USA v. Trinidad-Nova

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELIGIO TRINIDAD-NOVA [1],
Defendant.
Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB)
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	are 	several 	pre-trial 	motions 	by 	both
defendant 	Eligio 	Trinidad-Nova 	(“Trinidad”) 	and 	plaintiff 	United
States 	of 	America 	(the 	“United 	States” 	or 	“government”),
including: 	(1) 	a 	motion 	by 	the 	United 	States 	regarding 	defense
arguments 	and 	questions 	about 	the 	absence 	of 	investigative
techniques (Docket No. 146); (2) a motion in limine by the United
States regarding improper arguments (Docket No. 150); (3) a motion
in limine by the United States to introduce evidence of the state
investigation 	that 	resulted 	in 	defendant’s 	arrest 	(Docket
No. 151); 	and 	(4) 	an 	omnibus 	motion 	in 	limine 	by 	the 	defendant
(Docket No. 152).
For the reasons set forth below, the United States’ motion in
limine 	to 	preclude 	questions 	about 	the 	absence 	of 	investigative
tools 	(Docket 	No. 146) 	is 	DENIED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE. 	The 	United
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States’ 	motion 	in 	limine 	regarding 	improper 	arguments 	(Docket
No. 150) 	is 	GRANTED; 	the 	United 	States’ 	motion 	to 	admit 	evidence
of the state investigation that led to defendant’s arrest (Docket
No. 	151) 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIED 	IN 	PART; 	and 	defendant’s
omnibus 	motion 	in 	limine 	(Docket 	No. 	152) 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and
DENIED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
On 	September 	12, 	2022, 	Puerto 	Rico 	Police 	Bureau 	(“PRPB”)
Officers 	Ángel 	Luis 	Ramos-Torres 	(“Ramos”) 	and 	Yahaira 	Cruz-
Concepción 	(“Cruz”) 	attempted 	to 	serve 	Trinidad 	with 	a 	summons
regarding 	an 	unrelated 	state 	investigation. 	United 	States 	v.
Trinidad-Nova, Case No. 22-419, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11202, at *6
(D.P.R. 	Jan. 	16, 	2024) 	(Besosa, 	J.); 	see 	also 	Docket 	No. 	151 	at
p. 2. 	While the officers were serving the summons, Trinidad opened
the 	gate 	to 	his 	home, 	which 	caused 	his 	shirt 	to 	lift 	and 	the
officers 	to 	observe 	that 	he 	was 	carrying 	a 	firearm. 	Id. 	Upon
observing the firearm, the officers proceeded to arrest him. 	Id.
A 	grand 	jury 	returned 	an 	indictment 	on 	September 	29, 	2022,
charging Trinidad with being a prohibited person in possession of
a 	firearm 	and 	ammunition 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	922(g)(5)
(count one), and improper entry into the United States by an alien,
in 	violation 	of 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1325(a)(1) 	(count 	two). 	(Docket
No. 12.)
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On December 23, 2025, the government filed a motion in limine,
requesting 	that 	the 	Court 	preclude 	Trinidad 	from 	arguing 	and
questioning 	any 	absence 	of 	investigative 	techniques 	at 	trial.
(Docket 	No. 	146.) 	On 	December 	30, 	2025, 	the 	government 	filed 	a
second 	motion 	in 	limine, 	requesting 	that 	the 	Court 	preclude
Trinidad 	from 	engaging 	in 	improper 	arguments 	before 	the 	jury.
(Docket 	No. 	150.) 	The 	same 	day, 	the 	government 	filed 	a 	third
motion 	in 	limine, 	requesting 	the 	admission 	of 	evidence 	regarding
the 	state 	investigation 	that 	resulted 	in 	defendant’s 	arrest.
(Docket No. 151.)
