Lopez v. Policia de Puerto Rico

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
LAUCE ROBERTO LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
ADAN AGOSTINI-GRACIA, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 22-1650 (JAG)
OPINION AND ORDER
GARCIA-GREGORY, D.J.
Pending before the Court is Defendant Adan Agostini-Gracia’s (“Defendant”) Motion for
Summary Judgment, Docket No. 42; and Plaintiff Lauce Roberto Lopez’s (“Plaintiff”) Opposition,
Docket No. 46. For the following reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any, show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard, a fact is in “genuine” dispute if it could
be resolved in favor of either party; and “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the case.
Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986)).
The party requesting summary disposition bears the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Once the moving
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party has properly supported [its] motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). The non-movant must then demonstrate “through submissions of evidentiary
quality . . . that a trial worthy issue persists.” Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the entire record “in
the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.” Winslow v. Aroostook Cty., 736 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). The Court, however, may safely ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences,
and unsupported speculation.” Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 134 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). And it cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as these are jury
functions and not those of a judge. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales, 761
F.3d 81, 99 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following factual findings based on the Parties’ filings and the
evidence on record. In accordance with Local Rule 56(e), the Court only credits facts properly
supported by specific and accurate record citations. The Court has also disregarded all
argumentative and conclusory allegations, speculations, and improbable inferences disguised as
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facts. See Forestier Fradera v. Mun. of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006); Medina-Munoz v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).1
1. On May 3, 2021, the Court of First Instance of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, issued a one-
year Order of Protection under the Act Against Stalking, Case No. SJL284-21-1423, in favor
of Plaintiff’s neighbor Mr. Edgardo Arcaya Rodríguez (“Mr. Arcaya”) and against Plaintiff.
Both parties were present in court and were notified of the Order. Docket Nos. 43 at 1; 46-
1 at 1.
2. The Order of Protection was based on a judicial determination that Plaintiff engaged in a
pattern of stalking against Mr. Arcaya, including throwing poison and stones at Mr.
Arcaya’s residence. The Order instructed Plaintiff to refrain from harassing, persecuting,
intimidating, threatening, or otherwise interfering with Mr. Arcaya or members of his
family. Docket Nos. 43 at 1; 46-1 at 1.
3. On January 2, 2022, at around 4:00 PM, Plaintiff was at his home in Rio Piedras, Puerto
Rico. Docket No. 46-1 at 3.
4. The residents in Mr. Arcaya’s house had been playing extremely loud music since noon
that day. Id.
5. Plaintiff called the police to complain about the loud music coming from Mr. Arcaya’s
residence. Docket Nos. 43 at 2; 46-1 at 1.
6. Around 45 minutes later, Defendant arrived at the scene and talked to Plaintiff. Docket
Nos. 43 at 2; 46-1 at 2-4.
1 Defendant failed to oppose Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Uncontested Facts and, thus, those facts
are uncontested.
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7. From inside his locked gate, Plaintiff told Defendant he had arrived too late and that the
music had already stopped. Docket No. 46-1 at 4.
8. Plaintiff never exited his residence. Id.
9. Defendant then proceeded to walk to Mr. Arcaya’s house, where the loud music had been
playing, and talked to Mr. Arcaya. Id.
10. After talking with Mr. Arcaya, Defendant walked back to the front of Plaintiff’s house and
told Plaintiff to come out of his house in a rough manner. Id.
11. Plaintiff felt threatened by Defendant’s approach and asked Defendant to say what he
needed to say from outside of his house. Id.
12. Defendant got angry and yelled at Plaintiff that he was making this hard for himself. Id.
13. Plaintiff then retreated into his house. Id. at 2,4; Docket No. 43 at 2.
14. Plaintiff was never told that he was under arrest or that he had to come out of his house to
be arrested. Docket No. 46-1 at 5.
15. As Plaintiff was getting ready to shower, police officers entered Plaintiff’s residence
without a warrant, located him in the bathroom, and placed him under arrest. Id. at 3, 5;
Docket No. 43 at 2.
16. The first police officer to enter the bathroom immediately pointed a rifle at Plaintiff.
Docket No. 46-1 at 5.
17. Several additional police officers proceeded to enter Plaintiff’s bedroom. Id.
18. Defendant threw Plaintiff against a wall and proceeded to handcuff him, injuring his neck
in the process. Id.
