Alternative Extension under Rule 4(m) (ECF
No. 68) (Apex Renewed Reply).
II. 	THE SERVICE OF PROCESS ISSUE: APEX BANK
A. 	Statement of Facts
After filing his complaint on August 11, 2025, Mr. Casasnovas sought to serve
Apex Bank with a copy of his complaint and summons in accordance with Rule 4(m)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Compl. 	Mr. Casasnovas attempted service
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by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint at an Apex Bank branch to Tara
Mitchell, who was employed at Apex Bank as a Marketing/Special Projects Specialist,
and who was not authorized to accept service of process on behalf of Apex Bank. Apex
Mot. Attach. 1, Decl. under Penalty of Perjury of Ben Parker at 2 (Parker Aff.); Serv.
Order at 6. 	After reviewing federal, Puerto Rico, and Tennessee law on service of
process on a corporation, in its April 24, 2026 order, the Court ruled that “[t]his is
clearly insufficient service under federal, Puerto Rico, or Tennessee law”, id., and the
Court ordered Mr. Casasnovas to properly complete service. Id. at 9. In its response,
Apex Bank listed the proper person within Apex Bank to receive service:
8. Apex’s designated registered agent for service of process at the time
of the attempted service of process was:
Name: 	Matthew D. Daniels
Address: 9721 Sherrill Boulevard
Ste. 200, Knoxville, Tennessee 37932
Parker Aff. ¶ 8.
On May 13, 2026, Mr. Casanovas filed a proof of service with the Court, Mot.
Submitting Proof of Serv. (ECF No. 57), and he attached an affidavit of service. Id.,
Attach. 1, Aff. of Serv. at 1. In his motion, he represented:
On May 8, 2026, Defendant Apex Bank was duly served with the
Summons, Complaint, and Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury of Ben
Parker, by personal delivery to CT Corporation, Apex Bank's registered
agent, at 300 Montvue Road, Knoxville, Tennessee 37919, in accordance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(B). Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(l)(1), proof of service is made by the server's
affidavit. A true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Service executed by
process server Kelly Munsey, dated May 11, 2026, is attached hereto as
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.
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Id. at 1. 	The Affidavit of Service stated that Kelly Munsey, a person authorized to
make service under Tennessee law, attempted to serve Mr. Daniels on May 6, 2026
but was informed by the contact that she was a legal assistant to Mr. Daniels, that
she was not authorized to accept service of process on his behalf, and that he was out
of town for approximately one week. Aff. of Serv. at 1. On May 8, 2026, Kelly Munsey
then served Samantha Sutton, a registered agent of CT Corporation, at 300 Montvue
Road, Knoxville, TN 37919. Id.
B. 	The Positions of the Parties
1. 	Apex Bank’s Position
Apex Bank writes:
As discussed below, Plaintiff’s subsequent attempt at service did not
comply with Rule 4 and suffers from the same fundamental defects
previously 	identified 	by 	Apex 	and 	recognized 	by 	the 	Court.
Consequently, service remains insufficient, the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Apex, and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(5) is warranted
for the reasons discussed below.
Apex Renewed Mot. at 3. Citing Ben Parker’s December 19, 2025 affidavit, Apex Bank
says that CT Corporation is not Apex Bank’s registered agent for acceptance of service
of process and that Matthew Daniels is. Id. at 11 (citing Parker Aff. ¶ 8). Accordingly,
Apex Bank argues that as Mr. Casasnovas has now been given two changes to effect
service of process and has failed, his complaint should be dismissed. Id. at 11-12.
2. 	Rafael Juan Casanovas’s Opposition
In response, Mr. Casasnovas says that “[t]he First Circuit has recognized that
‘[a] return of service generally serves as prima facie evidence that service was validly
performed.’” 	Pl.’s Renewed Opp’n at 4 (quoting Blair v. City of Worcester, 522 F.3d
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105, 111 (1st Cir. 2008)). Mr. Casanovas points out that “the First Circuit instructs
that ‘factual disputes regarding agency should typically be resolved only after a live
hearing’ and that where there is ‘plausible factual disagreement or ambiguity,’ First
Circuit jurisprudence ‘favors permitting the litigants the opportunity to flesh out the
record.’” Id. (quoting Blair, 522 F.3d at 111-12). If service of process is defective, Mr.
Casanovas maintains that, if the Court determines that service was defective, Rule
4(m) requires that the Court either “dismiss the action without prejudice” or “order
that service be made within a specified time.” Id. (quoting F ED. R. CIV. P. 4(m)).
3. 	Apex Bank’s Reply
Apex Bank replies that Mr. Casanovas is attempting to generate a factual
controversy about service of process where none exists. Apex Renewed Reply at 3.
Said motion identifies no subsequent attempt to serve the individual,
despite having been afforded a second opportunity to cure the defective
service on Apex. Rather than complying with Rule 4, Plaintiff continued
pursuing service upon an individual who lacked authority to accept
service on behalf of Apex. This, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, does
not show neither diligence nor a good-faith attempt to achieve effective
service.
Id. Apex argues that the complaint should be dismissed in light of the second failure
of the Plaintiff to effect service and his decision not to attempt to cure his defective
service. Id. at 4-5.
C. 	Legal Standards
The Court previously described the standards the First Circuit has applied to
service of process issues. 	Serv. Order at 4-5. 	“Once adequately challenged, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show service was proper.” Schiff v. IRS, Civil No.: 24-
1511 (CVR), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52876, at *12 (D.P.R. Feb. 6, 2026); Rivera-Lopez
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v. Mun. of Dorado, 979 F.2d 885, 887 (1st Cir. 1992). At the same time, “[a] return of
service generally serves as prima facie evidence that service was validly performed.”
Carrasquillo-Serrano v. Mun. of Canovanas, 991 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting
Blair, 522 F.3d at 111). “That presumption of proper service is not insurmountable.”
Id. In Carrasquillo, the First Circuit observed that “[i]n Blair, the presumption was
overcome by a simple affidavit stating that the parties who received service were not
authorized to accept service.” Id. (citing Blair, 522 F.3d at 111-12). An affidavit may
be “sufficient to refute the prima facie presumption created by a return of service.”
Liyanage-Don v. Liyanage-Don, No. 1:25-cv-00461-SDN, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25954, at 	*7 	(D. 	Me. 	Feb. 9, 2026) 	(quoting 	Blair, 	522 F.3d at 	112 	(finding
presumption of service was overcome by affidavit stating parties who received service
were not authorized to accept service on behalf of defendant)).
D. 	Discussion
The Court is nonplussed that this service issue has returned for judicial
resolution. In its April 24, 2026 order, the Court wrote:
The Court views the service of process controversy as unnecessary,
forcing the Court to examine service of process issues under federal,
Puerto Rico, and Tennessee law, when an obvious solution is at hand:
Rafael Casasnovas must properly serve Apex Bank with a copy of the
summons and complaint.
