Sanchez-Gonzalez v. Warden MDC Guaynabo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
HUGO ALFONSO SÁNCHEZ-GONZÁLEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN MDC GUAYNABO,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-1035 (FAB)
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	defendant 	Warden 	MDC 	Guaynabo 	(the
“warden”)’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint. 	(Docket 	No. 	31.)
For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the 	warden’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is
DENIED.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff 	Hugo 	Alfonso 	Sánchez-González 	(“Sánchez”) 	is 	a
Mexican national. 	(Docket No. 13 at p. 2.) 	On November 14, 2018,
he 	was 	sentenced 	to 	120 	months 	of 	imprisonment 	after 	being
convicted 	of 	conspiracy 	to 	distribute 	50 	grams 	or 	more 	of
methamphetamine. 	See id.; Docket No. 31 at p. 2. 	He is currently
serving 	his 	sentence 	at 	the 	Metropolitan 	Detention 	Center 	in
Guaynabo, 	Puerto 	Rico. 	Id. 	While 	incarcerated, 	he 	earned 	good-
time 	credits 	totaling 	365 	days 	under 	the 	First 	Step 	Act 	(“FSA”).
See Docket No. 13 at p. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). 	Application of
the 	FSA 	credits 	advanced 	his 	release 	date 	from 	July 	20, 	2026 	to
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July 	20, 	2025. 	(Docket 	No. 	13 	at 	pp. 	2-4.) 	Before 	his 	release
date arrived, however, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) informed him
that 	he 	was 	deemed 	ineligible 	for 	FSA 	credits. 	Id. 	The 	BOP’s
reversal on his FSA eligibility was based on its assertion that he
was subject to a final order of removal (i.e., deportation). 	See
id.; 	Docket 	No. 	1-2 	at 	p. 	1; 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3632(d)(4)(E)(i) 	(“A
prisoner is ineligible to apply time credits [] if the prisoner is
the subject of a final order of removal[.]”)
Sánchez challenged the BOP’s finding that he was not eligible
for 	FSA 	credits. 	He 	attempted 	to 	resolve 	the 	issue 	informally
with the warden in early July 2024. 	See Docket No. 1-2 at pp. 4-9;
Docket No. 31-3 at p. 9 (detailing informal resolution procedures
as part of the BOP’s administrative remedy program). 	On July 25,
2024, 	after 	his 	informal 	resolution 	efforts 	were 	rebuffed, 	he
submitted a formal request to the BOP to reinstate his FSA credits.
See 	Docket 	No. 	31-3 	at 	p. 	39 	(plaintiff’s 	request), 	pp. 	9-11
(outlining 	administrative 	remedy 	procedure). 	His 	request 	was
denied on August 26, 2024. 	Id. at p. 40. 	He appealed the denial
on September 19, 2024. 	See Docket No. 1-3 (appeal); Docket No. 31-3
at 	pp. 	11-12 	(outlining 	administrative 	remedy 	procedure). 	On
January 	21, 	2025, 	after 	waiting 	over 	four 	months 	without 	a
response, he filed the current complaint pro se. 	(Docket No. 1.)
The complaint requests habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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§ 2241, arguing that the BOP erred in calculating his release date
by wrongly taking away his FSA credits. 	Id.1 	On April 10, 2025,
while 	his 	complaint 	was 	pending, 	he 	received 	a 	response 	to 	his
appeal 	informing 	him 	that 	he 	was 	not 	subject 	to 	a 	final 	order 	of
removal 	and 	that 	his 	FSA 	credits 	would 	be 	counted. 	See 	Docket
No. 13-3. 	On 	May 	12, 	however 	(less 	than 	two 	months 	from 	his
release 	date 	counting 	his 	FSA 	credits), 	the 	BOP 	backtracked,
informing 	Sánchez 	that 	they 	received 	an 	immigration 	detainer
stating 	that 	there 	was 	a 	final 	order 	of 	removal 	against 	him.
(Docket 	No. 	31-3 	at 	p. 	42.) 	Consequently, 	the 	BOP 	said 	that 	he
was not eligible for FSA credits. 	Id.
The 	warden 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint 	and 	makes 	two
arguments 	to 	support 	his 	motion. 	(Docket 	No. 	31.) 	First, 	the
warden 	moves 	for 	dismissal 	pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) (“Rule 12(b)(1)”), arguing that the Court does
not 	have 	jurisdiction 	to 	consider 	Sánchez’s 	complaint 	because 	he
failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing
it. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	8-11. 	Second, 	the 	warden 	moves 	for 	dismissal
pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(6) 	(“Rule
12(b)(6)”), arguing that Sánchez’s request is meritless because he
is 	statutorily 	ineligible 	for 	FSA 	credits. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 11-15.
1 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint through counsel on June 27, 2025. 	See
Docket No. 13.