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19. At the time of his arrest, Plaintiff was 77 years-old, 5’5 feet tall, and only weighed 126
pounds. He was unarmed. Id. at 5-6.
20. Plaintiff was taken to a police station and officers refused to tell him why he was being
arrested, so he exercised his rights and refused to talk to them. Id. at 6.
21. Plaintiff asked to call his attorney, but Defendant ignored him. Id.
22. Plaintiff was held in a cell without a bed until noon of the next day. Id.
23. Plaintiff suffers from numerous physical ailments and medical conditions due to his
advanced age, but he was not given access to his medications despite asking Defendant for
the medications. Id.
24. Plaintiff was charged with a felony violation of Act 284, Art. 4.B.4 (violation of a protective
order) and a misdemeanor for disturbing the peace under P.C. Art. 241.B. Id. at 3; Docket
No. 43 at 3.
25. The day after his arrest, Plaintiff was taken before a Municipal Judge of the Court of First
Instance and, for the first time, the court informed Plaintiff that he was arrested because
Mr. Arcaya claimed that Plaintiff had called him a “cabron”2 in violation of the protective
order issued some months prior. Docket No. 46-1 at 7.
26. The Municipal Judge found probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest and set bail at $1,000.00,
which Plaintiff posted. Id. at 3, 7; Docket No. 43 at 3.
27. The criminal charges against Plaintiff were later dismissed. Docket Nos. 43 at 3; 46-1 at 3.
2 This term roughly translates to “bastard” or “asshole.”
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ANALYSIS
I. Qualified Immunity
Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Docket No. 42 at 9-10. The
Court already ruled that Defendant is not protected by qualified immunity. Docket No. 29 at 9.
Specifically, in denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court found as follows:
To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity,
the Court must decide “(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by
the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if
so, whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
defendant’s alleged violation.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263,
269 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009)). Here, the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is
satisfied . . . Plaintiffs have established a cognizable Fourth
Amendment claim. “[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 590. As such,
the Supreme Court has held that “[n]o reasonable officer could
claim to be unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases,
that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home
is presumptively unconstitutional.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
564 (2004) (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586-88). The behavior
described in the pleadings is exactly the conduct that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to prevent. Taking Plaintiff’s well-plead
allegations as true, Officer Agostini’s conduct was a clear violation
of constitutional law that has been firmly established since the late
1800s. When officers disregard constitutional rights, they
undermine the authority of law enforcement and erode community
trust. Officers, by the nature of the authority entrusted to them,
must honor, and protect every citizen’s rights. Therefore, Officer
Agostini is not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture.
Id. Plaintiff has presented evidence supporting the allegations in the Amended Complaint.
Defendant has not put forth any evidence refuting Plaintiff’s version of the events, which supports
a finding that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights. Thus,
Defendant has failed to show that the Court should reconsider the determination that he is not
entitled to qualified immunity.
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II. Section 1983
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)
(cleaned up). To prevail in a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant, acting under
color of state law, deprived him of a federal right. Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). A defendant has acted under color of state law if he has abused the power
“possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (citation omitted). Further, to
establish the deprivation of a federal right, “plaintiffs must show that the defendants’ conduct was
the cause in fact of the alleged deprivation.” Rodriguez -Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).
In this case, Defendant does not dispute that he acted under color of state law. Instead, he
argues that Plaintiff was not deprived of a federal right because Defendant had probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s residence.
The Court strongly disagrees.
First, Defendant has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of
probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. Defendant contends that “Mr. Arcaya informed [him] that
Plaintiff had just violated the protective order carrying out acts aimed at intimidating Mr. Arcaya.
Mr. Arcaya presented Officer Agostini with a copy of the active protective order. Mr. Arcaya’s
allegation was corroborated at the scene by a witness, Ms. Nitza Torres Sáez.” Docket No. 43 at
2. Defendant cites 2 exhibits to support this proposed statement of fact: the state court complaint
filed as a result of Plaintiff’s arrest (Case No. SJ2022CR00004-1) and a witness summons (Case
No. KVA2022-0041). Docket Nos. 43-2; 43-3. This evidence, however, is insufficient for the Court
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to make a probable cause determination. Neither the state court complaint nor the witness
summons sheds any light on the specific allegations made by Mr. Arcaya (or the alleged
corroborating witness) that led Defendant to believe that Plaintiff had violated the protective
order. The only evidence on this issue is Plaintiff’s Unsworn Declaration, where he attests that he
was arrested because Mr. Arcaya claimed that Plaintiff called him a “cabrón.” Docket No. 46-2 at
3. Without any factual context, it is impossible to determine whether this was sufficient to show
a violation of the protective order for purposes of the probable cause analysis.