Serv. Order . at 6. The record is clear. Although Mr. Casasnovas attempted to serve
Matthew Daniels, when he was not immediately available, Kelly Munsey served
someone at CT Corporation, presumably on the assumption that Apex Bank had
designated CT Corporation as its registered agent. Although many corporations use
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CT Corporation as their registered agents, not all do. See Infinity Real Estate LLC v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’t Trust Co., No. 2:18-cv-00038-JAW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
150075, at *13-14 (D. Me. Sept. 4. 2018) (“Infinity's November 29, 2017 service of
process on CT Corporation does not constitute service of process on Deutsche Bank
because there is no evidence that CT Corporation was an agent of Deutsche Bank as
required by Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(9)(a)”). 	Apex Bank had not
designated CT Corporation as its registered agent and therefore Mr. Casasnovas’s
service on CT Corporation was a nullity.
Here, Mr. Casasnovas was on notice from Apex Bank itself by the December
15, 2025 Parker affidavit, which identified the name and address of its registered
agent in Tennessee, and yet Mr. Casasnovas served the summons and complaint on
an entity and individual not authorized to accept service on behalf of Apex Bank. See
Parker Aff. ¶ 8 (identifying Matthew D. Daniels of 9721 Sherrill Boulevard, Suite 200,
Knoxville, Tennessee, as Apex Bank’s designated registered agent for service of
process). The Court does not know if the fault in serving CT Corporation rests with
Attorney Castellanos-Otero’s loose instructions to Kelly Munsey or with Kelly
Munsey’s own improper decision to serve CT Corporation. It does not matter. Once
Apex Bank brought the error to Attorney Castellanos-Otero’s attention, it would have
been simple to properly serve Apex Bank by serving Mr. Daniels and put an end to
the service of process issue. 	As with the last service motion, however, instead of
acting quickly to serve Mr. Daniels, Mr. Casasnovas again stood his ground, insisted
he was right, and required the Court to resolve by order what should have been
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resolved by a new attempt to serve Mr. Daniels with specific instructions to serve
only him. Once again, Attorney Castellanos-Otero has chosen to argue, not act.
Mr. Casasnovas cites Blair v. City of Worcester in support of his opposition to
Apex Bank’s motion. Pl.’s Renewed Opp’n at 4. 	But in Blair, citing federal caselaw,
the First Circuit concluded that “an affidavit denying agency, standing alone, may be
sufficient to overcome the presumption of proper service created by the return of
service.” 522 F.3d at 112. Here, Mr. Casasnovas has had the Parker affidavit since
December 24, 2025 and has neglected or refused to serve the individual Apex Bank
has designated for eight months as the proper agent for service of process.
Under Rule 4(m), Mr. Casasnovas had ninety days to serve Apex Bank after
he filed the complaint on August 11, 2025. F ED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). Under Rule 4(m), he
should have completed service on Apex Bank by early November 2025. However, due
to his stubbornness or neglect, now over a year after he filed his complaint and two
motions to dismiss based on failure to make service, he has still not properly served
Apex Bank.
Mr. Casasnovas’s intransigence has now required this Court to issue two
orders on service of process; neither necessary. 	Had Mr. Casasnovas exercised a
modicum of due diligence and flexibility, the service of process issue would have been
resolved months ago. When service is not made within ninety days of the filing of a
complaint, Rule 4(m) requires that the Court either to “dismiss the action without
prejudice” or to “order that service be made within a specified time.” F ED. R. CIV. P.
4(m). 	In these egregious circumstances, the Court could dismiss Mr. Casasnovas’s
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complaint against Apex Bank without prejudice for his repeated and prolonged
failure to make service of process against Apex Bank.
It is well settled that the district court has the authority to dismiss an action
for plaintiff's failure to prosecute his action, including his failure to make service on
defendants, as well as for plaintiff's failure to comply with the court's orders. 	Stange
v. Peddler, Civil Action No. 20-12158-PBS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265599, at *3 (D.
Mass. 	Aug. 	20, 	2021) 	(citing 	Link 	v. 	Wabash 	R. 	Co., 	370 	U.S. 	626, 	630-31
(1962) (court’s “inherent power” to dismiss sua sponte for want of prosecution is
necessary for management of its affairs and to achieve orderly and swift disposition
of 	cases); 	Zavala 	Santiago 	v. 	Gonzalez 	Rivera, 	553 	F.2d 	710, 	712 	(1st 	Cir.
1977) (similar); Tyree v. Fair, No. 92-1742, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12860, at *5-6 (1st
Cir. Mar. 9, 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished) (failure to make service on defendants
named in complaint “in itself suffices for a finding of lack of prosecution”); Tower
Ventures, 	Inc. 	v. 	City 	of 	Westfield, 	296 	F.3d 	43, 	46 	(1st 	Cir.
2002) (“Although dismissal ordinarily should be employed only when a plaintiff's
misconduct is extreme...disobedience of court orders, in and of itself, constitutes
extreme misconduct (and, thus, warrants dismissal”) (citations omitted).
However, it makes little sense to dismiss Mr. Casasnovas’s complaint, only to
have him refile the complaint and finally properly serve Apex Bank. 	Instead, the
Court will once again order Mr. Casasnovas to properly serve Apex Bank by serving
Matthew D. Daniels, 9721 Sherrill Boulevard, Ste. 200, Knoxville, Tennessee 37932
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with a copy of the complaint and summons within twenty-eight days from the date of
this order.
This does not mean that there should not be a sanction for Mr. Casasnovas’s
willful failure to serve Apex Bank and his inexplicable stubbornness in defending his
failure. The Court is contemplating imposing a sanction, not against Mr. Casasnovas,
whose knowledge of service of process issues is presumably limited, but against
Attorney Castellanos-Otero, who is responsible for this delay and for the violations of
the 	Rules 	and 	the 	court 	orders. 	To 	this 	end, 	the 	Court 	ORDERS 	Attorney
Castellanos-Otero to SHOW CAUSE within fourteen days of the date of this order as
to why the Court should not impose a sanction upon him. The Court ORDERS Apex
Bank to reply to Attorney Castellanos-Otero’s response within fourteen days of his
response. 	The Court will issue an order on whether a sanction should be imposed
and, if so, will give counsel an opportunity to suggest an appropriate sanction.
This leaves the question of what to do about the remainder of Apex Bank’s
motion to dismiss the complaint, which has now been pending since December 24,
2025. Apex Bank’s motion to dismiss is based on Mr. Casasnovas’s failure to properly
serve the Bank and on his failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Apex Mot. at 1-25. 	The parties and the Court have been waylaid by the service of
process issue within Apex Bank’s motion to dismiss, and, as noted, Mr. Casasnovas
has not yet effected service of process on Apex Bank.
“Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
proper service of process must be effected.” 	Morales v. Spencer, 52 F. Supp. 3d 362,
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364 (D. Mass. 2014) (citing Omni Capital Int’l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S.
97, 104 (1987)). If the Court acts on the pending Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the pending
motion to dismiss, there would be a question as to whether the Court had the
jurisdiction to issue the order. 	As the Court observed in its April 26, 2026 service
order, “proper service of process is a prerequisite for litigating in federal court, and
in its absence, a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant unless the
defendant has waived service or otherwise consented to personal jurisdiction.” Serv.
Order at 8 (quoting Schiff v. IRS, Civil No. 24-1511 (CVR), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52815, at *17 n.7 (D.P.R. Mar. 12, 2026) (citing Herndon v. Ridgway, 58 U.S. 424, 425
(1854)).
In these circumstances, the Court has concluded it is wiser to make certain
that service has been effected and then address any Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Rather than retain the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as an orphan while resolving the service
of process issue, the Court is dismissing Apex Bank’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice to the extent it is grounded on Rule 12(b)(6). Once served, Apex Bank has
the right to refile a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, if it chooses to do so, directed to whether the
complaint states a cognizable cause of action.
III. 	THE RULE 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) MOTION: JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS
A. 	The Allegations in the Complaint2
2 	“When a district court considers a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, it must credit the plaintiff’s well-pled
factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Merlonghi v. United
States, 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010). The Court may, however, look beyond the pleadings to any evidentiary
materials submitted by the parties to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Martínez-Rivera v. Puerto
Rico, 812 F.3d 69, 72 (1st Cir. 2016).
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1. 	The Parties
Rafeal Casasnovas-Cortes is a natural person and resident of Puerto Rico.
Compl. ¶ 4. 	Mr. Casasnovas was a “borrower” and “consumer” entitled to the
protections of RESPA and Regulation X. Id. Apex Bank is a banking institution and
mortgage 	lender/servicer 	and 	conducts 	mortgage 	lending 	and 	loan 	servicing
operations in Puerto Rico and elsewhere.” 	Id. ¶ 5. 	Apex Bank is subject to the
requirements of RESPA and Regulation X in servicing Mr. Casasnovas’s loan. 	Id.
Sigfrido Steidel Figueroa is the Puerto Rico Court Administrator and is being sued
exclusively in his official capacity. 	Id. ¶ 6. 	Maite D. Oronoz Rodríguez is the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and is responsible for the Bureau of
Alternative Methods (Negociado de Métodos Alternos), and Mr. Casasnovas states
that he included Chief Justice Oronoz in this action solely in connection with her
office’s authority as head of the Puerto Rico Judiciary and not in connection with her
judicial functions. Id. ¶ 7.
2. 	Rafael Casasnovas’s Loan and Mortgage
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the complaint are
accepted as true, and the Court draws “all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trans-Spec
Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008)).
In reciting the allegations in the complaint, the Court has tried not include Mr. Casasnovas’s
adjectival advocacy in the guise of factual allegations. See, e.g. Compl. at 1 (“This action arises from
Defendants, Apex Bank’s blatant disregard for federal law governing mortgage servicing transparency
and borrower rights (in pure violation and complete disregard of the [RESPA], 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,
and its implementing regulation, Regulation X)”. 	Because Mr. Casasnovas interwove his factual
allegations with his legal positions and his advocacy, it has been more difficult than usual to set forth
the facts in the complaint without pronouncing a dispositive legal conclusion or an argument as a fact
that the Court must accept as true for purposes of the pending motions. 	In general, where the
assertion is a fact, the Court has stated it as a fact, and where the assertion is a legal conclusion or an
argument, the Court has framed the statement as an allegation.
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Rafael Casasnovas Cortés is the owner of a home in San Juan, Puerto Rico that
is subject to a mortgage loan originally made for personal, family, or household
purposes. 	Id. ¶ 9. Apex Bank is the current holder and/or servicer of this loan. Id.
After Mr. Casanovas experienced financial hardship, Apex Bank appeared in a
foreclosure action filed by an alleged previous holder against Mr. Casasnovas and his
property in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance of San Juan (a Commonwealth
court), case civil no. K CD2016-0616. Id.
In accordance with Puerto Rico law (the “Principal Residence Protection and
Mandatory Mediation in Foreclosure Proceedings Act,” Act 184-2012), the foreclosure
proceeding was referred to a mandatory mediation process. 	Id. ¶ 10. 	This court-
supervised mediation was intended to explore loss mitigation options (such as loan
modifications or other foreclosure alternatives) and is governed by confidentiality
rules under Puerto Rico law, meaning communications and documents from the
mediation generally cannot be disclosed outside that process. Id.
Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Casasnovas alleges that the mediation process
requires that Apex Bank’s loss Mitigation personnel not directly involved in the
mediation process such as underwriters, receive and evaluate the loss mitigation
documents submitted by the Plaintiff. 	Id. ¶ 11. 	The loss mitigation evaluation
conducted by Apex Bank as part of the mandatory mediation process concluded with
the servicer denying a loan modification. 	Id. ¶ 12. 	In connection with that denial,
Mr. Casasnovas says that Apex Bank failed to provide him with notice of his right to
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appeal. 	Id. 	Additionally, he says that Apex Bank did not disclose any specific or
pertinent reason for the denial. Id.
Mr. Casasnovas tried to use the local discovery rule to obtain the information
needed to dispute Apex Bank’s loan modification denial, but the Commonwealth
Court held that the information was not discoverable due to the confidentiality
provisions that apply to the compulsory mediation process. Id. ¶ 13. Therefore, in a
separate effort, independent of the foreclosure litigation, Mr. Casasnovas sought
information about the handling of his loan from Apex Bank by submitting multiple
QWR’s under RESPA. 	Id. ¶ 14. 	On April 1st, 2025; May 1st, 2025 and June 10th
2025, Mr. Casanovas sent Apex Bank formal QWR’s pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
Id. Each such correspondence included the name and account number of the borrower
and described the information being sought regarding the servicing of the loan,
thereby, in Mr. Casasnovas’s view, meeting the statutory definition of a QWR. Id. In
compliance with Regulation X, the QWR’s were mailed to the exclusive address
designated by Apex Bank for receipt of borrower inquiries, or otherwise to Apex
Bank’s business address, in which Mr. Casasnovas requested necessary information
related to the servicing of his loan, including but not limited to:
a. Loan Payment History and Calculations: A complete transactional history
of the loan (showing all payments received, how they were applied to
principal, interest, escrow, and fees) and an explanation of the current loan
balance calculation, including the application of any additional principal
prepayments or charges. 	Id. ¶ 15. 	Mr. Casasnovas sought documentation
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to understand whether payments had been properly credited and how any
arrearages or fees were computed. Id.