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Sánchez concedes that he did not fully exhaust his administrative
remedies 	but 	argues 	that 	his 	failure 	to 	do 	so 	should 	be 	excused.
(Docket No. 37 at pp. 4-8.) 	He also argues that he should receive
his 	FSA 	credits 	because 	the 	warden 	failed 	to 	raise 	his
ineligibility in a timely manner. 	Id. at pp. 8-11.
II. 	Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move to dismiss an action
for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction. 	In 	evaluating 	a 	motion
to 	dismiss 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(1), 	the 	court 	“accept[s] 	as 	true 	the
complaint’s 	well-pleaded 	factual 	allegations 	and 	draw[s] 	all
reasonable 	inferences 	in 	the 	[petitioner’s] 	favor.” 	Cangrejeros
de 	Santurce 	Baseball 	Club, 	LLC 	v. 	Liga 	de 	Béisbol 	Profesional 	de
P.R., Inc., 146 F.4th 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2025). 	The court disregards
“statements 	in 	the 	complaint 	that 	simply 	offer 	legal 	labels 	and
conclusions 	or 	merely 	rehash 	cause-of-action 	elements, 	and
consider[s] 	whether 	the 	non-conclusory, 	non-speculative 	facts
support 	the 	existence 	of 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction.” 	Id.
(quoting 	Lyman 	v. 	Baker, 	954 	F.3d 	351, 	360 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020)
(alterations 	omitted). 	The 	court 	“may 	consider 	information
attached 	to 	or 	incorporated 	into 	the 	complaint, 	along 	with 	facts
subject to judicial notice.” 	Id.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an
action 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be
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Civil No. 25-1035 (FAB) 	5
granted. 	“Although 	dismissals 	under 	Rules 	12(b)(1) 	and 	12(b)(6)
are conceptually distinct, the same basic principles apply in both
situations.” 	Cangrejeros, 	Loc. 	cit. 	(quoting 	Lyman, 	954 	F.3d
at 359) (alterations omitted). 	To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
a 	complaint 	must 	contain 	sufficient 	factual 	matter 	“to 	state 	a
claim 	to 	relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face.” 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	A court must decide whether
the 	complaint 	alleges 	facts 	which 	“raise 	a 	right 	to 	relief 	above
the 	speculative 	level.” 	Id. 	at 	555. 	In 	doing 	so, 	a 	court 	is
“obligated 	to 	view 	the 	facts 	of 	the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most
favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiffs, 	and 	to 	resolve 	any 	ambiguities 	in
their favor.” 	Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 2011).
Petitions 	for 	habeas 	corpus 	filed 	pursuant 	to 	section 	2241
allow 	a 	person 	“in 	custody 	under 	or 	by 	color 	of 	the 	authority 	of
the 	United 	States” 	to 	“attack 	the 	execution, 	rather 	than 	the
validity, of his sentence.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1); Hernández v.
Warden 	FMC 	Devens, 	Civil 	No. 	23-11330-MPK, 	2023 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS
161096, 	at 	*4-5 	(D. 	Mass. 	Sept. 	12, 	2023) 	(quoting 	United 	States
v. 	Barrett, 	178 	F.3d 	34, 	50 	n. 	10 	(1st 	Cir. 	1999)) 	(internal
quotation marks omitted). 	“Execution includes such matters as the
BOP’s calculation of the release date.” 	Hernández, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 	161096, 	at 	*5 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted).
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Civil No. 25-1035 (FAB) 	6
Section 2241 	“has 	also 	traditionally 	been 	available 	to 	inmates
challenging 	the 	revocation 	of 	good-time 	credits.” 	Francis 	v.
Maloney, 798 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2015).
III. Discussion
A. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The 	warden’s 	first 	argument 	for 	dismissal 	is 	that 	the
Court 	lacks 	jurisdiction 	to 	hear 	Sánchez’s 	habeas 	corpus 	claim
because 	he 	failed 	to 	fully 	exhaust 	his 	administrative 	remedies.
The Court rejects this argument.
Despite the warden’s assertion to the contrary, “[t]here
is 	no 	statutory 	requirement 	that 	a 	federal 	prisoner 	exhaust
administrative 	remedies 	prior 	to 	seeking 	habeas 	[corpus] 	relief
under 	28 U.S.C. 	§ 	2241.” 	Williams 	v. 	Warden, 	FCI 	Berlin, 	793 	F.
Supp. 3d 412, 422 (D.N.H. 2025); see also Idada v. Spaulding, 456
F. Supp. 3d 294, 295-97 (D. Mass. 2020) (explaining why the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s mandate to exhaust administrative remedies
does not apply to Section 2241 habeas corpus petitions challenging
the 	fact 	or 	duration 	of 	confinement). 	Consequently, 	failure 	to
exhaust 	administrative 	remedies 	is 	not 	“a 	jurisdictional 	bar 	to
consideration 	of 	a 	§ 	2241 	petition 	for 	habeas 	[corpus] 	relief.”2
2 	Although 	the 	warden 	asserts 	the 	exhaustion 	argument 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(1),
because exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement, the argument will be
considered under Rule 12(b)(6).
