Milicevic v. Bayamon Hotel Company LLC

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
TANIS MILICEVIC,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAYAMÓN HOTEL COMPANY, LLC, ET
AL.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC)
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Universal Insurance Company’s (“Universal” or “defendant”) motion
for summary judgment and statement of proposed uncontested material facts. ECF Nos. 155 and
156.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and dismisses the case with prejudice.
I. 	Procedural background
On May 4, 2022, Tanis Milicevic (“plaintiff”), field the instant slip-and-fall tort action
against Bayamón Hotel Company (“BHC”) (as the owner of the hotel) claiming that she suffered
damages due to BHC’s negligence. ECF No. 1. Notably, plaintiff chose not to sue the hotel’s
“operator” IHE, LLC (“IHE”), or the insurer of both the BHC and IHE, Liberty Insurance
(“Liberty”). ECF No. 1. The parties agreed to transfer the case to a United States Magistrate
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Judge for all further proceedings, including judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. ECF No. 22.
A year and three months later, BHC moved for leave to file a third-party complaint. ECF
No. 37. In support of its request for leave, BHC explained that it learned through discovery that
two insurance policies were in place, one issued by Liberty and the other one issued by
Universal. Id., at 2. BHC further asserted that the insurance policy issued by Liberty “covered”1
both the hotel and IHE. Id. Thus, BHC moved to file only third-party claims against Liberty and
IHE. Notably, in its first third-party complaint, BHC did not include Universal as a named third-
party defendant. Id. The Magistrate Judge granted BHC’s request to file a third-party complaint
as requested. ECF No. 39. Two weeks later, on October 10, 2023, BHC moved to file yet another
third-party complain, this time, against Universal. ECF No. 40.2 Id. The Magistrate Judge granted
the BHC’s request to file third-party claims against Universal. ECF No. 43.
On December 5, 2023, Liberty filed a motion to dismiss the third-party claims against it.
ECF No. 46. The Magistrate Judge denied the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 62. Thereafter, Liberty
filed its answer to the third-party complaint and a crossclaim against Universal.3 ECF Nos. 72,
73. On February 19, 2024, Universal filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 69.
1 The Court assumes that BHC meant to say that BHC and IHE were both insured under the Liberty policy and that
the damages claimed in the complaint fell within the scope of the policy’s coverage.
2 This second request to assert third-party claims was filed after the case management’s deadline had elapsed.
3 Liberty did not explain why it decided to file claims against Universal so late in the proceedings.
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 3
On March 7, 2024, plaintiff moved for leave to amend the complaint to include IHE,
Liberty, and Universal as co-defendants. ECF No. 81. The Magistrate Judge granted plaintiff’s
request for leave to amend the complaint. ECF Nos. 84 and 86. In April 2024, BHC and Liberty
filed their answers to the amended complaint. ECF Nos. 96 and 99. Two years after the
complaint was filed, plaintiff and BHC filed a motion to “substitute,” claiming that the “owner”
of the hotel was not BHC, but District Hotel Partners, LLC (“DHP” or the “hotel”). ECF No. 107.4
The Magistrate Judge allowed the substitution. ECF No. 109.
On May 23, 2024, plaintiff, DHP, IHE (now appearing as Bluhost, LLC), and Liberty filed
a motion captioned “Stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.” ECF No. 111. Therein, all parties
except Universal announced that they had reached an agreement and executed a confidential
settlement. Id., at 1. Accordingly, plaintiff informed the Court that she “released the appearing
Co-Defendants of all liability and will continue her causes of action only against Universal.” Id.
Likewise, Liberty requested dismissal of its crossclaim against Universal, and the hotel
dismissed its third-party claims against both Universal and Liberty. Id., at 2. That same day, the
Magistrate Judge issued an order noting the voluntary dismissal and ordered that partial
judgment be entered with prejudice. ECF No. 112. Accordingly, Universal’s motion to dismiss
and other filings were denied as moot. ECF Nos. 114-117.
4 According to the parties, the fact that the relevant insurance policies were issued on behalf of serval entities that
owned and operated hospitality centers or hotels threw off the parties and their attorneys as to the correct legal
entity. Id., at 2.
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 4
Universal filed a motion seeking disclosure of the settlements “to determine its effects in
the judgment or [its] own exposure, pursuant to Szendrey v. Hospicare, 159 D.P.R. 648 (2003) and
its progeny.” ECF No. 119, at 2. The Magistrate Judge denied Universal’s request for disclosure
of the settlement information. ECF No. 126. Accordingly, Universal filed its answer to the
amended complaint. Among other defenses, Universal asserted that plaintiff’s release in favor
of Universal’s insured via settlement “absorb whatever portion of liability that may be
assessed.” ECF No. 127 at 19.
