Munoz-Melendez v. Dillard-Lewis, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
SARA MUÑOZ-MELÉNDEZ,
Plaintiff
v.
DILLARD-LEWIS, INC.,
Defendant
CIVIL NO. 25-1367 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge.
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant 	Dillard-Lewis, 	Inc.
(“Dillard-Lewis” or “Defendant”)’s Motion to Dismiss coupled with
Motion 	to 	Transfer 	(“Motion”). 	(Docket 	No. 	37). 	Having 	reviewed
Docket No. 37 and the subsequent briefing, the Court hereby DENIES
the Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS the Motion to Transfer.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 	June 	12, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	Sara 	Muñoz-Meléndez 	(“Muñoz-
Meléndez” 	or 	“Plaintiff”) 	filed 	a 	Complaint 	in 	the 	Puerto 	Rico
Court of First Instance against Dillard-Lewis. (Docket No. 19-1).
Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	Dillard-Lewis 	unlawfully 	terminated 	her
employment 	after 	many 	years 	of 	service, 	capping 	off 	a 	pattern 	of
discrimination and harassment by Dillard-Lewis employees based on
Plaintiff’s 	age, 	race, 	and 	gender. 	Id. 	at 	3-6. 	Plaintiff 	alleges
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	2
she was treated disrespectfully, disobeyed by inferiors, and sworn
at in text messages. Id. at 4. Plaintiff bases her causes of action
on 	several 	Puerto 	Rico 	laws, 	including 	Acts 	80, 	100, 	and 	115, 	as
well as the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).
Id. 	Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	she 	suffered 	through 	a 	hostile 	work
environment, 	was 	given 	unequal 	pay 	despite 	her 	superior 	work
performance, 	and 	subjected 	to 	retaliatory 	termination 	for
complaining about the discrimination she faced. Id.
Dillard-Lewis 	filed 	a 	Notice 	of 	Removal 	on 	July 	11, 	2025,
bringing 	the 	suit 	to 	this 	District 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	diversity 	and
federal question jurisdiction. (Docket No. 1 at 3-7). On August 6,
2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	Motion 	for 	Remand. 	(Docket 	No. 	14).
Plaintiff stated that her federal ADEA claim was subsidiary to the
counts based in Commonwealth law, and that she planned to withdraw
it 	by 	amending 	the 	Complaint. 	Id. 	at 	5. 	On 	November 	12, 	2025,
Plaintiff filed the promised Amended Complaint, dropping her ADEA-
based allegations and proceeding solely on causes of action arising
under 	Puerto 	Rico 	law, 	including 	Acts 	80, 	100, 	and 	115. 	(Docket
No. 	35). 	On 	January 	9, 	2026, 	the 	Court 	denied 	Plaintiff’s 	remand
bid, 	ruling 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	not 	contradicted 	Dillard-Lewis’
assertion 	that 	complete 	diversity 	exists 	or 	any 	facts 	related 	to
party citizenship or the amount in controversy. (Docket Nos. 1 at
6-7; 22 at 2-3; 42-1 at 2, 5; 47).
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	3
On November 25, 2025, Dillard-Lewis filed the instant Motion
to 	Dismiss 	aimed 	at 	the 	Amended 	Complaint. 	(Docket 	No. 	37).
Dillard-Lewis 	argues 	that 	the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	is 	neither
a district in which it resides nor one in which a substantial part
of 	the 	events 	or 	omissions 	giving 	rise 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	claims
occurred. Id. at 7-11. In particular, Dillard-Lewis points to the
evidence 	in 	the 	Charge 	of 	Discrimination 	filed 	by 	Plaintiff 	with
the 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity 	Commission 	(“EEOC”). 	Id. 	at 	10-
11. 	Dillard-Lewis 	claims 	that 	the 	Charge 	substantiates 	the
connection between North Carolina and the discrimination Plaintiff
allegedly 	suffered. 	Id. 	For 	these 	reasons, 	Dillard-Lewis 	claims
that 	Plaintiff 	cannot 	satisfy 	any 	of 	the 	“venue 	options 	under
Section 	1391(b) 	which 	would 	enable 	her 	to 	litigate 	this 	civil
action 	in 	the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico.” 	Id. 	at 	12. 	Dillard-Lewis
requests that the Court consequently either (a) dismiss this case,
or 	(b) 	transfer 	it 	to 	the 	United 	States 	District 	Court 	for 	the
Eastern 	District 	of 	North 	Carolina. 	Id. 	at 	21-22. 	Dillard-Lewis
avers that the factors of (a) parties and witnesses’ convenience,
(b) 	the 	availability 	of 	sources 	of 	proof, 	and 	(c) 	the 	public
interest 	all 	weigh 	“overwhelmingly” 	in 	favor 	of 	transferring 	the
case to North Carolina. Id. at 16-21.