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Cockerham 	v. 	Boncher, 	125 	F.4th 	11, 	16 	(1st 	Cir. 	2024) 	(citing
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008)) (internal alterations
and quotation marks omitted). 	“Nevertheless, the availability of
an 	administrative 	remedy 	sometimes 	provides 	a 	prudential 	reason
not 	to 	permit 	a 	detainee 	to 	seek 	habeas 	[corpus] 	relief.”
Williams, 	793 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	422 	(citing 	Cockerham, 	125 	F.4th
at 16) 	(internal 	alterations 	and 	quotation 	marks 	omitted).
“Where, 	as 	here, 	Congress 	has 	not 	mandated 	exhaustion, 	federal
courts 	have 	some 	leeway 	to 	relax 	this 	requirement.” 	Anversa 	v.
Partners 	Healthcare 	Sys., 	835 	F.3d 	167, 	176 	(1st 	Cir. 	2016). 	“A
failure 	to 	exhaust 	may 	[] 	be 	excused 	when 	exhaustion 	would 	cause
the 	petitioner 	irreparable 	harm, 	such 	as 	by 	requiring 	him 	to 	be
incarcerated 	beyond 	the 	date 	he 	would 	otherwise 	be 	entitled 	to
release under the FSA.” 	Williams, 793 F. Supp. 3d at 422.
Although 	Sánchez 	concedes 	that 	he 	failed 	to 	fully
exhaust his administrative remedies,3 the Court finds that excusing
this 	requirement 	is 	warranted. 	Sánchez 	diligently 	pursued 	his
administrative 	options 	prior 	to 	filing 	his 	complaint 	before 	the
Court. 	He 	attempted 	informal 	resolution, 	and 	when 	that 	failed,
3 Sánchez never appealed the BOP’s denial of his September 19, 2024 appeal to
the general counsel, which is the final step in the BOP’s administrative remedy
program. 	See Docket No. 37 at p. 7 (conceding that Sánchez “filed his Habeas
Corpus petition [on] January 21, 2025 previous to receiving [the] BOP’s decision
on his [September 19, 2024 appeal] and bypassing the final step before the BOP
General 	Counsel[.]”); 	see 	also 	Docket 	No. 	31 	at 	pp. 	11-12 	(outlining
administrative remedy program appeal process).
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Civil No. 25-1035 (FAB) 	8
requested 	relief 	directly 	from 	the 	BOP. 	When 	his 	request 	was
denied, 	he 	timely 	appealed 	and 	waited 	several 	months 	without 	a
response. 	With 	his 	FSA-adjusted 	release 	date 	approaching, 	and
without 	having 	heard 	from 	the 	BOP 	on 	his 	appeal, 	he 	requested
relief from the Court. 	The BOP’s answer to his appeal arrived in
May 	2025 	– 	less 	than 	two 	months 	before 	his 	FSA-adjusted 	release
date. 	That date has come and gone, and his scheduled release date
(July 2, 2026) is rapidly approaching. 	Assuming arguendo that his
habeas corpus claim has merit, he is suffering irreparable harm by
remaining 	incarcerated 	beyond 	the 	date 	he 	would 	otherwise 	be
entitled 	to 	release. 	And 	considering 	how 	long 	he 	waited 	for
responses 	from 	the 	BOP 	the 	first 	time 	around, 	were 	the 	Court 	to
force him back into the administrative process, he would not likely
reach 	a 	resolution 	before 	his 	release. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court
waives 	the 	administrative 	exhaustion 	requirement 	and 	will 	not
dismiss the complaint on that basis.
B. 	Eligibility for FSA Credits
The 	warden’s 	second 	argument 	for 	dismissal 	is 	that
Sánchez’s 	habeas 	corpus 	claim 	fails 	on 	the 	merits 	because 	he 	is
statutorily 	ineligible 	for 	FSA 	credits. 	The 	Court 	rejects 	this
argument as well.
“A 	prisoner 	is 	ineligible 	to 	apply 	time 	credits 	[] 	if
the 	prisoner 	is 	the 	subject 	of 	a 	final 	order 	of 	removal[.]”
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Civil No. 25-1035 (FAB) 	9
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i). 	“This phrase seemingly refers to an
order of removal that can presently be executed, not some previous
order of removal that was already executed.” 	Rodríguez-García v.
