USA v. Bracero-Cruz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
J AMES MICHAEL B RACERO -C RUZ,
Defendant.
CRIM . N O. 25-281 (ADC)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendant James Michael Bracero-Cruz’s1 (“Defendant” or
“Mr. Bracero-Cruz”) “Motion to Suppress Evidence and for a Franks Hearing”
(the “Motion”). Docket No. 23. The Government filed a response in opposition to
Defendant’s Motion (the “Opposition”). Docket No. 29. The Defendant did not file a
reply. The matter was referred to the undersigned for the holding of an “appropriate
hearing and report and recommendation.” See Docket No. 24.
In his Motion, the Defendant requests that the Court: 1) hold a Franks hearing
to probe the veracity of Puerto Rico Police Bureau (“PRPB”) Agent Jesús Sánchez-
Zavala’s (“Agent Sánchez-Zavala”) affidavit in support of his application for a warrant
to search the Defendant’s residence (the “Affidavit”); and 2) “declare the search
warrant 	void and 	suppress 	all 	the 	evidence 	as 	tainted 	fruit 	of 	constitutional
violations.” 	Docket 	No. 23 	at 	9. 	The 	challenged 	Affidavit, 	which 	purportedly
accompanied the application for a search warrant, was not attached as an exhibit to
the Defendant’s Motion. Instead, the Defendant submitted only the search warrant
authorized by the Honorable Jerry Negrón Marn, Municipal Court Judge for the
Municipality of Fajardo, Puerto Rico (the Search Warrant”). The Search Warrant,
however, included a verbatim quote of the content of the Affidavit. The Court will
therefore refer to the Affidavit as quoted by Judge Negrón Marín.
1 The caption of the case in the docket identifies the Defendant as James Michael “Bracero-
Cruz.” In his Statement Under Penalty of Perjury and in the caption of the Motion, however, he
identified himself as James Michael “Cruz-Bracero.” To avoid confusion, the Court will continue to
identify him as he appears in the docket.
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After reviewing the parties’ written submissions and analyzing the applicable
law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion be DENIED without an
evidentiary hearing, and that none of the evidence challenged be suppressed.
I. 	FACTUAL SUMMARY
The following Factual Summary is derived from relevant sections of the
Affidavit as quoted verbatim in the Search Warrant and from the parties’ respective
filings. See Docket Nos. 23 and 29.
On May 20, 2025, Agent Sánchez-Zavala began his shift at approximately
5:30 a.m. at the Fajardo Drugs Division. Docket No. 30-1 at 2. During his shift,
Agent Sánchez‑Zavala was approached by Sergeant Edgardo Díaz-Soto, who assigned
him a confidential report (No. 2025‑022) to investigate. Id. The confidential report
stated that an individual named “James Bracero‑Cruz,” described as a white male of
medium build, with bulky hair and a tattoo on his neck, standing approximately 5’8”
tall, was armed and had been seen firing shots in front of his residence in a wooded
area in the Quebrada Vuelta Ward, at 15 Luis M. Cintrón Street, No. 424, in Fajardo,
Puerto Rico. Id. The residence was described as a wooden structure with a zinc gable
roof, painted gray and terracotta. Id.
At approximately 2:30 p.m. that afternoon, Agent Sánchez‑Zavala set out to
begin his investigation to corroborate the factual details provided in the confidential
report. Id. He had been assigned an unmarked vehicle, a set of binoculars, and a
portable radio to conduct surveillance. Id. After locating the residence at the address
described in the confidential report, he positioned himself at a vantage point that
allowed him to see the front of the house. Id. He confirmed that the residence matched
the description in the confidential report and he observed a white Toyota Corolla,
bearing a license plate number ending in “733,” parked in front of the house. Id.
At approximately 3:15 p.m., Agent Sánchez-Zavala observed a white male
matching the description of the Defendant arrive at the residence on foot. Id.
The individual was described as weighing approximately 225 lbs., standing 5’7” tall,
with bulky brown hair and a beard, dressed in cartoon-patterned pajamas and flip-
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flops, with a sweater draped over his shoulder. Id. Using his binoculars, Agent
Sánchez-Zavala observed a black pistol grip protruding from the Defendant’s left
pocket. The Defendant then entered the residence through the balcony and Agent
Sánchez-Zavala briefly lost sight of him. Id.