Trinidad 	filed 	an 	omnibus 	motion 	in 	limine 	on 	December 	31,
2025, 	requesting 	that 	the 	Court: 	(1) 	exclude 	all 	potential
witnesses 	from 	the 	courtroom 	during 	the 	testimony 	of 	other
witnesses 	and 	presentation 	of 	evidence; 	(2) 	exclude, 	pursuant 	to
Rule 	404(b), 	evidence 	of 	the 	state 	investigation 	that 	led 	to 	his
arrest; 	(3) 	exclude 	evidence 	not 	previously 	designated 	or
discovered; 	and 	(4) 	exclude 	any 	testimony 	given 	in 	violation 	of
the Confrontation Clause. 	(Docket No. 152.)
II. 	Arguments and Questions about Trying-the-investigation
The 	United 	States 	moves 	the 	Court 	“to 	preclude 	[Trinidad]
from 	using 	a 	trying-the-investigation 	defense 	whereby 	[he]
attempt[s] to improperly convince the jury to render a verdict in
his favor based on the absence of the government’s use of specific-
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	4
investigative techniques or on the absence of testing items not in
evidence.” 	(Docket 	No. 	146.) 	Trinidad 	argues 	that 	the 	Court
should 	determine 	the 	evidence’s 	relevance 	within 	the 	context 	of
trial 	because 	the 	government 	fails 	to 	identity 	in 	the 	motion 	any
evidence it seeks to exclude. 	(Docket No. 155.)
“Merely 	showing 	that 	an 	investigation 	is 	sloppy 	does 	not
establish 	relevance.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Patrick, 	248 	F.3d 	11, 	22
(1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion 	by 	excluding 	evidence 	“that 	the 	police 	failed 	to 	take
steps 	to 	adequately 	eliminate 	other 	possible 	suspects” 	because
“[such] 	speculative 	evidence 	of 	the 	inadequacy 	of 	the 	police
investigation 	would 	have 	shifted 	the 	jury’s 	focus 	from 	the
accusations 	against 	[the 	defendant] 	to 	accusations 	against 	the
police”.) 	The efficacy of a criminal investigation may, however,
“sometimes be relevant to the ultimate issue of guilt in a case.”
See 	United 	States 	v. 	Carmichael, 	373 	F. 	Supp. 	1293, 	1296 	(M.D.
Ala. 2005) (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 291-92 (5th
Cir. 	1987) 	(holding 	that 	defense 	counsel 	acted 	reasonably 	by
introducing evidence of “sloppy police work” to undermine the chain
of 	custody 	and 	“set 	the 	stage 	for 	an 	argument 	that 	others 	were
implicated in the murders”)).
The 	Court 	is 	not 	clairvoyant 	and 	does 	not 	yet 	know 	what 	the
evidence 	is 	and 	what 	the 	relevance 	as 	to 	any 	argument 	is. 	The
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	5
Court 	will 	wait 	to 	rule 	on 	the 	admissibility 	of 	any 	trying-the-
investigation 	evidence 	until 	it 	is 	presented 	in 	the 	context 	of
trial. 	If such evidence is admitted, the Court will instruct the
jury as follows:
You 	have 	heard 	testimony 	as 	to 	the 	manner 	in 	which 	the
government 	conducted 	its 	investigation 	in 	this 	case
including 	certain 	investigative 	methods 	or 	techniques
that 	were 	used 	and 	certain 	investigative 	methods 	or
techniques 	that 	were 	not 	used. 	In 	attempting 	to 	prove
its 	case, 	the 	government 	is 	under 	no 	obligation 	to 	use
all 	of 	the 	investigative 	methods 	that 	are 	available 	to
it or use any particular method. The question is whether
the 	evidence 	presented 	is 	sufficient 	to 	convince 	you
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
See, 	e.g., 	United 	States 	v. 	Lassend, 	545 	F. 	App’x 	3, 	5 	(1st 	Cir.