b. Loss Mitigation and Foreclosure Avoidance: All information related to any
evaluations of Mr. Casanovas for loss mitigation options (such as loan
modifications or other foreclosure alternatives). 	Id. 	This included any net
present value (NPV) analyses, income calculations, or criteria used by Apex
Bank to grant or deny a loan modification. Id. Mr. Casanovas also requested
copies of any notices or communications about loss mitigation sent pursuant
to 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39 (early intervention) or § 1024.41 (loss mitigation
procedures), and any internal notes or guidelines used by Apex Bank in
reviewing Plaintiff’s requests for assistance. Id.
c. Servicing Policies and Practices: Documents reflecting Apex Bank’s policies,
procedures, or practices in servicing loans of this type, especially relating to
how payments are handled when a loan is delinquent or in foreclosure, how
fees and escrow are managed, and how information is shared (or not shared)
during foreclosure mediation. 	Id. 	Mr. Casasnovas inquired into whether
Apex Bank’s servicing practices were consistent with federal requirements
and sought any internal guidelines that might shed light on Apex Bank’s
handling of his loan. Id.
d. Communications and Records: Copies of all communications or notices sent
to Mr. Casasnovas regarding the loan (including default notices, monthly
mortgage statements, escrow analyses, and any force-placed insurance
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notices), as well as records of communications between Apex Bank and any
other entities regarding his loan. 	Id. 	Mr. Casasnovas also requested
identification of the owner or assignee of the loan (if different from Apex
Bank), which servicers are specifically required to provide upon request. Id.
In Mr. Casasnovas’s view, these categories of information all relate directly to
the servicing of Plaintiff’s mortgage loan account and were therefore proper subjects
of a RESPA, RFI. 	Id. ¶ 16. 	By making these requests in writing, Mr. Casasnovas
says that he invoked Apex Bank’s duty under RESPA and Regulation X to conduct a
reasonable investigation and provide the requested information or explain why it
could not be provided. Id.
Apex Bank responded to Mr. Casasnovas’s QWR’s, but its responses were
limited and, in Mr. Casasnovas’s view, not compliant with the requirements of federal
law. 	Id. ¶ 17. 	In some instances, Apex Bank provided a brief acknowledgement of
receipt of the request (as required within 5 business days) and sent a written response
within roughly 30 business days, as the timeline under RESPA generally requires.
Id. 	However, Apex Bank failed to provide many of the documents and information
Plaintiff requested. 	Id. 	Apex Bank’s reply letters refused to produce significant
categories of the requested information. Id. Apex Bank’s responses, in relevant part,
denied or declined the RFI, offering the following justifications:
a. Apex Bank stated that because there were an ongoing foreclosure lawsuit
and mediation in Puerto Rico’s courts involving Plaintiff’s loan, it was not
required to provide certain information outside of that litigation. Id. Apex
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Bank took the position that his requests were improper or “duplicative” of
discovery in the foreclosure case and that Apex Bank should not have to
respond through a RESPA inquiry while litigation was pending. 	Id. 	Apex
Bank invoked 12 C.F.R.§ 1024.36(f) and claimed that the requests sought
information that had either already been asked and answered, or that
Plaintiff should obtain through the court process, implying the requests
were duplicative or overly broad. Id.
b. Apex Bank further asserted that many of the documents and data Plaintiff
sought were protected by the confidentiality of Puerto Rico’s mandatory
mediation process. Id. Because loss mitigation discussions and documents
exchanged during the court-ordered mediation are generally confidential
under Puerto Rico law, Apex Bank refused to provide those materials in
response to the QWR’s. 	Id. 	For example, Apex Bank would not turn over
internal loss mitigation evaluations or communications from the mediation
on 	the 	ground 	that 	such 	disclosure 	would 	violate 	the 	mediation
confidentiality rules. Id. In essence, Apex Bank argued that Puerto Rico’s
state-law confidentiality provisions prohibited it from releasing certain
information about Plaintiff’s loan and foreclosure alternatives (regardless of
RESPA’s supremacy). Id.
c. Apex Bank also characterized several of Plaintiff’s requests as “not directly
related” to the servicing of the loan (i.e. irrelevant) under Regulation X. Id.
Apex balked at providing general “servicing policies and procedures” or broad
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categories of documents, claiming that those requests did not relate to
Plaintiff’s specific account or were beyond the scope of what RESPA requires.
Id. Apex cited 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(f)(1)(iii), which allows a servicer to avoid
responding to requests for irrelevant information (defined as information not
directly related to the borrower’s account). 	Id. 	Apex contended that some
requested items fell under this irrelevant category, and thus it did not furnish
them. Id.
Mr. Casanovas alleges that Apex Bank relied on exceptions under Regulation
X for requests that are duplicative, seek confidential or privileged information, or are
not relevant to the loan account. 	Id. ¶ 18. 	As detailed below, Mr. Casasnovas
maintains that Apex Bank’s reliance on these exceptions was misplaced and unlawful
under the circumstances. 	Id. 	Notably, Mr. Casanovas argues that RESPA and
Regulation X do not contain any blanket exception that relieves a servicer from
responding to a QWR simply because a foreclosure lawsuit is pending or because
information was shared in mediation. 	Id. 	It is Mr. Casasnovas’s contention that
Apex Bank’s broad refusal to provide information on those grounds exceeded the
limited scope of permissible exceptions in the regulation. Id.
Mr. Casasnovas further alleges that, in its responses, Apex Bank failed to
address or correct the servicing errors that Plaintiff had pointed out. 	Id. ¶ 19. 	He
notes that Apex Bank did not acknowledge any wrongdoing in how it handled the
RFI’s. Id. In his view, Apex’s Bank’s response fell short of RESPA’s requirement that
the servicer, after investigation, either make appropriate corrections to the account
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or provide the borrower with a written explanation of why the account is already
correct. Id. In sum, Mr. Casasnovas alleges that Apex Bank did not comply with the
error resolution procedures mandated by 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35. Id.
Mr. Casasnovas alleges that he sent the QWRs for the purpose of obtaining
information 	about 	the 	loan’s 	servicing 	independently 	of 	any 	discovery 	in 	the
foreclosure action. 	Id. ¶ 20. 	In other words, Mr. Casanovas claims that he was
exercising his rights under federal law to get information from his servicer, separate
and apart from the state court litigation, relying on the federal statutes and
regulations. Id. He observes that the QWR’s were not issued by the state court, nor
were they part of any formal discovery process; he says they were private letters
invoking federal law obligations. 	Id. 	He reiterates that the information sought —
such as payment histories and servicing records — was information that Plaintiff, as
the borrower, is entitled to obtain from his servicer under RESPA, and he restates
that the fact related litigation was ongoing did not diminish Apex’s duties under
federal law. 	Id. 	Mr. Casasnovas alleges that nothing in RESPA or Regulation X
suspends a servicer’s QWR response obligations merely because a foreclosure or
mediation is in progress. 	Id. 	To the contrary, he says that federal regulations
explicitly list the only exceptions that allow a servicer not to respond, and being in
litigation is not one of those exceptions. Id. Therefore, Mr. Casasnovas contends that
Apex Bank’s refusal to provide information on the grounds of the pending foreclosure
case was unlawful and contrary to RESPA. 	Id. ¶ 21.