Approximately one hour later, at 4:15 p.m. a white Toyota Corolla with nickel-
plated luxury rims arrived in front of the residence Id. A few seconds later, the
Defendant exited the residence dressed in all black attire; long black pants, a black
sweater, a black cap and black sneakers. Id. In his right hand, he carried a clear
plastic bag containing a white powder that, based on Agent Sánchez-Zavala’s training
and experience, appeared to be cocaine. Id. The agent saw the Defendant place the
clear bag in his front right pants pocket, walk to the side of the house, and return
wearing a black waist bag. He then left through the pedestrian gate and walked
towards the driver’s side of the white Toyota. He took out the clear plastic bag from
his pocket and handed it to the female driver through the driver’s side door. After a
brief conversation, the Defendant walked around the front of the white Toyota and
entered the passenger side and drove off with the female driver. Id.
The next day, May 21, 2025, Agent Sánchez-Zavala continued his surveillance
at the residence. Id. At approximately 11:07 a.m., Agent Sánchez-Zavala observed
the Defendant standing at the balcony door wearing long black pants and no shirt.
Id. He again saw the grip of a pistol protruding from the front of the Defendant’s
waistband, and he had a cell phone in his hand. Id. When the Defendant looked
directly towards Agent Sánchez-Zavala’s position, the agent retreated for his own
safety and returned to the Fajardo Drug Division to draft an affidavit summarizing
the results of his surveillance. Id.
On May 22, 2025, Agent Sánchez-Zavala executed the Affidavit before the
Honorable Judge Negrón Marín. Id. at 3. After reviewing the Affidavit, Judge Negrón
Marín found probable cause and issued a warrant to search the Defendant’s residence
looking for evidence of violations of Puerto Rico’s Controlled Substances Act and
Weapons Act. Id.
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On May 28, 2025, at approximately 5:00 a.m., agents from the Puerto Rico
Police Bureau, Fajardo District (“PRPB Agents”), executed the search warrant.
Docket No. 29 at 5. The PRPB Agents conducted a “knock and announce” and found
the residence initially unoccupied. Id.
PRPB 	Agent 	Néstor 	Espinosa-Rodríguez 	(“Agent 	Espinosa-Rodríguez”)
reported that, shortly thereafter, the Defendant arrived and identified himself as
James Michael Bracero Cruz. Id. The individual stated that he resided there with his
mother and his wife. Id. The PRPB Agents executed the search in his presence. Id.
Inside the residence, agents seized the following:
• 	One (1) black 9mm Polymer P-80 pistol, model PF940C;
• 	Two (2) black Glock magazines — one with a capacity of thirty-one (31)
rounds of 9mm ammunition and another with a capacity of fifty (50)
rounds of 9mm ammunition;
• 	Forty-two (42) rounds of 9mm ammunition;
• 	One (1) black digital scale;
• 	Drug paraphernalia (small plastic baggies);
• 	One (1) black drug ledger containing names and numbers; and
• 	Five hundred fourteen dollars ($514.00) in U.S. currency.
Id.
From the Defendant’s person, agents seized one (1) black iPhone containing a
SIM card, bearing no. 8901260608756322737, and one (1) red iPhone enclosed in a
red and black case. Id. at 6.
Upon Agent Espinosa-Rodríguez’s seizure of the firearm, the Defendant stated
he did not know who owned it. Id. Agent Espinosa-Rodríguez then read the Defendant
his Miranda rights, placed him under arrest and transported him to the PRPB
Fajardo Drugs Division for processing. Id. Upon arrival, the Defendant was again
advised of his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged but chose not to waive. As a
result, the custodial interview was immediately terminated. Subsequently, the case
was referred to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) for
federal review and prosecution.
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On June 18, 2025, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment
charging the Defendant with being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1). See Docket No. 1.
II. 	LEGAL DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
U.S. Const. amend. IV, and generally requires law enforcement officers to secure a
warrant supported by probable cause prior to conducting a search or seizure.