Because Universal did not consent to trial jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, the case
reverted to the undersigned’s docket. ECF No. 131. On September 30, 2025, Universal filed a
motion for summary judgment and a proposed statement of uncontested material facts. ECF
Nos. 155, 156. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment and a response
to Universal’s proposed statement of uncontested material facts. ECF Nos. 157, 158. Universal
replied. ECF Nos. 160, 161. Plaintiff did not move for leave to file a sur-reply.
On December 2025, the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause regarding, inter alia, why
the case should not be dismissed. ECF No. 168. Specifically, the Court ordered plaintiff to argue
why the remaining claims were not time-barred or precluded by the collateral source doctrine.
Id. Both parties filed briefs in response to the Order. ECF Nos. 168, 169.
II. 	Legal Standard
Through summary judgment, courts “pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay
the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ.
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Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992). A court may grant summary judgment only when
the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660 (1st Cir. 2000). A factual dispute is “genuine” if it could
be resolved in favor of either party; it is “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the
case. Murray v. Warren Pumps, LLC, 821 F.3d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 2016); Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). Although the court states the facts in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought, the court is still required
“to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that
are not disputed.” Adria Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation
modified).
The court must review the record “taken as a whole,” and “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Anderson Plumbing Productions Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 135 (2000). Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are functions of a jury, not of a judge. See id.
It is a “bedrock principle that a party opposing summary judgment must adduce specific
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Rodríguez v. Encompass Health
Rehab. Hosp. of San Juan, Inc., 126 F.4th 773, 777 (1st Cir. 2025). Local Civil Rule 56(c) states, in
pertinent part, that “[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its
opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts” in which it “shall admit,
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 6
deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each
numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material facts.” Local Civil Rule 56(c).
The opposing party may also include a “separate section [of] additional facts” which must
comply with Local Rule 56(c). Id. Local Civil Rule 56, for its part, provides that “[f]acts contained
in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as
required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted. . .. The court shall
have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically
referenced by the parties’ separate statement of facts.” Local Civil Rule 56(c). This is known as
an “anti-ferret rule,” which is “intended to protect the district court from perusing through the
summary judgment record in search of disputed material facts and prevent litigants from
shifting that burden onto the court.” López-Hernández v. Terumo Puerto Rico, LLC, 64 F.4th 22, 26
(1st Cir. 2023). Litigants ignore the anti-ferret rule at their peril. Rodríguez-Severino v. UTC
Aerospace Sys., 52 F.4th 448, 458 (1st Cir. 2022). In the end, the nonmoving party is required to
demonstrate “through submissions of evidentiary quality that a trial worthy issue persists.”
Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 108 (1st Cir. 2006).
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III. 	Discussion5
A. 	Local Civil Rule 56 violations
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56(c)
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its
opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The
opposing statement shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the
motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph
of the moving party’s statement of material facts. Unless a fact is admitted,
the opposing statement shall support each denial or qualification by a
record citation as required by this rule. The opposing statement may
contain in a separate section additional facts, set forth in separate numbered
paragraphs and supported by a record citation as required by subsection
(e) of this rule. (Emphasis added).
If a non-movant improperly controverts the facts proposed by the movant, the court may
treat those facts as uncontroverted. Quintana-Dieppa v. Dep't of Army, 130 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2025)
(“If a party does not comply with the rule, the ‘district court is free, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, to accept the moving party’s facts as stated.’”) (quoting Cabán Hernández v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007)). Because the Court is not required “to ferret
through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely in dispute[,]” Rodríguez-
Severino v. UTC Aero. Sys., 52 F.4th 448, 458 (1st Cir. 2022), the First Circuit “time and again…
ha[s] emphasized the importance of complying with that rule.” Id.
Universal filed its proposed statement of uncontested material fact with 61 short,
enumerated paragraphs each with specific references to evidence on the record. ECF No. 156.
5 Because the facts of this case are not voluminous, the Court will consolidate the factual findings with the
discussion.
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 8
Plaintiff filed her response at ECF No. 157. Plaintiff admitted Universal’s proposed facts in
paragraphs 1-21, 27-30, 35, 49-54, and 61 and opposed the rest. Id. However, plaintiff did not
comply with Local Civil Rule 56(c).