2013) (holding that the district court did not err by instructing
the 	jury 	that 	“it 	could 	draw 	reasonable 	inferences 	from 	the 	fact
. 	. 	. 	that 	certain 	techniques 	were 	not 	used, 	as 	well 	as 	that 	law
enforcement 	is 	not 	legally 	required 	to 	use 	any 	specific 	or 	all
possible 	tests 	or 	techniques 	in 	order 	to 	prove 	its 	case”).
Accordingly, 	the 	United 	States’ 	first 	motion 	in 	limine 	is 	DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 	(Docket No. 146.)
III. Reasonable Doubt
The 	United 	States 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	prohibit 	Trinidad
from 	defining 	“reasonable 	doubt.” 	(Docket 	No. 	150 	at 	pp. 	2-3.)
This Court possesses “wide discretion in fashioning instructions”
to 	“provide 	the 	jury 	with 	a 	clear 	and 	succinct 	statement 	of 	the
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	6
law.” 	9 	Bender’s 	Fed. 	Practice 	Forms 	(2021); 	Kelly 	v. 	Airborne
Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 352 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the
First 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	“customarily 	cede[s] 	wide
discretion 	to 	the 	trial 	courts 	to 	fashion 	jury 	instructions 	as
they 	see 	fit”); 	see 	Fed. 	R. 	Crim 	P. 	51(b) 	(“The 	court 	. 	. 	. 	may
instruct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged.”).
The phrase “‘reasonable doubt’ does not require definition.”
United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 30 (1st Cir. 2006); Victor
v. 	Nebraska, 	511 	U.S. 	1, 	5 	(1994) 	(“[The] 	Constitution 	neither
prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires
them to do so as a matter of course.”). 	In fact, “most efforts at
clarification 	result 	in 	further 	obfuscation 	of 	the 	concept.”
United 	States 	v. 	Frabizio, 	459 	F.3d 	80, 	97 	(1st 	Cir. 	2006).
Accordingly, 	Trinidad 	is 	precluded 	from 	defining 	“reasonable
doubt” at any time during the trial, including during his opening
statement 	or 	closing 	argument. 	Cf. 	United 	States 	v. 	Ademaj, 	170
F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The district court acted properly in
precluding 	counsel 	from 	arguing 	that 	the 	jury 	should 	equate
‘reasonable 	doubt’ 	with 	‘an 	abiding 	conviction 	to 	a 	moral
certainty.’”). 	Trinidad may, however, argue that the United States
has 	failed 	to 	satisfy 	its 	burden 	of 	proof 	beyond 	a 	reasonable
doubt.
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IV. 	The Missing Witness Argument
The 	United 	States 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	“prohibit
[Trinidad] from introducing evidence about or arguing any relevant
inference from the fact that potential witnesses did not testify.”
(Docket No. 150 at p. 4.)
Federal 	Rule 	of 	Evidence 	402 	provides 	that 	all 	relevant
evidence 	is 	admissible 	unless 	excluded 	by 	the 	United 	States
Constitution, federal statute, or other rule. 	Fed. R. Evid. 402.
Evidence 	is 	relevant 	if 	“it 	has 	any 	tendency 	to 	make 	a 	fact 	more
or 	less 	probable 	than 	it 	would 	be 	without 	the 	evidence 	[and] 	the
fact 	is 	of 	consequence 	in 	determining 	the 	action.” 	Fed. 	R.
Evid. 401. 	The 	absence 	of 	a 	putative 	witness 	at 	trial 	is
irrelevant. 	Accordingly, 	the 	United 	States’ 	motion 	is 	GRANTED,
and 	both 	parties 	are 	prohibited 	from 	referring 	to 	the 	absence 	of
a putative witness in the presence of the jury.
V. 	Jury Nullification
“[T]he government moves this Court to preclude the defendant
from 	arguing 	jury 	nullification 	or 	otherwise 	presenting 	evidence
or 	pursuing 	lines 	of 	inquiry 	designed 	to 	elicit 	jury
nullification.” 	(Docket 	No. 	150 	at 	pp. 	4-5.) 	The 	United 	States
also requests that the Court preclude Trinidad from litigating the
United 	States’ 	immigrations 	laws 	and 	policies 	and 	eliciting 	the
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	8
jurors’ 	passions 	for 	or 	against 	immigrations 	policies.1 	Id. 	at
p. 7.