United States v. Rigaud, 664 F.3d 169, 173 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing United States v.
Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 713 (1st Cir. 2011)). Probable cause to search a residence exists
when the totality of the circumstances suggests that “there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. (citing
United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Information supporting probable cause is set out in an affidavit submitted
with the application for a search warrant. Although “[t]here is . . . a presumption of
validity 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	affidavit 	supporting 	the 	search 	warrant,” 	that
presumption 	may 	be 	refuted 	during 	what 	is 	known 	as 	a 	Franks 	hearing.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
To obtain 	a 	Franks 	hearing 	a 	party 	must 	first 	make 	two 	“substantial
preliminary showings:” (1) that a false statement or omission in the affidavit was
made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth; and
(2) the falsehood or omission was necessary to the finding of probable cause. See id.
at 155–56; Hicks, 575 F.3d at 138; United States v. Castillo, 287 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.
2002). In other words, the false statement or the omission must be shown to be
material to the ultimate decision to issue the search warrant. Failure to make a
showing as to either element dooms a party’s hearing request.
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In the event that a hearing is granted and “at that hearing the allegation of
perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side [or the omitted
material included], the affidavit’s . . . content is insufficient to establish probable
cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the
same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” 	Franks,
438 U.S. at 156.
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more than
conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. Id.
at 171. Moreover, a defendant’s own denial of the statement which he purports to be
false, without more, is insufficient to satisfy, and falls well short of, the “substantial
preliminary showing necessary to justify a Franks hearing.” United States v. Moon,
802 F.3d 135, 150-51 (1st Cir. 2015). See also, United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1,
10 (1st Cir. 1983) (upholding rejection of Franks hearing where district court found
appellants’ flat denials of gambling-related conversations insufficient to meet the
“substantial preliminary showing” requirement).
For an evidentiary hearing to be warranted, the defendant must allege a
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must
be accompanied by an offer of proof. The movant must point out specifically the
portion of the challenged affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be
accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Moon, 802 F.3d at 150-51.
Affidavits, 	sworn 	statements, 	or 	otherwise 	reliable 	statements 	of 	witnesses
challenging the veracity of averments in the affidavit should be furnished, or their
absence satisfactorily explained. Id. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistakes
are insufficient. Id. Critically, the deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose
impeachment is permitted is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental
informant. Id. Furthermore, as previously stated, the defendant’s general denials
about the factual assertions by the affiant are insufficient to meet the standard for
entitlement to a hearing. Id.
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If these requirements are met, and if, after setting aside the material that is
the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard, there remains sufficient
content in the affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required.
Id. Conversely, if the remaining content is insufficient, the defendant is entitled to a
Franks hearing under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.2
A. 	Defendant’s Motion falls well short of a “substantial
preliminary showing” to justify a hearing.
Attached as Exhibit 2 to the Motion is a Statement Under Penalty of Perjury
(the “Statement”) provided by the Defendant pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
In the Statement, the Defendant declares verbatim that:
1. 	During May of 2025 my residence was House # 424, 16
street, Luis M. Cintron Lots, Quebrada Vuelta Ward,
Fajardo, Puerto Rico (Casa # 424, Calle 16, Parcelas
Luis M. Cintron, Barrio Quebrada Vuelta, Fajardo,
Puerto Rico).
2. 	It has come to my attention that a police officer alleged
that he saw me:
a. 	On Tuesday, May 20 2025, possessing a firearm
in and near my residence in Fajardo, Puerto Rico;
2 The Government argues in its Opposition that the good faith exception could be a basis for
upholding the search of the Defendant’s residence and deny his Motion. See Docket No. 29 at 16-18.