Plaintiff denies Universal’s proposed statements of facts in paragraphs 22-26 by lumping
them together and giving three general reasons to reject those five statements. ECF No. 157 at 5-
6. The reasons provided by plaintiff do not track or otherwise cross reference the specific
proposed statements they are meant to oppose. This practice contravenes Local Civil Rule 56(c),
which, in no ambiguous terms, requires that the opposing party “admit, deny or qualify the
facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material
facts”) (emphasis added). In any event, the Court cannot assume that plaintiff’s purported
denials apply to all five statements because Universal’s statements in paragraphs 22-26,
although related, deal with several different sets of facts. See ECF No. 156 at 3-4.
Moreover, plaintiff’s blanket denials of Universal’s proposed statements in paragraphs
22-26 do not make reference to the page or paragraphs of the record that support them. For
example, plaintiff’s “first” paragraph with general denials only includes the following reference
to the record: “See the above quotes from Universal’s Investigation Report on this Point.” ECF
No 157 at 5. Even viewed in the most favorable light to plaintiff, this reference is not rule
compliant.
The discussion of the purported reasons to reject Universal’s statements also overlooks
the rule’s length requirement. Local Civil Rule 56(c) is pellucid when it requires a “short and
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 9
concise” response. Plaintiff’s grouped responses to Universal’s statements in paragraphs 22-26
run for almost three full pages in length. Undoubtedly, this is not a short or concise response.
See Cortés-Díaz v. Merk Sharp & Dohme, Civil No. 19-1611 (ADC), 2021 WL 4513714, at *1 (D.P.R.
Sept. 30, 2021).
In light of the multiple and egregious rule violations described above, the Court will
deem Universal’s statements of proposed material facts in paragraphs 22-26 uncontested. See
Quintana-Dieppa, 130 F.4th at 8.
Plaintiff’s response to Universal’s statements in paragraphs 31-33 only direct the reader
to her cluster response to paragraphs 22-26, which the Court discussed above. Accordingly,
plaintiff’s response to Universal’s statements in paragraphs 31-33 are in clear violation of Local
Civil Rule 56 and will not be taken in consideration for summary judgment purposes. See
Quintana-Dieppa, 130 F.4th at 8. Universal’s statements of proposed material facts in paragraphs
31-33 are uncontested.
Similar to her approach in opposition to Universal’s statements in paragraphs 22-26,
discussed above, plaintiff provided a single paragraph in response to Universal’s statements in
paragraphs 36-48. See ECF No. 157 at 7-8. Moreover, plaintiff’s purported support for her
response statement has no reference whatsoever to the record. Accordingly, Universal’s
statements in paragraphs 36-48 are uncontested. See Quintana-Dieppa, 130 F.4th at 8.
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B. 	Uncontested facts6
The following facts are supported by the record, and are either admitted or uncontested:
1. 	On June 12, 2021, the plaintiff suffered a fall in her room at the Hyatt Place San Juan
City Center, in Puerto Rico. SUMF ¶ 1.
2. 	That morning, plaintiff stepped out of bed and headed to the bathroom, put her right
foot on the carpeted floor and stepped on the tiled floor with her left foot and slipped
and fell. SUMF ¶ 3.
3. 	After the fall, the plaintiff noticed the tiled floor was wet. SUMF ¶ 4.
4. 	Before the fall, plaintiff felt that the carpet was “uncomfortable, spongy.” SUMF ¶ 5.
5. 	Despite noticing mold in the room and the uncomfortable feel of the carpet, plaintiff
did not complain to the Hotel during their stay. SUMF ¶ 6.
6. 	Plaintiff’s fall occurred the second morning of her stay. SUMF ¶ 8.
7. 	The floor in the room was not wet on the first morning of their stay. SUMF ¶ 9.
8. 	The plaintiff does not know why the floor was not wet on the first morning of the
stay (Friday) but was wet on the second morning (Saturday). SUMF ¶ 10.
9. 	Having arrived at the room on Thursday, plaintiff never saw the air conditioning
unit dripping water in the room. SUMF ¶ 11.
10. The day of the accident, plaintiff’s husband approached the tiled floor first, shortly
before the plaintiff did. SUMF ¶ 12.
11. Plaintiff’s husband did not suffer a fall on the floor that morning. SUMF ¶ 13.
12. Plaintiff’s husband did not notice the floor wet when he went to the tiled area prior
to the plaintiff’s fall. SUMF ¶ 14.