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The Judicial Defendants attached to their motion to dismiss two documents
from the state court proceedings between Apex Bank and Mr. Casasnovas. The first
is an order dated February 22, 2024 from the Court of First Instance, Superior Court
of San Juan in the case of Apex Bank v. Rafael Juan Casasnovas Cortes, Civil No. K
CD2016-0616. 	Jud. Defs.’ Mot. Attach. 1, Order. 	The second is a resolution of the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dated January 17, 2025, denying Mr. Casasnovas’s
petition for writ of certiorari for gross noncompliance with the rules of the Supreme
Court in the case of Apex Bank v. Rafael Juan Casasnovas Cortés, CC-2024-0719.
Jud. Defs.’ Mot. Attach. 2, Order.
The Superior Court Order reads in pertinent part:
Having examined the parties’ filings, the Court rules as follows:
√ 	Regarding 	the 	production 	of 	documents 	and 	other 	documents
concerning to the sale of the credits, Denied.
Defendants alleged that it is relevant since APEX claims to have
standing to enforce the financial claim. 	However, as the original
promissory note is available to defendants for inspection, any other
document concerning the sale is irrelevant, or at least defendants have
not put the court in a position to determine that it is relevant.
√ Regarding the documents pertaining to Loss Mitigation, within the
mediation process, Denied.
The 	Court 	believes 	that 	these 	documents 	are 	confidential 	under
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 6.01 of the Rules for Alternative
Dispute Resolution. 4 LPRA App. XXIX.
Id. at 2.
B. 	The Positions of the Parties
1. 	The Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
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The Judicial Defendants posit multiple grounds under which they say the
Court should dismiss with prejudice Mr. Casasnovas’s complaint against them: (i) the
Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s monetary claims against appearing defendants
in 	their 	official 	capacity; 	(ii) 	the 	confidentiality 	provisions 	whose 	validity 	is
challenged by Plaintiff is not preempted by federal law, and therefore, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (iii) this Court should refrain from
ruling on constitutional issues without first addressing threshold jurisdictional
grounds; 	(iv) 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	information 	related 	to 	the 	loss 	mitigation
procedure in state court is estopped by res judicata, and (v) in the alternative, this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds of Rooker-Feldman3 doctrine
or should abstain under the Younger4 doctrine. Jud. Defs.’ Mot. at 5-6. In addition,
the Judicial Defendants say that the Plaintiff failed to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 5.1(a)(2). Id. at 6.
2. 	Rafael Juan Casasnovas’s Opposition
In his opposition, Mr. Casasnovas first addresses the Eleventh Amendment
argument and concedes that he may not proceed for monetary damages against the
Judicial Defendants in their official capacities. 	Pl.’s Jud. Defs.’ Opp’n at 2. 	Mr.
Casasnovas waives any such monetary claim, limiting his request for relief to
declaratory and prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.5 Id.
3 	See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 476 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 476 (1983)
4 	See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38-39 (1971).
5 	209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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Mr. Casasnovas disputes the Judicial Defendants’ arguments about federal
preemption. Id. at 3. He says that “[f]ederal law preempts the Puerto Rico mediation
confidentiality rule to the extent it conflicts with RESPA’s mandates, and that
“RESPA (12 U.S.C. § 2616) explicitly provides that state laws are preempted if
‘inconsistent’ with RESPA, ‘and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.’” Id.
Mr. Casasnovas contends that claim preclusion should not apply because there
is no final judgment in Puerto Rico courts, and res judicata requires a perfect identity
between the things, causes and persons of the litigants, which is not present between
the two cases. Id.
As for the Rooker-Feldman argument, Mr. Casasnovas maintains that he is not
challenging a state court judgment, and, therefore, Rooker-Feldman does not apply.
Id. at 2. 	Mr. Casasnovas says that Younger abstention does not apply because this
“is a purely private civil dispute that does not fall into any of the three ‘exceptional’
categories 	requiring 	abstention 	(criminal 	prosecutions, 	certain 	quasi-criminal
enforcement actions, or uniquely state-interest civil proceedings).” 	Id. 	Mr.
Casasnovas argues that his technical failure to comply with Rule 5.1 should not merit
dismissal. Id. at 3-4.
3. 	The Judicial Defendants’ Reply
In their reply, the Judicial Defendants dispute Mr. Casasnovas’s argument
that Rooker-Feldman is limited to judgments, citing First Circuit caselaw that
applied 	Rooker-Feldman 	to 	interlocutory 	rulings. 	Jud. 	Defs.’ 	Reply 	at 	2-3.
Furthermore, the Judicial Defendants argue that the main point of Rooker-Feldman
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is that the United States District Court is not the appropriate forum for challenging
the orders of the Puerto Rico courts, which they contend is what is happening here.
Id. at 3-4.
If 	Rooker-Feldman 	does 	not 	bar 	the 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint, 	the 	Judicial
Defendants say that Younger abstention does, because the foreclosure between Mr.
Casasnovas and Apex Bank is still pending in Puerto Rico courts. Id. at 4-5.
Regarding res judicata, the Judicial Defendants, citing First Circuit law,
contradict Mr. Casasnovas’s contention that a perfect identity of the parties and
causes of action is necessary for its application. Id. at 5-6. The Judicial Defendants
maintain that the order of the Puerto Rico court, which determined that the
information being requested is deemed confidential under Puerto Rico law, is subject
to the principles of res judicata. Id.
Finally, the Judicial Defendants argue that Mr. Casasnovas is not entitled to
the information he is demanding under RESPA and therefore, his lawsuit fails on its
merits because RESPA does not preempt the confidentiality provisions of Puerto Rico
law. Id. at 6-7.
4. 	Rafael Juan Casasnovas’s Sur-Reply
With the Court’s permission, Mr. Casasnovas filed a sur-reply. Pl.’s Sur-Reply
at 1-7. First, Mr. Casasnovas rejects the Judicial Defendants’ reliance on Federación
de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005) to support their Rooker-Feldman argument. Mr. Casasnovas
contends that, unlike Federación, to rule in his favor in this case, the federal court is
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not required to conclude that the Puerto Rico court erred. 	Id. at 1-2. 	Instead, he
maintains that his federal cause of action is grounded on a distinct claim that the
Judicial Defendants violated federal law. Id. at 2-3.
Next, Mr. Casasnovas says that the Judicial Defendants have shifted their
defense from claim to issue preclusion, but he contends that the issue preclusion does
not apply because the issues in Puerto Rico courts and in this Court are different. Id.
at 3.