This argument is unavailing in a Franks motion analysis. To the extent that a court finds that a search
warrant is procured through falsity or a material misrepresentation by an affiant, that finding would
preclude a determination that the search warrant proponents could benefit from a good faith reliance
on that unduly procured warrant. “[T]he good faith exception does not allow law enforcement
authorities to rely on an error of their own making.” United States v. Morales-Pérez, Crim. 23-300
(FAB), Docket No. 122 at 23 (D.P.R. Aug. 25, 2025) (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.3(f) (6th ed.)). United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)
(holding that good faith exception does not apply when “magistrate was misled by . . . information that
the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the
truth” (emphasis added)); United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565, 573 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding Leon
good 	faith 	exception 	inapplicable 	when 	affiant 	recklessly 	omitted 	numerous 	material 	facts
undermining affidavit’s persuasiveness, including indicia of confidential informant’s unreliability);
United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that Leon good faith exception “does
not protect searches by officers who fail to provide all potentially adverse information to the issuing
judge, and for that reason, it does not apply here”).
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b. 	On 	Tuesday, 	May 	22, 	2025, 	possessing 	and
transferring to another person a plastic bag filled
with cocaine in and near my residence in Fajardo,
Puerto Rico; and
c. 	On 	Wednesday, 	May 	21, 	2025, 	possessing 	a
firearm in my residence in Fajardo, Puerto Rico.
3. 	I never possessed any type of firearm in or near my
residence 	in 	Fajardo, 	Puerto 	Rico 	on 	any 	of 	the
aforementioned dates.
4. 	I 	never 	possessed 	cocaine 	or 	any 	other 	controlled
substance in or near my residence in Fajardo, Puerto
Rico on any of the aforementioned dates.
5. 	I 	make 	this 	statement 	for 	the 	limited 	purpose 	of
establishing a substantial preliminary showing that the
affidavit supporting the search warrant which led to the
charges against me contains false statements which
render it invalid.
WHEREFORE, I subscribe this unsworn statement
under penalty of perjury on January 30, 2025.
s/ James Michael Cruz-Bracero
James Michael Cruz-Bracero
Docket No. 23-2. (Emphasis added). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that
the Defendant’s Statement falls well short of a “substantial preliminary showing”
required to justify a Franks hearing.
In United States v. Moon, 802 F.3d 135, the First Circuit rejected a similar
effort to obtain a Franks hearing based on a defendant’s generalized denial of the
facts recited in the warrant affidavit. There, the defendant, Terrance Moon (“Moon”),
was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His conviction stemmed from search warrants issued for his
person and for an apartment located at 99 Ormond Street in Boston, Massachusetts.
In the supporting affidavit, the affiant–detective stated that, based on information
from a confidential informant (“CI”) who had previously purchased heroin from Moon,
the Boston Police Department conducted surveillance of three recent controlled
purchases by this CI from Moon, including one purchase within the “last seventy two
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hours.” During the most recent transaction, Moon was observed driving a green
Mercedes registered to Sherrica Hendricks, his longtime girlfriend, who resided at 99
Ormond Street, Apartment # 1, in Mattapan, Massachusetts.
Moon sought to undermine the affidavit by asserting, in general terms, that he
was not in Boston on the dates identified in the affidavit. In a sworn statement
submitted in support of his suppression motion, Moon averred that he did not sell
heroin to anyone in the Boston area during the three days preceding and including
February 4, 2011—the date the search warrants were issued—and that he spent most
of his time in Worcester, Massachusetts during the first week of February 2011. He
argued that these denials, when combined with American Automobile Association
(“AAA”) records reflecting a request for a tow of the green Mercedes referenced in the
warrant materials, demonstrated that he could not have been in Boston for at least
one of the controlled buys described in the affidavit.
On appeal, the First Circuit concluded that the district court did not clearly err
in finding that Moon’s proffer failed to amount to a “substantial” showing of falsity.
The court explained that:
[t]he factual gap in Moon’s attempt to show the affidavit’s
inaccuracy—and thus its knowing or reckless falsity—
cannot be filled by his own denial that he sold heroin in
Boston 	within 	the 	relevant 	period. 	That 	disclaimer
constitutes no more than a conclusory and unsupported
allegation 	that 	falls 	well 	short 	of 	the 	‘substantial
preliminary 	showing’ 	necessary 	to 	justify 	a 	Franks
hearing.”
Id. at 149-50.