13. Plaintiff admits that the wet condition of the floor was “noticeable”. SUMF ¶ 15.
14. After her fall, the manager and 4 EMT personnel were also in the room. SUMF ¶ 17.
15. The wet conditions of the floor were immediately noticed by all who came into the
room after her fall. SUMF ¶ 18.
16. Plaintiff’s husband stayed in the same room and was all dressed up and ready to
leave the room prior to the plaintiff walking towards the bathroom and did not suffer
a fall. SUMF ¶ 20.
6 Because plaintiff is in agreement as to most of Universal’s proposed statements, and because plaintiff failed to
properly oppose the majority of the remaining statements, the Court tracks the undisputed material facts as listed
in Universal’s statement of uncontested material facts verbatim. See ECF No. 156. Aside from those specifically
identified herein, the Court draws the facts from the well-pleaded facts of the complaint and the statements of
proposed facts submitted by the parties that comply with Local Rule 56. See CMI Capital Market Inv. v. González-Toro,
520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008). Although the Court reviewed every statement submitted by the parties, it will only
consider and include in this Opinion and Order those facts that are material and uncontested for purposes of
summary judgment as mandated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 11
17. Plaintiff’s only basis to impute actual or constructive knowledge of the Owner
regarding the conditions in the room, is after the fall and only with respect to the
manager. SUMF ¶ 22.
18. According to plaintiff’s testimony under oath, the basis of her claim that the tiles
were a “dangerous condition,” amounting to a “hidden trap,” is that “it was very
slippery,” “it was like stepping on ice.” SUMF ¶ 23.
19. Although plaintiff claims that the Owner knew or should have known that the tile
was wet, and/or it was in full control of all the conditions in the room, she has
provided no admissible evidence of such knowledge or control by the Owner. SUMF
¶ 25.
20. Plaintiff’s claim that the Owner had full control of all conditions in the room at the
time, is based on her conclusion that they “own the hotel” “They run the hotel”.
SUMF ¶ 26.
21. Plaintiff has no personal knowledge about the Owner’s role in the room’s daily
conditions. SUMF ¶ 27.
22. Plaintiff stated that whoever was involved or responsible for running the hotel is
responsible for her fall. SUMF ¶ 28.
23. The plaintiff has no personal knowledge about the actual role of the owner over the
day-to-day operations. SUMF ¶ 29.
24. The plaintiff has no personal knowledge about the role of the owner and the operator
per their agreement. SUMF ¶ 30.
25. The basis for the Plaintiff’s claim that the Owner was on notice (actual or
constructive) about the conditions in the room, including that the tiles were wet and
slippery that morning, is the manager’s noting it “when the accident occurred”, after
the fall. SUMF ¶ 31.
26. Plaintiff has no basis for her allegation that the Owner was aware of the humid
conditions in the rooms, other than ownership: “I mean again, it’s their hotel, they
should be ultimately responsible.” SUMF ¶ 32.
27. The allegations in the Amended Complaint regarding the Owner’s supposed “full
control of all conditions in the room” is without support in any evidence. It is based
on mere ownership (“Well, they own the hotel.”), access (“They’ve had access to all
the rooms.”), on setting the temperature (“They set the temperature.”). SUMF ¶ 33.
28. The hotel was owned by District Hotel Partners, LLC, and operated by IHE, LLC.
SUMF ¶ 35.
29. The Hotel Management Agreement, by and between District Hotel Partners, LLC,
and IHE, LLC, for the Hyatt Place San Juan City Center, defines the roles, control and
duties of each party with respect to the property possessed by the Operator. SUMF
¶ 36.
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 12
30. The manager, as all other hotel personnel, reported directly to the Operator of the
Hotel, not the Owner. SUMF ¶ 37.
31. The Owner, DHP – Universal’s insured, had no participation, involvement or role in
the daily operations of the Hotel. SUMF ¶ 38.
32. The Owner, DHP – Universal’s insured, was not in possession of the hotel premises
(including the room where the fall occurred) and was not in control of the hotel
premises. Only the Operator, IHE, was in possession and exclusive control of the
hotel premises. SUMF ¶ 39.
33. Per the Hotel Management Agreement, the Owner -DHP, Universal’s insured, was
not charged with the daily operations of the Hotel. SUMF ¶ 40.
34. The Hotel Management Agreement, by and between District Hotel Partners, LLC,
and IHE, LLC, for the Hyatt Place San Juan City Center, provides that the Operator
(IHE) “shall have discretion and control, free from interference, interruption or
disturbance from [the Owner, Universal’s insured], in all matters relating to
management and operation of the Hotel.” SUMF ¶ 41.
