Lara-Nieves v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ÁLIDA IROMI LARA-NIEVES
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO ET
AL.
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	the 	Commonwealth 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	(the
“Commonwealth”), 	the 	Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety 	of 	Puerto 	Rico
Alexis 	Torres-Ríos 	(“Torres-Ríos”), 	and 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	the
Puerto 	Rico 	Police 	Bureau 	Antonio 	López-Figueroa 	(“López-
Figueroa”) 	(collectively, 	the 	“Commonwealth 	and 	Supervisory
Defendants” 	or 	“Defendants”)’s 	Motion 	for 	Partial 	Dismissal 	of
First 	Amended 	Complaint 	(“Motion”). 	(Docket 	No. 	56). 	For 	the
reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the 	Court 	hereby 	GRANTS 	IN 	PART
Defendants’ Motion.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 	August 	12, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	Álida 	Iromi 	Lara-Nieves
(“Plaintiff” 	or 	“Lara-Nieves”) 	filed 	a 	Complaint 	against 	the
Commonwealth, Secretary of Public Safety Torres-Ríos, Commissioner
López-Figueroa, 	and 	Inspector 	Luis 	Díaz-Muñoz 	(“Díaz-Muñoz”) 	for
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alleged 	employment 	discrimination 	and 	sexual 	harassment. 	(Docket
No. 1).
On 	August 	13, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	an 	Amended 	Complaint.
(Docket 	No. 	54). 	Therein, 	she 	states 	that 	on 	September 	26, 	2023,
she 	was 	sexually 	harassed 	and 	assaulted 	by 	Díaz-Muñoz, 	the
Assistant 	Director 	of 	the 	Licensing 	Investigations 	and 	Firearm
Inspections Bureau of the Puerto Rico Police Bureau (“PRPB”). Id.
at 	1, 	9. 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz 	possessed 	supervisory
authority 	over 	her, 	as 	she 	was 	then 	an 	attorney 	at 	the 	Legal
Affairs 	office 	of 	the 	PRPB. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	PRPB
leadership 	did 	not 	adequately 	protect 	her 	from 	Díaz-Muñoz 	and
likewise failed to timely investigate or discipline Díaz-Muñoz as
required 	by 	PRPB 	policy. 	Id. 	at 	12-13. 	She 	avers 	that 	she 	was
terminated on June 30, 2024, in retaliation for filing complaints
about Díaz-Muñoz’s assault. Id. at 2.
Against 	this 	alleged 	factual 	backdrop, 	Plaintiff 	asserts
claims 	under 	Title 	VII 	of 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	of 	1964 	(“Title
VII”); Section 1983; Puerto Rico Laws 69, 17, and 115; Puerto Rico
tort 	statutes; 	and 	provisions 	of 	the 	Constitution 	of 	the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, including on a supervisory liability
theory 	against 	Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety 	Torres-Ríos 	and
Commissioner López-Figueroa. Id. at 23-27, 38-39. Plaintiff seeks
damages, reinstatement, and injunctive relief requiring Defendants
to better enforce anti-sexual harassment policies. Id. at 38-39.
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On 	August 	27, 	2025, 	the 	Commonwealth 	and 	Supervisory
Defendants 	filed 	a 	Motion 	for 	Partial 	Dismissal 	(“Motion”) 	of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint; Díaz-Muñoz similarly filed a Motion
to Dismiss. (Docket Nos. 56, 57). The Commonwealth and Supervisory
Defendants 	argue 	for 	the 	dismissal 	of 	three 	categories 	of
Plaintiff’s 	claims. 	(Docket 	No. 	56). 	First, 	they 	argue 	that 	the
causes of action rooted in Puerto Rico constitutional protections,
the 	Civil 	Code’s 	general 	tort 	statute, 	and 	promissory 	estoppel
ought 	to 	be 	dismissed 	because 	the 	underlying 	conduct 	of 	alleged
employment 	discrimination 	and 	harassment 	is 	concurrently 	covered
by local antidiscrimination statutes. Id. at 8-9. Defendants aver
that 	the 	cited 	Civil 	Code 	and 	constitutional 	provisions,
therefore, 	are 	supplanted 	and 	do 	not 	provide 	for 	an 	independent
cause 	of 	action. 	Id. 	Second, 	Defendants 	contend 	that 	Plaintiff’s
demands 	for 	the 	enforcement 	of 	the 	PRPB 	Reform 	Agreement 	must 	be
dismissed 	because 	the 	Reform 	Agreement 	is 	a 	consent 	decree 	in 	a
separate 	case 	subject 	to 	ongoing 	judicial 	supervision. 	Id. 	at 	9-
12. Defendants argue that enforcement must be sought in that case,
not through collateral litigation. Id. Third, Defendants maintain
that Plaintiff’s supervisory liability theory against Secretary of
Public 	Safety 	Torres-Ríos 	and 	Commissioner 	López-Figueroa 	fails,
given that the Amended Complaint does not demonstrate their direct
personal 	involvement, 	deliberate 	indifference, 	or 	an 	affirmative
causal link between their conduct and the harm. Id. at 12-17. The
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Motion is not a model of clarity in describing the counts it seeks
to dismiss or the Section 1983 causes of action it brings, but it
appears to contest Count 3 (a Section 1983 cause of action) as to
Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety 	Torres-Ríos 	and 	Commissioner 	López-
Figueroa 	and 	Counts 	7-10 	(the 	general 	tort 	and 	constitutional
claims) 	only 	as 	to 	the 	Commonwealth. 	See 	(Docket 	Nos. 	54, 	62 	at
12-13).
On 	September 	30, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	her 	Response 	to 	the
Commonwealth and Supervisory Defendants’ Motion. (Docket No. 62).