Similarly, in United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d at 10, the First Circuit
observed that flat, self-serving denials of allegations merely “set up a swearing
contest” and, standing alone, do not establish a substantial possibility of perjury by
the affiant. Id. (holding that bare denials of the facts stated in a law enforcement
affidavit “do not demonstrate a substantial possibility of affiant perjury” and
therefore do not satisfy the “substantial preliminary showing” requirement).
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As 	in 	Moon 	and 	Southard, 	the 	Defendant 	here 	offers 	nothing 	beyond
generalized denials of the Affidavit’s factual allegations. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
Statement, he broadly denies possessing firearms or controlled substances at his
residence during the specified dates. Critically, the Statement is devoid of any
external 	corroboration—such 	as 	surveillance 	video, 	cell 	site 	or 	GPS 	data,
documentary records, or third party testimony—that would affirmatively contradict
Agent Sánchez Zavala’s sworn account. Consequently, the Statement does not
demonstrate that Agent Sánchez-Zavala included any “knowingly and intentionally”
false statement in the Affidavit, as required under Franks v. Delaware and its First
Circuit progeny. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56; United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d
44, 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2015).
The Defendant alternatively contends that, even if he cannot show that Agent
Sánchez-Zavala knowingly and intentionally made a false statement, he is still
entitled to a hearing upon a showing that the agent acted with reckless disregard for
the truth. To establish reckless disregard for the truth in this context, a defendant
must show that the affiant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the
challenged allegations. United States v. Ranney, 298 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2002)
(quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also Beard
v. City of Northglenn, 24 F.3d 110, 116 (10th Cir. 1994) (adopting similar standard).
Recklessness may be inferred “from circumstances evincing obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the allegations.” Williams, 737 F.2d at 602.
In this case, the Defendant identifies three grounds on which he claims Agent
Sánchez-Zavala either actually “entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the
allegations in the Affidavit or, at a minimum, should have had “obvious reasons to
doubt” their veracity. The Court finds each of these specific challenges to the agent’s
veracity unpersuasive.
First, the Defendant argues that Agent Sánchez-Zavala acted recklessly by
failing to investigate whether the Defendant possessed a valid Puerto Rico firearms
license. This contention is unavailing. As courts applying Franks have repeatedly
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recognized, “failure to investigate a matter fully, to exhaust every possible lead,
interview 	all 	potential 	witnesses, 	and 	accumulate 	overwhelming 	corroborative
evidence rarely suggests a knowing or reckless disregard for the truth.” United States
v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d at 53. An officer’s duty of further inquiry is triggered only when
he has knowledge of an obvious and unexplored reason to doubt the truthfulness of
the information being presented to the magistrate.
In Puerto Rico, the open carrying of a firearm is prohibited irrespective of
whether the individual holds a license. See United States v. Avilés Vega, 783 F.3d 69,
73 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Bula Cartagena, Crim. No. 24-124-2 (RAM), 2024
WL 2091542, at *1 (D.P.R. May 9, 2024). Thus, whether the Defendant in fact
possessed a firearms license is immaterial to the judge’s probable cause evaluation if
he was observed openly possessing a firearm outside his residence, which in this case
he was. He was therefore under no duty to investigate further whether the Defendant
possesses a valid firearms license.
In addition, independent of whether the Defendant was legally permitted to
possess a firearm, the fact that Agent Sánchez-Zavala observed him in possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a suspected drug transaction would independently supply
probable 	cause 	for 	the 	issuance 	of 	a 	search 	warrant. 	Accordingly, 	Agent
Sánchez‑Zavala was under no obligation, for Franks purposes, to investigate whether
the Defendant possessed a valid Puerto Rico firearms license, and his failure to do so
does not amount to reckless disregard for the truth.
Second, 	the 	Defendant 	contends 	that 	Agent 	Sánchez‑Zavala 	must 	have
fabricated 	his 	account 	in 	the 	Affidavit 	because, 	in 	the 	Defendant’s 	view, 	no
“experienced” drug dealer would carry a “large” transparent bag of cocaine openly,
where it could be seen by anyone in the close-knit neighborhood. See Docket No. 23
at 5. This argument fares no better than the first. Although the agent described the
clear plastic bag containing suspected cocaine as “large,” the record reflects that it
was not so large as to preclude it from fitting into the Defendant’s pants pocket.