35. Among the duties of the Operator, in Section 4.1, the Operator manages all
employees and personnel necessary for the operation of the Hotel (4.1(a)), establish
rates and services provided to guests (4.1(b)), enter into service contracts for all
utilities and maintenance (4.1(c)), procure replacement of operating equipment
(4.1(h)), make all routine “alterations, replacements, improvements” “necessary to
maintain and operate the Hotel properly” (4.1(i)), plan, execute and supervise
routine repairs and maintenance at the Hotel. SUMF ¶ 42.
36. The Hotel Management Agreement provides that the owner (Universal’s insured)
relinquished possession and control, granting the Operator “the sole and exclusive
right … to operate and manage the Hotel, and supervise and direct the Hotel
personnel”. SUMF ¶ 43.
37. Pursuant to Section 4.5 (Employees), the Operator -not Universal’s insured- had
complete 	discretion 	and 	control 	over 	all 	personnel 	matters, 	and 	the 	Owner
(Universal’s insured) 	could exercise no authority or interfere with personnel
employed by the Operator. SUMF ¶ 44.
38. The Operator had exclusive access and use of the premises, while the Owner had the
right to enter the premises “for the purpose of examining or inspecting the Hotel”.
SUMF ¶ 45.
39. The Hotel Management Agreement, by and between District Hotel Partners, LLC,
and IHE, LLC, for the Hyatt Place San Juan City Center, named the operator (IHE) as
the party with “the sole and exclusive right” “to operate and manage the Hotel, and
supervise and direct the Hotel personnel, during the “Term” of the Agreement.
SUMF ¶ 46.
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 13
40. The 	Operator 	(IHE) 	had 	the 	“discretion 	and 	control, 	free 	from 	interference,
interruption or disturbance from Owner, in all matters relating to management and
operation of the Hotel.” SUMF ¶ 47.
41. The duties of the Operator (IHE) included, inter alia: management and operation of
the Hotel; supervision and direction of Hotel personnel in all aspects’ determination
and administration of policies in connection with management; and plan, execute
and supervise routine repairs and maintenance at the Hotel. SUMF ¶ 48.
42. Liberty Insurance Company held a Commercial General Liability Policy in favor of
the operator of the hotel, IHE, LLC, which named the Owner, District Hotel Partners,
LLC, as additional insured. SUMF ¶ 49.
43. The requirement that the operator IHE obtain a policy naming the Owner, DHP, as
additional or named insured was a contractual requirement in Section 9.1(b) and
9.2(a) (General Insurance Provisions) of the Hotel Management Agreement, by and
between District Hotel Partners, LLC, and IHE, LLC, for the Hyatt Place San Juan
City Center. SUMF ¶ 50.
44. The Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company is made part of the Hotel Management Agreement. SUMF ¶ 51.
45. Universal issued Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy # 09-560-000634630-
2/000 in favor of District Hotel Partners, LLC d/b/a Hyatt Place San Juan City Center.
SUMF ¶ 52.
C. 	Universal’s motion for summary judgment
Plaintiff concedes that her pending claims hinge on what Universal calls “negligence and
premises liability” and agrees that the authorities cited in Universal’s memorandum of law
control in the disposition of the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 158 at 3. Accordingly,
the Court will recite the applicable law only briefly.
Generally, in order to prevail in a tort case a plaintiff must prove: “(1) a duty requiring
the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proof of
damage, and (4) a causal connection between the damage and the tortious conduct.” Blomquist
v. Horned Dorset Primavera, Inc., 925 F.3d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Woods-Leber v. Hyatt
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 14
Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1997)); see P.R. Laws Ann. t. 31, §10801. Failure to
prove any of these elements will bring plaintiff’s claim to an end.
Cases filed under Puerto Rico’s general tort statute7 take many forms. For example,
“[c]ases premised on the existence of a dangerous condition often arise from a ‘slip-and-fall,’
caused by a wet or slippery floor, and involve a claim that the business owner was negligent in
permitting the condition to remain because it is foreseeable that a wet floor is likely to cause
injury.” Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 504 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2007). As
plaintiff concedes, that is precisely the case here. See ECF No. 158 at 3. In such cases, the First
Circuit requires “an affirmative showing by the plaintiff that the defendant was negligent. This
showing, in turn, requires a demonstration that the defendant has either actual or constructive
knowledge of a dangerous condition.” Mas v. United States, 984 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1993); see
also Vázquez-Filippetti, 504 F.3d at 50 (“claims based on allegedly dangerous conditions on
commercial property (premises liability claims)[,] require a showing that the defendant knew of
or should have foreseen the risks created by the condition.”)). This requirement is essential
because, “a business owner is not the absolute insurer of the safety of its patrons[.]” Torres v.