She 	argues 	first 	that 	the 	Amended 	Complaint 	“is 	not 	asking 	the
Court 	to 	enforce 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Police 	Reform 	agreement” 	as 	a
consent 	decree, 	but 	rather 	seeks 	enforcement 	of 	PRPB’s 	own 	anti-
harassment policies, which “happen[] to be required by the Puerto
Rico 	Police 	Reform 	Agreement.” 	Id. 	at 	6-7. 	Second, 	Plaintiff
contends 	that 	she 	adequately 	pleads 	her 	supervisory 	liability
theory 	against 	Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety 	Torres-Ríos 	and
Commissioner 	López-Figueroa 	because 	the 	alleged 	facts 	indicate
deliberate indifference and an “affirmative link” to Díaz-Muñoz’s
constitutional violations, including alleged prior notice of Díaz-
Muñoz’s history of misconduct against women and failures to timely
investigate 	or 	impose 	corrective 	measures. 	Id. 	at 	7-12. 	Third,
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	not 	dismiss 	the 	claims
uncontested by Defendants at this Rule 12(b)(6) stage, on the basis
that their sua sponte dismissal is strongly disfavored under First
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Circuit 	precedent. 	Id. 	at 	12-13. 	Fourth, 	Plaintiff 	avers 	that
dismissal of the Puerto Rico constitutional and Civil Code general
tort claims would be premature. Id. at 12-13. She urges the Court
to 	defer 	any 	decision 	on 	the 	aforementioned 	counts 	until 	a 	later
stage, such as summary judgment. Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
When ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
“[t]he 	sole 	inquiry 	... 	is 	whether, 	construing 	the 	well-pleaded
facts 	of 	the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
plaintiffs, 	the 	complaint 	states 	a 	claim 	for 	which 	relief 	can 	be
granted.” 	Ocasio-Hernandez 	v. 	Fortuno-Burset, 	640 	F.3d 	1, 	7 	(1st
Cir. 2011). The Court must first “isolate and ignore statements in
the 	complaint 	that 	simply 	offer 	legal 	labels 	and 	conclusions 	or
merely 	rehash 	cause-of-action 	elements.” 	Schatz 	v. 	Republican
State 	Leadership 	Committee, 	669 	F.3d 	50, 	55 	(1st 	Cir. 	2012)
(internal 	citations 	omitted). 	Then, 	the 	Court 	takes 	“the
complaint's 	well-pled 	(i.e., 	non-conclusory, 	non-speculative)
facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s
favor,” 	to 	determine 	“if 	they 	plausibly 	narrate 	a 	claim 	for
relief.” 	Id. 	(internal 	citations 	omitted). 	One 	of 	the 	grounds
allowing a complaint to be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
is for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
When 	evaluating 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
12(b)(6), Courts may consider: “(a) ‘implications from documents’
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	6
attached 	to 	or 	fairly 	‘incorporated 	into 	the 	complaint,’ 	(b)
‘facts’ susceptible to ‘judicial notice,’ and (c) ‘concessions’ in
plaintiff’s ‘response to the motion to dismiss.’” Schatz, 669 F.3d
at 55–56 (quoting Arturet–Vélez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 429
F.3d 10, 13 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants 	ask 	the 	Court 	to 	dismiss 	three 	categories 	of
Plaintiff’s 	causes 	of 	action. 	See 	(Docket 	No. 	56). 	The 	Court
addresses each in turn.
A. Counts 7-10
Counts 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint bring
claims 	premised 	on 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Civil 	Code’s 	general 	tort
statute and Puerto Rico constitutional protections. (Docket No. 54
at 	31-38); 	P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	31, 	§ 	10801; 	see, 	e.g., 	Rivera-
Lopez v. Clinical Med. Servs., Inc., 2025 WL 3653805, at *4 (D.P.R.
2025). 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	these 	causes 	of 	action 	ought 	to 	be
dismissed 	because 	the 	underlying 	conduct 	of 	employment
discrimination 	and 	harassment 	is 	concurrently 	covered 	by 	local
antidiscrimination 	statutes. 	(Docket 	No. 	56 	at 	8-9). 	Plaintiff
answers 	that 	dismissal 	of 	these 	claims 	would 	be 	premature 	at 	the
motion-to-dismiss juncture. (Docket No. 62 at 12-13).
Plaintiff 	also 	points 	out 	that 	“the 	Movants 	did 	not 	ask 	for
dismissal 	of...the 	claims 	against 	the 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	and
Díaz-Muñoz in Counts 9 and 10.” (Docket No. 62 at 12). Defendants
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fail 	to 	rebut 	this 	framing. 	Moreover, 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	labels
its 	request 	for 	dismissal 	as 	to 	these 	counts 	as 	“Claims 	against
the 	Commonwealth,” 	and 	in 	conclusion 	avers 	that 	“[t]he 	Complaint
fails to properly state claims against the Commonwealth (Counts 7,
8 & 9)...and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.” 	(Docket 	No. 	56 	at 	4, 	17) 	(emphasis 	added). 	For 	these
reasons, the Court considers the Motion to Dismiss only as to the
Commonwealth in relation to Counts 7-10. The Court does not address
today whether Counts 9 and 10 should be dismissed as to Secretary
of Public Safety Torres-Ríos and Commissioner López-Figueroa.
a. Applicable law
i. 	Articles 1536, 1538, and 1540 of the Civil Code
Article 	15361 	is 	Puerto 	Rico’s 	general 	tort 	statute, 	and
states 	that 	a 	person 	who 	“through 	fault 	or 	negligence, 	causes
damage 	to 	another, 	is 	obliged 	to 	repair 	it.” 	P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit.
31, 	§ 	10801; 	see, 	e.g., 	Rivera-Lopez, 	2025 	WL 	3653805 	at 	*4. 	To
succeed 	on 	an 	Article 	1536 	tort 	claim, 	the 	plaintiff 	must
demonstrate 	“(1) 	evidence 	of 	physical 	or 	emotional 	injury, 	(2) 	a
negligent 	or 	intentional 	act 	or 	omission 	(the 	breach 	of 	duty
element), and (3) a sufficient causal nexus between the injury and
defendant’s 	act 	or 	omission 	(in 	other 	words, 	proximate 	cause).”
1 The Puerto Rico Civil Code was amended in 2020; Articles 1536 and 1540 were
previously titled Articles 1802 and 1803, respectively. See González-Ortíz v.
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 2024 WL 3759659, at *10 (D.P.R. 2024).
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	8
Gonzalez-Caban v. JR Seafood Inc., 48 F.4th 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2022)
(quoting Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43,
49 (1st Cir. 2007)).
Article 	1538 	allows 	for 	the 	imposition 	of 	punitive 	damages
“whenever 	the 	act 	or 	omission 	constitutes 	a 	crime, 	is 	committed
intentionally or with serious disregard for the life, safety, and
property 	of 	others.” 	P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	31, 	§ 	10801; 	see, 	e.g.,
Rodriguez 	Perez 	v. 	Abreu 	Garcia, 	2024 	WL 	808654, 	at 	*6 	(D.P.R.
2024).
Article 1540 applies the principle of respondeat superior to
Article 	1536 	claims. 	P.R. 	Laws. 	Ann. 	tit. 	31, 	§ 	10805. 	To 	impose
employer 	liability 	under 	respondent 	superior 	in 	Puerto 	Rico, 	a
court must find: (1) the desire to serve, benefit, or further the
employer’s 	business 	or 	interest; 	(2) 	that 	the 	act 	in 	question 	be
reasonably 	related 	to 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	employment; 	and 	(3) 	that
the 	agent 	not 	be 	prompted 	by 	purely 	personal 	motives. 	Borrego 	v.