On 	December 	19, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	her 	Opposition 	to 	the
Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 41). Therein, she rejects the notion
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	4
of 	either 	an 	improper-venue 	dismissal 	or 	a 	transfer 	to 	North
Carolina. Id. She insists that Puerto Rico remains an appropriate
forum because: she is and has been a longtime Puerto Rico resident;
she 	was 	hired 	in 	Puerto 	Rico; 	she 	traveled 	often 	to 	the
Commonwealth for work; and she was terminated while in Puerto Rico.
Id. at 8-11. Plaintiff highlights the fact that she was only based
out of North Carolina for “a brief two (2) years” out of the more
than 	a 	decade 	she 	spent 	as 	a 	Dillard-Lewis 	employee. 	Id. 	at 	17.
Plaintiff 	emphasizes 	that 	Dillard-Lewis 	maintains 	a 	significant
commercial 	presence 	in 	Puerto 	Rico 	and 	is 	subject 	to 	personal
jurisdiction here, making this District an appropriate venue under
Section 	1391. 	Id. 	at 	8-9. 	Plaintiff 	avers 	that 	transfer 	is
unjustified 	since 	her 	chosen 	forum 	is 	entitled 	to 	deference, 	her
financial 	resources 	are 	much 	more 	strained 	than 	Dillard-Lewis’,
and 	modern 	electronic 	discovery 	and 	remote 	testimony 	methods
render 	any 	inconvenience 	associated 	with 	litigating 	in 	this
District a thing of the past. Id. at 15-17.
On 	January 	8, 	2026, 	Dillard-Lewis 	filed 	its 	Reply 	to 	the
Opposition. (Docket No. 44). Dillard-Lewis stresses that Plaintiff
has not managed to dispute that its principal place of business is
North Carolina, has conflated personal jurisdiction analysis with
venue 	analysis, 	has 	not 	refuted 	the 	assertion 	that 	operative
employment decisions were made in North Carolina, has contradicted
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	5
her own EEOC filing, and has failed to rebut Dillard-Lewis’ recital
of the Section 1404(a) factors. Id. at 2-5.
Lastly, 	on 	January 	26, 	2026, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	Surreply.
(Docket 	No. 	49). 	Therein, 	Plaintiff 	again 	emphasizes 	that
witnesses and evidence may be managed through virtual means, that
the EEOC filing is irrelevant, that she retains the presumption in
favor 	of 	her 	choice 	of 	forum, 	and 	that 	she 	is 	financially
constrained. 	Id. 	at 	5-7. 	Plaintiff 	also 	references 	case 	law
suggesting that the Court ought to examine the entire sequence of
events 	underlying 	her 	claim, 	a 	sequence 	she 	avers 	includes 	her
time 	in 	Puerto 	Rico 	both 	before 	and 	after 	her 	move 	to 	North
Carolina. Id. at 5-6.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Transfer Under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) governs venue for cases removed from state
court 	and 	“expressly 	provides 	that 	the 	proper 	venue 	of 	a 	removed
action is the district court of the United States for the district
and 	division 	embracing 	the 	place 	where 	such 	action 	is 	pending.”
Polizzi 	v. 	Cowles 	Magazines, 	Inc., 	345 	U.S. 	663, 	666 	(1953)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Once the identity of the “proper” venue is so established, 28
U.S.C. 	§ 	1404 	enters 	the 	picture. 	Section 	1404 	of 	the 	Judicial
Code of the United States provides that “[f]or the convenience of
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	6
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may 	transfer 	any 	civil 	action 	to 	any 	other 	district 	or 	division
where it might have been brought or to any district or division to
which 	all 	parties 	have 	consented.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1404(a). 	This
section codified and liberalized the common law doctrine of forum
non 	conveniens, 	which 	was 	embraced 	by 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	in 	Gulf
Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,
the 	Supreme 	Court 	reasoned 	that 	“Congress, 	by 	the 	term 	‘for 	the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,’
intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing
of 	inconvenience” 	than 	previously 	required 	under 	the 	doctrine 	of
forum non conveniens. 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
The 	plaintiff’s 	chosen 	forum 	is 	ordinarily 	afforded
deference. 	Gulf 	Oil 	Co., 	330 	U.S. 	at 	508 	(“unless 	the 	balance 	is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed”); Concilio Mision Cristiana Fuente de
Agua Viva, Inc. v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 2024 WL 326796, at *5 (D.P.R.