KMart Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (D.P.R. 2002) (cleaned up).
7 See P.R. Laws Ann. t. 31, §10801. The current version of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, Act No. 55 of June 1, 2020,
codified as 31 L.P.R.A. § 5311 et seq., entered into force on November 28, 2020, repealing the previous 1930 Code.
See Rivera-Rosario v. LSREF2 Island Holdings, Ltd., Inc., 79 F.4th 1, 5 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2023).
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In this case, Universal has argued and proffered several uncontested facts to establish
that plaintiff lacks evidence on the hotel’s knowledge element. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (“the burden on the moving party may be discharged by… pointing out…
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”). Universal
successfully asserted among other key facts, that not one person staying in the room (including
plaintiff and her husband) alerted the hotel staff or any other person of any condensation, moist,
or liquid in the room’s tiled floor before accident. See Uncontested Facts ¶¶ 4-6. Moreover, the
uncontested facts show that plaintiff has no evidence to prove that the operator and much less
the owner of the hotel knew of the dangerous condition. For example, it is uncontested that
Universal’s insured (the owner), had no participation, involvement, or role in the daily
operations of the hotel. SUMF ¶ 38. Moreover, the manager, as did all other hotel personnel,
reported directly to IHE (the operator), not Universal’s insured. SUMF ¶ 37. Plaintiff does not
point to any evidence supporting a finding that IHE or Universal’s insured had any notice of
the purported dangerous conditions in the room.
More importantly, the undisputed facts show that the basis for plaintiff’s claim that the
owner was on notice (actual or constructive) about the conditions in the room, including that
the tiles were wet and slippery the morning of the accident, is the manager’s noting such
conditions after the fall. SUMF ¶ 31. Indeed, plaintiff’s case for knowledge entirely rests on the
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 16
ownership theory8 (i.e. “I mean again, it’s their hotel, they should be ultimately responsible.”
SUMF ¶ 32), which, as explained before, gets plaintiff nowhere because “a business owner is not
the absolute insurer of the safety of its patrons[.]” Torres v. KMart Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
Universal was able to expose plaintiff’s lack of evidence of constructive or actual knowledge of
either IHE or the hotel’s ownership of any dangerous condition in the room. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Pierluisi v. Coopervision Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1038,
1042 (D.P.R. 1988) (“summary judgment filed by defendant should be granted where it is
evident that there is an absence of evidence to prove an essential element of the plaintiff's
claim.”).
Thus, plaintiff’s lack of evidence as to the hotel’s knowledge of the dangerous condition
(condensation and resulting moist in tiled floor) forecloses on plaintiff’s right to assert a tort
claim against defendant. Indeed, as eloquently stated by a sister Court “[f]ailure to prove any
element [of a tort claim] is fatal….” Cruz-Ramos v. Toro Verde Corp., Civil No. 21-1078 (MAJ), 2023
WL 4144982, at *5 (D.P.R. June 22, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-1639, 2024 WL 504056 (1st Cir. Feb. 8, 2024).
Thus, the Court need not go any further.
This result is neither unfair nor unheard of. Calderón-Ortega v. U.S., 753 F.3d 250, 254 (1st
Cir. 2014) (“Stripped of rhetorical flourishes, the plaintiff's real complaint is that the district court
8 The Court briefly notes that plaintiff’s theory of ownership liability is precisely that, a theory of liability, not a
negligence standard. Because plaintiff concedes that her claims are negligence-based (as opposed to, for example,
strict liability), asserting that the remaining defendant is the insurer of the “owner” of the hotel does absolutely
nothing to show that plaintiff has admissible evidence to create a triable issue as to that party’s negligence.
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Civil No. 22-1202 (ADC) 	Page 17
did not hold the defendant liable as an insurer of the plaintiff's safety. But even though an owner
or occupier of commercial premises must exercise due care for the safety of its patrons, it is not
liable in tort without a showing of fault.” (citing Vázquez-Filippetti, at 49)).
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Universal’s motion for summary judgment at ECF No. 155
is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 5th day of February, 2026.
S/AIDA M. DELGADO-COLÓN
United States District Judge
Case 3:22-cv-01202-ADC-MBA Document 182 Filed 02/05/26 Page 17 of 17