Jury 	nullification 	is 	a 	“practice 	whereby 	a 	juror 	votes 	in
purposeful 	disregard 	of 	the 	evidence, 	defying 	the 	court’s
instructions on the law.” 	United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44,
65 	(1st 	Cir. 	2012) 	(internal 	citation 	and 	quotation 	omitted).
Requesting 	that 	the 	jury 	acquit 	the 	defendant 	for 	reasons 	other
than 	insufficient 	proof 	(i.e. 	potential 	punishment 	following 	a
conviction, 	religious 	beliefs, 	unjust 	prosecution) 	is 	a 	form 	of
jury nullification.
The Court will instruct the jury that:
The punishment provided by law for the offenses charged
in 	the 	indictment 	is 	a 	matter 	exclusively 	within 	the
province of the judge, and should never be considered by
you in any way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
See 	United 	States 	v. 	Manning, 	79 	F.3d 	212, 	219 	(1st 	Cir. 	1996)
(“An 	attorney’s 	attempt 	to 	achieve 	[jury 	nullification]
indirectly, by arguing the severity of the punishment to the jury,
is 	equally 	impermissible.”); 	United 	States 	v. 	Joselyn, 	99 	F.3d
1182, 1197 	n.11 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that defense counsel “made
an 	improper 	appeal 	for 	jury 	nullification” 	by 	stating: 	“People
1 The Court will address the government’s request to preclude argument
about the United States’ immigration policies with the jury nullification
argument because they are both 	appeals to the 	jurors 	to disregard the
evidence.
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	9
aren’t born and the Almighty says you may be a prosecutor. 	That’s
a right that’s given by the people. 	It’s a trust. 	And when it’s
abused, somebody’s got to do something about it.”); United States
v. Arena, 918 F. Supp. 561, 580 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The only purpose
of repeated references to the evils of abortion would be to appeal
to 	the 	emotions 	of 	the 	jury, 	inviting 	nullification.”); 	United
States 	v. 	Chugay, 	Case 	No. 	21-0008, 	2022 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	97875,
at 	*3-4 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	June 	1, 	2023) 	(granting 	the 	United 	States’
motion 	to 	preclude 	“[any] 	argument 	pertaining 	to 	Defendant’s
claimed 	motive 	to 	help 	immigrants,” 	because 	these 	statements
requested jury nullification).
“Jury 	nullification 	verdicts 	are 	lawless, 	a 	denial 	of 	due
process 	and 	constitute 	an 	exercise 	of 	erroneously 	seized 	power.”
United 	States 	v. 	Rushin, 	844 	F.3d 	933, 	939 	(11th 	Cir. 	2016)
(internal 	citation 	and 	quotation 	omitted). 	This 	Court 	possesses
the 	discretion 	to 	“block 	defense 	attorney’s 	attempts 	to 	serenade
a 	jury 	with 	the 	siren 	song 	of 	nullification,” 	and 	“may 	instruct
the jury on the dimensions of their duty to the exclusion of jury
nullification.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Sepúlveda, 	15 	F.3d 	1161, 	1190
(1st Cir. 1993) (noting that “neither the court nor counsel should
encourage 	jurors 	to 	exercise 	[the] 	power 	[to 	nullify 	a
prosecution]”); 	see 	United 	States 	v. 	Díaz, 	820 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	301,
306 	(D.P.R. 	2011) 	(Besosa, 	J.) 	(prohibiting 	the 	defendant 	from
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	10
setting 	forth 	a 	jury 	nullification 	argument 	at 	trial); 	United
States v. Apicelli, Case No. 14-012, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67667,
at 	*2 	(D.N.H. 	May 	26, 	2015) 	(holding 	that 	“defense 	counsel 	is
precluded 	from 	raising 	issues 	related 	to 	jury 	nullification 	at
trial, 	and 	the 	court 	will 	not 	instruct 	the 	jury 	on 	the
nullification power”) (citation omitted).