United States, 790 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting Rodriguez v.
United States, 328 F.Supp. 1389, 1391 (D.P.R. 1971)).
This 	District 	has 	repeatedly 	held 	that 	“provisions 	of 	the
Puerto 	Rico 	Civil 	Code 	are 	supplementary 	to 	special 	legislation
like 	Title 	VII, 	and 	that 	a 	special 	law 	prevails 	over 	a 	general
law.” Orellano-Laureano v. Instituto Medico del Norte, Inc., 2023
WL 	4532418, 	at 	*6 	(D.P.R. 	2023) 	(internal 	citation 	omitted);
Torres-Figueroa 	v. 	Televicentro 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	LLC, 	2024 	WL
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	9
4769756, at *2 (D.P.R. 2024) (explaining that “laws such as Title
VII,...Law 	115, 	and 	Law 	80 	are 	special 	laws” 	and 	so 	supplant
Article 1536). Tort claims under Articles 1536 and 1538 are to be
dismissed when they are entirely duplicative. See Santana-Colon v.
Houghton Mifflin Harcout Pub. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d 129, 140 (D.P.R.
2014). 	The 	Puerto 	Rico 	Supreme 	Court 	and 	courts 	in 	this 	District
have held that, “to the extent that a specific labor or employment
law covers the conduct for which a plaintiff seeks damages, [they
are] barred from using the same conduct to also bring a claim under
Article [1536].”2 Id.
ii. 	Puerto Rico constitutional protections
Puerto 	Rico’s 	Constitution 	provides 	that 	“[t]he 	dignity 	of
the human being is inviolable,” P.R. Const. art. II, § 1; protects
all 	against 	“abusive 	attacks 	on 	[their] 	honor, 	reputation 	and
private 	or 	family 	life,” 	Id. 	§ 	8; 	and 	protects 	workers 	against
“risks to [their] health or person in [their] work or employment,”
Id. § 16.
However, 	this 	District 	has 	repeatedly 	held 	that
constitutional claims based on these provisions are not available
in the employment discrimination context when they are duplicative
of 	specific 	labor 	and 	antidiscrimination 	statutes. 	See, 	e.g.,
Galarza-Cruz v. Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc., 2018 WL 324863, at *1
2 The Santana-Colon case referred to the former Article 1802. See supra note
1; 81 F. Supp. 3d at 140.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	10
n.2 (D.P.R. 2018); Televicentro of Puerto Rico, 2024 WL 4769756 at
*2. 	When 	Puerto 	Rico 	constitutional 	claims 	“are 	essentially
predicated on allegations covered by specific labor or employment
statutes, 	plaintiff[s 	are] 	barred 	from 	using 	the 	same 	conduct 	to
also 	bring 	a 	claim 	under 	other 	provisions” 	and 	constitutional
claims 	attempting 	to 	do 	so 	must 	be 	dismissed 	with 	prejudice.
Galarza-Cruz, 	2018 	WL 	324863 	at 	*1 	n.2; 	Televicentro 	of 	Puerto
Rico, 	2024 	WL 	4769756 	at 	*2. 	This 	District 	has 	in 	the 	past
dismissed 	claims 	based 	specifically 	on 	Sections 	1, 	8, 	and 	16 	of
the 	Commonwealth’s 	Constitution 	because 	the 	workplace
discrimination-related 	conduct 	alleged 	was 	covered 	by 	“specific
labor or employment statutes.” Galarza-Cruz, 2018 WL 324863 at *1
n.2.
iii. Inartful pleading
A 	complaint 	need 	not 	be 	an 	archetype 	of 	legal 	craftmanship,
but it must nevertheless provide “enough facts to state a claim to
relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face” 	and 	give 	fair 	notice 	as 	to
what 	the 	claim 	is 	and 	the 	grounds 	upon 	which 	it 	rests. 	Bell 	Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (internal citation
omitted).
When a plaintiff pleads tort causes of action in an inartful
manner--such 	as 	by 	collapsing 	multiple 	legal 	theories 	into 	a
single, 	confusing 	cause 	of 	action--courts 	are 	not 	required 	“to
swallow 	the 	plaintiff’s 	invective 	hook, 	line, 	and 	sinker; 	bald
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	11
assertions, 	unsupportable 	conclusions, 	periphrastic
circumlocutions, 	and 	the 	like 	need 	not 	be 	credited.” 	Aulson 	v.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). Likewise, courts are not
obligated 	to 	“conjure 	up 	unpled 	allegations 	or 	contrive
elaborately 	arcane 	scripts 	in 	order 	to 	carry 	the 	blushing 	bride
[of 	the 	Complaint] 	through 	the 	portal 	[of 	the 	Rule 	12(b)(6)
stage].” 	Gooley 	v. 	Mobil 	Oil 	Corp., 	851 	F.2d 	513, 	514 	(1st 	Cir.
1988). 	“Judges 	are 	not 	mind-readers, 	so 	parties 	must 	spell 	out
their 	issues 	clearly, 	highlighting 	the 	relevant 	facts 	and
analyzing 	on-point 	authority.” 	Rodriguez 	v. 	Munic. 	of 	San 	Juan,
659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011).
b. Plaintiff’s tort-based and constitutional claims must be
dismissed
i. 	Count 8 is a tort-based claim
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that while Count 8 of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint begins under the label of “Breach of
Implied Contract and Promissory Estoppel” and initially discusses
doctrines 	rooted 	in 	the 	“common 	law,” 	it 	then 	veers 	into
negligence-based 	arguments 	and 	culminates 	in 	a 	request 	for 	“an
award 	of 	punitive 	damages” 	under 	Article 	1538, 	Puerto 	Rico’s
general tort-based damages statute. (Docket No. 54 at 33-34); see
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 10801.
The 	briefing 	does 	not 	clarify 	the 	nature 	of 	the 	claim. 	Both
the 	Motion 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	Response 	treat 	Count 	8 	as 	part 	and
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	12
parcel of the Article 1536 tort-based causes of action, and neither
meaningfully 	address 	the 	elements 	of 	promissory 	estoppel 	or 	an
implied-contract theory. See (Docket Nos. 56 at 8–9, 62 at 13–14).
Thus, the Court construes Count 8 as an inartfully pled tort claim,
since 	it 	ultimately 	seeks 	tort-based 	relief 	under 	Article 	1538.