Indeed, the Court credits the Government’s position that the bag was “large” only in
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comparison to the smaller distribution‑size baggies of cocaine recovered pursuant to
the warrant, and that its being characterized as “large” in the Affidavit does not, in
any meaningful way, undermine the agent’s veracity.
Third, the Defendant asserts that Agent Sánchez‑Zavala could not have been
truthful because, given the close‑knit character of his neighborhood, Agent Sánchez-
Zavala could not have conducted surveillance in front of the Defendant’s house
without being detected. Yet the Affidavit itself acknowledges that the Defendant
ultimately discovered the agent’s presence, forcing the agent to withdraw for safety
reasons. That candid admission is consistent with the Defendant’s description of an
observant neighborhood and, if anything, enhances rather than detracts from Agent
Sánchez‑Zavala’s credibility.
In sum, the Defendant has offered nothing beyond uncorroborated, general
denials in an attempt to impeach Agent Sánchez‑Zavala’s sworn Affidavit. None of
his arguments tend to show that Agent Sánchez‑Zavala lied or otherwise acted with
reckless disregard for the truth. These contentions are insufficient to overcome the
strong presumption of validity that attaches to a warrant affidavit and do not satisfy
the “substantial preliminary showing” required to warrant a Franks hearing. See
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72; Southard, 700 F.2d at 10; Moon, 769 F.3d at 149–50.
B. Defendant’s attack on the confidential report also fails to support
suppression of the evidence.
The Defendant further contends that “absent the false statements [in the
Affidavit], there was no corroboration of the facts provided by the [confidential
report].” (Docket No. 23 at 6-7). He argues that if the Court were to excise the
challenged facts, the Search Warrant would be based solely on an uncorroborated
confidential tip, and probable cause would be lacking. See id.
As 	previously 	discussed, 	the 	Defendant’s 	challenge 	fails 	to 	satisfy 	his
substantial preliminary showing that Agent Sánchez-Zavala lied or acted with
reckless disregard for the truth. Consequently, there is no legal basis to excise any
portion of the Affidavit. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
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Furthermore, even if the Court were to credit the Defendant’s factual denials—
of not possessing a firearm nor narcotics—they do not, by themselves, impeach the
Affidavit or establish that the Agent lacked a good-faith belief in the information
presented to the issuing judge. The Franks inquiry is focused strictly on the affiant’s
veracity and state of mind at the time the warrant was sought; it does not provide a
vehicle for a de novo trial on the underlying facts. See United States v. Ranney, 298
F.3d at 78. Therefore, even if the Defendant could prove he was unarmed on the day
of 	the 	search, 	such 	evidence 	is 	immaterial 	to 	whether 	Agent 	Sánchez-Zavala
entertained “serious doubts” as to the truth of his own observations during the prior
surveillance period.
Because the Defendant has failed to impeach the Affidavit, the issuing court
properly relied on the “totality of the circumstances” presented—including both the
confidential report and the Agent’s subsequent, independent corroboration of the
Defendant’s possession of a firearm and controlled substances. See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Accordingly, the Affidavit provided a more than sufficient
basis for the issuance of the Search Warrant.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the Defendant
failed to meet his substantial preliminary showing that Agent Sánchez-Zavala
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false
statement or omission in his Affidavit. The Court further finds that the Search
Warrant was supported by probable cause related to violations of Puerto Rico’s
Controlled Substances Act and Weapons Act. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS
that Defendant’s Motion (Docket No. 23) be DENIED without holding an evidentiary
hearing.
.
Case 3:25-cr-00281-ADC Document 32 Filed 03/10/26 Page 13 of 14

United States v. James Michael Bracero-Cruz 	Page 14
Crim. No. 25-281 (ADC)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The parties have fourteen days to file any objections to this Report and
Recommendation. Failure to file the same within the specified time waives the right
to appeal this Report and Recommendation. Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d
143, 150-51 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Valencia Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.
1986).
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 10th day of March 2026.
s/Marshal D. Morgan
MARSHAL D. MORGAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:25-cr-00281-ADC Document 32 Filed 03/10/26 Page 14 of 14