Second, the facts of this case clearly show that no exigent circumstances existed to justify
the warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s home. “At the [Fourth] Amendment’s very core stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.” Fla. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (cleaned up). “Freedom in one’s own dwelling is the
archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment; conversely, physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which it is directed.” Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 303 (2021)
(cleaned up). Therefore, “the contours of [] any [] warrant exception permitting home entry are
jealously and carefully drawn, in keeping with the centuries-old principle that the home is
entitled to special protection.” Id. (cleaned up).
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless
search is objectively reasonable. The exception enables law enforcement officers to handle
emergencies—situations presenting a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a
warrant.” Id. at 301 (cleaned up). The exigency exception requires courts to evaluate the totality
of the circumstances. Id. at 302. Only “[w]hen the totality of circumstances shows an emergency—
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such as imminent harm to others, a threat to the officer himself, destruction of evidence, or escape
from the home—the police may act without waiting.” Id. at 308.
Here, Defendant has provided no evidence showing that “the delay required to obtain a
warrant would bring about some real immediate and serious consequences—and so the absence
of a warrant is excused.” Id. at 302 (cleaned up). The record is devoid of any evidence
demonstrating that there was an immediate danger or a “need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (cleaned up). Defendant has not
presented any evidence that Plaintiff posed a threat to others, nor is there any evidence showing
a risk of escape or destruction of evidence. Defendant has shown no compelling need for a
warrantless entry.
Defendant’s argument that warrantless entry was justified under the “hot pursuit”
exception fails because he has not shown that Plaintiff “was not merely stepping into [his] home
but was fleeing arrest, requiring the officers to follow [him] in hot pursuit.” Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d
16, 27 (1st Cir. 2017) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). While it is true that “a suspect may not defeat
an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by [] escaping to a private place,” United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976), there is simply no evidence that the arrest here was set in
motion before Plaintiff retreated into his home. “That a suspect will not agree to step outside his
home in response to an officer’s request does not, without more, constitute exigent circumstances
sufficient to authorize a warrantless entry into the home.” Morse, 869 F.3d at 25-26 (citation
omitted).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has instructed that
[A]n important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for
which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is
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created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a
serious crime has been committed . . . application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should
rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that
only a minor offense [] has been committed.
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). In this case, the underlying offense was uttering a one-
word insult in alleged violation of a protective order. This is a relatively minor offense, which
further supports the unreasonableness of the warrantless entry.
Additionally, the aggressive manner in which the police officers arrested Plaintiff also
supports a finding of unreasonableness. Plaintiff attests as follows:
I started to get ready to take a shower since it was getting dark.
That suddenly I see someone is trying to break the bathroom’s lock
from outside and immediately a police officer opens the door and
starts pointing a rifle at me. That numerous other Police officers
proceeded to enter my bedroom, and [Defendant] threw me against
a wall and proceeded to handcuff me, injuring my neck with the
impact. That at the time of my arrest I was 77 years old, [] 5’5 [feet
tall] and weigh[ed] 126 pounds and I was clearly unarmed, inside
my home and wasn’t fleeing or trying to escape.
Docket No. 46-2 at 2. Defendant has not contested this version of the events. As such, the record
seemingly shows that Defendant and the other police officers used excessive force when arresting
Plaintiff. See Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The Fourth Amendment is
implicated where an officer exceeds the bounds of reasonable force in effecting an arrest or
investigatory stop.”) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, because Defendant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence
neither the existence of probable cause nor the existence of exigency, Defendant’s request for
dismissal is hereby DENIED.
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III. Supplemental State Law Claims
Finally, because the Court does not dismiss Plaintiff’s federal cause of action, Defendant’s
request to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims is
hereby DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this Thursday, February 05, 2026.
s/ Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
JAY A. GARCIA-GREGORY
United States District Judge
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