2024) 	(“[p]laintiff’s 	choice 	of 	venue 	is 	accorded 	a 	strong
presumption in its favor”) (internal quotation omitted); Coady v.
Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000); Nowak v. Tak How
Investments, 94 F.3d 708, 720 (1st Cir. 1996).
When 	determining 	whether 	to 	grant 	a 	transfer, 	the 	relevant
private-interest factors to be examined by a court are:
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	7
[T]he 	relative 	ease 	of 	access 	to 	sources 	of
proof; availability of compulsory process for
the 	attendance 	of 	unwilling 	and 	the 	cost 	of
obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses;
possibility 	of 	view 	of 	the 	premises; 	if 	view
would 	be 	appropriate 	to 	the 	action; 	and 	all
other practical problems that make trial of a
case, easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
Gulf 	Oil 	Co., 	330 	U.S. 	at 	508-509; 	see 	also 	Aquakem 	Caribe, 	Inc.
v. Kemiron Atl., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201-202 (D.P.R. 2002).
Public-interest 	factors 	also 	have 	a 	bearing 	on 	the 	transfer
determination. 	Gulf 	Oil 	Co., 	330 	U.S. 	at 	509. 	These 	factors 	have
included “the trial judge’s familiarity with the applicable state
law, 	the 	local 	interest 	in 	adjudicating 	disputes 	at 	home; 	court
congestion 	in 	the 	two 	forums, 	[and] 	the 	fairness 	of 	placing 	the
burden 	of 	jury 	duty 	on 	the 	citizens 	of 	the 	state 	with 	greater
interest in the dispute.” NPR, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Puerto
Rico, 242 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (D.P.R. 2003) (internal quotations
omitted).
Considering 	the 	aforementioned 	factors, 	the 	decision 	to
transfer 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1404(a) 	necessarily 	requires 	an
“individualized, 	case-by-case 	consideration 	of 	convenience 	and
fairness.” 	Stewart 	Org., 	Inc. 	v. 	Ricoh 	Corp., 	487 	U.S. 	22, 	29
(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
B. The Court’s Discretion to Transfer
The 	decision 	to 	transfer 	is 	within 	the 	Court’s 	discretion.
See Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737 (1st Cir.
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	8
1977). 	The 	Court 	need 	not 	determine 	the 	best 	venue 	but 	“merely 	a
proper 	venue.” 	Astro–Med 	v. 	Nihon 	Kohden 	of 	Am., 	591 	F.3d 	1, 	12
(1st Cir. 2009) (citing Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244
F.3d 	38, 	42 	(1st 	Cir. 	2001)). 	Courts 	may 	even 	transfer 	an 	action
under 	§ 1404(a) 	on 	their 	own 	initiative. 	See 	Desmond 	v. 	Nynex
Corp., 	37 	F.3d 	1484 	(1st 	Cir. 	1994) 	(“It 	is 	well 	settled 	that 	a
court 	may 	transfer 	a 	case 	sua 	sponte 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§
1404(a) . . . .”) 	(citing 	Caldwell 	v. 	Palmetto 	State 	Sav. 	Bank,
811 	F.2d 	916, 	919 	(5th 	Cir. 	1987)); 	Lead 	Indus. 	Assoc. 	v.
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir.
1979); Mobil Corp. v. S.E.C., 550 F. Supp. 67, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
III. DISCUSSION
As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Defendant’s 	request
for 	the 	case 	to 	be 	dismissed 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1406. 	This 	action
was 	removed 	from 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Court 	of 	First 	Instance 	to 	this
District. 	Hence, 	it 	is 	governed 	by 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1441(a), 	which
“expressly 	provides 	that 	the 	proper 	venue 	of 	a 	removed 	action 	is
the 	district 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	for 	the 	district 	and
division 	embracing 	the 	place 	where 	such 	action 	is 	pending.”
Polizzi, 	345 	U.S. 	at 	666 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted);
Lambert 	v. 	Kysar, 	983 	F.2d 	1110, 	1113 	n.2 	(1st 	Cir. 	1993) 	(“the
venue 	of 	a 	removed 	action 	is 	not 	governed 	by 	§ 	1391, 	but 	by 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 	1441(a)”). 	Given 	that 	venue 	is, 	therefore, 	initially
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	9
“proper,” 	the 	dispute 	then 	narrows 	to 	whether 	the 	requested
transfer to the Eastern District of North Carolina is warranted.