(Docket 	No. 	54 	at 	33-34). 	The 	Court 	will 	not 	attempt 	to 	divine--
much 	less 	supply--some 	alternative 	theory 	Plaintiff 	could 	have
intended 	to 	advance. 	See 	Rodriguez, 	659 	F.3d 	at 	175 	(“Judges 	are
not mind-readers”).
ii. 	Counts 7-10 are duplicative of counts brought under
special legislation
Plaintiff’s 	wrongful 	termination 	tort 	cause 	of 	action 	in
Count 7, promissory estoppel cause of action in Count 8, infliction
of 	emotional 	distress 	cause 	of 	action 	in 	Count 	9, 	and
constitutional 	causes 	of 	action 	in 	Count 	10 	are 	all 	barred 	as 	to
the Commonwealth. This is so because specific employment statutes
cover the conduct upon which these claims rest.
As 	Plaintiff’s 	own 	Amended 	Complaint 	confirms, 	Counts 	7-10
seek 	additional 	avenues 	of 	relief 	for 	the 	same 	nucleus 	of 	facts
concerning 	workplace 	harassment 	and 	her 	firing 	that 	Plaintiff
discusses under the special antidiscrimination statutes invoked in
her 	Amended 	Complaint, 	including 	Title 	VII 	and 	Puerto 	Rico 	Laws
69, 	17, 	and 	115. 	(Docket 	No. 	54). 	Plaintiff’s 	recital 	of 	the
actions perpetrated against her under each of Counts 7-10 does not
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	13
differ 	from 	the 	conduct 	with 	which 	she 	pleads 	the
antidiscrimination counts based on Title VII and Puerto Rico Laws
69, 17, and 115. Id. at 15-38. Put differently, the “terminat[ion
of]...employment 	as 	described 	above 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	her 	sex 	and
for 	complaining 	of 	sexual 	harassment” 	and 	“attack[]...[on 	her]
honor 	and 	reputation... by 	sexually 	harassing 	her 	or 	allowing
others to sexually harass her, and dismissing her for complaining
about said sexual harassment” that Plaintiff used to plead Counts
7-10 	is 	the 	very 	conduct 	that 	animates 	her 	earlier 	statutory
claims. Id. at 32-38.
That 	overlap 	is 	dispositive; 	it 	requires 	the 	dismissal 	of
each 	of 	Counts 	7-10 	as 	to 	the 	Commonwealth. 	This 	District 	has
repeatedly held that “provisions of the Puerto Rico Civil Code are
supplementary 	to 	special 	legislation 	like 	Title 	VII, 	and 	that 	a
special law prevails over a general law.” Orellano-Laureano, 2023
WL 	4532418 	at 	*6 	(internal 	citation 	omitted); 	Televicentro 	of
Puerto 	Rico, 	2024 	WL 	4769756 	at 	*2. 	Similarly, 	courts 	in 	this
District have often ruled that constitutional claims under Article
II’s 	Sections 	1, 	8, 	and 	16 	are 	not 	available 	where 	they 	simply
restate workplace discrimination and retaliation already governed
by specific labor statutes. See Galarza-Cruz, 2018 WL 324863 at *1
n.2. 	Here, 	Counts 	7 	and 	9 	expressly 	invoke 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Civil
Code 	general 	tort 	framework. 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at 	32-36). 	Count 	8
ultimately seeks tort-style relief. Id. at 33-34. Count 10 pleads
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	14
constitutional 	claims 	under 	Article 	II’s 	Sections 	1, 	8, 	and 	16.
Id. at 36-38. None of these claims identify any distinctly tortious
or unconstitutional act, duty, or injury independent of the alleged
harassment, 	retaliation, 	and 	termination 	Plaintiff 	challenges
through Title VII and Puerto Rico Laws 69, 17, and 115. Id. at 32-
38. For these reasons, Counts 7-10 are hereby DISMISSED as to the
Commonwealth.
B. Count 3
Count 3 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint brings a supervisory
liability 	Section 	1983 	claim 	against 	Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety
Torres-Ríos and Commissioner López-Figueroa. (Docket No. 54 at 23-
27, 38-39).
a. Applicable law
42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	(“Section 	1983”) 	allows 	individuals 	to 	sue
state 	and 	local 	government 	officials 	who 	deprive 	them 	of 	“any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It “is not itself a source of substantive
rights,” 	but 	merely 	provides 	“a 	method 	for 	vindicating 	federal
rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-
94 	(1989) 	(quoting 	Baker 	v. 	McCollan, 	443 	U.S. 	137, 	144 	n.3
(1979)).
Section 	1983 	is 	meant 	to 	provide 	redress 	for 	constitutional
violations 	by 	state 	and 	local 	government 	actors, 	including 	in
Puerto Rico. “The traditional definition of acting under color of
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	15
state 	law 	requires 	that 	the 	defendant 	in 	a 	§ 	1983 	action 	have
exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.’” 	West 	v. 	Atkins, 	487 	U.S. 	42, 	49 	(1988) 	(quoting 	United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also Billings v.
United 	States, 	57 	F.3d 	797, 	801 	(9th 	Cir. 	1995) 	(citing 	Daly-
Murphy 	v. 	Winston, 	837 	F.2d 	348, 	355 	(9th 	Cir. 	1987)) 	(Ҥ 	1983
provides 	no 	cause 	of 	action 	against 	federal 	agents 	acting 	under
color of federal law”). “For purposes of section 1983, Puerto Rico
is the functional equivalent of a state,” and Puerto Rico officials
are 	treated 	like 	state 	officials. 	See 	Cruz-Arce 	v. 	Mgmt. 	Admin.
Servs. 	Corp., 	19 	F.4th 	538, 	541 	n.1 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021); 	42 	U.S.C. 	§
1983 (creating 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	allowing 	individuals 	to 	sue 	for
violations 	of 	federal 	rights 	“under 	color 	of 	any 	statute,
ordinance, 	regulation, 	custom, 	or 	usage, 	of 	any 	State 	or
Territory”).
i. Supervisory liability under § 1983
Section 	1983 	liability 	cannot 	be 	based 	on 	“a 	respondeat
superior 	theory 	-- 	a 	‘supervisor’s 	liability 	must 	be 	premised 	on
his 	[or 	her] 	own 	acts 	or 	omissions.’” 	Justiniano 	v. 	Walker, 	986
F.3d 	11, 	20 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021) 	(quoting 	Guadalupe-Báez 	v. 	Pesquera,
819 	F.3d 	509, 	515 	(1st 	Cir. 	2016)). 	A 	supervisor 	cannot 	be 	held
liable 	under 	Section 	1983 	solely 	because 	of 	his 	position.
