Munoz-Melendez v. Dillard-Lewis, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
SARA MUÑOZ-MELÉNDEZ,
Plaintiff
v.
DILLARD-LEWIS, INC.,
Defendant
CIVIL NO. 25-1367 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge.
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Plaintiff 	Sara 	Muñoz-Meléndez
(“Muñoz-Meléndez” 	or 	“Plaintiff”)’s 	Motion 	to 	Remand 	(“Motion”),
(Docket 	No. 	14), 	and 	Defendant 	Dillard-Lewis, 	Inc. 	(“Dillard-
Lewis” 	or 	“Defendant”)’s 	Opposition 	to 	Motion 	to 	Remand
(“Opposition”). 	(Docket 	No. 	22). 	Having 	reviewed 	these 	filings,
the 	record, 	and 	the 	applicable 	law, 	the 	Court 	hereby 	DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On 	June 	12, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	Complaint 	in 	the 	Puerto
Rico 	Court 	of 	First 	Instance 	against 	Dillard-Lewis. 	(Docket 	No.
19-1). 	Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	Dillard-Lewis 	unlawfully 	terminated
her employment after many years of service, capping off a pattern
of discrimination and harassment by Dillard-Lewis employees based
on 	Plaintiff’s 	age, 	race, 	and 	gender. 	Id. 	at 	3-6. 	Among 	these
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allegations 	was 	the 	claim 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	treated
disrespectfully, 	disobeyed 	by 	inferiors, 	and 	sworn 	at 	in 	text
messages. 	Id. 	at 	4. 	Plaintiff 	based 	her 	claims 	on 	several 	Puerto
Rico laws, including Acts 80, 100, and 115, as well as the federal
Age 	Discrimination 	in 	Employment 	Act 	(“ADEA”). 	Id. 	Plaintiff
alleged that she suffered through a hostile work environment, was
given 	unequal 	pay 	despite 	her 	superior 	work 	performance, 	and
subjected 	to 	retaliatory 	termination 	for 	complaining 	about 	the
discrimination she faced. Id.
Dillard-Lewis 	filed 	a 	Notice 	of 	Removal 	on 	July 	11, 	2025.
(Docket No. 1). Therein, Dillard-Lewis posits that this Court had
subject-matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	present 	litigation 	because:
(a) Dillard-Lewis and Plaintiff are citizens of different states,
(b) 	the 	Complaint 	expressly 	pled 	claims 	under 	the 	federal 	ADEA,
and 	(c) 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	permitted 	the 	Court 	to 	hear
Plaintiff’s Puerto Rico law claims. Id. at 3-7.
On 	August 	6, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	Motion 	for 	Remand.
(Docket 	No. 	14). 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	removal 	is 	improper
because 	her 	claims 	are 	ultimately 	anchored 	in 	Puerto 	Rico 	labor
laws, 	which 	afford 	her 	expedited 	justice 	and 	pro-employee
procedural 	protections. 	Id. 	at 	2-3. 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	her
federal 	ADEA 	claim 	is 	subsidiary 	to 	the 	counts 	based 	in
Commonwealth law, and that she planned to withdraw her ADEA claim
by amending the Complaint. Id. at 5.
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On 	August 	20, 	2025, 	Dillard-Lewis 	filed 	its 	Opposition 	to
Motion 	to 	Remand 	(“Opposition”). 	(Docket 	No. 	22). 	Dillard-Lewis
argues 	that 	remand 	is 	improper 	for 	two 	reasons: 	(a) 	because 	the
Court 	continues 	to 	possess 	federal-question 	jurisdiction 	since
Plaintiff 	had, 	at 	that 	point, 	not 	yet 	amended 	her 	Complaint 	to
drop the ADEA claim, and (b) because the Court continues to possess
diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 2-8.
On 	November 	12, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	the 	promised 	Amended
Complaint, 	dropping 	her 	ADEA-based 	allegations 	and 	proceeding
solely on causes of action arising under Puerto Rico law, including
Acts 80, 100, and 115. (Docket No. 35).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Removal
Pursuant 	to 	the 	federal 	removal 	statute 	28 	U.S.C 	§ 	1441(a),
“any 	civil 	action 	brought 	in 	a 	State 	court 	of 	which 	the 	district
courts 	of 	the 	United 	States 	have 	original 	jurisdiction, 	may 	be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of 	the 	United 	States 	for 	the 	district 	and 	division 	embracing 	the
place where such action is pending.” For a district court to have
original 	jurisdiction 	over 	a 	civil 	action, 	it 	must 	be 	determined
that 	“the 	case 	could 	have 	been 	filed 	originally 	in 	federal 	court
based on a federal question, diversity of citizenship, or another
statutory grant of jurisdiction.” Villegas v. Magic Transp., Inc.,
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	4
641 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	108, 	110 	(D.P.R. 	2009) 	(citing Caterpillar, 	Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1987)).