Likewise, 	“it 	is 	improper 	to 	needlessly 	arouse 	the 	emotions
of 	the 	jury, 	and 	[] 	misconduct 	occurs 	when 	a 	prosecutor
interject[s] issues having no bearing on the defendant’s guilt or
innocence and improperly appeal[s] to the jury to act in ways other
than 	as 	dispassionate 	arbiters 	of 	the 	facts.” 	United 	States 	v.
Rodríguez-Kelly, Crim. No. 23-0231, 2024 WL 4263024, at *3 (D.P.R.
Sept. 23, 2024) (Antongiorgi-Jordán, J.) (citing United States v.
De 	La 	Paz-Rentas, 	613 	F.3d 	18, 	26 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010)) 	(internal
quotations omitted).
In 	light 	of 	the 	above, 	the 	United 	States’ 	motion 	is 	GRANTED
as 	to 	jury 	nullification 	and 	to 	arguments 	about 	immigration
policies, 	with 	the 	understanding 	that 	the 	prohibition 	applies
equally 	to 	both 	the 	government 	and 	Trinidad. 	This 	prohibition
encompasses 	statements 	intended 	to 	inflame 	the 	passions 	of 	the
jury. 	The 	Court 	is 	not, 	however, 	clairvoyant. 	Either 	party 	may
raise 	timely 	objections 	during 	closing 	argument 	or 	at 	any 	time
during the trial.
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VI. 	Evidence of Potential Penalties and Personal Hardship
The 	United 	States 	moves 	the 	Court 	to 	“preclude 	[Trinidad]
from 	introducing 	evidence, 	making 	argument, 	or 	otherwise
mentioning 	the 	potential 	penalties 	faced 	upon 	conviction.”
(Docket No. 150 at p. 7.) 	It also seeks to prohibit “any arguments
or 	evidence 	designed 	either 	to 	infer 	a 	motive 	or 	excuse 	for
[Trinidad’s] 	criminal 	conduct 	or 	to 	invoke 	sympathies 	regarding
the impact of a conviction upon [his] family.” 	Id.
A 	defendant’s 	potential 	sentence 	“is 	not 	relevant 	to 	the
determination of whether there [is] sufficient evidence to support
the conviction itself.” 	United States v. Merlino, 592 F.3d 22, 30
(1st 	Cir. 	2010) 	(citing 	Shannon 	v. 	United 	States, 	512 	U.S. 	573,
579 	(1994) 	(“It 	is 	well 	established 	that 	when 	a 	jury 	has 	no
sentencing function, it should be admonished to reach its verdict
without 	regard 	to 	what 	sentence 	might 	be 	imposed”)). 	Moreover,
Trinidad’s motives for engaging in criminal conduct and potential
personal 	hardships 	resulting 	from 	a 	conviction 	are 	irrelevant.
See 	SEC 	v. 	Spencer 	Pharm, 	Inc., 	58 	F 	Supp. 	3d 	165, 	166 	(D. 	Mass.
2014) 	(holding 	that 	“any 	possible 	adverse 	consequences 	if 	[the
defendant] is found liable for violations of U.S. securities law”
are 	irrelevant) 	(citation 	omitted). 	Accordingly, 	the 	United
States’ 	motion 	is 	GRANTED, 	and 	Trinidad 	is 	prohibited 	from
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	12
referring 	to 	potential 	penalties 	and 	personal 	hardships 	that 	may
result from a conviction.
VII. Requests for Discovery Before the Jury
The 	United 	States 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	preclude 	Trinidad
“from 	requesting 	discovery 	from 	witnesses 	. 	. 	. 	or 	otherwise
commenting on discovery matters during closing argument.” 	(Docket
No. 	150 	at 	p. 	8.) 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Criminal 	Procedure 	16
(“Rule 16”) governs discovery in criminal actions. 	Fed. R. Crim.