Guadalupe-Báez, 	819 	F.3d 	at 	515. 	“This 	does 	not 	mean, 	however,
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	16
that 	for 	section 	1983 	liability 	to 	attach, 	a 	supervisor 	must
directly engage in a subordinate’s unconstitutional behavior.” Id.
For a supervisor to be held liable for the actions of a subordinate
state or local government official, it is necessary that: “(1) the
behavior 	of 	such 	subordinates 	results 	in 	a 	constitutional
violation, 	and 	(2) 	the 	official’s 	action 	or 	inaction 	was
affirmatively linked, to that behavior in the sense that it could
be 	characterized 	as 	supervisory 	encouragement, 	condonation, 	or
acquiescence 	or 	gross 	negligence 	amounting 	to 	deliberate
indifference.” Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881,
884 	(1st 	Cir. 	1988). 	Deliberate 	indifference, 	in 	turn, 	requires
more 	than 	proof 	of 	supervisory 	negligence. 	See, 	e.g., 	Ramírez-
Lluveras 	v. 	Rivera-Merced, 	759 	F.3d 	10, 	19 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014). 	To
succeed on a theory of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must
show 	that: 	(1) 	supervisory 	officials 	had 	knowledge 	of 	relevant
facts; 	(2) 	from 	which 	they 	could 	draw 	the 	inference; 	(3) 	that 	a
substantial risk of serious harm existed. See Guadalupe-Báez, 819
F.3d at 515 (citing id.).
At 	the 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	stage, 	the 	First 	Circuit 	has 	cautioned
against 	demanding 	a 	level 	of 	factual 	specificity 	unattainable
prior 	to 	discovery. 	Guadalupe-Báez, 	819 	F.3d 	at 	516 	(criticizing
the 	district 	court 	for 	“set[ting] 	the 	bar 	too 	high” 	for 	a
supervisory 	liability 	claim 	at 	the 	12(b)(6) 	stage 	and 	for
disregarding a supervisor’s constructive awareness of past harm).
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	17
“A 	high 	degree 	of 	factual 	specificity 	is 	not 	required 	at 	the
pleading stage.” Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49,
56 (1st Cir. 2013).
ii. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process under § 1983
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits
a state from depriving any person of ‘life, liberty, or property,
without 	due 	process 	of 	law,’” 	and 	has 	both 	a 	substantive 	and 	a
procedural 	component. 	Gonzalez-Fuentes 	v. 	Molina, 	607 	F.3d 	864,
879 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010) 	(quoting 	U.S 	Const. 	amend. 	XVI, 	§ 	1).
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	property 	interests 	“may 	take 	many 	forms,”
including 	an 	interest 	in 	employment. 	Bd. 	of 	Regents 	of 	State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972); see also Cleveland Bd.
of 	Educ. 	v. 	Loudermill, 	470 	U.S. 	532, 	541 	(1985) 	(regarding
government 	employees’ 	interest 	in 	continued 	public 	employment).
Pursuant to First Circuit precedent and “[u]nder Puerto Rico law,
public 	employees 	have 	a 	property 	interest 	in 	their 	continued
employment, 	not 	in 	the 	functions 	they 	perform.” 	Ruiz-Casillas 	v.
Camacho 	Morales, 	415 	F.3d 	127, 	134 	(1st 	Cir. 	2005). 	“Property
interests are creatures of state law, and under the laws of Puerto
Rico, 	public 	employees 	who 	lawfully 	hold 	career 	positions 	have 	a
protected 	property 	interest 	in 	continued 	employment 	in 	those
positions.” 	Casiano-Montanez 	v. 	State 	Ins. 	Fund 	Corp., 	707 	F.3d
124, 129 (1st Cir. 2013).
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	18
Procedural due process claims under § 1983 require courts to
determine 	first 	if 	plaintiffs 	were 	deprived 	of 	a 	liberty 	or
property interest protected by the United States Constitution and,
if 	so, 	whether 	the 	procedures 	causing 	the 	deprivation 	“were
constitutionally 	sufficient.” 	Gonzalez-Fuentes, 	607 	F.3d 	at 	886
(internal 	citation 	omitted). 	One 	of 	the 	lynchpin 	requirements 	of
procedural 	due 	process 	is 	adequate 	notice 	and 	that 	“the 	affected
individual 	must 	be 	forewarned 	and 	afforded 	an 	opportunity 	to 	be
heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Perrier-
Bilbo v. United States, 954 F.3d 413, 433 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
141 	S. 	Ct. 	818 	(2020) 	(quoting 	González-Droz 	v. 	González-Colón,
660 	F.3d 	1, 	13 	(1st 	Cir. 	2011)). 	When 	evaluating 	the
appropriateness 	of 	the 	procedures 	employed, 	courts 	“balanc[e] 	a
number of factors, including the nature of the private and public
interests 	involved; 	the 	risk 	of 	erroneous 	deprivation 	accruing
under 	the 	procedures 	used 	by 	the 	state; 	and 	the 	probable 	benefit
of demanding additional procedural safeguards.” Aponte-Rosario v.
Acevedo-Vila, 	617 	F.3d 	1, 	9 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010) 	(internal 	quotation
omitted).
b. Plaintiff 	properly 	pleads 	her 	Section 	1983 	theory
i. 	Count 3 contains two distinct Section 1983 theories
As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	the 	Court 	construes 	Count 	3 	of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as containing two Section 1983-based
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	19
theories: (a) an Equal Protection theory grounded in Secretary of
Public 	Safety 	Torres-Ríos 	and 	Commissioner 	López-Figueroa’s
alleged supervisory liability for Díaz-Muñoz’s harassment; and (b)
a 	procedural 	due 	process 	theory 	premised 	on 	the 	allegation 	that
Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety 	Torres-Ríos 	and 	Commissioner 	López-
Figueroa 	terminated 	Plaintiff’s 	career 	employment 	without
affording 	her 	the 	opportunity 	to 	be 	heard. 	See 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at
23-27). Once more, the Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity
in pleading these claims, as it collapses the two theories into a
single 	count. 	Id. 	The 	bulk 	of 	Count 	3’s 	allegations 	focus 	on
Supervisory Defendants’ failure to properly supervise Díaz-Muñoz,
with just two brief paragraphs asserting deprivation of due process
rights. Id. at 26.
The 	briefing 	again 	does 	not 	greatly 	assist 	the 	Court 	in
disentangling these theories. The Commonwealth fails to contradict
or even address the second theory of Plaintiff’s due process right
to be heard before the termination of her employment. (Docket No.