28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1404(a) 	provides 	that 	“[f]or 	the 	convenience 	of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may 	transfer 	any 	civil 	action 	to 	any 	other 	district 	or 	division
where it might have been brought or to any district or division to
which 	all 	parties 	have 	consented.” 	The 	Court 	now 	turns 	to 	the
private- 	and 	public-interest 	factors 	bearing 	on 	Defendant’s 	28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) request.
A. Private-interest Factors
1. The convenience of the parties and witnesses
Plaintiff’s 	choice 	of 	venue 	is 	accorded 	a 	“strong
presumption” 	in 	its 	favor. 	Cuadrado 	Concepción 	v. 	United 	States,
2019 	WL 	5847216, 	at 	*3 	(D.P.R. 	2019) 	(citing 	Coady, 	223 	F.3d 	at
11). 	That 	said, 	“[t]he 	most 	important 	factor 	in 	deciding 	whether
to 	transfer 	an 	action 	is 	the 	convenience 	of 	the 	witnesses.” 	See
Colon Perez v. Metan Marine, Inc., 2018 WL 1664697, at *8 (D.P.R.
2018) 	(quoting 	Demers, 	Jr. 	v. 	Pilkington 	N. 	Am., 	Inc., 	2010 	WL
4683780, at *6 (D.N.H. 2010)).
The 	Court 	rules 	that 	the 	convenience 	factor 	weighs 	strongly
in favor of Defendant, notwithstanding the personal inconvenience
Plaintiff 	incurs 	in 	having 	to 	travel 	from 	Puerto 	Rico 	to 	North
Carolina, where she worked for an extended period of time. (Docket
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	10
No. 41 at 17). Plaintiff acknowledges that she frequently traveled
back and forth between Puerto Rico and North Carolina prior to her
more recent relocation back to the island. Id. at 13.
Courts give less weight to a plaintiff’s choice of forum when
the 	operative 	events 	occurred 	elsewhere. 	Colon 	Perez, 	2018 	WL
1664697, at *8. In this case, the great majority of the challenged
conduct occurred in North Carolina. See (Docket No. 37 at 10-11).
Defendant 	has 	ably 	outlined 	how 	even 	Plaintiff’s 	own 	EEOC 	filing
locates 	the 	alleged 	discriminatory 	and 	retaliatory 	conduct 	to
Defendant’s 	Raleigh, 	North 	Carolina 	office. 	Id. 	Similarly, 	the
facts pled by Plaintiff in relation to her medical leave, alleged
demotion, 	unequal 	pay, 	disputes 	with 	coworkers, 	and 	hostile 	work
environment in Raleigh all relate to conduct from her two years in
North Carolina. See (Docket No. 35 at 3-6).
The 	case 	law 	in 	this 	District 	requires 	parties 	requesting 	a
Section 1404 transfer on the basis of the convenience of witnesses
to 	clearly 	specify 	the 	key 	witnesses 	to 	be 	called 	and 	provide 	a
general 	statement 	as 	to 	their 	testimony. 	Arroyo-Perez 	v. 	Demir
Grp. 	Int’l, 	733 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	314, 	320 	(D.P.R. 	2010) 	(citations
omitted). 	Defendant 	meets 	this 	burden, 	listing 	eight 	key
witnesses. 	(Docket 	No. 	37 	at 	17-18). 	These 	witnesses 	are 	either
upper-level 	management, 	alleged 	to 	have 	been 	involved 	in 	the
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	11
harassment of Plaintiff, or serve as custodians for relevant files.
(Docket No. 37 at 17-18). All reside in North Carolina. Id.
While 	it 	is 	true 	that 	Plaintiff 	generically 	references 	the
presence of potential witnesses she trained in Puerto Rico, (Docket
No. 41 at 8), and attempts to create a Puerto Rico nexus for some
relevant facts such as the location of her hiring and firing, id.
at 12-18, none of these facts tip the balance in favor of venue in
this 	District. 	The 	Court 	finds 	that 	Defendant 	has 	made 	the
particularized 	showing 	of 	inconvenience 	to 	itself 	and 	witnesses
necessary to tilt this factor in favor of transfer. On this record,
the 	concentration 	of 	key 	witnesses 	and 	operative 	events 	in 	North
Carolina 	outweighs 	the 	more 	generalized 	and 	hypothetical 	Puerto
Rico connections Plaintiff identifies.
As a court in this District has noted before, “it makes [more]
sense for arguably one person to travel to [the proposed transfer
state] 	than 	to 	make 	all 	of 	Defendants’ 	witnesses 	to 	[sic] 	travel
to Puerto Rico.” Rodríguez-Navarro v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2016 WL
4179884, at *2 (D.P.R. 2016).