P. 16; see James Cissell, Federal Criminal Trials § 7-7 (2021 ed.)
(“Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is the basic,
and 	in 	most 	cases, 	the 	exclusive 	discovery 	tool 	that 	can 	be
utilized 	by 	a 	defendant”). 	In 	addition 	to 	Rule 	16, 	the 	Supreme
Court 	has 	held 	that 	due 	process 	of 	law 	demands 	the 	disclosure 	of
exculpatory and impeachment evidence. 	See Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 	83, 	87 	(1963) 	(holding 	that 	the 	United 	States 	must 	disclose
exculpatory 	evidence 	that 	“is 	either 	material 	to 	guilt 	or 	to
punishment”); 	Giglio 	v. 	United 	States, 	405 	U.S. 	150, 	154 	(1972)
(holding that the United States must disclose impeachment material
when “the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence.”). 	References to Rule 16, Brady, and Giglio
are irrelevant and will confuse the jury. 	Accordingly, the United
States’ 	motion 	is 	GRANTED, 	and 	Trinidad 	is 	prohibited 	from
referring to discovery matters in the presence of the jury.
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VIII. Exclusion of Rule 404(b) Evidence
The 	government 	has 	requested 	that 	the 	Court 	allow 	them 	to
introduce evidence related to a state investigation that Trinidad
argues is barred by Rule 404(b). 	(Docket No. 151; Docket No. 152.)
The 	government 	argues 	that 	this 	fraud 	investigation 	is
intrinsically intertwined with the events that led agents from the
Caguas 	Property 	Division 	to 	execute 	an 	arrest 	in 	San 	Juan 	and
provides context to the agent’s actions and scope of the interview.
(Docket No. 151.) 	Although Trinidad stated that he believed this
evidence is inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), he informed the
Court 	that 	he 	would 	address 	the 	issue 	further 	in 	his 	response 	to
the motion. 	(Docket No. 152 at p. 2.)
Pursuant 	to 	Rule 	404(b), 	“evidence 	of 	any 	other 	crime 	. 	. 	.
is 	not 	admissible 	to 	prove 	a 	person’s 	character 	in 	order 	to 	show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character.” 	Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 	“Accordingly, evidence
falls within the ambit of Rule 404(b) only if it is extrinsically
relevant.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Pina-Nieves, 	577 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1, 	3-4
(D.P.R. 	2021) 	(Besosa, 	J.) 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Epstein, 	426
F.3d 431, 439 (1st Cir. 2005)) (emphasis in original). 	“Evidence
intrinsic 	to 	the 	crime 	for 	which 	defendant 	is 	on 	trial 	[] 	is 	not
governed 	by 	Rule 	404(b).” 	Epstein, 	426 	F.3d 	at 	439. 	The 	terms
“intrinsic” 	and 	“prior 	bad 	act 	evidence” 	are 	“loose 	labels,”
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	14
subject to a fact-specific inquiry. 	United States v. Randazzo, 80
F.3d 	623, 	630 	(1st 	Cir. 	1996). 	Prior 	bad 	acts 	are 	“reasonably
distinct 	(e.g. 	in 	time 	and 	place) 	from 	the 	crime 	charged 	in 	the
indictment.” 	Id. 	By contrast, intrinsic evidence is “more closely
entangled with the events that comprise the charged offense.” 	Id.
For 	instance, 	“[u]ncharged 	acts 	[that] 	illuminate 	the 	chronology
of 	events 	leading 	to 	the 	acts 	charged 	in 	an 	indictment, 	or 	that
inform 	the 	jury 	concerning 	the 	circumstances 	surrounding 	the
commission 	of 	the 	charged 	crime” 	are 	generally 	admissible. 	1
Weinstein’s Evidence Manual § 7.01 (2021). 	The intrinsic evidence
doctrine 	is 	applied 	“broadly” 	by 	the 	First 	Circuit 	Court 	of
Appeals. 	Id. 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Robles-Álvarez, 	874 	F.3d
46, 	50-51 	(1st 	Cir. 	2017)) 	(affirming 	the 	admission 	of 	intrinsic
evidence 	to 	prove 	“how 	the 	various 	co-conspirators 	came
together”).