56 	at 	12-17). 	As 	a 	result, 	the 	parties’ 	argumentation 	solely
concerns the supervisory liability framework. Id.; (Docket No. 62
at 	7-12). 	Nevertheless, 	given 	that 	two 	paragraphs 	of 	Count 	3
explicitly assert that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause
by 	not 	affording 	Plaintiff 	a 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	challenge
her 	dismissal, 	the 	Court 	considers 	this 	theory 	below.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	20
i. 	The Equal Protection theory is properly pled
Plaintiff’s 	Equal 	Protection 	claim 	against 	Supervisory
Defendants hinges on a number of critical assertions about notice,
sustained 	inaction, 	and 	the 	PRPB 	leadership’s 	treatment 	of
Plaintiff and Díaz-Muñoz after the latter’s alleged harassment of
the former. (Docket No. 54 at 23-27). Most significantly, Plaintiff
alleges 	that 	(a) 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	failed 	to 	restrain 	Díaz-
Muñoz’s behavior despite three prior sexual harassment allegations
against 	him 	from 	2015, 	2016, 	and 	2017; 	(b) 	Commissioner 	López-
Figueroa 	waited 	sixteen 	months 	from 	the 	time 	Plaintiff 	filed 	her
complaint to fire Díaz-Muñoz from the PRPB, and only did so after
she 	filed 	multiple 	lawsuits 	and 	was 	herself 	terminated 	from 	her
job; 	(c) 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	did 	not 	discipline 	or 	take
corrective 	measures 	against 	Díaz-Muñoz 	despite 	this 	incident
occurring 	after 	a 	pattern 	of 	similar 	behavior 	earlier 	in 	Díaz-
Muñoz’s 	PRPB 	career; 	(d) “[o]ver 	the 	years, 	Commissioner 	López-
Figueroa 	protected 	and 	shielded” 	Díaz-Muñoz 	from 	discipline; 	and
(e) 	the 	PRPB 	allowed 	Díaz-Muñoz 	to 	continue 	carrying 	his 	“duty
firearm, 	taser, 	pepper 	spray 	and 	baton 	during 	the 	Department 	of
Justice’s 	investigation 	into 	the 	alleged 	acts 	of 	criminal
misconduct” and that this further constituted a failure to protect
Plaintiff’s physical and mental wellbeing. Id. at 14, 23-27.
At 	the 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	stage, 	the 	Court’s 	inquiry 	is 	not 	into
whether 	Plaintiff 	will 	ultimately 	satisfy 	the 	First 	Circuit’s
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	21
demanding test for Section 1983 supervisory liability, but rather
whether 	her 	present 	allegations 	“nudge[] 	[her] 	claims 	across 	the
line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547; see
also Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 221 (1st Cir. 2015). In
conducting that inquiry, the Court does not demand a “high degree
of factual specificity...at the pleading stage.” Rodríguez–Reyes,
711 F.3d at 56; see also Guadalupe-Báez, 819 F.3d at 515.
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	clear 	the
plausibility threshold under a theory of deliberate indifference-
-albeit 	narrowly. 	First, 	as 	to 	the 	averment 	that 	Supervisory
Defendants failed to take remedial actions to protect women in the
PRPB from Díaz-Muñoz, Plaintiff plausibly pleads facts indicating
the existence of notice and a pattern of inaction. (Docket No. 54
at 	23-27). 	First 	Circuit 	case 	law 	on 	supervisory 	liability 	under
Section 	1983 	requires 	more 	than 	proof 	of 	supervisory 	negligence.
See, e.g., Ramírez-Lluveras, 759 F.3d at 19. However, the Circuit
has 	also 	cautioned 	district 	courts 	against 	demanding 	a 	granular
level 	of 	detail 	in 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	as 	to 	the 	mechanics 	of 	how
supervisors 	received 	notice 	or 	approached 	discipline. 	Guadalupe-
Báez, 	819 	F.3d 	at 	516 	(criticizing 	the 	district 	court 	for
“set[ting] the bar too high” for a supervisory liability claim at
the 	12(b)(6) 	stage 	and 	for 	disregarding 	a 	supervisor’s
constructive 	awareness 	of 	past 	harm). 	Here, 	Plaintiff 	does 	more
than 	simply 	assert 	that 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	were 	above 	Díaz-
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	22
Muñoz in the chain of command. (Docket No. 54 at 23-27). Instead,
she 	pleads 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz 	had 	a 	pattern 	of 	sexually 	harassing
women at the PRPB, that Supervisory Defendants did not respond to
a 	slew 	of 	complaints, 	and 	that 	Commissioner 	López-Figueroa 	in
particular 	“protected 	and 	shielded” 	Díaz-Muñoz 	from 	discipline
during 	this 	time. 	Id. 	Credited 	as 	true 	and 	taken 	together, 	these
allegations 	support 	a 	plausible 	inference 	that 	Supervisory
Defendants 	were 	aware 	of 	the 	recurring 	risk 	posed 	by 	Díaz-Muñoz
and opted not to take corrective measures.
Second, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning a nearly year-and-
a-half-long 	delay 	before 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	acted 	against
Díaz-Muñoz; 	Commissioner 	López-Figueroa’s 	alleged 	role 	in
shielding 	Díaz-Muñoz; 	and 	the 	failure 	to 	prevent 	Díaz-Muñoz 	from
carrying around his numerous PRPB-issued weapons during this time
support 	a 	plausible, 	pleading 	stage 	inference 	of 	deliberate
indifference. 	Id. 	Taken 	as 	a 	part 	of 	the 	pattern 	alleged 	by
Plaintiff--of 	prior 	allegations, 	supervisors 	shielding 	the
offender, 	and 	then 	this 	prolonged 	delay 	in 	justice--Plaintiff’s
averments 	as 	to 	slow 	discipline 	further 	bolster 	the 	plausibility
of her claim. Id.
Courts 	in 	this 	district, 	when 	faced 	with 	similar 	claims 	at
the 	12(b)(6) 	stage, 	have 	typically 	allowed 	cases 	to 	proceed 	to
discovery in order to further develop the record on plausibly pled
sexual 	harassment 	claims. 	See, 	e.g., 	Rivera-Freytes 	v. 	Puerto
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	23
Rico, 	894 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	159, 	162 	(D.P.R. 	2012) 	(finding 	“that 	the
factual 	allegations, 	taken 	as 	true 	and 	considered 	together, 	show
that 	[supervisory 	defendant’s] 	inaction 	is 	linked 	to 	the 	other
defendants’ 	alleged 	unconstitutional 	conduct 	under 	a 	theory 	of
deliberate 	indifference” 	but 	cautioning 	that 	this 	“does 	not
necessarily 	herald 	a 	likelihood 	of 	success” 	later 	on 	without
factual 	substantiation) 	(internal 	citations 	omitted); 	see 	also
Torres 	Calderon 	v. 	Puerto 	Rico 	Police 	Dep’t, 	2007 	WL 	2428675, 	at
*2 	(D.P.R. 	2007) 	(finding, 	in 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	context, 	that
the 	complaint 	alleged 	facts 	which 	Could 	establish 	supervisory
liability 	where 	supervisors 	did 	not 	properly 	recruit 	or 	train
subordinate police officers).