2. Relative access to sources of proof
While 	electronic 	communication 	diminishes 	the 	relevance 	of
geographic 	proximity 	to 	physical 	evidence, 	that 	“does 	not 	render
this factor superfluous.” Cuadrado Concepción, 2019 WL 5847216, at
*3 (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 316 (5th
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	12
Cir. 	2008)). 	To 	the 	extent 	proximity 	aids 	in 	ease 	of 	access,
evidence 	about 	Plaintiff’s 	alleged 	demotion, 	her 	medical 	leave,
the supposedly hostile work environment in Raleigh, accounting and
payroll records, and contracting files will be easier to obtain in
the 	Eastern 	District 	of 	North 	Carolina. 	Plaintiff 	has 	pointed 	to
little 	in 	the 	way 	of 	physical 	evidence 	located 	in 	this 	District.
As 	such, 	the 	Court 	rules 	that 	this 	factor 	weighs 	in 	favor 	of
transfer.
B. Public-interest Factors
1. Familiarity with the applicable law
“[A] 	court’s 	familiarity 	with 	the 	applicable 	law 	has . . .
been 	recognized 	in 	this 	circuit 	as 	an 	appropriate 	factor 	in
deciding 	a 	motion 	to 	transfer.” 	Cuadrado 	Concepción, 	2019 	WL
5847216, 	at 	*3 	(quoting 	Scholtens 	v. 	Gyrus 	Acmi, 	Inc., 	2019 	WL
2528377 	(D. 	Mass. 	2019), 	R&R 	adopted, 	2019 	WL 	2565664). 	Here,
Plaintiff asserts that Puerto Rico law governs her claims. (Docket
No. 	41 	at 	18). 	She 	has 	even 	gone 	so 	far 	as 	to 	file 	an 	Amended
Complaint to drop her ADEA-based allegations and proceed solely on
causes of action arising under Puerto Rico law, including Acts 80,
100, 	and 	115. 	(Docket 	No. 	35). 	Plaintiff 	freely 	admits 	that 	her
choice of forum is a result of “the judicial procedures in Puerto
Rico pertaining [sic] labor cases” so she can benefit from “shorter
terms 	for 	Defendant 	to 	answer 	complaints, 	expedite 	process,
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	13
employer’s obligation to cover employees lawyer fees and recurrent
jurisprudence 	and 	legislation 	that 	vigorously 	protect 	employee
rights.” (Docket No. 41 at 10).
It 	is 	far 	from 	certain 	at 	this 	juncture 	whether 	Puerto 	Rico
law 	indeed 	applies 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	that 	she 	was 	unlawfully
terminated, 	discriminated 	against, 	and 	harassed 	as 	a 	result 	of
conduct mostly occurring in North Carolina. (Docket No. 19-1 at 3-
6). 	Given 	the 	uncertainty 	around 	the 	applicable 	law, 	this 	factor
weighs only slightly against transfer. See BMJ Foods Puerto Rico,
Inc. v. Metromedia Steakhouses Co., L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 229, 234
(D.P.R. 2008) (transferring case to the Northern District of Texas
despite claim arising under Puerto Rico’s Act 75 dealership law).
2. Local interest and burden of jury duty
Considerations of local interests in adjudicating disputes at
home 	weigh 	in 	favor 	of 	transferring 	this 	case 	to 	North 	Carolina.
As outlined above, the claims in this lawsuit stem mostly from the
hostile 	work 	environment 	that 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	existed 	at
Defendant’s 	Raleigh 	office. 	See 	(Docket 	No. 	37 	at 	10-11). 	Hence,
citizens 	in 	North 	Carolina 	have 	a 	stronger 	interest 	in 	deciding
this 	case 	than 	do 	Puerto 	Rico 	citizens. 	In 	turn, 	that 	greater
interest makes it fairer to burden citizens in North Carolina with
jury duty for this case than citizens in Puerto Rico.
Case 3:25-cv-01367-RAM Document 50 Filed 04/15/26 Page 13 of 14

Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	14
IV. CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Dillard-Lewis’s
Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS its Motion to Transfer at Docket No.
37.
The 	Clerk 	of 	Court 	shall 	TRANSFER 	this 	case 	to 	the 	Eastern
District of North Carolina. This case is now closed in the District
of Puerto Rico for statistical purposes. 	Judgment shall be entered
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 15 th day of April 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-01367-RAM Document 50 Filed 04/15/26 Page 14 of 14