In 	his 	sur-reply, 	Mr. 	Casasnovas 	reiterates 	his 	argument 	that 	Younger
abstention does not apply, arguing that the Judicial Defendants’ formulation would
swallow Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013). Id. at 3-4. Mr.
Casasnovas 	disputes 	the 	Judicial 	Defendants’ 	interpretation 	of 	the 	RESPA
regulations and maintains that the regulations require a fulsome response from Apex
Bank, regardless of the confidentiality provisions of Puerto Rico law. Id. at 4-6.
Finally, Mr. Casasnovas argues that the Court should allow him to amend his
complaint to clarify that he is seeking an order that would require the Puerto Rico
courts to create an exception to the mediation confidentiality rules that would allow
compliance with RESPA. Id. at 6-7.
C. 	Legal Standards
“Although 	dismissals 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(1) 	and 	12(b)(6) 	are 	‘conceptually
distinct…the 	same 	basic principles 	apply 	in 	both 	situations.” 	Cangrejeros de
Santurce Baseball Club, LLC v. Liga de Béisbol Profesional de P.R., Inc.146 F.4th 1,
11 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 351, 359 (1st Cir. 2020)). 	“In
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both contexts, [courts] accept as true the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Cangrejeros, 146 F.4th at
11 (citing Lyman, 954 F.3d at 359 and Cheng v. Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 443 (1st Cir.
2022)). 	However, 	courts 	disregard 	“conclusory 	legal 	allegations” 	and 	factual
assertions that are “too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief
from the realm of mere conjecture.” Legal Sea Foods v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 36 F.4th
29, 34 (1st Cir. 2022) (first quoting Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d
82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015), and then quoting SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir.
2010) (en banc).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 I2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), “[courts] also disregard ‘statements in the complaint that
simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements,’
and consider whether the non-conclusory, non-speculative facts support the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction.” 	Cangrejeros, 146 F.4th at 11 (quoting Lyman, 954
F.3d at 360) (quoting Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55
(1stCir. 2012)). “[Courts] may consider information attached to or incorporated into
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the complaint, along with facts subject to judicial notice.” 	Id. 	(citing Lyman, 954
F.3d at 360).
In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “plausible” means “something more
than 	merely 	possible” 	or 	“merely 	consistent 	with 	a 	defendant’s 	liability.”
Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and
citations omitted) (first quoting Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55 and then quoting Ocasio-
Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011)). Although this does not
require “detailed factual allegations,” the facts pleaded must at least “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 	Thus, a facially
plausible complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	In other words, dismissal is
appropriate if a complaint’s well-pleaded facts do not “possess enough heft to ‘sho[w]
that [the plaintiff] is entitled to relief.’” Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.
2008) (first alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Assessing a complaint’s plausibility is a context-specific task that requires “the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 	Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. In the First Circuit, district courts apply a “two-step analysis.” Cardigan
Mountain Sch., 787 F.3d at 84. 	“First, the court must distinguish ‘the complaint’s
factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal
allegations (which need not be credited).’” García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d
100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P. R., 676 F.3d 220, 224
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(1st Cir. 2012)); see also Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55 (stating that a court may “isolate and
ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or
merely rehash cause-of-action elements.”)
“Second, 	the 	court 	must 	determine 	whether 	the 	factual 	allegations 	are
sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.’” García-Catalán, 734 F.3d at 103 (quoting Haley v. City of Bos.,
657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)). 	“If the factual allegations in the complaint are too
meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere
conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal.” 	Tambone, 597 F.3d at 442 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
D. 	Discussion
1. 	Eleventh Amendment
As Mr. Casasnovas concedes that he may not bring a monetary damages claim
against the Judicial Defendants in their official capacities under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court dismisses with prejudice that portion of the complaint.
2. 	Rooker-Feldman
When considering motions to dismiss that raise multiple grounds for dismissal,
the Court ordinarily “resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter”
before addressing personal jurisdiction or the merits. 	Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 536 U.S. 574, 578 (1999). The Court begins with the Judicial Defendants’ motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court must “take all well-pleaded
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allegations as true and give Mr. Casasnovas the benefit of all reasonable inferences.”
Perales-Muñoz v. United States, 151 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2025). As “the party seeking
to invoke federal jurisdiction,” Mr. Casasnovas bears “the burden of demonstrating
[its] existence.” Id. The Court may also consider jurisdictional evidence submitted
by 	the 	parties and matters 	subject 	to judicial 	notice. 	See Martinez-Rivera v.
Commonwealth of P.R., 812 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2016). Here, the Judicial Defendants
have submitted certified copies of documents from the Puerto Rico courts, and the
Court has taken judicial notice of those documents. 	“If the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, [it] must dismiss the action.” 	F ED. R.
CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
Congress has given the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to review
“[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State” where the
judgment in question concerns federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). This jurisdiction is
“exclusive” to the Supreme Court. 	Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per
curiam). 	“Accordingly, under what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction
over final state-court judgments.” 	Id. “The idea is that…the only federal court with
statutory jurisdiction to review a state court's decision is the Supreme Court, and ‘an
aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he no longer can do
directly.’” Tyler v. Supreme Jud. Ct. of Mass., 914 F.3d 47, 50 (1stCir. 2019) (quoting
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416). 	This doctrine “applies only in the ‘limited circumstances’
where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state
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proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and
seeking review and rejection of that judgment.’” Federación, 410 F.3d at 24 (quoting
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)).
Here, the record reflects that Mr. Casasnovas has been a defendant in a
foreclosure action initiated by Apex Bank in the Court of First Instance, Superior
Court of San Juan and, during the litigation, he made a discovery request for the loss
mitigation documents that he now seeks in this federal case. 	The Superior Court
denied 	his 	request 	because 	it 	concluded 	that 	the 	requested 	documents 	were
confidential under the rules applicable to mediations. Mr. Casasnovas applied for a
writ of certiorari to the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, which denied his petition for
writ, and then applied for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,
which also denied the petition for writ.6 The foreclosure between Apex Bank and Mr.
Casasnovas is apparently still pending in the courts of Puerto Rico.
The first question that the parties dispute is whether the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is applicable to interlocutory orders. 	Here, to the Court’s knowledge, the
foreclosure case is still pending in state court, and there has been no final judgment,
and furthermore, the state court’s discovery order denying Mr. Casasnovas’s request
for loss mitigation documents is an interlocutory order.