To be sure, the Amended Complaint is sparse on the details of
Supervisory 	Defendants’ 	involvement 	in 	shielding 	Díaz-Muñoz 	from
discipline. 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	may 	well 	contest, 	at 	summary
judgment or trial, whether the prior incidents were substantiated
by investigation, what each supervisor knew and when, whether there
was 	cause 	for 	the 	sixteen-month 	delay 	in 	firing 	Díaz-Muñoz, 	and
whether 	the 	requisite 	causal 	nexus 	exists. 	See 	Morales, 	793 	F.3d
at 	221; 	Grajales 	v. 	Puerto 	Rico 	Ports 	Authority, 	682 	F.3d 	40, 	50
(1st Cir. 2012) (“a favorable plausibility determination does not
necessarily herald a likelihood of success at subsequent stages of
litigation”). 	However, 	Plaintiff 	does 	plead 	more 	than 	mere
supervisory negligence--she alleges a history of past misconduct,
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	24
superiors’ 	involvement 	in 	protecting 	and 	shielding 	the 	offender,
and a lengthy delay in disciplinary consequences. Hence, the Court
cannot 	conclude 	on 	this 	record 	that 	the 	supervisory 	liability
theory 	is 	implausible. 	The 	Guadalupe-Báez 	court 	noted 	that 	“[i]n
our 	view, 	there 	is 	enough 	here—though 	not 	by 	much—to 	permit
[plaintiff] to proceed to discovery.” 819 F.3d at 517. The same is
true here.
Accordingly, 	this 	Court 	holds 	that 	Count 	3 	of 	the 	Amended
Complaint pleads the facts necessary to satisfy the First Circuit’s
Rule 	12(b)(6) 	standard 	for 	supervisory 	liability 	under 	Section
1983. 	Id. 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	is 	DENIED 	as 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Equal
Protection theory in Count 3.
ii. 	The procedural due process theory is properly pled
The Court now turns to the two remaining paragraphs in Count
3. Plaintiff accuses Supervisory Defendants of direct involvement
in terminating what she avers was a career post:
151. 	Secretary 	Torres-Ríos 	and 	Commissioner
López-Figueroa 	terminated 	Ms. 	Lara-Nieves’s
employment 	at 	the 	PRPB 	without 	affording 	her
a 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	challenge 	her
dismissal for a career position.
152. 	Secretary 	Torres-Ríos 	and 	Commissioner
López-Figueroa 	violated 	Ms. 	Lara-Nieves’ 	due
process right to continued employment with the
Commonwealth.
(Docket No. 54 at 26).
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	25
The 	Amended 	Complaint’s 	previous 	“General 	Allegations”
section 	does 	not 	shed 	light 	on 	this 	process. 	Id. 	at 	6-14.
Paragraphs 79 and 80 are duplicates and both state that “[o]n May
30, 2024, Secretary Torres-Ríos notified Ms. Lara-Nieves that her
employment 	would 	be 	terminated 	effective 	June 	30, 	2024, 	without
offering 	any 	explanation 	as 	to 	the 	termination.” 	Id. 	at 	14.
Paragraph 81 appears to contain a scrivener’s error, stating that
“[o]n 	June 	30, 	2024, 	Secretary 	Torres-Ríos 	terminated 	Ms. 	Lara-
Nieves’ 	employment 	at 	the 	PRPB, 	upon 	recommendation 	by 	. 	[sic]”
before 	trailing 	off 	without 	identifying 	the 	source 	of 	the
recommendation. 	Id. 	There 	is 	no 	other 	account 	of 	Plaintiff’s
attempts 	to 	obtain 	an 	opportunity 	to 	respond 	before 	or 	after 	her
termination.
The 	Court 	is 	tasked 	with 	determining 	whether 	Plaintiff 	has
pled a deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected by
the United States Constitution and, if so, whether the procedures
causing 	the 	deprivation 	“were 	constitutionally 	sufficient.”
González-Fuentes, 	607 	F.3d 	at 	886 	(internal 	citation 	omitted).
Under 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment, 	she 	has 	the 	right 	to 	adequate
notice 	and 	to 	the 	“opportunity 	to 	be 	heard 	at 	a 	meaningful 	time
and 	in 	a 	meaningful 	manner.” 	Perrier-Bilbo, 	954 	F.3d 	at 	433
(internal citation omitted).
As 	to 	determining 	whether 	Plaintiff 	has 	pled 	a 	deprivation,
it 	is 	settled 	precedent 	in 	the 	First 	Circuit 	that 	“[p]roperty
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	26
interests are creatures of state law, and under the laws of Puerto
Rico, 	public 	employees 	who 	lawfully 	hold 	career 	positions 	have 	a
protected 	property 	interest 	in 	continued 	employment 	in 	those
positions.” Casiano-Montanez, 707 F.3d at 129. Plaintiff expressly
alleges 	that 	she 	held 	a 	“career” 	position 	and 	that 	Supervisory
Defendants 	terminated 	her 	from 	that 	position. 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at
26). At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, such pled facts suffice to place
a protected property interest at issue.
Plaintiff 	also 	pleads 	facts 	indicating 	constitutionally
inadequate 	process. 	She 	alleges 	that 	Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety
Torres-Ríos 	notified 	her 	on 	May 	30, 	2024 	that 	she 	would 	be 	fired
in 	a 	month, 	“without 	offering 	any 	explanation 	as 	to 	the
termination.” 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at 	14). 	Count 	3 	then 	alleges 	that
both 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	were 	involved 	in 	terminating 	her
“without 	affording 	her 	a 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	challenge 	her
dismissal.” 	Id. 	at 	26. 	Read 	together, 	these 	allegations 	suggest
that 	Plaintiff 	received 	neither 	notice 	of 	the 	reasons 	for
termination 	nor 	any 	meaningful 	pre- 	or 	post-deprivation
opportunity 	to 	respond. 	That 	is 	enough 	to 	plead 	a 	due 	process
deficiency 	at 	this 	stage, 	because 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment
requires 	notice 	and 	“an 	opportunity 	to 	be 	heard 	at 	a 	meaningful
time 	and 	in 	a 	meaningful 	manner.” 	Perrier-Bilbo, 	954 	F.3d 	at 	433
(internal 	citation 	omitted). 	Courts 	in 	this 	district 	have
repeatedly allowed procedural due process claims to survive at the
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	27
motion 	to 	dismiss 	stage 	when 	plaintiffs 	allege 	they 	were 	fired
from 	career 	positions 	without 	hearings. 	See, 	e.g., 	Santana 	v.