To 	establish 	a 	violation 	of 	section 	922(g)(5), 	the 	United
States 	must 	prove, 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt, 	(1) 	that 	Trinidad
was an alien unlawfully in the United States; (2) that he knowingly
possessed 	a 	firearm, 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	firearm 	travelled 	in
interstate commerce. 	See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A); see also United
States v. Cedeño-Mariano, 971 F. Supp. 2d. 225, 230 (D.P.R. 2013)
(Besosa, J.).
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	15
Here, 	the 	evidence 	about 	the 	state 	investigation 	toes 	the
line 	between 	extrinsic 	and 	intrinsic 	evidence. 	The 	government
states that “the [officers] were serving a summons for an interview
to 	‘Francisco 	Trinidad’ 	related 	to 	a 	fraud 	complaint 	filed 	with
the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Police 	Bureau 	in 	Caguas.” 	(Docket 	No. 	151 	at
p. 2.) 	It is not clear whether Eligio Trinidad was the target of
the 	investigation, 	which 	would 	be 	extrinsic 	evidence 	of 	a 	prior
bad act. 	But it is also intrinsic evidence because it provides a
description 	of 	the 	events 	that 	led 	to 	the 	arrest. 	See 	United
States 	v. 	Robles-Álvarez, 	874 	F.3d 	46, 	50 	(1st 	Cir. 	2017)
(affirming the admission of a smuggling trip to Antigua because it
provided 	a 	“‘necessary 	description 	of 	the 	events 	leading 	up 	to’
the charged crime”, [conspiracy to import controlled substances],
holding 	that 	evidence 	“concerning 	matters 	intrinsic 	to 	the 	crime
charged 	does 	not 	‘trigger’ 	[Rule 404(b)]”) 	(citing 	United 	States
v. Souza, 749 F.3d 74, 84 (1st Cir. 2014)).
To the extent that the government wants to discuss details of
the 	state 	investigation, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	it 	is 	extrinsic
evidence, does not have a special relevance under Rule 404(b), and
is 	therefore 	inadmissible. 	The 	evidence 	that 	the 	officers 	were
there to serve a summons, however, provides context as to why the
Caguas officers were in San Juan. 	A summons can be served for any
type 	of 	case 	and 	does 	not 	imply 	a 	prior 	bad 	act. 	Accordingly,
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	16
testimony 	that 	the 	officers 	were 	serving 	a 	summons 	is 	intrinsic
evidence not barred by Rule 404(b).
Regardless of whether the evidence is considered intrinsic or
extrinsic, 	it 	must 	still 	comply 	with 	Rule 	403. 	See 	Pina-Nieves,
557 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	5. 	Rule 	403 	does 	not 	protect 	against 	all
potentially prejudicial evidence because virtually all evidence in
a 	criminal 	proceeding 	is 	likely 	prejudicial 	in 	some 	way. 	United
States v. Villa-Guillén, 102 F.4th 508, 518 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing
United States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 119-20 (1st Cir.
2008) 	(additional 	citations 	omitted). 	To 	exclude 	evidence
pursuant 	to 	Rule 	403, 	the 	prejudice 	must 	be 	“unfair” 	and
“substantially 	outweigh” 	its 	probative 	value. 	Id.; 	Fed. 	R.
Evid. 403. 	To 	the 	extent 	the 	discussion 	is 	limited 	to 	stating
that 	the 	officers 	were 	serving 	a 	summons, 	the 	Court 	determines
that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice to the defendant.