6 	This litigation history is set out in the Judicial Defendants’ motion, Jud. Defs.’ Mot. at 8-9, and
Mr. Casasnovas has not contended it is erroneous. Although the Judicial Defendants request that the
Court take judicial notice of the proceedings in Puerto Rico courts, id. at 9 n.2, the Court does so only
on a limited basis. The Court takes judicial notice that there have been proceedings in the state courts
of Puerto Rico, but it cannot take judicial notice of the actual proceedings beyond what is set forth in
the attachments to the Judicial Defendants’ memorandum. This is because under federal statute, all
proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico must be conducted in
English, and the Judicial Defendants have provided only limited translations of those documents. See
48 U.S.C. § 864; Aguasvivas v. Pompeo, 984 F.3d 1047, 1056 n.10 (1st Cir. 2021).
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The parties correctly identify Federación as the binding First Circuit authority.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a plaintiff who lost in state court proceedings
from ‘implicitly or explicitly. . . 	seeking an opposite result … [in] the lower federal
courts.’” Overseas Military Sales Corp. v. Giralt-Armada, 503 F.3d 12, 15 n.1 (1st Cir.
2007) (quoting Federación, 410 F.3d at 24).
In Federación, the First Circuit, applying Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), carved a middle path for determining whether a federal court is
barred from addressing an interlocutory order from a state court under Rooker-
Feldman. See Dustin E. Buehler, Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending the Doctrine
to State Ct. Interlocutory Orders, 36 F LA. ST . U. L. REV . 373, 404-07 (2009). 	The
Federación Court wrote:
Cox Broadcasting defines four situations in which a non-final judgment will
nevertheless be considered “final” for purposes of § 1257:
[(1)] there are further proceedings — even entire trials — yet to occur in
the state courts but where for one reason or another the federal issue is
conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained;
[(2)] the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State,
will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future
state-court proceedings;
[(3)] the federal claim has been finally decided, with further proceedings
on the merits in the state courts to come, but in which later review of
the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the
case;
[(4)] the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with
further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review here
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might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering
unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where
reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any
further litigation on the relevant cause of action rather than merely
controlling the nature and character of, or determining the admissibility
of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come . . . [and] refusal
immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode
federal policy.
Id. at 25 n. 11 (quoting Cox, 420 U.S. at 479-83). From the Court’s perspective, the
exception that best fits this situation is number one. 	Mr. Casasnovas presumably
raised the federal issue in his quest for discovery from Apex Bank, and the Court of
First Instance rejected his claim. 	The state court’s ruling on the discoverability of
the loss mitigation information is certainly conclusive for the rest of the state court
litigation, especially since Mr. Casasnovas’s attempts at appellate review have been
rejected.7 Thus, the Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Mr.
Casasnovas, a litigant who lost a federal issue in state court proceedings from
“‘implicitly or explicitly . . . seeking an opposite result . . . [in] the lower federal
courts.’” Federación, 410 F.3d at 24.
As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, “‘lower federal courts
possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.’” 	T.M. v.
Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1750 (2026) (quoting Feldman, 460
7 	The evidence that Mr. Casasnovas raised RESPA in his state discovery motion is equivocal.
But the Court concludes that if he failed to raise RESPA in state court, he waived the right to raise it
here. The Court rejects the notion that a litigant could put the federal argument in his back pocket
during the state proceeding and come to federal court and obtain an order overruling a state court
discovery order based on an issue that could have been but was not raised before the state court.
Furthermore, “[t]here is a presumption that the state courts, including the State's highest court, are
as capable as their federal counterparts in safeguarding federal rights.” Bryan v. N.H. AG John M.
Formella, No. 26-cv-337-SM-TSM, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137637, at *5 (D.N.H. May 19, 2026) (citing
Bettencourt v. Bd. of Reg. in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 776 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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U.S. at 484 n.16). 	Here, Mr. Casasnovas, dissatisfied with the Puerto Rico court’s
discovery ruling, seeks a federal court order effectively countermanding the state
court’s order. 	This, in this Court’s view, violates Rooker-Feldman, and the remedy
for 	a 	violation 	of 	Rooker-Feldman 	is 	“dismiss[al] 	for 	want 	of 	subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1748 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284 and citing Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006)).
3. 	Younger Abstention
Proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is famously fraught,8 but in
the Court’s view, the application of Younger abstention to this situation is clearer. In
1971, the United States Supreme Court decided Younger v. Harris, supra, the seminal
case for Younger abstention.
Mr. Casasnovas observes that “[i]n Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571
U.S. 69 (2013), the Supreme Court unanimously clarified that Younger abstention
applies only to three types of exceptional state proceedings: (1) ongoing state
criminal prosecutions; (2) certain state civil enforcement proceedings akin to
criminal prosecutions; and (3) state civil proceedings involving certain orders
uniquely ancillary to the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions (such as civil contempt or other court-supervision orders).” Pl.’s Jud. Defs.’
Opp’n at 16 (emphasis in Pl.’s Opp’n). 	But, as the Sprint Communications Court
wrote, the Supreme Court isolated three types of exceptional state proceedings in
8 	The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into Rooker-Feldman, decided just this June,
addressed whether the doctrine applied while a state court judgment was being appealed. T.M., supra.
The Supreme Court’s five-four decision reflects the unsettled nature of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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1989 in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S.
350 (1989). 	This means that the First Circuit decided Massachusetts Delivery
Association v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012) with the NOPSI standards already
in place as later reaffirmed in Sprint.
As the foreclosure action is not a criminal case or a state civil enforcement
action akin to a criminal prosecution, the question narrows into whether the state
foreclosure action and involves “certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368. The
NOPSI Court cited two examples of abstainable orders: Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
226, n. 12 (1977) (civil contempt order) and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13
(1987) (requirement for the posting of bond pending appeal). 	NOPIS, 491 U.S. at
368. 	At the same time, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the various types of
abstention are not “rigid pigeonholes.” Pennzoil, 481 U.S. 1, 11, n.9 (1987)); NOPSI,
491 U.S. at 359.
The Court concludes that this case falls within the third category identified in
Sprint. 	Mr. Casasnovas seeks federal relief that would effectively countermand the
state court’s discovery order denying disclosure of documents it concluded were
confidential 	under 	the 	rules 	governing 	Puerto 	Rico’s 	mandatory 	foreclosure-
mediation process. 	A state court’s authority to control discovery and enforce
confidentiality requirements in a court-supervised proceeding implicates its ability to
administer its own judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the Court concludes this
discovery order is “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
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judicial 	functions,” 	NOPSI, 	491 	U.S. 	at 	368, 	and 	that 	the 	threshold 	Sprint
requirement is satisfied.
In Massachusetts Delivery Association v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012),
the First Circuit engaged in a comprehensive review of Younger abstention. 	The
Coakley Court began by noting that the “normal rule is that the federal courts must
exercise their jurisdiction and decide cases brought before them.” 	Id. at 40 (citing
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)). 	Younger concerned “a
case involving an underlying state criminal prosecution against a defendant who then
filed suit in federal court to attack the state statute on which his criminal prosecution
was brought.” Id. (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 38-39).
As the First Circuit explained, the Younger doctrine “reflects a ‘longstanding
public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings.’” 	Id.