If 	the 	propriety 	of 	a 	removal 	petition 	is 	questioned, 	“the
removing party bears the burden of showing that removal is proper.”
Id. 	(citing 	Danca 	v. 	Priv. 	Health 	Care 	Sys., 185 	F.3d 	1, 	4 	(1st
Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added).
B. Complete Diversity
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil
actions 	involving 	controversies 	between 	citizens 	of 	different
states. 	See 	U.S. 	Const. 	art. 	III, 	§ 	2, 	cl. 	1; 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1332.
Pursuant 	to 	the 	federal 	removal 	statute, 	the 	diversity 	of
citizenship 	between 	the 	parties 	“must 	be 	complete; 	that 	is, 	no
plaintiff 	may 	be 	a 	citizen 	of 	the 	same 	state 	as 	any 	defendant.”
BRT 	Mgmt. 	LLC 	v. 	Malden 	Storage 	LLC, 	68 	F.4th 	691, 	695 	(1st 	Cir.
2023) (citations omitted).
C. Citizenship
“Key 	to 	establishing 	diversity 	jurisdiction 	are 	the
citizenships 	of 	the 	parties 	before 	the 	court.” 	BRT 	Mgmt. 	LLC, 	68
F.4th 	at 	695. 	For 	purposes 	of 	diversity, 	“[n]atural 	persons 	are
citizens 	of 	the 	state 	in 	which 	they 	are 	domiciled.” 	Id. 	An
individual’s 	domicile 	“is 	the 	place 	where 	he 	has 	his 	true, 	fixed
home 	and 	principal 	establishment, 	and 	to 	which, 	whenever 	he 	is
absent, 	he 	has 	the 	intention 	of 	returning.” 	Rodriguez-Diaz 	v.
Sierra-Martinez, 	853 	F.2d 	1027, 	1029 	(1st 	Cir. 	1988) 	(quotation
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	5
omitted). 	A 	corporation, 	meanwhile, 	is 	a 	citizen 	of 	its 	state 	of
incorporation 	and 	its 	principal 	place 	of 	business. 	See 	Vitalife
Inc. v. Keller Med., Inc., 2021 WL 424222, at *2 (D.P.R. 2021); 28
U.S.C. 	§ 	1332(c) 	(“a 	corporation 	shall 	be 	deemed 	to 	be 	a 	citizen
of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated
and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place
of business”).
III. DISCUSSION
As 	Dillard-Lewis 	has 	repeatedly 	pointed 	out, 	Plaintiff 	has
not contradicted Dillard-Lewis’ assertion that complete diversity
exists; 	nor 	has 	she 	contested 	any 	facts 	related 	to 	party
citizenship 	or 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy. 	(Docket 	Nos. 	1 	at 	6-7,
22 	at 	2-3, 	42-1 	at 	2, 	5). 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	deems 	the 	facts
detailed below to be uncontested.
A. Plaintiff is a citizen of Puerto Rico
For purposes of diversity, “[n]atural persons are citizens of
the state in which they are domiciled.” BRT Mgmt. LLC, 68 F.4th at
695. Puerto Rico is treated as a state for diversity analyses. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (“the word ‘States’, as used in this section,
includes 	the 	Territories, 	the 	District 	of 	Columbia, 	and 	the
Commonwealth 	of 	Puerto 	Rico”). 	Plaintiff 	acknowledges 	in 	her
Amended 	Complaint 	that 	she 	is 	a 	resident 	of 	Coamo, 	Puerto 	Rico.
(Docket No. 35 at 1). In other filings, she similarly admits that
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it is an “unequivocal fact that she is a resident of Puerto Rico.”
(Docket No. 41 at 5).