Accordingly, 	the 	government’s 	motion 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and
DENIED 	IN 	PART. 	The 	government 	will 	be 	allowed 	to 	mention 	that
the 	officers 	were 	at 	Trinidad’s 	residence 	to 	serve 	a 	summons 	but
may not elaborate on the details of the state investigation.
IX. 	Presence of Witnesses During Trial
Trinidad has requested that the Court exclude witnesses from
the 	courtroom 	so 	that 	they 	may 	not 	hear 	the 	testimony 	of 	other
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	17
witnesses 	in 	line 	with 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Evidence 	615(a). 	(Docket
No. 152); see United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st
Cir. 1993). 	The government has not responded to this request, but
it is GRANTED. 	Trinidad also requests that he and the case agent
be 	exempted 	from 	this 	rule 	and 	be 	allowed 	to 	discuss 	their
testimony 	with 	the 	attorneys 	involved 	in 	the 	case 	provided 	no
witnesses 	are 	present. 	The 	Court 	likewise 	GRANTS 	this 	request.
Defendant Trinidad should, of course, be present during the trial.
The case agent is allowed to be in Court throughout the trial. 	If
Trinidad 	decides 	to 	testify, 	however, 	he 	may 	not 	confer 	with 	his
counsel while his testimony is ongoing.
X. 	Exclusion of Evidence Not Designated or Discovered
Trinidad 	requests 	that 	the 	government 	be 	barred 	from
introducing 	any 	evidence 	not 	designated 	and 	not 	previously
discovered. 	(Docket 	No. 	152.) 	The 	Court 	finds 	the 	motion 	to 	be
premature and will make determinations as to the admissibility of
evidence 	as 	the 	need 	arises. 	This 	request 	is 	therefore 	DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
XI. 	Exclusion 	of 	Testimony 	in 	Violation 	of 	the 	Confrontation
Clause
Trinidad next requests that the Court prohibit the government
from 	violating 	the 	confrontation 	clause 	of 	the 	United 	States
Constitution as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	18
(2004); United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2004); and
others. 	(Docket No. 152.) 	According to Trinidad, the Court should
prohibit 	the 	government 	from 	introducing 	hearsay 	couched 	in
summary 	witness 	or 	“overview” 	testimony. 	To 	the 	extent 	that
Trinidad 	is 	asking 	the 	Court 	to 	prohibit 	the 	government 	from
violating 	constitutional 	protections 	the 	motion 	is 	GRANTED.
Additional hearsay objections, however, will be dealt with during
trial.
XII. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the United States’ motion in
limine 	to 	preclude 	questions 	about 	the 	absence 	of 	investigative
tools is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 	(Docket No. 146.) 	The United
States’ motion in limine regarding improper arguments is GRANTED.
(Docket 	No. 	150.) 	The 	government’s 	request 	for 	the 	admission 	of
evidence regarding the investigation that resulted in defendant’s
arrest is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 	(Docket No. 151.)
The defendant’s omnibus motion in limine (Docket No. 152) is
GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIED 	IN 	PART 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE. 	The
defendant’s 	request 	that 	the 	Court 	exclude 	witnesses 	from 	the
courtroom 	so 	that 	they 	may 	not 	hear 	the 	testimony 	of 	other
witnesses, 	with 	the 	exception 	of 	the 	case 	agent, 	is 	GRANTED. 	If
the defendant testifies, he may not consult with his counsel while
his testimony is ongoing. 	Likewise, the defendant’s request that
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Criminal No. 22-419 (FAB) 	19
the Court prohibit the government from violating the confrontation
clause 	is 	GRANTED, 	but 	his 	request 	that 	the 	government 	be 	barred
from 	presenting 	evidence 	not 	designated 	or 	discovered 	is 	DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Trial 	is 	set 	to 	commence 	on 	February 	9, 	2026 	at 	9:00 	a.m.
before the undersigned in a courtroom to be determined in the Old
San Juan Courthouse.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 12, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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