(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43). 	Younger abstention is based on “two conceptual
foundations.” Id. The first concerns federal interference in criminal actions pending
in state court and is not pertinent to this case. Id. However, the second conceptual
foundation and the more important one for purposes of this case, is that “Younger
rests upon basic notions of federalism and comity, and also on a related desire to
prevent unnecessary duplication of legal proceedings.” Id. (citing Younger, 401 U.S.
at 44).
The First Circuit observed that “[i]n Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.
Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982), the [Supreme] Court set forth
three general guidelines, which [the First Circuit has] since described in a series of
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cases: Younger applies ‘when the requested relief would interfere (1) with an ongoing
state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an important state interest; and (3) that
provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal
constitutional challenge.’” Coakley, 671 F.3d at 41 (citing Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d
26, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2007)).
Here, there was and is a pending state court proceeding, which was ongoing
when Mr. Casasnovas filed his federal lawsuit.9 	Turning to the second prong, it
seems 	apparent 	that 	“the 	state 	court 	proceedings 	‘implicate 	important 	state
interests.’” 	Id. (quoting Middlesex Cnty., 457 U.S. at 432). 	The Court readily
concludes that the extent to which its mandatory mediation process for foreclosure
actions remains confidential represents an important state interest. 	Finally, in his
federal lawsuit, Mr. Casasnovas has alleged that the Puerto Rico confidentiality
provision 	is 	unconstitutional. 	Pl.’s 	Compl. 	at 	¶ 39(d) 	(“2013 	amendments 	to
Regulation X stated that loss mitigation was a standard servicer duty, consequently
making Puerto Rico’s confidentiality clause in the Act unconstitutional”). 	Mr.
Casasnovas has not made the case that the Puerto Rico courts failed to provide him
with an adequate opportunity to advance his federal constitutional challenge.
There is one additional issue, however. 	Although not raised by the parties,10
the First Circuit discussed the preemption exception to Younger in Sirva Relocation
9 	The Coakley Court set forth several criteria for determining whether the federal case would
interfere with the state case. 671 F.3d at 40-41. It seems clear that, if successful, this federal lawsuit
would interfere with the pending state foreclosure action, effectively countermanding a state court
discovery order.
10 	The Court could deem the Younger preemption argument waived. 	See Liviz v. Supreme
Judicial Ct. of Mass., No. 1-1340, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 29380, at *2 (1st Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) (“Liviz
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LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 197-200 (1st Cir. 2015). The First Circuit explained that
the preemption “exception pertains when state law is ‘flagrantly and patently
violative 	of 	express 	constitutional 	prohibitions 	in 	every 	clause, 	sentence 	and
paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made
to apply it.’” Id. Sirva, 794 F.3d at 197 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (internal
quotation mark omitted)). 	The First Circuit described the preemption exception as
“quite narrow.” 	Id. 	But the First Circuit acknowledged that the courts have it is
possible 	“that 	a 	facially 	conclusive 	claim 	of preemption may 	serve 	to 	override
the Younger mandate. Id. (citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 366-67).
The First Circuit wrote that “when a federal statute indisputably preempts a
state-law claim, preemption is facially conclusive whether or not we have previously
opined on the question.” 	Id. at 198. 	But “when there is room for reasonable doubt,
the preemption claim is not facially conclusive and cannot block abstention.” Id. The
First Circuit cited Verizon New England, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Labor
& 	Training, 	723 	F.3d 	113, 	118-19 	(1st 	Cir. 	2013) 	as 	“holding [the]
preemption exception inapplicable where federal plaintiff was attempting to extend
the doctrine of labor law pre-emption in[to] a new area.” 	Sirva, 794 F.3d at 198
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The First Circuit explained that Younger “contemplates that when federal
questions are raised in a state proceeding, those questions ordinarily should be
resolved in that proceeding.” Id. at 198 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45). 	The Sirva
does not develop any argument that one or more of the recognized Younger-abstention exceptions
might apply”).
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Court noted that “[o]nly when preemption of the state-law claim is beyond reasonable
dispute does the paradigm shift.” 	Id. (citing Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d
1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2024)). 	The First Circuit pointed out that “[e]ven modest
ambiguity concerning the result of a preemption inquiry precludes this shift.” 	Id.
The First Circuit gave three examples of when preemption would not prevent Younger
abstention: (1) when there are “unresolved factual disputes” pertinent to preemption,
(2) where a federal court “would be required to delve into unsettled complexities of
state law,” and (3) if “the reach of a preemption provision is itself uncertain.” Id. at
198-99.
Applying First Circuit guidance, the Court concludes that RESPA preemption
of Puerto Rico confidentiality rules is not “beyond reasonable dispute.” 	Id. at 198.
First, the Court of the First Instance in Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals of Puerto
Rico, and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has already ruled that the mediation
confidentiality rules bar Mr. Casasnovas’s demand that Apex Bank reveal the loss
mitigation information he is demanding, and that ruling has been upheld by both the
Court of Appeals of Puerto Rico, and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, albeit the
latter on procedural grounds.
Second, even if Mr. Casasnovas’s interpretation RESPA would require Apex
Bank to disclose loss mitigation information, it is by no means clear that the state
confidentiality policies should not exempt disclosure during the mediation process.
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Third, it is by no means “beyond reasonable dispute” that Mr. Casasnovas’s
interpretation of RESPA and the scope of the information he is demanding are subject
to disclosure under RESPA. See Apex Mot. at 10-24.
The Court concludes that the Younger abstention applies and that it must
dismiss Mr. Casasnovas’s complaint as against the Judicial Defendants.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part and DISMISSES in part Defendant Apex Bank’s
Renewed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60). The Court GRANTS the Renewed Motion
10-to Dismiss insofar as it asserts that Rafael Juan Casasnovas has failed to properly
serve Apex Bank with a copy of the complaint and summons, ORDERS Rafael Juan
Casasnovas to effect service within twenty-eight days, and DISMISSES without
prejudice Apex Bank’s motion to the extent it demands that Rafeal Juan Casasnovas’s
complaint be dismissed. 	The Court ORDERS Attorney Castellanos-Otero to SHOW
CAUSE within fourteen days as to why this Court should not impose a sanction upon
him for his failure to serve Apex Bank and his intransigence once his failure had been
demonstrated, and ORDERS Apex Bank to reply to Attorney Castellanos-Otero;s
response within fourteen days of his response. 	The Court DISMISSES without
prejudice Apex Bank’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) as moot regarding service of
process and as premature regarding whether the complaint states a cognizable cause
of action because the Court has not yet assumed jurisdiction.
The Court GRANTS the Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss both insofar
as the complaint demands monetary damages against the Judicial Defendants and
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DISMISSES the monetary damages claims against the Judicial Defendants in their
official capacities as violative of the Eleventh Amendment and insofar as the
complaint violates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 14th day of September, 2026
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