Warden, FCI-Herlong, No. 2:23-cv-0849-SCR-P, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42999, at *10 (E.D. Ca. Mar. 10, 2025) (emphasis in original); see
also Albarrán v. Boncher, Civil No. 22-11777-NMG, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 	84974, 	at 	*3-7 	(D. 	Mass. 	May 	11, 	2023) 	(plaintiff 	was 	only
found ineligible for FSA credits after a previously executed final
order of removal was reinstated). 	If an individual was previously
deported on an order of removal, that order does not automatically
render him ineligible for FSA credits because “ICE lacks the legal
authority 	to 	subject 	an 	individual 	to 	deportation 	based 	on 	the
same removal order more than once.” 	Id. (citing Morales-Izquierdo
v. 	Gonzales, 	486 	F.3d 	484, 	487 	(9th 	Cir. 	2007)) 	(emphasis 	in
original). 	If the individual re-enters illegally, however, it is
possible 	to 	reinstate 	a 	previously 	executed 	removal 	order 	rather
than 	go 	through 	the 	full 	removal 	process. 	See 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(5) 	(“If 	the 	Attorney 	General 	finds 	that 	an 	alien 	has
reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or
having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior
order 	of 	removal 	is 	reinstated 	from 	its 	original 	date 	and 	is 	not
subject 	to 	being 	reopened 	or 	reviewed.”); 	G.P. 	v. 	Garland, 	103
F.4th 898, 900 (1st Cir. 2024) (“Congress has created an expedited
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Civil No. 25-1035 (FAB) 	10
removal 	process 	for 	noncitizens 	who 	reenter 	the 	United 	States
unlawfully 	after 	having 	previously 	been 	removed.”) 	(internal
alterations 	and 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	A 	final 	reinstated
removal order operates like an original removal order and bars an
individual’s eligibility for FSA credits. 	See Albarrán, 2023 U.S.
Dist. 	LEXIS 	84974, 	at 	*3-7 	(finding 	an 	inmate 	subject 	to 	a
reinstated final order of removal ineligible for FSA credits).
The 	warden 	provided 	the 	Court 	with 	a 	collection 	of
documents 	to 	show 	that 	Sánchez 	is 	subject 	to 	a 	final 	order 	of
removal 	and 	consequently 	ineligible 	for 	FSA 	credits. 	The 	first
document 	is 	a 	“Notice 	to 	Alien 	Ordered 	Removed/Departure
Verification,” 	dated 	February 	5, 	2014, 	which 	indicates 	that
Sánchez 	was 	deported 	on 	February 	6, 	2014. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	31-1.
The 	second 	is 	a 	“Warrant 	of 	Removal/Deportation,” 	dated
September 4, 2014, which contains an attachment indicating that he
was 	deported 	on 	September 	24, 	2014. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	31-2. 	The
third 	is 	a 	“Notice 	of 	Intent/Decision 	to 	Reinstate 	Prior 	Order,”
dated September 24, 2014, which reinstated his February 2014 order
of 	removal. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	31-5. 	The 	warden 	also 	provided 	two
immigration 	detainers, 	dated 	September 	4, 	2019 	and 	May 	2, 	2025,
respectively, which state that the Department of Homeland Security
“has 	determined 	that 	probable 	cause 	exists 	that 	the 	subject 	is
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Civil No. 25-1035 (FAB) 	11
removable” based on “[a] final order of removal against the alien.”
See Docket No. 31 at pp. 13-15; Docket No. 31-4.
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	these 	materials 	fail 	to 	show 	that
Sánchez 	is 	currently 	subject 	to 	an 	enforceable 	final 	order 	of
removal. 	The 	February 	5, 	2014 	order 	was 	executed 	the 	next 	day.
It 	was 	reinstated 	on 	September 	24, 	2014, 	which, 	as 	indicated 	in
the 	warrant 	of 	removal, 	was 	the 	same 	day 	he 	was 	deported 	for 	the
second time. 	After his second deportation, it was not enforceable,
and 	the 	warden 	has 	not 	provided 	the 	Court 	with 	any 	evidence 	that
it has been reinstated again since then. 	The immigration detainers
do 	not 	imply 	otherwise. 	Although 	they 	posit 	that 	Sánchez 	is
subject 	to 	a 	final 	order 	of 	removal, 	they 	do 	not 	specify 	whether
the 	order 	is 	currently 	enforceable 	or 	if 	it 	has 	already 	been
executed. 	Without additional detail, there is nothing to suggest
that the order referenced in the immigration detainers is not the
same one that was executed years ago.
Accordingly, none of these documents shows that Sánchez
was subject to an enforceable final order of removal when his FSA
credits 	were 	revoked. 	Because 	the 	warden 	fails 	to 	establish
Sánchez’s ineligibility for the credits, the Court cannot conclude
that his habeas corpus request is without merit, and consequently,
the motion to dismiss must be denied.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	above 	reasons, 	the 	warden’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is
DENIED. 	(Docket No. 31.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 2, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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