Calderon, 188 F. Supp. 2d 160, 177 (D.P.R. 2002) (requiring a pre-
termination 	hearing 	before 	plaintiff 	could 	be 	fired 	from 	a
guaranteed 	position); 	Pagan 	Quinones 	v. 	Irizarry 	Mendez, 	2011 	WL
2712525, 	at 	*5 	(D.P.R. 	2011) 	(holding 	plaintiffs 	plausibly 	pled
due 	process 	violations 	when 	they 	alleged 	lack 	of 	opportunity 	to
challenge adverse employment actions). The parties’ briefing does
not 	develop 	the 	contours 	of 	the 	process 	allegedly 	provided 	(or
not), 	but 	the 	Court’s 	task 	at 	the 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	stage 	is 	only 	to
determine whether pled facts, accepted as true, state a plausible
claim.
Because Plaintiff alleges she held a career appointment that
was 	terminated 	with 	no 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	challenge 	the
dismissal, Count 3 states a plausible procedural due process claim.
(Docket 	No. 	54 	at 	14, 	26). 	Accordingly, 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	is
DENIED as to Plaintiff’s procedural due process theory in Count 3.
C. Injunctive relief pursuant to the PRPB Reform Agreement
The 	Commonwealth 	and 	Supervisory 	Defendants 	argue 	that
Plaintiff’s 	demands 	for 	the 	enforcement 	of 	the 	PRPB 	Reform
Agreement 	must 	be 	dismissed 	because 	the 	Reform 	Agreement 	is 	a
consent 	decree 	in 	a 	separate 	case 	subject 	to 	ongoing 	judicial
supervision. 	(Docket 	No. 	56 	at 	9-12). 	They 	argue 	that 	its
enforcement 	must 	be 	sought 	in 	that 	case, 	not 	through 	collateral
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	28
litigation. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	replies 	that 	the 	Amended 	Complaint 	“is
not 	asking 	the 	Court 	to 	enforce 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Police 	Reform
agreement” 	as 	a 	consent 	decree, 	but 	rather 	seeks 	enforcement 	of
PRPB’s 	own 	anti-harassment 	policies, 	which 	“happen[] 	to 	be
required by the Puerto Rico Police Reform Agreement.” (Docket No.
62 	at 	6-7). 	She 	points 	out 	that 	the 	only 	remedy 	sought 	in 	the
Amended 	Complaint 	related 	to 	the 	PRPB 	Reform 	Agreement 	is 	in 	a
brief 	portion 	of 	her 	prayer 	for 	relief. 	Id. 	at 	6. 	Defendants 	do
not rebut Plaintiff’s framing of her prayer for relief.
The Amended Complaint nowhere uses the PRPB Reform Agreement
as 	a 	premise 	for 	a 	freestanding 	cause 	of 	action. 	See 	(Docket 	No.
54 	at 	15-38). 	A 	prayer 	for 	relief 	does 	not 	constitute 	a 	“claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2)-(3). Moreover, Plaintiff’s Response clarifies that she
is 	not 	seeking 	to 	enforce 	the 	PRPB 	Reform 	Agreement 	but 	rather
seeks 	enforcement 	of 	PRPB’s 	own 	anti-harassment 	policies, 	which
“happen[] 	to 	be 	required 	by 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Police 	Reform
Agreement.” (Docket No. 62 at 6-7). She concedes that the mention
of the Reform Agreement is “inconsequential” to her request for an
order 	enforcing 	the 	PRPB’s 	own 	policies 	regarding 	sexual
harassment. 	Id. 	at 	7. 	Defendants 	do 	not 	offer 	argumentation 	to
contradict 	Plaintiff’s 	interpretation 	of 	her 	own 	Amended
Complaint. 	Hence, 	there 	are 	no 	“[c]laims 	[s]eeking 	to 	[e]nforce
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	29
the Police Reform Agreement” in the first place. (Docket No. 56 at
9).
The 	Court 	concurs 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	reading 	of 	the 	words 	“as
required by the Police Reform Agreement” in her prayer for relief
as solely providing contextual background. (Docket No. 54 at 38).
So, 	the 	Court 	construes 	her 	requested 	injunctive 	relief
accordingly. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	may 	not 	later 	reframe 	the 	injunctive
relief 	request 	in 	Paragraph 	F 	of 	her 	prayer 	for 	relief 	as
requesting 	direct 	enforcement 	or 	supervision 	of 	the 	Reform
Agreement 	in 	this 	action. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	is 	“bound 	by 	[her]
statements 	made 	in 	court 	filings” 	here, 	since 	her 	admission 	is
“clear” 	and 	comes 	via 	an 	“express 	statement.” 	See, 	e.g., 	Akebia
Therapeutics, 	Inc. 	v. 	Azar, 	976 	F.3d 	86, 	95 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020)
(“parties 	may 	be 	bound 	by 	statements 	made 	in 	court 	filings”);
Harrington 	v. 	City 	of 	Nashua, 	610 	F.3d 	24, 	31 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010)
(“[o]rdinarily, 	a 	pleading 	admitting 	a 	fact 	alleged 	in 	an
antecedent 	pleading 	is 	treated 	as 	a 	binding 	judicial 	admission,
removing 	the 	fact 	from 	contention 	for 	the 	duration 	of 	the
litigation); 	Schott 	Motorcycle 	Supply, 	Inc. 	v. 	Am. 	Honda 	Motor
Co., 976 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1992) (binding a party to a “clear
and express statement” from its amended complaint).
Accordingly, 	Defendants’ 	request 	to 	dismiss 	an 	asserted
Reform 	Agreement 	“claim” 	is 	DENIED 	AS 	MOOT 	under 	Plaintiff’s
construction.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	30
V. CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	at
Docket 	No. 	56 	is 	hereby 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIED 	IN 	PART.
Plaintiff’s claims in Counts 7-10 as to the Commonwealth are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED
as 	to 	the 	entirety 	of 	Count 	3 	and 	as 	to 	the 	injunctive 	relief
request 	for 	the 	PRPB 	to 	enforce 	its 	policies 	against 	sexual
harassment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 9 th day of March 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH_____
United States District Judge
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