Moreover, Dillard-Lewis avers that Plaintiff is a domiciliary
of Coamo, Puerto Rico. (Docket Nos. 1 at 7, 22 at 2). Nowhere does
Plaintiff 	contradict 	this 	averment. 	Plaintiff’s 	most 	germane
statement 	in 	the 	record 	as 	to 	her 	domicile 	is 	her 	aforementioned
admission 	that 	she 	resides 	in 	Puerto 	Rico. 	(Docket 	No. 	35 	at 	1).
Residence is not the same as domicile for purposes of determining
citizenship. 	See, 	e.g., 	Lundquist 	v. 	Precision 	Valley 	Aviation,
Inc., 	946 	F.2d 	8, 	10 	(1st 	Cir. 	1991) 	(“the 	relevant 	standard 	is
‘citizenship,’ 	i.e., 	‘domicile,’ 	not 	mere 	residence; 	a 	party 	may
reside in more than one state but can be domiciled, for diversity
purposes, 	in 	only 	one”). 	Nevertheless, 	Plaintiff’s 	failure 	to
contradict Dillard-Lewis as to her domicile, coupled with the fact
that 	Plaintiff’s 	factual 	allegations 	center 	in 	part 	around 	her
decision to move back to Puerto Rico and accept a remote position,
see, e.g., (Docket No. 35 at 3-4), suggests that there is no real
dispute as to where Plaintiff is domiciled.
Hence, Plaintiff is a citizen of Puerto Rico for the purposes
of diversity jurisdiction.
B. Dillard-Lewis is a citizen of North Carolina
A 	corporation’s 	citizenship 	is 	determined 	by 	its 	state 	of
incorporation 	and 	its 	principal 	place 	of 	business. 	See 	Vitalife
Inc., 	2021 	WL 	424222, 	at 	*2; 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1332(c). 	Dillard-Lewis
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avers 	that 	its 	state 	of 	incorporation 	and 	principal 	place 	of
business 	are 	both 	in 	North 	Carolina. 	(Docket 	Nos. 	1 	at 	6, 	22 	at
2). It incudes a statement under penalty of perjury from its Vice
President, 	Steven 	Hester, 	which 	attests 	to 	these 	facts. 	(Docket
No. 1-1 at 2).
While 	some 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	filings 	allege 	that 	Dillard-Lewis
is permitted to do business in Puerto Rico, maintains a permanent
commercial 	operation 	in 	Puerto 	Rico, 	and 	is 	organized 	under 	the
laws 	of 	the 	Commonwealth, 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	contest 	the 	facts
that Dillard-Lewis is incorporated in North Carolina and that its
principal place of business is there. (Docket Nos. 35 at 2, 41 at
7-8). 	In 	fact, 	in 	the 	Amended 	Complaint, 	Plaintiff 	acknowledges
that 	Dillard-Lewis 	is 	a 	“foreign 	corporation.” 	(Docket 	No. 	35 	at
2).
Hence, 	Dillard-Lewis 	is 	a 	citizen 	of 	North 	Carolina 	for 	the
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
C. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000
Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	references 	several 	sources 	of
alleged 	damages 	that 	together 	constitute 	the 	amount 	in
controversy. Id. at 9-12. Plaintiff claims that she is entitled to
six 	months’ 	salary, 	totaling 	nearly 	$42,000, 	and 	three 	weeks 	of
salary 	for 	each 	year 	of 	service, 	totaling 	over 	$58,000, 	under
Puerto 	Rico 	law. 	Id. 	at 	9-10. 	She 	separately 	alleges 	that 	“for
having 	been 	a 	victim 	of 	retaliation, 	[she] 	is 	entitled 	to
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Civil No. 25-1367(RAM) 	8
compensation in the amount of not less than $250,000.00, an amount
that must be paid twice [and] for having been discriminated against
based 	on 	age, 	she 	is 	entitled 	to 	compensation 	in 	the 	estimated
amount of $200,000.00.” Id. at 11-12.
Hence, 	it 	is 	facially 	apparent 	from 	the 	Amended 	Complaint
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 	record 	reflects 	that 	Plaintiff 	is 	a 	citizen 	of 	Puerto
Rico, Defendant is a citizen of North Carolina, and the amount in
controversy 	exceeds 	$75,000. 	Hence, 	complete 	diversity 	exists
between the parties and the Court possesses original jurisdiction
over 	the 	present 	action. 	The 	Court 	DENIES 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to
Remand at Docket No. 14.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 9 th day of January 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge
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